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ABSTRACT 
Since deregulation in the Unites States most jet operating new-entrant carriers have failed. 
Theories on competition had been put to the test and reality turned out to be different to the 
vision. The new-entrant airlines were to challenge the inefficient incumbent carriers and 
provide lower fares for the benefit of the public. To begin with they were successful, but 
were not able to create sustainable strategy to survive when the incumbents had adjusted to 
the new operating environment. 
The background to the failure predicament is examined in the thesis in considerable detail, in 
order to give a fairly good overview of the characteristics of new-entrants and the 
environment they existed in. Much attention is given to the new-entrants' strategy in order 
to explore past deficiencies and pave the way for successful alternatives. 
The European liberalisation is examined in order to contrast it with the US deregulation. 
The purpose of such contrast is to examine whether the lessons learned in the United States 
will apply to European new-entrants, both at the present and in the future. 
The literature on the causes of corporate failure is examined in detail in order to discover 
some underlying traits. Success is examined as well in order to identify whether success 
mirrors failure. In addition, the role of success in causing failure is highlighted. 
Statistical failure prediction models are explored in order to cast light on the present status 
of the failure prediction methodology. That overview explains the foundation for selecting 
the Logistic Regression statistical methodology for the thesis. 
Results of a questionnaire survey performed on new-entrant airlines, is introduced in terms 
of the dichotomous failure and distress variables. On the grounds of that qualitative survey 
and a new-entrant airline quantitative data-base, a number of failure prediction and distress 
models were developed. Finally, the best failure prediction models of these different sources 
are combined in order to examine whether such combination enhances prediction quality. 
The main conclusion of the thesis is that the combination of quantitative and qualitative data 
sources for failure and distress prediction of corporations, in this case new-entrant airlines, 
enhances predictability. Furthermore, the general conclusion is that no single prescription 
exists for success or avoidance of failure due to the dynamism of the corporations and the 
environment they operate in. However, few prerequisites of success and non-failure were 
found to be: (i) high relative quality; (ii) dominant market share on routes and airports; (iii) 
high relative aircraft utilisation; (iv) high relative employee utilisation; (v) controlled growth 
in terms of maintaining item (ii); low cost in terms of achieving items (iii) and (iv); and (vi) 
resourceful innovation without going into the extremities. 
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Part I. 
Background Theory 
In this part the neccessary background information will be provided. First, the 
purpose of the thesis, fundamental models of analysis and assumptions will be 
revealed. Second, the basic theories of competition and theories pertinent to 
deregulation in air transport will analysed. Thirdly, the deregulation process and 
experience in the United States will be discussed in general terms in order to put the 
operating environment of new-entrant airlines into context. 
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1. Thesis Prologue 
1.1 The Purpose of The Thesis 
1.1.1 Why research New-entrants? 
When deregulation of the air transport materialised in the United States in 1978 
great hopes were associated with it. Primarily in terms of lower fares and increased 
service to the public. One of the fundamental aspects of deregulation was the 
potential new entry of new carriers that might be able to offer lower fares than the 
incumbents and create pressure on the whole air transport system to economise. It 
was, therefore, believed that the threat of entry by a new airline with new ideas 
and/or low cost structure to be the foundation of effective competition. This was to 
be achieved by keeping the incumbents striving to fulfil customers' needs and wants 
at the price they are willing to pay. This increase in the efficiency of the whole air 
transport system was supposed to produce the highest obtainable total utility for the 
users. New-entrants started to appear soon after deregulation creating dramatic 
changes in the United States. Soon it became apparent, however, that the new-
entrants had problems surviving as the post deregulation years passed. In fact, after 
1987 very few new-entrants had survived a major reorganisation of the air transport 
industry, leaving few very large incumbents like American, United and Delta in 
control. This trend then progressed further and today there are only a few jet 
operating new-entrants established before 1990, still operating. 
There have been numerous explanations to this failure phenomena provided by 
industry analysts and ex-managers of new-entrant airlines, explanations like: (i) Poor 
management; (ii) unfavourable regulatory environment (route rights, etc.)~ (iii) 
inadequate infrastructure (slots, etc.); (iv) poor financial foundation~ (v) 
overexpansion; (vi) poor service standards; (vii) inadequate distribution systems~ 
(viii) poor marketing strategy; (ix) lack of protection against predatory pricing~ (x) 
brand image conflict due to evolutionary change in the product or strategy of the 
new-entrants (the problems of growth, etc.); (xi) conspiracy to undermine the ne\V-
entrant by incumbents; and (xii) unfavourable economic climate (recession, etc.) 
Of course, each downfall has its unique explanation in the eyes of the stakeholder, 
but are there perhaps similar factors to blame in new-entrant airlines' failures? Can it 
be that factors that are assumed to be important for survival are actually not the ones 
that make or break an airline? Can the downfall of a new-entrant be foretold prior to 
failure? Can a financial distress model prevent failure if used timely enough by the 
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carrier's management? How does the ch~nge ~ v~rious factors affect the well-being 
of new-~ntrants? Are ne~-entrants bemg dIscnminated against by authorities in 
terms of Infrastructure bamers? In the thesis it is hoped that answers will be found to 
some of the questions here. 
1.1.2 The European Case 
In the very beginning the research project's aim was to research factors that would 
make or brake a ne~-entrant carrier in Europe specifically with the aim of learning 
from the US expenence. For that reason a number of European carriers were 
included in the questionnaire survey that will be elaborated on in Chapter 11. As the 
groundwork of the project progressed, it became apparent that enormous differences 
exist between operating environments of new-entrants in different countries within 
the European Union. Furthermore, accounting standards and filing differed 
dramatically and currency exchange rates affected numbers, is such a way that 
unchanged 'paid in capital' would differ from one year to an other due to fluctuations 
in the dollar rate. 
To complicate matters further a rather unpredictable policies and influence of 
governments has played a large role in European air transport, making the 
predictability of any quantitative or qualitative model for that matter highly 
questionable. Based on these concerns a decision was made to concentrate the 
project on the US case, where these factors where more or less stable, one currency, 
laisser .. faire policy on air transport and uniform accounting rules and most 
importantly readily available data on various aspects of the airlines at the DoT. 
It is hoped that this study will lay the groundwork for future research on new-
entrants' failures for the European case as the situation becomes more uniform than 
now. This will occur in the near future as government funding of airlines and 
political protectionism through infrastructure regulation will be abolished in Europe. 
F or that reason a chapter on liberalisation in Europe was included for the reader to 
gain some perspective for comparison with the US case. 
1.1.3 The Research's Aim 
This research is primarily aimed at finding factors that can be associated with failure 
of new-entrant airlines in the United States and apply those factors for the creation of 
failure prediction models. Although many firm but often contradictory explanations 
have been given for new-entrant' s failure, some of which are listed in Section 1. 1. 1, 
most will agree that each of these failures has been the result of an interaction of 
complex set of factors. By having managers of these carriers rat~ various facto~s 
selected from the literature and previous studies on company failures, a trend IS 
sought that will show what factors were the most important in the. mi~d ~f the 
manager during a period of non-distress as well as distress. Therefore, It wIll gtv~ an 
indication as to what factors were the most important in terms of resources reqUired 
to deal with them. When these factors have been identified they will be used to 
4 
discriminate between failed and non-failed as well as distressed and non-distressed 
new-entrant carriers. 
The final product of this study will be a failure prediction model derived from this 
implied relationship based on various ratios and questionnaire results, indicating the 
airlines performance in various dimensions like organisation, operations finance, 
strategy, environment and management. In addition it is hoped that the combination 
of various failure/distress prediction model sources will increase the prediction 
dimensions for the practitioner and improve prediction accuracy, as a result. 
1.2 The Project's Organisation 
The following figure shows how the thesis project was organised into three parts 
whose description follows. 
Figure 1-1 The Project's Organisation 
Literature review Part I. 
New-entrants' data-bas Part II. 
Part III. 
1.2.1 Part I . 
. . hr . arts The first part was literature The thesis project was orgarused mto t ee mam p . . 
review whose purpose was to establish what sort of envrronment the new~e~trant 
encou~tered how the new-entrants organised themselves and behaved ~thin the 
constraints they had. Furthermore, the literature review ~as used . to. establ~s~ what 
research had been performed on success and failure and fallure predlctlOn mo e s 
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1.2.2 Part II 
!he second part can be divi~ed i~to two phases. The first phase was the design and 
~mplementatlon ofth~ q~~stlOnnalre survey, whose purpose was to gain direct insight 
Into management pnontles and organisation characteristics at new-entrant airlines 
and their l~ages with good and poor performance. The second phase of Part II was 
the estabhshment of a data-base that included financial and traffic data on new-
entrants. 
1.2.3 Part III 
The results of the first two parts led to the establishment of an inventory of new-
entrant's success and failure factors. The factors that could be quantified were then 
drawn from the data-base. Failure prediction models based on the three sources 
questionnaire Part I, Part II and the data-base, were then constructed and evaluated. 
The final aspect of the project was the combination of the models from various 
sources in order to investigate whether prediction enhancement occurred. 
1.3 The Thesis Organisation 
The thesis itself is divided into four parts in order to clarifY its overall structure. 
Please note that this division is separate from the organisation of the thesis project 
covered in previous section. 
The first part deals with theories of competition and deregulation of air transport in 
the United States. 
The second part has to do with the characteristics and behaviour of new-entrant 
airlines in the deregulated environment. The case of liberalisation and new-entrants 
in Europe is covered in order to provide introduction and contrast in the analysis. 
In the third part theories and various observations on the issue of failure are covered 
as well as an introduction to failure prediction models in general. 
The fourth and final part covers the questionnaire survey among new-entrant airlines' 
managers and subsequent failure prediction models based on the survey and the ?~w­
entrant airlines' data base. The part is concluded by showing a method of combmmg 
prediction models of various sources and a discussion of the overall findings. 
Each part of the thesis is explained in more detail by an introduction paragraph on 
each parts' title page. 
Figure 1-2 The Thesis Organisation 
Part I. Background Theory 
Theories of competition 
New~ntrant Airlines 
Part II. in The United States 
Part III. The Issue of Failure 
Part IV. Model Construction 





Discussion of findings 
Deregulation of Air Transport 
Liberalisation and new-entrant 
airlines in Europe 
Failure prediction models 
In the thesis all carriers fitting the selection criteria set forth in the introduction of 
Chapter 3, will be termed as new-entrants throughout their operating life regardles 
of size. This is done due to the basic assumption that such a carrier is inherentl 
different in terms of internal structure and infrastructure access compared to the pre-
deregulation majors across all the stages of the life-cycle. In fact, the the i i 
concerned with a set of underprivileged past-deregulation carrier fitting a et f 
selection criteria in contrast to privileged pre-deregulation carriers. The named 
privilege factor is defined as having built an asset base under government protection 
and by having grandfather-rights to slots at airports that could be bought and Id 
after deregulation. 
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1.5 The Underlying Model of Analysis 
In Figure 1-3, the underlying model of analysis in the thesis is shown. This concept 
will be used as a guideline in constructing the various parts of the thesis. It basically 
looks at the organisation as a system of interacting factor groups. The factor groups 
can belong to different departments within the organisation or outside the 
organisation as is the case with environment factors. Management is a separate 
factor group that governs the other factor groups and selects the strategy that moves 
the airline in a direction. 
The interaction of these factors occurs through the information and communication 
system. Thus, the information system has a central role in the organisation. If it is 
poor in terms of accuracy, timeliness or relevance, decision-making will suffer. The 
communication system is governed by the same factors, but not only in mechanical 
ways but through human interaction. The quality of such interaction is facilitated 
through clear vision of the organisation spelled into purpose, strong culture 
characterised by cheerful and enjoyable working atmosphere, free interchange of 
information regardless of employees position within the hierarchy or functional area. 
The mechanical part of the communication system is composed of the degree to 
which employee interaction is built into the information system by means of message 
boxes and conferencing. 







Information- and Communication System 
Accuracy Timeliness Relevance 
Environment 
Strategy 
Decisions are bound to be affected by the managers' background, be it prior 
experience, education, personality or personal objectives. Thes~ ~ffects a.re per ?n 
related and constitute the internal influence on the manager' s decl l~n-maki~g, whil 
external influences are derived from the environment through the mfonnatlOn- and 
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~ommu~cation system. The decisions based on the analysis of information from the 
mformatton- and communication system, subject to these two sources of influence 
determine the airline's fortune. ' 
The direction lines in Figure 1-2 reveal how communication flows between the factor 
groups t~~ugh the. inf~rmation- and communication system enabling managers to 
m~ke declsIon.s whic~ m tu~ affect the factors within the groups. The model is 
umque by plaCIng the Inf~r:natlOn- and communication system as the central engine in 
the comp~ny b~t recogmsmg that the human influence will interfere both positively 
and neg~t.lVely In ~he manager's decision making. Another feature is the assumption 
that deCISIon-making plays a central role in determining the company's fortune. 
1.6 The New-entrants' Evolution Path 
Every company has a life-cycle just like an organism. The airline will therefore go 
through various stages from infancy to maturity and eventually decline. One of the 
fundamental aspects of management is, then, to maintain the health of the 
organisation in order to extend its life. Therefore, the life-cycle concept is important 
in financial distress and bankruptcy analysis due to its illustrative capacity of 
explaining the changing demands on the organisation as it grows and matures. In 
order to depict the special case of new-entrant airlines in the United States, namely 
fast growth and sudden decline, a conceptual evolution model was produced, as 
illustrated in Figure 1-3. 
In the model, the term Start-up airline will be used for the airline's preparation phase 
until operations commence. The term New-entrant will be used for the airline until it 
reaches $99 million in operating revenue. A Transitional is a carrier having 
operating revenue of $100 to $499 million, which is in fact the classification of a 
national according to the DoT. An Interim-major carrier has revenues of $500 - 999 
million and Modulation-major carrier in excess of $1 billion or more. The final types 
are the Mega- and Global carriers. 1 The latter being any major carrier having 
operating base within two or more continents, while a mega carrier would be one of 
the world's largest carriers. The reason for making this distinction between the 
traditional FAA classification scheme, is that carriers starting operations in the 
deregulated or liberated market grow in a different environment than the pre-
deregulation incumbents that built their asset base under protective regulation. As a 
result, the carriers established after deregulation are sometimes referred to as new-
entrants even though they have already reached the size of a major according to the 
FAA classification. Another important reason to use the classification in Figure 1-4, 
is that carriers established under deregulation may have different composition in 
terms of structure compared to carriers established before Deregulation. This 
possibility, will however, not be researched in this thesis, but pointed out here as a 
basis for further research. 
I Such carrier would result from a merger between USAir and British Airways. 
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The evolution path shows how the new-entrant airline advances in size from a small 
carrier to a large carrier in tenns of critical mass. An airline can remain at any stage 
except the first one which is Start-up. Although these tenns are used to explain this 
evolution they are used interchangeably with the tenns 'new-entrant' meaning any 
airline that fits the definition of a new-entrant postulated in Chapter 4, Section 4.2. It 
is assumed that a carrier can stagnate or fail at any stage. Meaning that a carrier can 
progress through the stages at a fast phase and then suddenly fail at the Modulation-
major stage or any other stage for that matter. 
Jet operating carrier will usually leave the Start-up stage during the first year of 
operations, enter the New-entrant 's stage in the first or second year of operations and 
the Transitional stage during the first to third year of operations. The fourth stage 
Interim-major stage is usually entered during the third to fifth year of operations. The 
last stage is the Modulation-major which the carrier enters usually after five years of 
operations. It must be noted, however, that the time at which the carrier enters a 
stage is very different depending on strategy and character of the operations, thus, 
the time frame is only a rough guide. What is more, a carrier can stay for years on a 
single stage due to a mature market or slow growth strategy. According to historical 
trends new-entrants have not declined from the new-entrants or transitional stage due 
to lack of critical mass to deploy. This means that such carriers fail suddenly. 
Furthennore, many new-entrants of early success have failed as they reached the 




















































2 America West enjoyed a successful turnaround during Chapter XI bankruptcy. 
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The underlying principle of the length of the decline period is therefore the size of the 
asset base resource, as shown in the figure. Then one can infer that one of the 
revival techniques of US carriers was to produce super-size carriers in order to enjoy 
scale efficiencies. Another revival method was to increase international operations" 
that will eventually lead to mergers of international carriers, producing a Global-
carrier. 
1. 7 Conclusion 
A number of concepts have been introduced in the chapter to facilitate the reader's 
understanding of the underlying principles of the thesis. These concepts are a 
necessary introduction to the ideology on which the thesis is based. 
The purpose of the thesis is to provide a comprehensive background to answer a 
number of basic questions about new-entrants and to develop from that base, failure 
and distress prediction models from various sources of data. 
3 Looking from the US example, American and United. 
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2. Competition Structures 
2.1 Introduction 
The chapter's purpose is to review competition theories in order to cast light on the 
reasons why deregulation of the air transport industry occurred in the United States. 
F.urthermore, . some inference will be made as to what competition theory applies to 
air transport, m the context of the market behaviour after deregulation was initiated. 
Furthermore, theories relating to competition behaviour will be examined in the 
context of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Darwinian theory of Natural Selection, 
Oligopoly and Duopoly. 
2.2 Competition Structures 
2.2.1 Introduction 
There has been increased movement to the notion that unregulated competItIOn 
actually increases the welfare of all. This idea has been disputed by Marxists and 
Keynesians in the past. As many western societies are moving away from Keynesian 
economics and towards laisser-faire economics, competition intensity or rivalry is 
increasing. In view of these developments the study of competition strategy has 
become to be of major importance to companies trying to gain competitive advantage 
in the fight for customers. Consequently there has been an increase in company 
failures as the stronger and the smarter outmanoeuvre the weaker and the smaller in 
the fight for customers. As a result, every company is constantly fighting for its 
survival in a way that resembles Darwin's theories on the survival of the fittest. 
One of the fundamental prerequisites to reaching optimum welfare equilibrium in an 
industry where the buyers are weak4, like in air transport, is to maintain effective 
competition; where the firms strive to control costs in order to offer low prices to 
attract buyers and maintain or gain market-share and profitability. The strongest 
method to achieve this target is by a constant threat of new entry by new firms or 
existing firms, into existing markets. The following sections will explore this 
equilibrium with new-entrants especially in mind. 
4 Weak in this respect means that a single buyer will not be able to influence the pronder of the sen'ice If 
there are few large buyers, for example, all\ single buyer can inflict much innuencc on the provider in all 
respects of the operation and price setting. 
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2.2.2 Competition Theory 
~escription of each competition structure will follow, In order to exanune the 
dtfference between perfect and imperfect competition. 
(i) Perfect competition is usually associated with greater market 
performance, higher industry output levels, lower costs and prices. The 
structure may, nevertheless, be less beneficial to the consumers than 
presumed as benefits can arise from product differentiation. Perfect 
competition dictates a market where barriers to entry are non-existent, many 
small firms sell identical products to many buyers, all the players have perfect 
information and compete solely on the basis of price. In view of the 
tendency, in most if not all industries, of sellers to think of ways to gain 
competitive advantage on the basis of other factors than price, one can clearly 
see that perfect competition is an unreal concept in consumer markets. 
(ii) Imperfect competition is characterised by two main forms, monopolistic 
competition and oligopoly. Monopolistic competition is in a market where 
there are many small suppliers of non-standardised products. Thus each 
supplier is providing his own differentiated product(usually branded) and has 
a monopoly control over that product. As all the products are similar, the 
suppliers are competing with each other in the market. An oligopoly is a 
market structure with high entry barriers and few sellers. The relationship 
between the suppliers is interdependent, meaning that decision making is 
heavily induced by other suppliers in the market. Oligopolistic markets often 
take the form of excessive emphasis on product differentiation as price 
differentiation more often than not leads to price-wars due to the suppliers' 
priority in maintaining their market-share. If there is total avoidance of price 
competition the consumers will be paying high prices due to the costs 
associated with the escalation of product differentiation. Yet, product 
differentiation does provide consumers with increased choice and often better 
tailored products to their individual needs and wants. Features that customers 
may be willing to pay a premium price for. 
(iii) Pure monopoly is a market structure where one firm is in a market with 
high barriers to entry, selling an unique product. Pure monopoly does usually 
not exist as there are usually products that can replace the product supplied 
by the monopolist. For example, if one does not want to use the only airline 
in the market one can drive, sail, walk, cycle or use the bus. Nevertheless, it 
must be recognised that monopoly has been the norm in domestic markets 
rather than the exception in countries around the world. If not altogether 
then route-wise by the granting of exclusive rights to a route, although, 
competition by other transportation modes becomes more effective as 
distance travelled becomes less. 
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2.2.3 Contestability Theory 
The t.hreat of potential entry has been tenned as contestability in the literature and 
theonsed by Baumol, Panzar and Willing in 1982.5 The theory states that the benefits 
of perfect competition can be realised without having many finns producing because 
the thr~~t of ~ntry will actually manifest itself as an effective substitute for perfect 
competItIon, gIven that entry and exit is costless. 6 
The conditions for contestability are as follows: 
(i) Equal access to economies of scale and to technology, whether 
expressed as access to competitive levels of unit cost or as 
equivalent access to product quality; 
(ii) no sunk costs, a firm can enter and exit without entry and exit 
costs, including operating losses resulting from predation; and 
(iii) price sustainability, there is a set of prices that can occur after 
the entry of at least one firm which will support profitable 
operation.7 
Fawcett and Farris argue in a 1989 paper that the airline industry showed 
characteristics of a contestable market before deregulation and at the beginning of 
deregulation but has developed into a non-contestable market. 8 It must, however, be 
emphasised that the theory of perfect contestability was never supposed to describe 
reality, K. Button recognised this in his work and quoted Baumol, i.e. 
In our analysis, perfect contestability then serves not primarily as a 
description of reality, but as a benchmark for desirable industrial 
organization which is far more flexible and is applicable far more widely 
than one that was available to us before.9 
If air transport markets are not perfectly contestable then they may be imperfectly 
contestable. This implies that potential new-entrants may have some influence on the 
total welfare derived from the market. This was developed into the theory of 
imperfect contestability. 
5 Baumol, W.J., Panzar, J.C. and Willing, R., Contestable Markets and The Theory of Industry Structure, 
Harcowt Brace Jovanovich, Sandiago, 1982. See also: Baumol, Panzar, Willing, Contestable Markets: An 
Uprising in the Theory of Industrial Structure, American Economic Review, 1983. 
6 Op. cit. (Baumol, 1982). 
7 Levine, Michael E., Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy and Public Policy, 
Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol 4, No.2, Spring 1987, pp. 404-405. 
8 Fawcett, Stanley E. and Farris, Martin T., Contestable Markets and Airline Adaptability Under 
Deregulation, Transportation Journal, Fall 1989, p. 12. 
9 Baumol, W. J., Contestable Markets: an uprising in the theory of industrial structure: American Economic 
Review, 72, p.2. This was quoted in: Button, Kenneth, The deregulation of U.S. mterState aVIatIOn: an 
assessment of causes and consequences, Transport Reviews, 1989, Vol. 9, No.2, p. 108. 
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The term was originally put forth by Bain lO and defined as follows by Morrison and 
Winston: 
... for a given route, our welfare-change measure is influenced by the 
number of both actual and potential carriers on the route. l1 
Morrison and Winston conclude that the air transport market is actually imperfectly 
contestable based on the fact that three potential competitors are necessary in order 
to have the same effect as one actual competitor.12 They also found that small 
'critical mass' and at least four potential carriers are necessary in order to affect the 
behaviour of actual carriers.13 
2.2.4 The Failure o/The Contestability Theory 
Critics of the contestability theory state that the sunk costs of route development and 
brand loyalty render the theory invalid in air transport markets. Although the 
incumbents should have been the disadvantaged carriers under deregulation in view 
of their cost structure, they were able to tum their size to their advantage by 
developing competitive tools that increased the new-entrants costs, thus, reducing the 
effective cost difference. These tools were especially effective in terms of reducing 
the new-entrant's load factor despite its lower cost structure and lower average fares. 
Thus, the incumbents have been effective in driving the new-entrants out of business 
and reducing the implied contestability of the industry. However, new entry seems to 
be cyclical in the sense that as the industry is weakened due to heavy losses there is 
an upsurge in market entry. Thus, market entry as such is not made on the basis of 
rents but rather on the basis of how wounded the industry is at the time of entry. 
Levine points out that contestability theory allows for economies of scale unlike the 
theory of perfect competition. 14 However, economies of scale reduce the propensity 
of new entrants to compete in a market. Economies of scale relating to costs were, 
however, believed not to exist in aviation. On the contrary, new entrant airlines 
10 Bain, Joe S., A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39 American Econ. Rev., 1949, No. 448, 452 & 
nO.7. 
11 Morrison, Steven and Winston, Clifford, Empirical hnplications and Tests of Contestability Hypothesis, 
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XXX, April 1987, p. 59. 
12 Op. cit. (Morrison and Winston), p. 61. 
13 Morrison and Winston do not take into accOlmt the 'level' of threat of a potential carrier. There is a major 
difference between the threat of a potential entry by large low cost carrier like Southwest compared to a 
small new-entrant like Reno Air. The analysis show that the potential threat to the incumbents is onh 
accounted for when the potential entrant is already operating in other markets and has achieved 'small 
critical mass'. What consitutes a 'small critical mass' is not defmed further h\ the authors and leaves 
therefore a questionmark as to what sort of a carrier it represents. Such definition is, however, important as 
most new-entrants represent neglible 'critical-mass'. It must, therefore, be conclud~d that research on 
contestability must distinguish between potential entry of existing flnns and new flnns ~ ~e market, as the 
latter is a lesser threat to an incumbent carrier and constitutes, therefore, less contestablhty m the market. 
14 Op. cit. (Levine, 1987), see note 60 on page 404 in his article. 
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would have the cost advantage due to the high cost structure of the incumbent 
carriers. Thus, it was believed that economies of scale would not be an issue of new 
entry in air transport. The fact of the matter is, as has been pointed out by Levine, 
that there are other sorts of economies that created barriers to entry and facilitated 
the oligopolistic concentration in the deregulated air transport market. These barriers 
are economies of scope, information and density. The result according to Levine is 
that the competitive significance of computer reservation systems, contractual 
vertical integration, code-sharing, development of hubs, consolidation to achieve 
'presence' and possibility of predation, have become a major barrier to entry.I5 
Accordingly, rendering market contestability non-existent. 
2.3 Theoretical Approximation of Air Transport Market Behaviour 
2.3.1 Airlines under Duopoly 
Bowder and Zhang16 found that the Coumot Oligopoly model was more consistent 
than the Bertrand or Cartel models with data on duopoly routes operated by United 
and American. The concern of the test was a discussion of the industry being subject 
to 'excessive competition' and becoming 'excessively concentrated'. The Coumot 
model assumes that each of the competitors takes the quantity as given, while under 
the Bertrand model they take the price as given. If a duopolist under the Bertrand 
model changes his price under the irrational assumption that the competitor will keep 
his price fixed, the result will surely be price war and prices will approach marginal 
costs. Coumot behaviour is, however, not rational in reality and a manager can't 
make a Coumot assumption in the face of the 'principle of outsmarting' .17 A 
Coumot dupolist could improve his situation by rethinking his strategy and gain 
advantage that way. If one considers the fact that prices usually drop substantially 
when the third carrier enters a route, one may easily assume that duopolists form 
cartels in order to maintain their set market-share and a fixed fare. The mere fact that 
such a cartel doesn't need to be communicated directly but assumed or 
communicated through the CRS's supports this view. Therefore, under duopolistic 
structure there is a tendency to form cartels in order to monitor prices and, therefore, 
build blockages against entry.18 In view of this it is logical that the Coumot model 
applies rather than the Bertrand as the airlines would not reduce the profitability of 
the duopolistic route by tinkering with the price. 
15 Op. cit. (Levine, 1987), pp. 418-419. 
16 Brander, James A, and Zhang, Aruning, Market conduct in the airline industry~ an empirical investigation, 
Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 21, No.4, Winter 1990. 
17 Ibis principle is derived from Game Theory. 
18 One may ask how a cartel situation leading to higher fares may bl.ock entry. T~ answer this on can point. out 
that the new-entrant can not gain market-share on price differentIatIOn due to Its lower cost structure, It the 
incumbents enforce through predation a fixed price that is higher than the new-entrant can offer. If the ~ew­
entrant accepts the situation and attempts to compete it will not posess any ad\"<U1tage III the eyes ot the 
customer and the new-entrant falls between as a result. 
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2.3.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma 
The s~ called 'pris.oner's. d.ilemma' can contribute to the understanding of airline 
beh~vIour u~der o~I~opobst1c competition. The simple matrix shown in Figure 2.1 
depIcts that ~ an ~Irl~e rea~ts to a competitor's fare reduction by reducing its own 
fares, both will mamtam theIr market-share but will be worse off. If however either 
one red~ces fares without a reaction by the other, an increase in ~arket-sh~e and 
profit Wl~ b~ t.he result. The most beneficial action for both would be to hold prices, 
thus, maIntammg the market-share and present profit levels. This is what is called a 
cartel situation, because the prerequisite to maintain this situation is an agreement not 
to break the fare equilibrium. 19 
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While collusion is illegal in the United States the cartel state is not inconceivable. 
The airlines can decide unilaterally on a fare in a market by following a price leader. 
However, such a situation is inherently unstable as the environment can change, for 
example, during recession when excess capacity may be in the market. An effective 
cartel needs policing and that can not be done legally. Yet cartel discipline is possible 
through threats often signalled through CRS' s among US airlines. 20 
In a market with low entry barriers, rent will attract a new entrant. Usually with 
lower cost structure. Thus, it is necessary for the incumbents to raise entry barriers 
in an industry with inherently low entry barriers. One way of doing so is to adapt a 
'deterrent' strategy where the airline will minimise profits whenever there is a 
likelihood of new-entry. In a situation where both players react to one other and the 
payoff becomes negative, the only long-term benefit to either one is if one exits the 
market and previous profit levels can be reinstated. In such a situation the staying 
power of the players becomes the issue and profits are sacrificed for market-share. 
The problem is, still, that as the profit levels are reinstated new-entrants will emerge 
JQ For such equilibriwn to form, it seems that a ratio of2 to 1 in market- hare between the h 0 competito ha 
to exist. See section 1.3.5, Competitors Analogy, item (v). 
20 See The AvrnarkAviation Economist, The silent conversation i sue: farce or tragedy?, Ma 199 , pp 24 . 
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and a price war will reoccur. The only way out of the dilemma for the new-entrant 
~s to develop a niche that is hard for the competitors to enter. In the air transport 
mdustry the scope for niche marketing is, however, limited due to the commodity 
nature of the product. Geographical niches are possible but easy for the competitors 
to enter due to the inherent ease of moving the 'plant' the aircraft from one market to 
another. Operational niches where the airline operates direct services instead of hub 
and spokes are more suitable to the time sensitive passengers. Such strategy has 
worked well for Southwest Airlines but due to the airline's long-term profitability 
other airlines are taking up similar strategy and entering direct services. 21 
2.3.3 The Darwinian Model of Natural Selection 
In an economic system where behavioural freedom is almost limitless in economic 
terms, meaning that predatory behaviour is allowed or antitrust laws poorly enforced, 
there is going to be what is termed as 'economic natural selection'. 22 
The framework is important as a crude way to explain the behaviour of large 
powerful airlines in a market with weak airlines. The framework gives also simple 
explanation for the poor overall profitability in the US airline industry for the past 
decade. 
The theory derived from evolutionary biology,23 uses the act of spite to explain the 
behaviour of firms that have market power in a competitive market of few. Spite is 
the behaviour trait of harming both oneself and another, in the belief that such an act 
will only lead to short-term loss but long-term gain as the competitor will be harmed 
more. Schaffer states that: 
When firms have market power[24], the potential for 'spiteful' behaviour exists. 
A firm which forgoes the opportunity to maximise its absolute profit may still 
enjoy a selective advantage over its competitors if its 'spiteful' deviation from 
profit-maximisation harms its competitors more than itself. 25 
Thus, it could be alleged that airline's spitefulness has caused the immense industry 
losses during deregulation. The sign of reversal can be seen by the fact that the mega 
carriers, experiencing losses for many consecutive years, are retiring aircraft and 
21 Furthennore, the second part of Southwest's strategy, to enter secondary markets, will soon be saturated as 
there are only so many markets available for a carrier operating jet equipment. 
22 The best known application of this concept was by Milton Friedman, The methodology of positive 
economics, in: Essays in positive economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, ill., 1953, p.22. 
23 See: Hamilton, William D., Selfish and spiteful behaviour in an evolutionary model, Nature 228, 1970, pp. 
1218-1220' and selection of selfish and altruistic behaviour in some extreme models, in: IF. Eisenberg and 
Wilton S. Dillon, eds., Man and beast: Comparative social behaviour, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, 
D.C., 1971, pp. 57-91. 
24 Market power is the ability of a finn to control market prices and other terms and conditions of supply. 
usually through dominant market-share. 
25 Shaffer, Mark E., Are Profit Maximisers the Best Survivors?, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organisation, Vol. 12, 1989, p. 30. 
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exiting unprofitable markets, thus, increasing the contestability of the market. The 
purpose of such behaviour is to cash in on the short term 'spitefulness' by reducing 
over-capacity and stem away from fare-wars, maintain fare levels, cut costs and 
increase profitability. 26 
2.3.4 The Application of Competition Theory to Air Transport 
The question is then whether we are dealing with oligopoly, monopolistic 
competition or perfect contestability in the US deregulated air transport, as the 
perfect competition structure has been excluded as unrealistic. Table --2-1 shows that 
there is a distinction between monopolistic and oligopolistic competition in two 
important ways, namely the requirement of many small sellers and perfect information 
under monopolistic competition. This does not prevail in the air transport industry as 
sellers are few when individual markets are examined and information biased or not 
available to buyers, as a result oligopolistic or perfect contestability prevails in air 
transport markets. 27 Now that the hypothesis of perfect contestability describing air 
transport markets is rejected in Section 2.2.4, the only competition structure that 
approximates Deregulated air transport markets is that of oligopoly. 





2.3.5 A Support of The Oligopolistic Inference 
In order to test the oligopolistic inference the number of airlines serving each route in 
the Unites States domestic market was analysed. To begin with one might expect 
26 In 1993 Delta retired 20 aircraft and layed off 600 pilots, United made an agreement to defer and convert to 
options 49 aircraft orders, American cut 900 jobs and red~ced its operation at unpr~fitable San Jose. h~b, 
which created an immediate oportunity for Southwest Airlmes. See: US cuts WIn confidence, Airlme 
Business, May 1993, p. 10. 
27 For a comprehensive discussion on this issue see: Financial Condition of The Airline Industry, h~gs 
before the Subcornrn. on Aviation of the Cornrn. on Public Works and Transp., 103 Congr., 1st seSSIOn, 
February 17-24, 1993. 
28 Differentiated oligopoly is where few competitors offer subs~tial product differentiation. This is not true 
for large major carriers as their product differentiation is neghgble. 
29 A competitively induced decision making can sometimes make the fmn obsessed with competitors actions. 
thus, opening a gap in the market for new-entrants. 
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much competition in the US air transport market as the number of carriers with more 
than 1 percent market-share were 15 in 1991.30 However, there are not many routes 
that hav~ more than two carriers competing. In fact most routes are served by only 
one carner. ~urthermore~ most of the smaller carriers are locked into marketing 
~greements WIth t?e large Incumbents. Thus, it is apparent that effective competition 
IS less than one mIght think route wise. Table 2-2, shows that large portion of routes 
are ~ctually monopolies, while duopolistic and oligopolistic routes are only small 
portIon of the total number of markets. 
Table 2-2 The Number of Scheduled Carriers in Each Market 
Number of carriers February 1978 % February 1987 % 
1 3839 77.3 3458 65.3 
2 802 16.2 1027 19.4 
3 205 4.1 419 7.9 
4 66 1.3 191 3.6 
5 26 0.5 87 1.6 
6 13 0.3 52 1.0 
7 7 0.1 27 0.5 
8 4 0.1 14 0.3 
9 1 0.02 8 0.2 
10+ 2 0.04 9 0.2 
4965 ~100.0 5292 100.0 
Source: The table is based on Button (1989). Total percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 
This actually depicts that routes are subject to different competition structures 
namely: monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly. This means that there are many parts to 
play that call for different strategies on behalf of the airline. Airlines are often, 
therefore, strategic clusters rather than one strategic entity. 
2.4 Conclusion 
It is concluded that the US airline industry approaches oligopolistic rather than 
monopolistic structure. The intense rivalry that has characterised the industry since 
deregulation, is because of excess capacity, market-share orientation, Chapter XI 
carriers, spiteful behaviour and deterrent strategy to prevent new-entrance. 
Most routes in the US domestic market are monopoly routes or 65 percent, 19.4 
percent were duopolies, while 15.3 percent had three or more competitors in 1987. 
This indicates that a large incumbent is a strategic cluster rather than a single 
strategic entity, as it has to adapt to three different competition structures calling for 
different strategies. Incumbents under duopoly tend to compete in terms of capacity 
rather than price, which indicates that they are prone to form a cartel situation on 
pnce. 
30 Maldutis, John, Airline Competition at the 50 Largest U.S. Airports - Update, Salomon Brothers. Juh 7, 
1992. 
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Darwin's theory of Natural Selection explains well the tendency of the stronger 
airlines (spiteful incumbents) to harm themselves (fares below costs) in order to harm 
others (new-entrants) more. The optimum end-result for the spiteful player would 
then be the death of the weak carriers and the spiteful carriers will be restored to 
strength (higher fares). This theory explains very well, in general terms, the 
competitive behaviour in the US deregulated air transport market. 
The prisoner's dilemma explains that forceful reactions of incumbents to a new-
entrant have tended to move all players to a worse profit situation. This could be 
explained in terms of the theory of 'spite' where a strong carrier may decide to 
forego short-term profitability for a long term market power. 
The following chapter will examine how the actual application of economic theory 
worked in the U.S. air transport market. The analysis will be in general terms in 
order to give ample perspective on the new-entrants' competition environment. 
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3. The Deregulation Process and 
Experience in The United States 
3.1 Introduction 
The purp~se ?f the cha?ter is to give an overview of the developments leading to 
dere~latlon m the Umted States, as well its effects on law and regulation as 
expenence accumulated. Furthermore, deregulation's effect on the airlines and the 
consumer will be examined, in order to put the new-entrant airlines into context with 
the following chapters. One must vision that a new-entrant's chance of survival is 
dependent on its own actions, just as well on what is happening in the economy, at 
the incumbent airlines, and in the government and its institutions. The chapter will, 
therefore, give a brief account of this issues, as a basis to the main promulgation of 
the thesis, namely what factors constitute success and failure of new-entrant airlines 
and which of those can be quantified and entered into a failure prediction model. 
3.2 The Advent of Deregulation 
With the advent of consumerism, that many date to the beginning of Ralph Nader's31 
crusade against safety negligence of US automobile manufacturer's in the 70's, 
corporations just as well as the lawmaker had to shift their focus to the consumer and 
their ultimate benefit in many respects. It is in this climate that ideas of reducing the 
role of regulation in the economic sector become a reality. Not that the idea was new 
but rather that the climate was ripe for its implementation. 32 
Air transport was in many respects a suitable testing ground for such economic 
experiment: weak unions, highly visible industry, industry concentration, lack of 
31 Ralph Nader was a lawyer that wrote a critical book about the Convair automobile. Although the book was 
not particularly well sold it put forth the important conclusion of producer's social responsibility. In a 
congressional hearing on automobile safety where Mr. Nader was a witness it became apparent that General 
Motors had had Mr. Nader followed and researched. This led to an appology by the president of OM. 
Following the incident Mr. Nader brought a lawsuit against GM on the basis of the company having im'ased 
his privacy. The lawsuit was settled out of court for $425,000, of which a part was used to establish the 
Center for the Study of Responsive Law. The Center has become one of the most et1ective consumer 
watchgroup on all kinds of issues, including Air Transport. Its importance is though fIrst and foremost to 
bring the consumer welfare in the forefront in corporate America. 
32 Liberalism originated with John Smith and David Hume, in the late 18th and early 19th century. It holds 
that the government should not interfere with the individuals. as they are better infonned than the 
govenunent on what is best for their welfare. In their spirit Milton Friedman the Nobel pnze WInner 111 
economics, maintains that government should not regulate industries but enforce anti-trust laws. 
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economie.s of scale ~nd ~ successful example of deregulation results in California. In 
fact, carn~rs operatIng m the 'liberalised' states of California, Texas and Florida 
were offe~ng very competitive service at fares below the prevailing rates in the rest 
o~ t?e Untted States. Not only were carriers like Southwest and Pacific Southwest 
Airlines ~PSA) more efficient, but they enlarged the markets they entered due to low 
fares, as It attracted wider clientele than the regulated high fare carriers.33 
~urtherm~re, regulators had assumed that fare levels would drop as a result of the 
mtroductton of large wide-body aircraft due to lower cost per seat. This did not, 
however, ?ccur and load factors only dropped due to the increased capacity provided 
by these aIrcraft. 
Figure 3-1 Variables Affecting US Deregulation 
Economic Studies 
More freedom, greater efficiency 
Laissez-faire Economics Senator Kennedy Hearings 
Deregulation of Air Transport 
3.2.1 The Role of The Civil Aeronautics Board 
Airlines 
Broken unity 
A lack of unity against reform played an important role in making deregulation 
possible, not only among airlines but also within the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB).34 The CAB had lacked the ability to provide the public with low fares on 
interstate routes compared to what had prevailed in the deregulated states of 
California and Texas. The reason was the CAB's inclination to protect the 
profitability of the airlines and to maintain 'optimal' route network. 
33 Oum, T. H., Stanbury, W. T. and Tretheway, Airline Deregulation in Canada and Its Economic Effects, 
Transportation Journal, Summer 1991 , p. 6. 
34 In June 1977 President Carter nominated Alfred E. Kahn as the new Chairman of the CAB, but he wa one 
of the leading proponents of airline deregulation. At the same time Elisabeth Baile wa nominat d a a 
board member leading to a Board of three that supported Kahn, leaving on! OMelia to repre nt the 
previous views. Kahn began to deregulate on his own on the assumption that he was acting in the publi 
interest and could therefore act without formal legal reform. At the same time the Congre and nat 
had differing views of deregulation; the senate for legal reform but against noi e control and ub idle ', \\lule 
the Congress was intere ted in the noi e and sub id i sue but not the Deregulation bill. 
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The ~o~rd sensing the changed atmosphere was prior to the economist Alfred Kahn's 
nOffilnatton to head the CAB: increasingly lenient toward some regulatory reform, 
although n?t for ful~ deregulatton. Under CAB's chairman John E. Robson, the CAB 
presented Its own Ideas of regulatory reform 'the monitored regulatory reform' in 
1976. The Board would, however, not find comfort in freeing up entry and exit on 
trunk passenger routes. Regardless of this opposition the Board had in fact 
consented that regulatory reform was imminent and thus jumped on the bandwagon 
that would eventually run the CAB over. When Kahn was nominated following John 
Robson's departure, the Board's attitude was fully converted to free market 
philosophy. 
3.2.2 The Economic Basis of Deregulation 
In the airline industry no operating economies of scale were considered to exist, a 
notion grounded on the fact that operating costs of an airline increase in almost equal 
proportion to the number of aircraft added to the fleet. Furthermore, capital was not 
considered to be sunk, as the physical plant the aircraft can be moved from one 
market to another. These two factors would allow carriers to enter the market freely 
because the incumbents would not possess any inherent advantage. 
Another assumption was that the industry had low entry barriers and therefore it 
would be driven to more competition through an increase in the number of players. 
Even though this would not occur, the contestability of the market would keep the 
existing players striving to lower prices and increase efficiency in order to create a 
barrier to entry. As was shown in Chapter 2 on the failure of the Contestability 
Theory, this was oversimplification of reality. 
3.2.3 Changing Ideas on The Role of Government 
An other root of deregulation were the changing ideas about the role of government. 
This ideas advocated by economists like Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises and 
Milton Friedman, emphasised 'laissez faire,35 or 'hands off' economics, but these 
state that competition can take the place of government regulation in a more efficient 
way. Thus, serving the consumer better in the long run by allowing firms to gain 
flexibility through the freedom to explore ways to maximise profit, taking into 
account only the limitation of generally accepted ethics and general law in society. 
Economic studies in the early 1960s and 1970s criticised as well the necessity to 
regulate the airline industry, the leading reformists Levine36 and Jordan37 reported on 
the efficiency achieved in the deregulated California market; Keeler38 concluded that 
35 Mises concludes in an article that Laissez faire means: 'let the individual citizen, the much talked-about 
common man, choose and act and do not force him to yield to a dictator.', Ludwig von Mises, Planning for 
Freedom, Libertarian Press 1980, p. 49. 
36 Levine, Michael, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and National Regulatory Policy, 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 74,1965. pp. 1416-1447. 
37 Jordan, W. A, Airline Regulation in America: Effects and Imperfections, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 
38 Keeler, T.E.,1972, Airline regulation and market performance. Bell JOurnal of Economics, 3. J 978. pp. 
399-424. 
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regulation dilut~d a~l profits derived fro~ ~AB' s fare system due to excess capacity; 
Douglas and Miller suggested a competItIon model that showed more efficiency in 
terms of ca~acity control if ~ares were not regulated. De V any 40, however. reported 
that regulatIon was actually III the consumer interest as fares where set close to the 
output maximising level. Keeler41 in a later study reported that CAB's regulation was 
costing the passengers $2.7 billion in excess charges per year. 
An article by Michael Levine summarised well the academic attitude on air transport 
regulation, but he stated that: 
Regulation of United States air transportation is predicated upon erroneous 
economic assumptions and results in unnecessarily high fares, disguised in 
efficiencies (such as premature replacement of equipment) and a lack of 
diversified service.42 
It was, however, president Gerald Ford's pressure on Congress to establish a 
National Commission on Regulatory Reform in order to restore the public faith in 
government after the Watergate incident that pushed deregulation ahead. The 
commission was never formed but the issue was raised and Senator Edward Kennedy 
initiated hearings in 1975 that prepared successfully the political basis for the United 
States Air Transportation Deregulation Act. 
3.2.4 Full Deregulation 
The regulatory reform was greater than originally anticipated by reformists. Marcus 
concluded that if the resistance would have been industry wide, deregulation would 
never have occurred. However, as the airlines felt disadvantaged by government 
policies the resistance collapsed and full deregulation became a reality: 
When firms feel disadvantaged by government policies, when they perceive 
that competitive advantage can be won through eliminating government 
restrictions, and when they believe that they are well positioned to take 
advantage of policy change, then they become a destabilizing force both 
within their industry and in the large political arena. Under these 
conditions, they seem to be willing to forego government protection no 
matter what the likely consequences or the surprises that may be in store for 
them under more competitive conditions.43 
39 Douglas, G. W., and Miller, 1. C., Economic Regulation of Domestic Air Transport: Theory and Policy, 
Brookings Institution, 1974. 
40 DeVany, A. S., The Effect of Price and Entry Regulation on Airline Output, Capacity and Efficiency, Bell 
Journal of Economics, 6, 1975, pp. 327-345. 
41 Keeler, I.E., Domestic Tnmk Airline Regulation: An Economic Evaluation, Studies on Federal Regulation, 
U.S. Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Washington 1978. 
42 Op. cit. (Levine, 1965), pp. 1416-1447. 
43 Marcus, Alfred A, Airline Deregulation: Why the Supporters Lost Out, Long Range Planning, Vol. 20, No. 




was ~he fir~t airline to disrupt the unity of US airlines against regulatory 
reform when Its chaIrman Edward E. Carlson gave the following statement before 
Congress: 
United could be comfortable with total deregulation.... In a deregulated 
environment, United could make the business judgements as to market 
opportunities and management would have to live with the financial results. 
Under the existing regulatory climate, we do not have these opportunities.45 
The main reason for this pro-deregulation attitude by United may have been that it 
was not allowed to expand during the low growth period from 1969 until the 
statement was given, a period referred to as the route moratorium. 46 
3.3 The Deregulation Act 
The United States Civil Aeronautics Act was passed in 1938 and established the Civil 
Aeronautics Authority that became the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 1940. The 
Airline Deregulation Act was signed on October 28, 1978. It had number of 
provisions one of which was to deregulate gradually and protect small communities. 
The main elements of the Deregulation Act, were: (i) To establish the freedom of any 
carrier fulfilling safety requirements to enter markets, and for any carrier to exit a 
market; (ii) to establish the freedom to compete on the basis of price by abolishing 
any price regulation; and (iii) to provide and protect small community air service 
through subsidies. 
CAB's authority was eliminated gradually with regard to economic regulation, 
according to the following schedule: (i) Dormant route authority and then all 
authority over routes would cease by 1981; (ii) limited fare authority until 1983;47 
and (iii) limitation of merger approval. 48 
Then in 1985 the CAB was dissolved according to a 'sunset clause' in the Act, and 
its remaining functions moved to the Department of Transportation. 
44 To llllderstand their position one must reckon that from 1969 the CAB had put all domestic route awards on 
hold. See: L. Keyes, A Survey of Route Entry Awards by the CAB, 1969-74, Kennedy Hearings Vol. 4, 
2545-48. 
45 Regulatory Refonn in Air Transportation, Hearings before Subcomm. on Aviation of Sen. Committee on 
Commerce on S.255l, S.3364, and S.3536, 94th Congo 2nd Sess., 1976, pp. 532 and 534. The testimony of 
Edward E. Carlson. 
46 The route moratorium is a phrase that appeared in the Kennedy hearings due to an ~leged freezing of the 
route network since 1969, due to low traffic growth. No airline had, in fact, been aSSIgned new routes smce 
then. 
47 Air Carriers could reduce their fares up to fifty percent without CAB's approval and raise fares up to five 
percent per year in competitive markets. 
48 The CAB could only approve mergers if the anti-competitive results are less than the transportation need and 
no-less anticompetitive alternative is available. 
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3.4 Regulation Developments Since The Deregulation Act 
3.4.1 Computer Reservation Systems 
It is i,?p0:ta~t to note that the bias of CRS' s has been reduced through the years, 
lesserung Its Impact on new-entrants. The following section will try to evaluate the 
changes and their effects at different time periods. First, prior to CAB's 1984 CRS 
regulation; second, from 1984 until the introduction of the Competition Enhancement 
Act of 1992; and third, post 1992. 
Before 1984 the CRS' s were seriously biased in favour of their owners (hosts), 
especially on the actual display itself as can be observed in Table 3 -1. In 1984 the 
CAB issued rules that corrected this display biases to a certain extent. Nevertheless, 
the system's hosts still benefited from their ownership in terms of proportionally 
more bookings than non-host airlines. This has been termed as 'incremental 
revenues. ,49 That are generated by a combination of 'architectural bias,50 and travel 
agents' (T A) identification with the CRS' s host airline, termed as 'halo effect'. 
In 1984 the CAB issued regulation in order to deal with unfair CRS practices. The 





Prohibited 'bias' in the listing of airline schedules on CRS 
screens. This prohibition prevented CRSs from continuing the 
practice of displaying the schedules of the airline owning the 
CRS above the schedules of other airlines. 
Required CRS owners to charge all airlines the same 'booking 
fee' for listing their schedules and issuing tickets through the 
CRS. Prior to this prohibition, CRS owners were charging 
airlines different fees, sometimes related to the extent to which 
an airline competed with the CRS owner. 
Prohibited CRS owners from leasing CRSs to travel agents for 
terms of more than five years. The intent of this rule was to 
furnish more opportunities for competition in marketing CRS 
systems to travel agents. 
Prohibited CRS owners from requiring that a travel agent use 
a particular CRS system exclusively. This provision was also 
C S .. 51 intended to promote R competition. 
The alleged biases left in the CRS' s after the passing of the 1984 regulation and 
directly affect new-entrants, are shown in the table below. 
49 Incremental revenues are defmed as 'added revenues resulting when agent~ ~sing CRSs book more travel on 
the airline owning the CRS than the agents would normally make on that arrlme. 
50 Architectural bias is it called when every function of the CRS is not ope.n to all participants in the ~stem. 
'Functional Equality' is the term used to describe a system where all functtons of the system are equall) open 
to all participants. 
51 Hearing on the Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992, Befor~ the Subcommittee on Aviation of the 
Committee on Public Works and Transportation House of Representattves, June 18, 1992, p. 2. 
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Table 3-1 Sources of CRS' s Display Bias52 
Individual carrier Displa~g fligh~s/~ares for carrier YY ahead of those for carrier XX by means of over-ride of 
identity othe! dIsplay pnonty parameters. Displaying fares for carrier YY in addition to those for 
carner XX whenever fares for carrier XX are requested. 
Carrier's status Because carrie~ ~ is not a co-host, not enabling any enhancements for carrier XX through 
of participation in ~e system. ~1ffi1larly, because XX .is a participating carrier: a) excluding from the display 
the system fl~ghts ~y carner XX that compete Wlth those of carrier YY, connecting flights by carrier XX. 
Priority given to Display~g ~arrier YY IT! connection ahead of carrier XXlZZ or XXIYY connection despite 
on-line transfer other infenor connectIon parameters for the fonner. Where the connection is 
domestic/international , a wholly domestic carrier or a foreign intemational carrier loses 
display priority. 
Code-sharing C~er XX and carrier ZZ making agreement for designation of carrier XXlZZ connection as 
carner XXIXX to retain priority under above parameters. 
Dual-listing If code-sharing then using also separate, additional listing (usi.Tlg different flight parameters if 
necessary to avoid detection) of carrier XX flight for local traffic purposes. 
Restriction on Limiting the number of classes of service types of fare which may be listed (in some 
display of fares instances fewer classes have been available for participating carriers than for a vendor 
carrier). 
Change of gauge Retention of single flight number where a change of aircraft is required en-route in order to 
without change of achieve display priority. This practice can also lead to dual or mUltiple listing where there are 
flight number several feeder services for a long-haul service with the same flight number. 
Departure time, Falsification of flight schedules by carriers, individually or jointly, to achieve display priority. 
arrival time, 
length of flight 
time 
Some of the more important sources of bias left in the CRS' s after the 1984 
regulation were 'functional differences,' 53 some of which can be seen in Table 3-2. 
Two of those most commonly cited are last-seat availability and 'autovalidation'. 
Last-seat availability has been cited as one of the causes for T A's to prefer the host 
carrier, as last-seat availability has not been available through the primary display of 
some CRS's. That requires the TA to spend time to enter 'direct-link' with the non-
host carrier. This has even failed due to 'connection interference's' causing the 
booking to fail although the T A is in good faith that it actually went through to the 
non-host's system. Therefore, TA's often feel less secure to use this cumbersome 
facility in view of the consequences for the passenger. The second source of bias is 
autovalidation that has to do with the host carrier receiving initially the whole ticket 
amount when multi-segment ticket is issued on two or more carriers. The usual rule 
is that the validated carrier should be the first segment or longest segment carrier. 
On some CRS' s the system will autovalidate on the CRS' s host carrier if it is carrying 
the passenger on any segment of the trip, unless the T A validates the ticket on a 
0fi 0 54 
speCl c carner. 
52 Computer Reservation Systems: More international, more complex, more intense debate, The A vrnark 
Aviation Economist, May 1987, 19. 
53 Equal functionality is when the CRS does not cause a travel agent to book its customers on an airline that it, 
otherwise, would not have selected. 
54 Apollo made provisions to eliminate autovalidation on their system in 1993. 
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Table 3-2 Sources of Complaints About Market Manipulation of CRS' S55 
Control of participation Outright refusal to accept a (.for~i~) carrier as a participant, or acceptance only 
under unduly burdensome or dIScrurunatOry conditions. 
Control of sales (i) ~~p~lation of a p~icipating carrier's fare and flight infonnation to that 
information c~er s dIsadvantage.; (11) Evaluation of and response to a competing carrier's 
revIsed schedules and fares before they are officially announced. 
Control of marketing Information generated through a CRS exclusively available to vendor or sold only at 
information ~xcessive fee~ (includ~g, for example, data to identify travel agents who might be 
mduced. to dIrect theIr business away from competing carriers or analyses of 
reservatIOn pattems with a view to amending tariffs). . 
Control of reservations Rese~ation for flights on routes where vendor is a dominant or monopoly carrier 
policy condItIoned upon use of the same carrier wherever available for any other segments 
of the journey. 
Control of ticket Designation of vendor as validating carrier on all tickets or on any ticket containino a 
validation coupon for that carrier (whether fIrst coupon or not) in order to achieve impro:ed 
cash flow. 
Control of system 'La~t-seat' availability or advance issue of boarding passes available only for vendor 
enhancements carner. 
Inequitable access fees (i) Through inequitable allocation of costs amongst vendor, participating carriers and 
travel agents; (ii) through fee structures that vary amongst participating carriers~ (iii) 
through excessive fees for enhancement facilities. 
Even though bias could be eliminated from the computer reservation systems, it is 
likely that incremental revenue will be present, unless the systems will be fully de-
hosted. The opportunities left to the host airlines are still numerous. 
The host airlines feel that since the CAB eliminated the bias which created much of 
the incremental revenues for the host, compensatory rates for booking on on-host 
flights had to be introduced. Furthermore, they feel that architectural bias is not the 
reason why T A's choose to book some carriers more than others, but rather the 
commission overrides offered by the host airlines. 
If that is the case there is a much less interest by the regulator to regulate such 
practices as they are generally considered to be a part of the normal business 
relationship between the T A and the airline. McNamara senior-VP at American 
Airlines stated in a hearing before congress that: 
CRS systems do Dot cause travel ageDts to book customers on a particular 
. I· ·d d 56 aIr IDe; OVeITI es o. 
Certain CRS owners have included in their CRS agreements with T A's, clauses that 
'tie' the owner's commission levels to the CRS usage. These clauses are actually 
purposefully created to prevent the T A to install more than one CRS system ~n the 
agency. Even though the agent wished to provide its customers with extra sefVlce by 
installing software that biased the display by showing more airlines, or lowest fares 
across or shortest possibly itinerary. They were not able to do so as the CRS 
55 Op. cit. (Computer Reservation Systems), p. 20. 
56 The Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992, Hearing Before The Subcommittee on Aviation, .of the 
. Committee on Public Works and Transportation, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 2nd session on 
II.R. 5293, June 18,1992, p.13. This extract from the courts fmding was quoted by Anne II. McNamara 
Senior VP Administration and General Counsel, American Airlines. 
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agreem~nts usually co~tain:d a clause prohibiting the use of third party software on 
the basIs of technologIcal mcompatibility. This further reduced the new-entrants' 
chances of being listed advantageously on the basis of low fares or direct flights. 
Airlines and tra~~l agent~ felt increasingly uneasy towards the CRS hosts ability to 
control competttton leadmg to a suit against American and United. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the CRS' s hosts were taking advantage of their dominant position. The 
Court of Appeals ruling brought about under the Sherman Anti-trust Act, stated 
that: 57 
Airlines generally subscribe to every CRS because the CRS's charge the 
airline per booking. The $1.75 fee to secure a booking is of little 
consequence because a $300 or $400 fare may otherwise be lost. This is not 
to say that a CRS can charge its airline subscribers any fee that it desires, 
no matter how high. Basic economic theory tells us that an airline will 
withdraw from the CRS if the cost of using it causes the marginal cost of 
providing a flight booked on the CRS to exceed the marginal revenue 
gained by the booking. 58 
This ruling rejected completely the notion that hosts misused their position, on the 
grounds of how low their booking fee was as a portion of the total ticket price. 
Congressional Subcommitttees, on the other hand, felt the need to take a close look 
on the CRS dominance and in 1992 a bill on 'airline competition enhancement' was 
presented to the US Congress to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The bills' 
purpose was: 
... to enhance competition among air carriers by prohibiting an air carrier 
who operates a computer reservation system from discriminating against 
other air carriers participating in the system and among travel agents which 
subscribe to the system, and for other purposes. 59 
The reason for the bill was that even though the hosts advantage of display bias had 
been eliminated, T A's still booked majority of comparable flights on the CRS' s host 
airline. This has been traced to the hosts capability of controlling the booking 
behaviour of the T A's through architectural bias, which is the structural and 
programming features of the system that still makes it more convenient for the T A to 
book with the systems host airline. The bill was not passed but initiated regulation by 
the US Department of Transportation regarding CRS' s. 
In order to substantiate this the United States' Department of Transportation 
analysed the substance of incremental revenues and found that: 
57 This was a 1989 trial in the Federal District Court in California involving among others Northwest and 
Alaska against Sabre and Apollo's host airlines American and U~ted. The court fOWld no antItrust 
violations and the plaintifs appealed the judgement. See (91 Datly Journal D.A.R. 13279) and U.S. 
Supreme Court of denied certiorari (112 S. ct. 1603 , 1992) 
58 Op. cit. (Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992). pp. 24-25. Testimony by Anne H. McNamara. 
'i() Op. cit. (Airline Competition Act of 1992), p. 1. 
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... airline revenues in 1986 were about 14 percent higher for United and 15 
percent higher for American because of incremental revenues. These were 
only moderately lower than the estimates of incremental revenues for the 
pre-rule period.60 
This finding indicates that the CRS' s are still benefiting the host and therefore placing 
t~e non-host members of the system at a disadvantage. Although this host 
dIsadvantage has not been fully explained it is nevertheless still there after the CAB's 
ruling on display bias. A likely explanation as mentioned before, are the commission 
overrides link-up with the host's CRS. 
Another important aspect of the CRS issue is the importance of the systems revenues 
and profits which the CRS owners can attribute back into the airline's operation to 
buy aircraft, international routes, slots and not the least withstand fare wars.61 In this 
regard it can be alleged that the CRS' s have had major importance for American's 
and United's growth and other carriers demise. As the CRS's profitability 
information is not readily available, various estimates have been constructed: The US 
Department of Transportation estimated that in 1988 based on older data, adjusted 
annual rate of return for Apollo was approximately 50 to 55 percent and 75 to 90 
percent for SABRE. 62 
Table 3-3 indicates roughly the profit of the largest systems. If profits and 
incremental revenues63 are added together it is clear that the CRS' s contribution to 
American and United has been of major importance in their growth and competitive 
position in the market. 
Following numerous congressional hearings on CRS' s bias, the hosts have started to 
remove most of the alleged sources of bias. SABRE has for example stated that it 
has removed all differences in order to make the system 'absolutely identical' in every 
respect to each participant. This identical treatment will, however, in many instances 
come at a cost as in some systems there are number of service levels at different fee 
levels. Thus, the higher the service the higher the fee. 64 
60 Pre-rule meaning before the CRS regulation was introduced in 1984. Prepared Statement by John H. 
Anderson, associate director, transportation Issues at the General Accounting Office, before Congress on the 
Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992, June 18, 1992. 
61 This has been possible by the hosts as the CRS's have been run as departments within the host airlines, 
rather than as separate companies. As a result there has been discussion about a possible requirement of 'de-
hosting' of CRS's. Some of the small CRS's are de-hosted, but the large ones COVIA and SABRE are still 
hosted. 
62 Op. cit. (Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992), p. 17. The testimony of Jeffrey N. S~e assistant 
secretary of transportation for policy and international affairs U.S. Department of TransportatJon. Note that 
this estimate is not reliable as an estimator for current profitability. 
63 In a study by DoT reported in May 1988, it was estimated that in 1986 the ~alo effect. from the two largest 
CRS's SABRE and Apollo increased revenues by 40 and 36 percent respectJvely and mcremental r~"enues 
increased revenues likewise by 15 and 14 percent. See: U.S. Department of TransportatJon, Study ot Arrlmc 
Computer Reservation Systems IDoT-P-37-88-2, May 1988). 
64 Op. cit. (Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992), p. 28. 
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Net operating margin % Before tax profits $(mill) 
1988 16.9 na 
1989 16.2 90 
1990 14.1 32 
1991 13.9 (110 million profit) 15 
Note: Other financial information for this two main systems is not available. 
!he CRS issue has clearly hindered the new-entrants in two important ways. First, in 
In the way of host advantage based on biases and airline ownership of the largest 
CRS's. Second, due to the revenue which the CRS' s have generated for their hosts 
and stipulated their staying power. 
3.4.2 Advertising 
Under deregulation advertising has become an issue as some airlines have tended to 
emphasise the short-term benefit from capturing the customer's attention through 
deceptive advertising knowing that a certain percentage of those that make contact 
will accept the 'true' value of the product even though it was described differently in 
the advertisement. 
The DoT in judging airline's adherence to Section 411 66 of the F ederal Aviation Act 
follows a 'Statement of General Policy' Part 399.80, that lists the following as a 
breach of the code of conduct in airline advertising: (i) Misrepresentation of the 
quality of service type or size of aircraft, departure times, points served, number of 
slots, and total trip time; (ii) misrepresentation of fares and charges; and (iii) 
misrepresentation of discounts stating that they are available when they are not. 
Furthermore, Part 399.84 states that advertisements which state a lower fare than is 
actually charged to the customer as an unfair deceptive practice, but this practice was 
often used by the incumbent's when new-entrant entered a market offering lower fare 
than prevailed. In addition non-inclusion in advertising of code-sharing when 
-present, which is considered a deceptive or unfair practice, as the passenger may not 
realise unless notified that there may be a carrier or equipment switch enroute. This 
discriminates effectively against a direct service new-entrant. 
To address these and other issues the DoT applies to airline advertising standards 
that constitute allowed practices: (i) Taxes can be listed separately as long as they are 
included in the advertisement; (ii) fares can be advertised as one-way even though 
round-trip ticket is required to receive the advertised fare; (iii) restrictions on fares 
must be listed in the advertisement; and (iv) if a low fare is advertised a 'reasonable' 
number of seats must be made available at that fare. 
65 Op. cit. (Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992), pp. 24-25. 
66 Section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act states that the FAA has the duty to: ' ... investigate and detennine 
whether any air carrier, foreign air camer, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in Wlfair or deceptive 
practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation or the sale thereof.' 
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Items . (ill and .(~ are the most controversial ones. It can be alleged that an 
advertisement cltmg fare for one way but requiring round-trip to receive the fare to 
be purely ~slea?ing. ~urthermore, 'reasonable' number of seats is not defined ~y 
further for Item IV leadmg to no carrier's breach of it since the code of practice was 
initiated. 
The ~o! has found two main complaints on behalf of airline customers regarding 
advertlsmg; (a) lack of availability that deals with item (iv); and (b) lack of adequacy 
of disclosure about restrictions on fares, that deals with item (iii).67 
It is clear that the enforcement of the advertising standards is beneficial for the new-
entrant, by reducing barriers to entry. 
3.4.3 Merger Regulation 
It became an issue in the deregulation process that the industry might become 
concentrated. In order to keep the checks and balances in mergers and acquisitions 
the CAB was given control over mergers and agreements according to a standard set 
forth by the Bank Merger Act.68 Under section 408(b) of the Deregulation Act the 
Board: (i) shall approve a merger, unless it finds it not consistent with the public 
interest, but (ii) shall not approve a merger if (following section 7 of the Clayton Act) 
the effect of the merger may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to 
create a monopoly; unless (iii) the anti-competitive effects of the merger are 
outweighed in the public interest by its probable effect in meeting significant 
transportation conveniences and needs of the public, and less anti-competitive 
alternatives are not available.69 
Section 414 dealt with the exceptions from the antitrust laws and states that the 
Board: 
... may excempt any person affected by its order from the operations of the 
antitrust laws ... 
Furthermore the CAB: 
... may not excempt such person unless it determines that such excemption is 
required in the public interest.7o 
When the Act's Sunset Clause was effected the supervision of mergers and 
agreements along with antitrust immunity was transferred to the. Department of 
Justice (DoJ) under supervision from the Department of Transporta.tlO~ .. On J~uary 
1, 1989 the Department of Justice took full charge of domestlc-alrhne-antltrust 
67 Airline Advertising Refonn Act of 1991, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Comm. on 
Publ. Works and Transp., H. ofRepr., I02nd Congr., 2nd session on H.R. 5124. pp. IX to X. 
68 See 12 U.S.C. section 1828 (c) 5, and (5) and Section 1842(a). 
0 0 Swrunary as presented in, Lowenfeld, Andreas F. , Aviation Law. 2nd ed. Matthew Bender, 1981, Section 
4.27, p. 4-70. 
70 See Section 414 of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. 
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issues. The Department of Justice has been considered to take a tougher stand on 
airline mergers and CRS issues than the DoT. The DoJ blocked the proposed deal 
between USAir and Eastern on Eastern's Philadelphia gates and the Toronto route, in 
view of USAir's dominant position at the airport and it being Eastern's main 
competitor on the route. Furthermore, it opposed the Sabre-Datas II joint venture, 
leading to its cancellation that resulted in Datas II merger with Pars. In February 
1991 the Dol blocked United's bid for Eastern's slots and gates at Washington 
National on the basis of Sherman's Section 1, as the proposed sale had a less anti 
competitive alternative, namely Northwest becoming the eventual buyer of the 
package. 
3.4.4 Bankruptcy Law 
Chapter XI of the US bankruptcy law has played a role in the structure of the US 
airline industry, reason being the protection against creditors it provides. In fact, 
such protection has major influence on the cost structure of the carrier involved, 
allowing it to compete by offering lower fares. In reality Chapter XI is a way for a 
bankrupt carrier to remain in possession of its assets under court supervision, while it 
attempts to reorganise. If the carrier can gain approval for its reorganisation plan, 
the carrier can emerge from bankruptcy, if not it will enter Chapter 7, that means full 
liquidation under the control of a trustee. 
The loophole in the bankruptcy law allowing bankruptcy in order to lower cost 
structure was closed in 1984 following the heavily criticised bankruptcy of 
Continental Airlines, allegedly for the sole purpose of breaking unions at the airline in 
order to lower costs. 
3.5 Industry Behaviour Following Deregulation 
3.5.1 Financial Condition The Airline Industry 
The financial health of the US airline industry deteriorated rapidly from 1979. Table 






























71 Financial Condition of the Airline Industry, Hearings Before the Su~mmittee on Aviation of the 
Conunittee on Public Works and Transportation House of RepresentatIves, One IIundred and ThIrd 
Congress, First Session, February 17- 2..f. 1993. 
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The table shows that there are three periods of losses 1981 to 1983, 1986 and 1990 
and onwards. The reasons for the losses in 1981 to 1983 are usually stated as being 
the recession and the effects of the air traffic controllers strike (PATCO) which 
limited access to many airports. Another reason is that low-fare, low-cost new-
entrant airlines and the intrastate carriers emerged in the interstate market in 1981, 
creating disruption in the market equilibrium, especially in 1986. 
The loss period of 1986 can be attributed to frequent fare wars and to the debt 
burden many carriers took on as a result of the many acquisitions and mergers that 
occurred during that year. 
The last period of industry losses has been attributed to: (i) the recession; (ii) the gulf 
crisis; (iii) over capacity; and (iv) Chapter XI carriers. The recession affected demand 
for air travel, causing less passenger growth than anticipated (see section 3.5.6 on 
traffic growth). The Gulf Crisis reduced demand for international air travel affecting 
the domestic demand as well. The traffic growth was high in the mid-eighties 
causing, the majors to place optimistic orders for new aircraft. When these entered 
the fleet between 1988 and 1992 the growth had levelled off. Thus, the industry'S 
largest carriers suddenly found themselves with about 300 additional aircraft in need 
of passengers, in 1993. The Chapter XI carriers have allegedly forced yields down 
due to their protection from creditors and the resulting reduction in debt payments. 
This association is, however, disputed as the non-bankrupt carriers may emphasise 
strategic attacks on the bankrupt carriers in order to undermine their financial well-
being and prevent them emerging from bankruptcy. In either case the result is going 
to be poorer overall profit performance. 
As the years have progressed the operating expenses per ASK declined, due to cost 
saving measures of the airlines, especially by trimming labour and salaries, along with 
other cost saving measures like fuel efficient aircraft, two pilot aircraft and increased 
homogeneity of the fleet. 
Table 3-5 Financial Indicators of Major US Carriers 
OperatinJ!. expense per ASK OperatinJ!. Revenue per ASK 
Airline '78 '84 '92 '94 '78 '84 '92 '94 
American 0.085 0.081 0.068 0.067 0.088 0.087 0.068 0.069 
United 0.065 0.075 0.071 0.060 0.070 0.081 0.068 0.062 
USAir 
-
0.105 0.088 0.084 - 0.119 0.082 0.078 
Delta 0.072 0.091 0.073 0.066 0.079 0.097 0.068 0.065 
Northwest 0.108 0.073 0.069 0.068 0.117 0.076 0.066 0.074 
TWA 0.110 0.079 0.068 0.067 0.1l3 0.080 0.060 0.062 
0.079 0.079 - 0.084 0.076 - -Pan Am -
Continental 0.068 0.062 0.060 0.062 0.072 0.069 0.058 0.062 
, Source: Complied from Air Transport World '79 - 95. All figures are m 1994 dollars. 
3.5.2 The Economic Environment 
From Table 3-6 one can see that in 1980 to 1982 jet fuel prices increased by 65 
percent at the same time when the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 16.3 percen.t. 
The effect of this is hindering of growth and increased costs. In 1986 the econonuc 
indicators show favourable environment and high traffic growth, but losses occurred, 
nevertheless due to heavy merger activity and the resulting debt burden and 
inefficiencie~. In 1989 jet fuel prices rose again by 46.5 percent in 1989 and 1990. 
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~t the same t~me the CPI started to rise again, while interest rates offset the cost 
mcrease by gomg down from 1991 to 1993 by 68.2 percent. 
Table 3-6 Economic Trends Since Deregulation 
Year Consumer Price Jet Fuel Prices US Discount Consumer Price % Index Public % Index o/Cost % Rate Index % Index All Items1 Transportation2 PerGallo~ Middle Rate4 
1980 100.0 100 100 53.0 100.0 1981 1l0.2 10.2 124.1 24.1 106.5 6.5 92.3 
-7.7 1982 116.9 6.1 137.6 10.9 112.3 5.4 66.3 
-29.2 1983 120.6 3.2 144.2 4.8 99.2 
-11.6 66.3 0.0 1984 126.1 4.6 153.1 6.2 88.9 
-10.4 62.4 
-5.9 1985 130.6 3.6 160.0 4.5 92.8 4.4 58.5 
-6.3 1986 133.0 1.8 169.5 5.9 64.4 
-31.6 42.8 
-26.7 1987 137.9 3.7 175.4 3.5 64.7 0.4 46.7 9.0 1988 143.6 4.1 178.6 1.8 61.9 
-4.3 50.5 8.3 1989 150.5 4.8 187.5 5.0 70.4 13.7 54.4 7.7 1990 158.6 5.4 206.4 10.1 90.6 28.8 50.6 -7.1 1991 165.3 4.2 215.5 4.4 78.8 
-13.1 27.2 
-46.2 1992 170.3 3.0 219.2 1.7 76.1 
-3.4 22.8 
-14.3 1993 175.4 2.9 na na 68.8 
-9.7 22.8 0 1994 179.9 2.6 na na 64.9 -4.8 36.0 58.0 l,ol 
Source. Bureau of Labour StattstlCS, US Dept. of Labour. Prices are annual domestic average except 1983, which IS 
December price. Source: ATW 1979 - 1993. 4 Source: Federal Reserve Board. 
3.5.3 Industry Fare Structure 
From 1981 until 1983, 22 new jet operating carriers emerged causing the incumbents 
to react with lower fares although they had not shed the extra weight of the 
regulatory era. It is apparent if one examines Table 3-7, that as early as 1981 
competition had already reached high levels, both in terms of the percentage of 
markets with discount fares offered and in reduction of fares measured in terms of 
discount fare as a percentage of couch fare. Little reduction occurred in fares from 
1981 until 1984 with the exception of the top 100 markets, where there was a slight 
reduction. In other smaller markets there was rather a tendency to raise fares as the 
table shows. 
Table 3-7 Fare Discounts Pre and Post Deregulation 
Percentage of markets with discount Average discount fare as a percentage of 
fares couch fare 
Market rank 1976 1981 1984 1976 1981 
Top 50 69 95 96 78 63 
51-100 60 92 90 80 67 
101-150 36 82 84 80 70 
151-200 39 86 80 80 72 
Smaller markets 30 81 72 80 74 
Source: Meyer, J.R., and Oster, C. V., DeregulatlOn and the Future of IntercIty Passenger Travel, 
Cambridge MIT press, 1987. 







The linkage between market-share and profitability has been established by Buzzell 
and Galen in their work on 'Profit Impact of Market Strategy' (PIMS). The reason 
72 Buzzell, Robert D., Gale, Bradley T., The PIMS Principles: Linking Strategy to Perfonnance, The Free 
Press, Macmillan 1987. 
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behi~d this link~ge is not, h~wever, fully known. Buzzell and Gale mention four 
~~ssIble underlymg factor~: (1) Economies of scale~ (ii) risk aversion by customers~ 
(111) market power; and (IV) a common underlying factor. A common underlying 
factor between ROI and market-share could be competent management. 73 
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Research: Airlines, July 7, 1992. Omitted squares are for years when the airline was not operating. 
It is fairly well established by economists that economies of scale are virtually non-
existent in air transport although other scale efficiencies do exist as was covered in 
Chapter 2. Risk aversion is based on the customer's tendency to select a product he 
firmly knows and feels comfortable with. Market power is nested in the ability to 
bargain more effectively with suppliers of services and products. These findings do 
hold in air transport as large market-share at one airport has usually created strong 
bargaining position of an airline. 
73 Op. cit. (Buzzell), p. 73. 
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Perce~t Increase in Market Share by Airline Based on Enplanements 
AJlAirports, 1980-91 
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41.2 -2.6 -37.5 13.3 13.5 
-7.7 8.6 6.3 11.6 1.1 0 1.4 -2.2 1.2 
2.0 -3.1 0.8 2.6 -2.5 -4.3 3.7 17.2 3.9 11.7 1.4 10.8 
Source: Maldutis, Julius, Airline Competition at the 50 Largest US Airports - Update, Salomon Brothers, United States Equity 
Research: Airlines, July 7, 1992. 
Airports that have become 'hub' airports usually experience downgrading of their 
bond ratings as risk is considered to have increased. 74 This is based on the fact that if 
a dominating hub airline leaves the airport or fails the airport will be seriously 
harmed. As a result the airport authorities may go into great lengths to avoid any 
such disastrous developments by giving concessions to the dominant carrier in the 
form of protection from competition and airport fee reductions under special 
circumstances. This ability of US airports is based on their private or county rather 
than government ownership. Market power is, therefore, conclusively a major force 
in the US air transport market. 
74 Doganis, Rigas, The Airport Business, Routledge 1992, p. 202. 
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The link between ROI and market share does not exclude small market-share 
busin.esses. Studi~s in the .PIMS ~ata base show that such businesses can reach high 
ROI If they offer high relatIve quahty, narrow product lines and low total costS. 75 
Table 3-8 shows that the market-share of the largest six carriers went from 45.7 
percent in 1979 to 78.0 percent in 1991. This is a considerably concentration, 
creating an effective barrier to entry at major airports. 
Rapid increase in market-share at airports appears to be related to failure as all the 
airlines listed in Table 3-9, having 8 percent annual growth or greater on the average 
have failed or been acquired, with the exception of USAir that is, nevertheless, 
having serious financial problems. It is only Southwest that has above 8 percent 
market-share on the average and has not had financial problems or failed. Other 
failed carriers with lower overall average market-share increases have also had 
sudden increases in market-share for one or more years. For example, AirCal 
increased its market-share by 40 percent in 1980-1981; Republic by 51.2 percent in 
1981; Eastern by 47.0 percent in 1990; Midway by 33.3 percent in 1990. Such 
sudden increases can often be explained by the airline in question, acquiring another 
carner. 
The general rationalisation of the alleged relationship between failures and fast 
growth and sudden growth in market-share, can be that the cost of gaining such 
increase is greater than the benefit it provides. First of all the acquisition of slots, 
terminal facilities and promotion costs of entering new markets can put a great strain 
on the airline's financial resources and cash-flow in particular. The same can be said 
about the acquisition of an other carrier in order to gain market-share, not mentioning 
the organisational strain it creates while staff functions and route networks are being 
merged. 
3.5.5 Capacity 
Over-capacity is one of the factors cited as the reason for losses in the early nineties. 
The following table shows the average capacity offered and the resulting average 
load-factors. It is worth pointing out that average load factors have not declined, but 
increased during the period. This implies that if over-capacity was present that 
capacity was being utilised well by the traveling public, probably due to lower fares 
being offered. 


























75 Carolyn Y Woo. and Arnold C. Cooper, The Surprising Case for Low Market Share', Harvard Business 
Review, November-December 1982, pp. 106-113. 
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To test whether lower fares contributed to the increase in load-factors Table 3-11 
was constructed in order to show operating profits per available seat kilo~etre. 
It i~ clear that as capacity increased dramatically at the incumbent carriers they tried 
~o mcrease loa~s b?, lowering fares. This led to poor operating profit for all the 
mcumbent carners m 1992. In 1994 American, United and Northwest had reached 
p.rofit~bility again, while l!SAir, Delta and TW A had not. The implication of this 
sltuatton for new-entrants IS that market entry is problemsome unless the incumbents 
can. be avoide~, but at the same time aircraft are readily available lowering the 
equIpment barner to entry. These points will be discussed further in Chapter 6 and 7. 
Table 3-11 US Incumbent Airlines' Operating Profit Per ASK 1978 - 1994 
Operating profit per ASK 
S Cents Per ASK 
Airline '78 '84 '92 '94 
American 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.002 
United 0.005 0.006 (0.003) 0.002 
USAir 0.014 (0.006) (0.006) 
Delta 0.007 0.006 (0.005) (0.001) 
Northwest 0.009 0.003 (0.003) 0.006 
TWA 0.003 0.001 (0.008) (0.005) 
Pan Am 0.005 (0.003) 
Continental 0.004 0.007 0.000 
Source: Compiled from Air Transport World '79 - '95. All figures are 1994 prices. 
Table 3-12 shows that the three largest majors added capacity out of line with 
passenger growth trends, but in the period from 1988-1992 the number of revenue 
passengers grew by 4.4 percent, compared to 30 percent in the four preceding years. 
The reason may have been the tendency to optimism during the growth period in the 
mid-nineties and long lead-times in aircraft delivery from manufacturers at the time. 














Source: Financial Condition of The Airline Industry, p. 19. 
At any rate the large majors were more optimistic than the smaller carriers, as the 
latter group reduced their capacity, while American, D~1ta ~d U nite~ add~d 35 
percent. Much addition of capacity during low growth penods increases nvalry in the 
market, reducing the viability of entry of new carriers. 
3.5.6 Traffic Growth 
The air transport industry is recognisable cyclical because both leis~re passeng~rs and 
to lesser extent business passengers tend to cut travel expenses dunng a recession. A 
survey of North American business travellers reveals that although air fares for 
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business passengers are up, annual costs incurred by corporations per staff traveller 
have ~ecreased by 7.1 percent from 1988 until 1990. 7G Thus, for a large segment of 
the le~sure mar~et, travel is basically a luxury and for many businesses during 
receSSIon, travel IS one of the cost areas affected by a cost cutting program. 












































As fuel prices came down from 1983 to 1986 with only slight increase in 1987 the 
average growth was 8.2 percent during the period. In 1989 fuel prices rise again 
along with the Consumer Price Index that rose from 1.8 in 1986 to 3.7 in 1987, to 
5.4 percent in 1990, with slight reduction in 1991 to 4.2. These effects caused 
reduced traffic growth, with the Gulf Crisis in 1991 causing further reduction. After 
1991 the traffic picks up fast with 14.1 percent growth in passenger haulage (see 
Table 3-6). These increases are attributed, as mentioned before, to fare wars caused 
by too much capacity in the industry. 
3.5. 7 Hub and Spoke Route Networks 
Hub and spoke route networks have had a major impact on the air transport industry 
following deregulation, creating perhaps the greatest barrier to entry. To begin with 
it is important to define what constitutes a hub. A hub is defined as: 
.•• a pattern of simultaneous arrivals followed by simultaneous departures at 
any airport, such that a passenger from any arriving flight can connect to 
any departing flight within a reasonable period.77 
The FAA definition of a hub differs considerably from the one above: 
... air traffic hubs are geographic areas, and are based on the percentage of 
total passengers enplaned in the area. 
Hub airports are classified into four types by the FAA, large hubs, medium hubs, 
small hubs and non-hubs. The FAA definition does not take into account the hub and 
spoke ideology of the traffic arriving and leaving in banks. Therefore, one can not 
use the 'hub' concept as defined by the FAA in the same context as that used by the 
76 Julie Barker, Super Savers, Successful Meetings, part 1, Vol. 39, Iss. 10, Sep. 1990, pp. 152-154. 
77 US airlines hubs and spokes, Travel and Tourism Analyst. August 1986, p. 30. 
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airlin~s in their str~tegic planning. In this section we will use the hub concept 
mearung that traffic IS scheduled in banks. 
One of the ad:antages ~f a .hub netw~rk is the reduction of the number of linkages 
nece~sary. to be .the destmabon nodes m the network. It requires n(n-1) linkages to 
provl~e dIrect fhghts between the destinations served (n). If, however, a hub is used 
the hnkages are reduced for the destinations served by the hub to (n-1). 
Furthermore, the hub allows for the operation of larger aircraft with lower seat-mile 
costs as the geographical catchment area for passengers is much larger for a hub 
o~eration than direct service. This boosts load factors allowing more frequency on 
thinner routes and larger aircraft on high density routes as mentioned before. 
An important feature of an hub location is the size of the local market that will be 
captured by the dominant hub carrier. What is more the hub carrier if in a dominant 
position can charge relatively higher fares for passengers originating or terminating 
their journey at the hub airport. 78 
The hub strategy of the major carriers after deregulation was primarily geographic 
and market-share driven. A carrier well located in the Eastern United States, wishing 
to gain market-share in the Western part would develop a hub in that region in order 
to build a market-share. Another way would be to gain instant market-share by 
acquiring a carrier already operating a hub in the area, just like People Express did 
with the acquisition of Frontier, gaining a hub location in Denver. 
Hub and spoke strategies can be divided into three phases since deregulation; (i) one 
or two hub strategy prior to 1986; (ii) multi-hub strategy from 1986 to 1992; and (iii) 
hub consolidation from 1992 to date. The main problem with the one or two hub 
strategy was the inability of the hub airport to accommodate constant growth in air 
traffic and the provision of adequate number of peak hour flights. As a result, the 
hub airports became overly crowded causing inconvenience to the passenger. This 
reason and the carrier's wish for geographic expansion led to the construction of 
secondary hubs. By that action the carrier relieved some of the pressure on the main 
hub and reduced the inconvenient transfers and lengthy routes for part of their 
passengers, increasing the passenger's incentive to use the carrier. 
As the major carriers concentrated on building large hubs during the early 
deregulation years they withdraw from direct markets causing their market-share to 
decline and other carriers like new-entrants and commuters would fill in the gaps and , 
gain. When the strategy changes and the majors started to establish medium to small 
size hubs the leeway for new-carriers was drastically reduced. 
The inefficiencies of hub operations are substantial in terms of less fleet utilisation 
due to the aircraft arriving and departing in blocks. Thus when the hub airport 
becomes large the time period it takes each block to arrive and leave becomes larger, 
78 An Antitrust suite was brought against American, Continental, Delta, Midway, Northwest, Pan Am, lWA, 
United and USAir over conspiration to fIx prices through to and from hub cities, through a CRS. The 
airlines lost the case and a $364 million antitrust fimd was created from which passengers can clalITI 
vouchers in order to get discount otT selected flights with the above carriers, provided the passenger made a 
trip with one of the above named carriers through one of the J·l named hub cities. 
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thus, creating inefficiencies both in terms of fleet utilisation and passenger waiting 
time. This may explain the economies experienced by Southwest's direct flights, 
where fleet utilisation is high compared to the hub airlines. 
New-entrant's scope of operations is of course limited by the geographical 
distribution of other carrier' hub locations and route networks. Thus, it is important 
to visualise where each major carrier's domain lies: United's main hubs are Chicago, 
Denver, San Francisco and Washington's Dulles, this leaves the carrier with 
geographical coverage in the north-east, mid-west and west, but less coverage in the 
south~ American's main hubs are in Chicago, Dallas, Miami, Nashville and 
RaleighlDurham, leaving only the west poorly covered; Delta has probably the 
largest geographic coverage of any US carrier with main hubs in Atlanta, Cincinnati, 
Dallas and Salt Lake City~ USAir has emphasised the Eastern US in their hub 
strategy leaving the mid-west and west without hubs~ Continental has its main hub in 
Texas Houston and Newark as a result of the People Express take-over, Denver is 
its mid-western hub leaving the western US uncovered; Northwest's hub strategy is 
centred around Detroit, Memphis, Boston and Minneapolis. 
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1981 1986 1991 
% % % 
32.87 44.56 48.43 
27.40 44.20 46.76 
20.05 18.05 20.81 
35.37 27.39 23.73 
29.60 35.59 47.50 
24.61 25.19 24.04 
27.68 24.68 67.18 
21.44 28.05 35.10 
38.09 62.71 62.17 
1.68 2.99 39.22 
21.18 44.70 76.17 
0 4.71 81.94 
51.21 54.08 86.97 
39.75 46.79 87.79 
15.63 22.78 30.99 
42.72 16.35 9.66 
3.98 1.81 84.19 
0 4.74 43.18 
23.15 30.57 36.83 
14.44 61.91 80.49 
4.11 3.07 51.75 
39.81 39.25 a 35.15 
24.55 11.14 4.17 -
31.59 29.01 13.60 -
45.62 14.67 3.01 -
40.72 48.40 16.57 -
24.04 26.84 28.99 
45.28 63.16 71.76 
17.87 10.49 66.97 
0 1.03 95.53 
18.18 5.43 75.97 
22.64 28.10 38.67 
20.70 35.96 53.55 
59.79 82.44 89.35 
10.34 13.52 23.61 
the 50 Lar est U.S. Airports-Update. Salomon Broth g crs. 1992. 
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In :iew. of this geographical locations of major hubs there is less coverage by the 
majors 10 the south and the mid-west, but in the latter named area Southwest has 
b~e? ~trong in the .short-haul market. Table 3-14 shows the development in major 
aIrlIne s hub strategIes and market-share at each hub location. 
3.5.8 The Chapter XI Carriers' Effect on The Industry 
Chapter XI carriers can operate for extended periods depending on the time it takes 
to negotiate a reorganisation plan, sometimes for years. Such carriers face pressure 
to maintain cash-flow in order to cover day to day operating costs. Therefore, they 
may lean on fare discounting in order to maintain adequate demand levels, as many 
passengers might otherwise avoid flying with a bankrupt carrier. 
A way to raise working capital through other means than stimulating demand through 
low fares, is the so-called 'debtor in possession' (DIP) protection of lender to a 
Chapter XI company. Under the scheme the injection of loans is encouraged through 
special protection scheme whereas priority for payment ahead of other creditors is 
guaranteed by law. America West secured loans from Northwest and Guinness Peat 
Aviation through DIP. In fact the scheme has in some cases induced a financially 
troubled carrier to declare bankruptcy in order to secure much needed loans only 
available under DIP. This is what is alleged to have happened in the case of Pan Am 
and Midway. Pan Am needed cash and was negotiating a short-term loan, but the 
financial institution involved would not provide the loan unless the carrier declared 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, in order to secure the loan under the DIP scheme. Similar 
situation occurred with Midway that could only secure a $25 million loan upon 
bankruptcy declaration. The problem with this development for the airline and the 
financier is that the airline's image and cash-flow is lessened causing sudden drop in 
income. This is due to the fact that many passengers and travel agents avoid booking 
with bankrupt carriers. Therefore, one can assume that this inducement to file for 
bankruptcy to be actually seriously negative to the carrier involved but a secure 
short-term option for the creditor involved, as he will recover his investment as far as 
there are assets to cover the secured loan. 
Chapter XI bankruptcy as a management tool originated with Continental's 
bankruptcy in September 1983. The purpose of the bankruptcy that was allegedly 
unnecessary due to $60 million cash reserves and non-default on loans, was primarily 
to resolve a labour dispute. The bankruptcy was utilised as an instrument to re 
negotiate all labour contracts allowing the carrier to lower its cost struc~ure i~stantly. 
The loophole in the bankruptcy law allowing this type of an bankruptcy mcentlve was 
closed in 1984. 
A further development in bankruptcy as a management tool was the so cal~ed 'pre-
packaged' bankruptcy, where the airline arranges for DIP financmg and 
reorganisation plan before declaring bankruptcy, in order to reduce the bankruptcy 
period and increase the carrier's chances of emerging. 
An important question of the whole bankruptcy issu~ is whether bank.rupt carri~rs 
seriously bias the competition structure by fare cuttmg fuelled by theIr protec.tlOn 
against creditors and therefore lower cost structure. The large Chapter Xl carners, 
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~erica West,. Continental and Trans World had among them 18 percent of the 
~ndustry traffic m 1992. The former president of America West M. 1. Conway stated 
m 1 ?93 that the .effect of the Chapter XI carriers was overstated as the bankrupt 
carners d~ not gam any advantage of the bankruptcy as the effect will not be positive 
on .operattng costs. Furthermore, the carriers will have to pay for large portion of 
theIr costs up-front in cash. In addition, he stated that the stigma of bankruptcy will 
bleed off traffic. 79 It may be precisely this traffic bleeding that has made it so difficult 
for bankrupt carriers to emerge from Chapter XI. The reason being that the 
passenger takes a perceived risk by travelling with a bankrupt carrier. 80 In order to 
make the customer willing to undertake such risk the fare must be attractive. 
Therefore, it is clear that Chapter XI carriers have to offer attractive fares to maintain 
the necessary cash-flow, to payoff the up-front costs of running the airline from day 
to day and to keep up the demand. 
3.5.9 Concentration 
Mergers and bankruptcies, most of which occurred in 1986 caused the prevailing 
concentration in the US air transport. This has led to controversy as to the benefit of 
deregulation to the consumer and the airlines. In general the view appears to be that 
the industry has become more concentrated as a result of deregulation, although, 
competition has increased in terms of number of carriers serving each of the high 
density routes (See Table 2.2). Table 3.15 shows the increase in concentration since 
deregulation both in terms of number of airlines achieving more than 1 % total 
market-share measured in terms of enplanements at the 50 largest airports and the 
Herfindahl index that measures concentration at airports. Both of these indicators 
show that concentration has increased substantially since deregulation. Although this 







Number of Airlines that Achieved 1 Percent Market -share or Greater 
in The US Market81 
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
22 22 22 21 21 21 21 20 19 18 16 15 
2243 2198 2248 2462 2455 2562 2757 3187 3352 3443 3605 3904 
287 270 277 301 320 357 390 348 352 350 355 347 
Airlines with more than 1 percent market-share were 25 in 1979 but only 15 in 1991, 
at the same time when total enplanements increased from 310.8 million to 346.5 
million with the largest peak in 1986 when they reached 389.7m. The Herfindahl-
79 Op. cit. (Financial Condition of the Airline Industry), p. 643. The testimon~ ofM. J. Conway, America West. 
80 Using a credit card reduces this risk as credit card comp~es will not honor payments to bankrupt ~er: 
for unused tickets. Travel agents can also validate the tIckets on an other ~er lI1 order to dela} the 
payment to the bankrupt carrier and therefore r~du~ the risk of the passenger lI1 ca~ ~~ ~er ~oes tmder 
within three or four weeks, which is the processmg tune of the payment through the "alldakd camero 
81 Op. cit. (Maldutis), p. 4. 
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Hirschman index (~) S?OWs the increased concentration as the weighted average 
for the 50 largest aIrports mcreased from 2.224 in 1979 to 3.904 in 1991.82 
The purpose of mergers in deregulated air transport markets is to: (i) gain instant 
acces~ to m~rke~s . that would otherwise take considerable time to grow into 
orgarucally; (11) elImmate a competitor; (iii) increase debt in order to create a buffer 
against a hostile take-over; (iv) to gain a competitive tool like a computer reservation 
system; (v) gain economies of scope, information and density, in order to create a 
barrier to entry or enhance the ability to fight off a competitive threat; (vi) build 
critical mass in order to enhance the staying power of the airline in a fierce 
competition. 
It is important to contrast mergers that are the result of an attempt to salvage the 
leftovers of a bankrupt airline against those that have the sole purpose of gaining the 
advantage of a system that will improve competitive status considerable. In fact there 
is little reason for courts to block a merger of a bankrupt carrier as such an act can 
cause 'social harm' to those employees that would otherwise keep their jobs. It is 
rather the period prior to bankruptcy of a carrier that needs to be analysed in order to 
filter out the effects of predatory actions for the purpose of driving a carrier into 
bankruptcy for the sole purpose to overtake it or simply eliminate it. 
The application of post deregulation competition tools, as mentioned before, (yield 
management systems, CRS' s, hub and spoke systems, for etc.) by the incumbents 
influenced the many mergers and acquisitions that occurred in 1986. The year was 
characterised by over capacity and fare wars that had serious effect on profitability, 
especially in regard to the new-entrants that had less critical mass and therefore less 
staying power. 
Table 3.16 shows large mergers that occurred in 1986, but four of these involved 
new-entrants. All were taken over by the incumbents with the exception of People 
Express's brief take-over of Frontier. The new-entrants taken-over were People 
Express and the former intrastate carriers AirCal, PSA and Republic airlines. 
Table 3-16 Large Mergers of US Airlines in 198683 
Pe<JQle Express With Frontier 
Texas Air with Eastern and Pe<JQ.le Express 
American with Air California 
Delta with Western 
Northwest with Republic 
TWA with Ozark 
USAir with Pacific Southwest Airlines 
Sawers states that as profitability fell in 1985 companies 'with high costs, large debts 
or uncompetitive services were encouraged to seek safety in the arms of stronger 
firms'. Furthermore, he finds that these factors explain the disappearance of Eas~em, 
Western, People Express and Frontier. 84 It must be noted that People Express IS an 
82 I-llll above 1800 indicates high concentration, while HHI below 1000 indicates low concentration. 
83 David Sawers, Competition in the Air, lEA, 1987, p.32. People Express was added to Sawers list. 
84 Op. cit. (Sawers). pp. 32-33. 
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exception on some of the points stated by Sawer as it had the lowest cost per ASM 
of any carrier in 1985. 
3.5.10 Market Behaviour 
Marke~ behaviour during dere~lation has been characterised by heavy discounting 
and wtder spread between busmess and discount fares. The use of controlled fare 
offerings has become the norm, meaning that airlines use close-out days and limited 
seat offering at the lowest fares. In order to stimulate sales and minimise the T A's 
lost revenue on heavy discount ticket sales, the carriers have developed sales 
incentives usually linked to sales volume at distribution, as is explained in Section 
3.4.1. 
The airlines have emphasised the business travel segment heavily in order to maximise 
yields and to subsidise the heavily discounted fares for the leisure market. This trend 
has been upset by the advent of the fax-machine, tele-conferencing and computer 
networking that has caused ever increasing number of businesses to question the high 
costs of business travel. This trend became clear during the Gulf-crisis when number 
of big corporations restricted travel of their employees for safety reasons and 
introduced to themselves a way to save costs without reduction in productivity. 
Furthermore, as the airlines have been involved in fare wars and perhaps 'excessive' 
discounting in order to force a competitor to leave a market, they have placed 
increasing importance on increased yield from the business market. The president of 
the US National Business Association, lR. Hintz states that: 
In view of cost considerations, business travel is no longer inelastic or 
insensitive to pricing •.... Traditional airline practices have taken business air 
travel for granted and have forced business [travellers] to subsidise leisure 
travel.85 
There is a clear trend that airlines are increasingly under the scrutiny of the business 
community and especially by corporation travel managers that push for increased 
discounts. Therefore, it is becoming a problem for some of the airlines to subsidise 
unrealistic pricing decisions at the low end of the market by increasing or maintaining 
present fare levels aimed at the business market, without loosing passengers. 
3.5.11 Quality of Service 
Most complaints filed are on flight related problems, baggage mishandling and 
customer service, in that order. In 1983 just to take an example, flight problems 
were 26.5 percent, baggage complaints 16.3 percent and refund problems 14.9 
percent. 
Table 3-17 and Table 3-18 show trends in complaint rates from 1978. The 1979 
increase can be explained by an industry wide decline in on time performance and the 
85 Op. cit. (The Financial Condition of the Airline Industry), p. 414. The testimony of H. I-lintz, on behalf of 
the National Business Travel Association. 
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CAB's efforts to make it easier to file complaints. 86 As on-time performance 
improved the complaints declined. The high increase in complaints in 1987 through 
1988 can be attributed to airport congestion at hub airports causing delays and 
missed connections. The congestion at the hub airports during these years has been 
explained by the havoc in scheduling caused by the high merger activity during 1986. 
In addition, unrealistic scheduling was an important factor, escalated by carriers 
attempts to tamper with scheduling in order to gain better CRS display position. If 
one examines the complaint rates of individual airlines one can see that the airlines at 
the bottom of the list were all having labour disputes due to cost-cutting programs or 
mergers if not both. Eastern had serious union fights, Northwest suffered from 
merger problems affecting labour and organisation, just as Continental that had 
serious. customer service disputes as their record shows. The reason for the high rise 
in Hawaiian's customer complaint rates were problems with a new international 
service. A biasing factor resulting in higher complaint rates during 1987 could be 
much publicity of service problems in the period. After 1988 the complaint rate drops 
considerable indicating smoother operations at all airlines filing. 
Table 3-17 Incumbent Airlines' Consumer Complaints 1978 - 1991 
Complaints per 100. OOOpassengers 
Airline '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 Avg. 
Aloha 1,88 2,12 1,08 0,84 0,82 0,41 0,26 0,12 0,25 0,46 0,93 0,30 0,32 0,43 0,73 
Alaska 0 0 0 2,34 0 0,61 0,55 0,51 0,72 1,49 1,25 0,88 0,59 0,48 0,94 
Delta 1,87 2,21 1,41 0,90 0,79 0,70 0,65 0,66 0,56 2,19 1,38 0,72 0,55 0,47 1,08 
Piedmont 4,84 5,42 2,91 1,33 1,23 0,68 0,64 0,68 1,04 2,97 1,80 0 0 0 2,14 
Hawaiian 2,21 1,61 1,55 1,35 1,04 0,67 1,44 1,55 2,93 8,44 7,34 4,19 2,34 1,68 2,74 
Republic 0 6,40 5,28 2,63 2,02 1,34 0,73 1,33 2,18 0 0 0 0 0 2,74 
Frontier 6,76 5,14 3,44 1,84 1,35 1,00 1,59 1,14 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.78 
USAir/AlI 5,68 8,94 5,03 3,46 1,97 1,09 1,22 1,50 1,38 3,51 2,12 2,16 1,26 0,63 2,85 
American 5,90 10,0 5,68 2,89 2,29 1,31 1,09 1,33 1,39 3,84 2,07 1,22 1,04 1,42 2,96 
Ozark 5,73 9,27 4,95 1,99 1,12 0,90 0,93 0,73 1,06 0 0 0 0 0 2,96 
United 3,67 7,95 3,62 2,28 2,10 1,42 1,70 2,48 2,56 6,60 2,82 1,98 1,37 1,47 3,00 
Western 4,29 9,14 4,96 2,08 1,95 1,60 1,65 1,48 1,27 0 0 0 0 0 3,16 
Eastern 5,58 6,77 4,51 2,47 1,56 1,35 1,11 1,60 2,42 13,1 10,1 6,48 2,23 0 4,56 
Northwest 11,1 8,75 4,90 2,81 2,34 2,27 1,68 1,69 2,67 18,6 6,21 1,95 1,33 0,98 4,81 
Continental 5,63 8,69 5,27 2,69 1,55 5,93 3,89 4,21 3,56 24,6 11,9 3,29 2,09 1,21 6,04 
TWA 9,84 12,3 11,8 6,60 5,15 3,33 3,69 3,35 4,13 12,4 7,80 5,31 5,63 4,46 6,84 
Pan Am 12,8 16,2 13,0 8,91 4,61 3,60 3,95 5,04 4,64 13,0 9,50 0,81 3,91 3,89 7,42 
Braniff I 6,17 14,4 9,45 4,42 6,18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,12 
Texas In1'l 6,40 10,6 13,0 6,55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.14 
Average 5.90 8.11 5.66 3.07 2.24 1.66 1.57 1.73 2.05 8.55 5.01 2.44 1.89 1.56 4.17 
Source: Air Transport World '79 - '92. 
The importance of examining complaint '8 rates is related to t~e hypothesis that good 
service breeds success and bad service failure. The problem IS, however, the ~ausal 
relationship, namely whether the problems of the carrier l~ad to po?r. sefV1ce or 
whether the poor service leads to the carrier's problems. In eIther case It IS clear .that 
poor staff-function whether the airline is having problems or not leads to senous 
problems for the carrier. In fact the overall average for non-failed carriers was 2.14 
complaints per 100.000 passengers, compared to 5.28 for failed carriers. 
86 Complaint rates are calculated from filings from the airlines and from DoT data: This way of coun~g the 
complaints could incorporate inaccuracy, that is hard to es~ate. The complarnt rates are neverthe ess a 
indicator of airline service quality and is the only publIcly avrulable source. 
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Looking at incumbent carriers' average complaint rates for each year in comparison 
to t?at of n~w-entrants, ~hows. tha~ complaint rates at new-entrant carriers have 
dechned con~lderably. This dech?e IS particularly great after the charter based new-
entrants CapItol and V'.0rl.d termmated their scheduled operations. After 1986 the 
new-entrants have ~amtamed lower complaint rates than the incumbent carriers 
probably due to t~e mcumbents' problems in integrating their route systems after th~ 
frequent mergers m 1985-1987 and shake-out in the industry. 
Table 3-18 New-entrant Airlines' Consumer Complaints 1978 - 1991 
Airline '81 '82 '83 '84 
Complaints per 100.000 passenJ!ers 
'85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 Avg. 
Regional 
Air 
Wisconsin 0.22 0.00 0.11 
Horizon 0.63 
Intrastate 
0.11 0.44 0.39 
Air Florida 12.5 8.5 5.21 
- - - - - 8.74 
AirCal 
- -
2.12 1.17 0.94 0.46 0.55 
- - - - - - 1.05 MarkAir 
PSA 1.92 0.83 0.81 
1.84 1.31 1.58 
0.51 0.83 1.03 2.09 
- - - - 1.15 Southwest 0.82 0.74 0.37 0.33 0.36 0.46 1.59 1.24 0.81 0.56 0.46 0.70 
Start-up 
America 0.67 na 0.94 3.42 2.24 1.41 1.65 1.76 1.73 
West 
Braniff II 1.22 2.20 1.44 4.77 4.14 -
- - 2.75 
Jet America 2.04 3.19 
- - - - - 2.62 
Midway 1.45 3.37 1.29 5.83 2.67 1.64 1.42 2.06 2.47 
Midwest Exp. 0.00 0.00 
Muse 0.55 0.55 
New York A 1.40 2.30 4.36 - - -
- -
2.69 
People Expr. 2.90 4.54 7.90 
- - - - -
5.11 
Charter 
Am. Trans 4.81 - 1.28 3.05 1.63 2.70 
Air 
Capitol 30.8 26.8 28.6 
- - - -
28.73 
Tower Air 5.29 3.09 4.19 4.19 
Transamerica 5.6 5.86 4.34 5.24 2.58 
- - - - -
- 4.72 
World 22.3 10.5 3.39 6.11 11.2 18.3 
- - - -
11.97 
NEAveraJ!e 10.9 7.77 6.24 1.91 3.10 4.32 3.75 2.57 1.84 1.49 1.32 4.20 
fncu. Average 3.07 2.24 1.66 1.57 1.73 2.05 8.55 5.01 2.44 1.89 1.56 4.17 
. . Source: Air Transport World '79 - '92. Empty squares denote non avaIlablhty of data or that the arrlme was not operating . 
3.6 Conclusion 
The environment for deregulation was favourable due to a fading belief in 
government interference, successful deregulation in California and Texas leading to 
lower fares than in interstate air transportation, broken unity of airlines due to the 
route moratorium among other factors, increased influence of the consumer 
movement and finally the Kennedy hearings that criticised heavily the inefficiencies of 
the prevailing system. 
The Deregulation Act provided for gradual deregulation. In 1984 the CAB was fully 
terminated and the remaining functions were moved to the DoT. The functions 
remaining were among other things, the small community subsidy program and the 
merger approval. 
Developments in regulation following deregulation have been primarily in the area of 
competition enhancement as the incumbent airlines have been successful in 
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developing tools that have raised the barriers to entry. This regulation has been 
mainly concerned with CRS, mergers and advertising. 
The industry has had three main loss periods since deregulation, 1981 - 1983, 1986, 
1990 - 1993. The alleged reasons for industry losses were increases in fuel prices, 
merger activity and overcapacity. 
Concentration has increased since deregulation as in 1979, 25 carriers had 1 percent 
mar~et share or more at 50 of the largest airports, but in 1991 there were only 15 
carners. 
Hub and spoke networks were considered the most important strategic tool of the 
industry following deregulation. Market-share analysis of airlines shows that those 
airlines having dominant position on one or more airports were more likely to survive 
at least for longer periods than those not having such position. In the last few years 
there has been increased attention on direct service carriers like Southwest as its 
constant profit performance is better than for most larger carriers. Southwest's 
efficiency is first and foremost, because of its high fleet utilisation attitude: quick 
tum-around at gates, direct services, short-haul, high quality service although it is of 
no-frills type and its gradual growth. 
Carriers are sometimes forced into bankruptcy in-order to secure loans from loan 
institutions that want DIP protection. This often leads to untimely bankruptcy that 
could have been avoided and therefore the associated drop in demand. Chapter XI 
carriers operating under protection from the creditors during reorganisation have to 
offer attractive fares to maintain demand as passengers and T A may circumvent the 
bankrupt carrier otherwise, but incumbents can just as well initiate fare wars in order 
to undermine the financial condition of the bankrupt carrier in order to eliminate a 
competitor. 
Quality of service measured in terms of complaint's rates, has increased from 1988, 
while in 1979 the average rate reached its highest or 8. 11 complaints per 100.000 
passengers. The period 1987 to 1988 was also poor due to problems in route sys~e~ 
integration following the high merger activity in 1985-1987, as well as unreahstlc 
scheduling in order to gain better CRS display listing. 
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Part II. 
New-entrants in The United States 
Under Deregulation 
In this part of the thesis the new-entrant airlines' case under deregulation will be 
addressed. First, the new-entrants will be identified and their various characteristics. 
Then the new-entrants' origin and its impact on initial operations and strategy will be 
analysed. Second, the operating environment of new-entrants will be analysed in 
terms of barriers to entry and government influence. Third, the operating 
characteristics of new-entrants will be described in detail. Fourth, the competition 
reality of new-entrants will be analysed in terms of strategy selection. Fifth, the case 
of the European Union liberalisation will be analysed in comparison with US 
Deregulation in order to give a perspective on the difference of the two. 
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4. The New-entrant Airlines 
4.1 Introduction 
T~e pu~ose of this chapter is to introduce the new-entrants included in the study and 
br~e~y dISCUSS why new-entrants failed under deregulation in the context of their 
ongtn. 
It is necessary to repeat clearly that for the purpose of this study only jet operating 
carriers have been examined. As a result, airlines formed after deregulation, 
operating prop aircraft are not included unless such operation developed into jet 
operations or mixed operations constituting a major jet operation. 
4.2 New-entrants' Classification 
The thesis is based on a classification of new-entrants that may be less than straight-
forward to the reader. First of all, only jet operating airlines are covered in the thesis. 
Jet operation is different from turboprop operations as it is highly capital intensive 
and high-cost. Thus for the sake of increasing the comparability only jet operating 
carriers were selected. 
The general definition of a new-entrant in the thesis is as follows: 
A domestic or international airline established after deregulation or 
liberalisation of a domestic market or bilateral route; or a regional, 
intrastate, charter or cargo carrier that expanded scheduled passenger 
operations after the regulatory change. 
The main groups of new-entrants that resulted from the above definition, were: (i) 
start-up new-entrants; (ii) intrastate new-entrants; (iii) regional based new-entrants; 
and (iv) charter based new-entrants. There was no new-entrant in scheduled 
passenger operations that originated from cargo operations. 
Figure 4-1, shows the underlying method of grouping the new-entrants and why 
individual carriers are included in the project. As the DoT classification is based on 
revenues a carrier that starts coast to coast service would usually be classified as , 
small regional or large regional during the first operating year. Therefore, a start-up 
carrier can only advance from that category to small regional and then from there to 
the other classes. In the study a start-up carrier is not included unless it has operated 
for one full accounting year, as a prerequisite for inclusion in the questionnaire survey 
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and three years for inclusion in the failure prediction model Afte thr f 
. . . . r ee years 0 
operatlons a Jet operatmg carrier has usually advanced to the larger revenue classes. 
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At the beginning of deregulation a new-entrant could have come from the ranks of 
existing small regionals, from charters or large regionals. New entry is therefore 
characterised by advancement from a lower class to a larger class with the exception 
of charters and cargo carriers that are classified as such regardless of size. 
The thin lines in the figure show from left to right the direction of new-entrance and 
the thick lines to the far right, the possible development path of the new-entrant. The 
reason for including the whole development path from relatively small size to large 
size is the fact that these are all carriers that derive their existence or ability to 
expand, on the national or international level. 
4.3 Basic Characteristics of New-entrants' Groups 
As the Airline Deregulation Act took effect there were five basic shifts in the industry 
structure: (i) trunk and national carriers entered markets previously unavailable 
during regulation, (ii) intrastate carriers expanded into the adjacent states or further, 
(iii) supplemental carriers started scheduled operations, (iv) small regionals expanded 
to higher density routes, and (v) new airlines emerged. 
Most jet-operating new-entrants have been characterised by exceptionally fast growth 
in their first months and years of operation. Such fast growth shows clearly that 
consumer markets develop extreme demand if the price is right. Southwest Airline 
one of the former intrastate carriers is a clear example of such occurrence as its 
ultra-low fares cause dramatic increase in demand. The carrier states, in fact, that it 
is competing with the car rather than other airlines. This statement tells more than 
many words of the impact low-fare new-entrant carriers have had on air travel in the 
United States. They, more than anything else, have made it possible for a large 
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segment of the market to use air travel, that they would, otherwise, not have done at 
the pre-deregulation fares. 
As Chapter 6, will explain in detail, early new-entrants were better capitalised than 
the more recent new-entrants, something that indicates greater financial barriers to 
entry than existed during the early years of deregulation. As will become apparent in 
Chapter 7, other barriers to entry have been somewhat reduced as the upsurge of 
new-entry after 1992 attests. 
Most new-entrants have a common advantage, that is lower costs,87 than the 
incumbents, thus, they offer lower fares for comparable product. This seems to be a 
secure ticket to success until one examines the record that shows almost total failure 
rate for new-entrants. 
The reasons for new-entrants' problems are numerous, but can be divided into three 
main facets: (i) managerial problems; (ii) industry barriers; and (iii) adverse 
environment. The managerial problems are extremely hard to address as one can 
look at management as art rather than science. One can deny that management is 
usually the reason for most company failures. What most find hard to accept is the 
fact that management has alternatives in any decision and those decisions shape the 
companies ability to deal with the environment. So basically a company does not fail 
due to adverse economic climate or competitors predatory behaviour. Lets examine 
the latter one. An airline enters a competitor's hub airport and fails as a result. It can 
claim that the incumbent used predation to crush it. The reason for the failure, 
though, was the management decision to enter the hub airport in the face of poor 
legal protection against predation. 88 Hence, the airline took a risk and risk can cause 
failure, success or everything in-between. 
Industry barriers are more obvious and limit the new-entrants options, although, it is 
management's decision whether to go ahead while a specific barrier IS not yet 
overcome. 
Adverse environment can affect the new-entrant negatively if it is assuming a 
favourable economic climate but encounters a storm This happens frequently when 
the airline's resources are exceeded so that it can only survive in a favourable climate 
because management ignores the fact that all economic systems are cyclical by 
nature. 
The study will assume that the airline is a holistic system whose good or bad 
performance depends on the quality of interaction between its components. The 
model describing these parts and how they interact can be found in Chapter 1. 
4.3.1 Regional Airlines 
Under increased pressure in the early forties, to provide increased service to smaller 
communities the CAB created a level of scheduled service called 'local service'. The 
87 See for example: Elizabeth Bailey and Jeffrey R. Williams, The Journal of Law & Economics, April, 1988, 
pp.191-193. 
88 Smaller new-entrants can not even go to court with a perfectly good cause due to the legal costs involved. 
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resulting 'local carriers' were then subsidised to provide 'essential' service to this 
communities. In the late fifties, there was a substantial pressure to cut this subsidies 
in order to reduce the Government deficit. To accomplish this the local carriers were 
allowed to serve the higher density routes in order to be able to cross-subsidise the 
thinner ones. This, however, shifted the carriers' focus into the more profitable 
markets leaving the small communities with the minimum government required 
service of two flights a day. 89 
As the local carriers started to abandon some of the most unprofitable markets a gap 
was left for 'air taxis' operating small aircraft. These carriers were not regulated by 
the CAB and did not receive subsidies from the government. As a result of this 
development the CAB recognised air taxis as 'third level' 'commuter' carriers in 
1969. Consequently, they were allowed to make agreements with the local carriers to 
take over the most unprofitable routes on the terms of receiving part or all of the 
subsidy payments meant for the local carrier. To facilitate the commuter service the 
CAB gradually reduced the restrictions in terms of aircraft size until the passing of 
the Airline Deregulation Act when these carriers were allowed to fly aircraft up to 60 
seats. After the passage of the Act these carriers increased the number of exclusively 
subsidised routes served, from 112 to 266 out of 316 subsidy points. This shift in 
commuter carriers' importance governed the change in the name from 'commuters' 
to 'regionals' in the early 1980's.90 
Table 4-1 Regional Based New-entrants 
Regional carriers Entered service Ended service Explanation 
Air Wisconsin 198291 1992 Acquired by United Airlines 
Empire 198092 1986 Acquired by Piedmont 
Horizon 1981 1986 Ac uired b Alaska 
Included are only carriers that operated jets to some extent. The table is based on the starting year of jet-operations. 
The deregulators in the United States recognised that it was not enough to increase 
competition between existing carriers but there had to be ample scope for entry ~r 
new carriers. This was accomplished through the Loan Guarantee Program. 
Another no less important aspect was the guarantee of service to small communities 
for ten years. 94 On the basis of 'essential air service' scheme airlines serving small 
89 Feldman, Joan, Regional airlines in the USA, Travel & Tourism An~lyst, The Economist Pub. Ltd., May 
1987. In fact from 1959 to 1963, 128 cities were abandoned by the earners 
90 Op. cit. (Feldman), p. 16. 
91 Began operations in 1965 and jet operations in 1982. 
92 Started service as Oneida Aviation in 1975, but began F28 jet operations in 1980. 
93 The FAA Loan Guarantee Program existed before the 1978 Deregulation Act but was e;..:p~ded \\ i th the 
. . . . tat d harter carriers Each earner could gam Act's passage to mclude ehgIble commuters, mtras e an c . . 
guarantee of up to $100 million for up to 15 years. l?e pro~am was ?~~ on the FAA guaranteemg a loan 
amounting to 90 percent of the purchase price of arrcraft, If the petltlonmg ~er was lillable to sec~e 
uninsured loan elsewhere on reasonable terms, given certain provisions the carner had to fulfil. The resu ts 
of the program was to make it easier for new-entrants to secure loans at favourable terms. 
94 Bailey, Elizabeth E., Graham, David, R., Kaplan, Daniel P., Deregulating the Airlines, MIT Press, 1985, p. 
4. 
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communities would receive subsidies until 1988. However, in the bill it was made 
poss~ble for a carrier to bump out an other carrier receiving subsidies, if it could 
provIde the same level of service without the subsidy payments. 
Some ~f the region~ls did .not ~ake ~ny major changes in their strategy immediately 
followmg deregulatIon. Air Wisconsm for example kept its initial strategy of serving 
short-haul routes between medium sized communities and major hubs (O'Hare). 
What changed for Air Wisconsin was the increased competition and faster growth 
than anticipated. The reason for the accelerated growth was primarily the reduction 
or suppression of service by United and Republic following deregulation. This 
development at Air Wisconsin characterises many of the regionals during the early 
deregulation years. Not only in terms of picking up routes abandoned by the majors 
but also in starting jet operations with small jets like the BAe 146, BAC-Il1 or F28, 
as Air Wisconsin did on short-haul routes from a hub to communities with a 
population of 100 thousand inhabitants or more. 95 
The third new aspect of deregulation for regionals was their changing status in the 
CRSs and the resulting shift from interlining to code-sharing with the majors. Many 
regionals lost their separate image and independence as they secured closer ties with 
the incumbents, turning them into an extension of the major's image, by becoming a 
feeder carrier under the major's name; United Express, Continental Express and so 
forth. Under such scheme the carriers loose control as one can see from the fact that 
many of these carriers have sold-out to the majors or failed, Air Wisconsin being the 
largest fatality in this terms. This aspect of their strategy will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7. 
Another route for the regionals was to become a fully independent jet operator. One 
such carrier Empire Airlines began operations in 1975, operating small prop aircraft. 
Deregulation, led its founder Paul Quackenbush to steer his regional airline into 
filling gaps left by the majors in New York State, but deregulation had caused the 
incumbents to leave many low density routes. As a result, Empire acquired F28' s, 
85 passenger jets in 1980. Empire became a fully fledged jet operator focusing on 
hub strategy out of Syracuse to the immediate area, including Canada. Conversely, 
Horizon Air like Air Wisconsin, selected a strategy in-between, operating a mixed 
fleet of turboprops and jets. 
The regional new-entrants took advantage of deregulation at a slower pha~e o~ l~ss 
grandiose scale than the intrastate and start-up carriers, perhaps due to thelr eXlstmg 
experience of operating next to the majors. All the airlines listed in Table 4-1. entered 
jet operations and all failed with Air Wisconsin being the last casualty, acqulred and 
dismantled by United in 1992-1993. 
4.3.2 Charter Based Airlines 
Shortly after the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 the CAB ~ssued an 
exempt order authorising non-scheduled operations. After World War I~, this type of 
operations received a boost with the availability of large surplus war alrcraft. As a 
95 Air Transport World, Sept., 1982. pp.79-82. 
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result of increased activity the Board changed the exemption regulation to divide the 
irregulars into two groups, large- and small irregulars. The change in the regulation 
prohibited the large irregulars to operate regularly, that is more than 12 flights per 
month between any two points. 
In 1962 supplemental carriers were granted certificates to provide non-scheduled 
charter services.96 Due to increased fare competition in the seventies with the trunks, 
the supplementals entered their decline period that reached its height with the advent 
of deregulation in 1978. 
Charter airlines are heavily depended on tour operators, meaning that the decision to 
start scheduled operations involves setting up basically all the necessary 
infrastructure, except flight operations. This has placed the charters in almost a 
similar situation as any start-up carrier except that the charter has fully operational 
flight department from the outset. The downside is, however, that the flight 
equipment is usually long-range wide-body aircraft only suitable on highly 
competitive long-haul domestic or international routes. Following deregulation the 
scheduled incumbents exited many unprofitable short-haul routes and increased their 
emphasis on medium to long-haul domestic routes, limiting the charters' 
competitiveness even further. As the domestic passenger growth levelled off the 
incumbents then increased the stress on international routes increasing even further 
the constraints on the charter based new-entrants. 
Table 4-2 Charter Based New-entrants 
Airline and origin Entered scheduled Ended scheduled 
service service 
Charter based carriers 
American Trans Air 199297 
Capitol 1979 1984 
Carnival 198898 
Morris Air 199299 1994 
National Airlines 1993100 
Tower 1983 
World 1979 1985 





Acquired by Southwest 
Still operating ('94) 
Still operating 
Bankru tc 
With deregulation the charters lost a large portion of their market to the scheduled 
carriers due to reduction in fares on scheduled routes. The logical answer seemed 
therefore to enter the scheduled market like many charter carriers did. The charters 
that did not take that route fared poorly and most failed, such as: McCulloch, ONA 
and Saturn. Evergreen, on the other hand, turned to cargo operati?ns and became 
successful there. Carriers like Capitol, World, TIA, Transamenca, Tower and 
American Trans Air, entered scheduled operations and fared differently. Capitol, 
96 Charters were called supplementals in the United States, but the term 'charter' \\i11 be used in this study. 
97 Limited scheduled operations, mostly charter. The carrier did not gain scheduled authority on its 0\\11 until 
the date specified in the table. 
98 Established from the assets of Pacific Interstate Airlines. 
()() Started as a charter carrier in 1984. 
100 Started service in 1988 as Private Jet Expeditions. 
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T.I~ TransAmerica and World went soon out of business. Tower with a clear-cut 
ruche market and America Trans Air with sophisticated structure of peripheral 
businesses have succeeded so far. 
All of the carriers that entered scheduled operations strived to maintain their charter 
base by ~xing it with scheduled and cargo operations. Even that strategy did not 
work readIly for the former supplementals, although it can not be said to be the cause 
of their troubles, rather on the contrary. This mixing of types of operations allowed 
World, for example, to scale down to the charter base when scheduled operations ran 
into difficulties. 
An important characteristic of new-entrant charter based carriers was much longer 
stage lengths due to the necessity to be able to offer long distance international flights 
for tour operators; long-distance holiday markets like Mexico, Virgin Islands, Europe 
and other popular holiday destinations. It is noteworthy that consumer complaints are 
high for these airlines as can be seen from table 3.17 in Chapter 3. One possible 
explanation is the vulnerability of long distance route system to extensive delays 
throughout the network in the case of mechanical delay, acts of god and ad-hoc 
charters that are sometimes given priority over poorly booked scheduled flights. 
Furthermore, these airlines tend to operate both scheduled and charter flights with the 
same equipment increasing aircraft utilisation but also increasing the possibility of 
delays. 
One of the more recent charter-based new-entrants, Morris Air had considerable 
initial success, but sold-out to Southwest in 1994. Morris Air was apparently not in 
financial difficulties as it made $10 million operating profit and $4.5 net profit in 
1993. The motivation behind the merger that was initiated by Morris Air may have 
been sheer profit motive in the face of increased competition from Delta at the Salt 
Lake City Hub that might have diluted the well-being of the airline. Thus once again 
a charter-based new-entrant disappeared. 
The charters lacked customer recognition and were, therefore, just like any other new 
airline starting operations in a new market. Furthermore, the charter carriers in the 
United States were prohibited to integrate vertically and operate tour operating 
companies. Thus, the advantage of charters over new carriers seems ~o have b~en 
limited to easier access to capital, less preparation time in terms of fulfilhng operatmg 
regulation as the operation is licensed and ready. In other aspects the ch~rters ran 
into similar problems of securing an effective distribution system and carvmg out a 
niche and protecting it. 
4.3.3 Intrastate Airlines 
As early as 1946 the state of California had liberal view toward~ entrance of new 
airlines in its intrastate market. This lead to 18 new-entrants untIl 1975 but only 3 
remained in service at the end of the period. In 1965, one of the proponents of 
deregulation, Michael Levine reported that the deregulated market b~t.ween Los 
Angeles and San Francisco was benefiting the consumers by the proVlslon of the 
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lowest 'overland' fares in the world and 300 percent increase in passengers over the 
period from 1959 until 1965.101 
The state of Texas had similar liberated views, although, the state controlled entry, 
but not far~s. Southwest had therefore, a substantial advantage in 1978 with the 
adve.nt of mterstate deregulation by having experience with differential pricing, 
speclfic~lly "o~-peak" a~d "p~ak-pricing". Southwest's advantage was also 
substantIal .havmg e~penence m low-fare operations, while the competition 
trans~erred Its emphaSIs to fare-competition from service-competition after 1978. 
The Idea of Southwest's operations was, nevertheless, not unique as Pacific 
Southwest Airlines (PSA) began operations in 1949, initiating the low-fare, no-frills 
concept. 102 
As deregulation came into effect these carriers expanded their services into the 
adjacent states. The most aggressive in terms of such expansion was Air Florida, that 
actually cut off its intrastate operations, focusing on domestic and international 
routes until bankruptcy in 1984. 
Table 4-3 




















Acquired by American 
Bankruptcy/acquired by Midway 
Acquired by USAir 
Still 0 atin 
The first carrier listed in the table is not included in the analysis in the following chapters. 
Of the former intrastate carriers only Alaska Airlines and Southwest are still 
operating, Air California and PSA were acquired by American and USAir 
respectively, but Air Florida was acquired by Midway after bankruptcy. 
4. 3. 4 New Airlines 
Start-up airlines entered usually on the basis of much lower costs than the 
incumbents. Thus, being able to offer lower fares. Their entrance strategies have 
been varied but fall basically into three categories; (i) low-fare, no-frills service; (ii) 
low fare, full-frills; and (iii) standard fare, premium service. In addition to these there 
was, of course, a difference in their strategy pertaining to hub op~ration, p~int to 
point or being a feeder carrier. It is apparent that the start-up carners selectmg to 
operate hub service from an underserved metropolitan airpo~ at the dawn. of 
deregulation experienced explosive growth; People Express, Midway ~d Ame~ca 
West fall into this category. Other carriers experienced less success WIth premIUm 
service carriers at the bottom of the roster. 
IOIOp. cit. (Levine, 1965), pp. 1430-1433. 
I02Meyer, John R., Clinton V. and Oster J.R., Deregulation and the New Airline Entrepreneurs, MIT Press. 
1984. p.22 
59 
From the start of deregulation in the United States until the end of 1992 there were 
168 new certificates issued for new carriers, of these there were only 56 still flying. 103 
The greatest number of new start -ups was from 1979 to 1981 when 55 new carriers 
started ope~a~ions and from 1983 to 1985 when other 55 carriers started operations. 
As the theSIS IS only concerned with jet operating carriers the record is even worse as 
Table 4-4. shows. Of th.e 26 airl~nes listed 15 went bankrupt, 5 were acquired by 
other carners, five are st111 operatmg and one became a charter carrier solely. Only 
America West has re-emerged from Chapter XI bankruptcy. 
Table 4-4 Start-up Jet Operating New-entrants 
Airline and origin Entered service Ended service Explanation 
New carriers 
Air Atlanta 1984 1986 Bankruptcy 
Air Chicago 1980 1982 Bankruptcy 
Air One 1983 1984 Bankruptcy 
America West 1983 1994 Chapter XI (re-emerged) 
American International 1982 1984 Bankruptcy 
Florida Express 1984 1988 Acquired by Braniff 
Frontier Horizon 1984 1985 Bankruptcy 
Hawaii Express 1982 1983 Bankruptcy 
Jet America 1982 1986 Acquired by Alaska 
Kiwi 1992 Still operating('94) 
McClain Airlines 1986 1987 Bankruptcy 
MGMrand Air 1987 1993 Started charter only 
Midway I 1979 1991 Bankruptcy 
Midway II 1994 Still operating ('95) 
Midwest Express 1984 Still operating 
Muse (Transtar) 1981 1985 Acquired by Southwest 
New York Air 1980 1985 Acquired by Continental 
Northeastern 1982 1984 Bankruptcy 
Pacific East 1982 1984 Bankruptcy 
Pacific Express 1982 1984 Bankruptcy 
People Express 1981 1986 Acquired by Continental 
Presidential 1985 1989 Bankruptcy 
Reno 1992 Still operating('94) 
Sunworld 1983 1988 Bankruptcy 
ValuJet 1993 Still operating(,94) 
Ultr Air 1993 1994 Bankru tc 
Please note that this table is not fully exhaustive of new-cntrant jet carriers as some of these carriers entered bankruptcy very soon 
after initiation of operations, leaving little information in the literature. 
The best known start-ups during early deregulation were: Midway Airlines(1979); 
New York Air(1980); and in 1981 there was People Express, Muse Air, Sun Pacific, 
Sun Air, Pacific Express and Air Chicago. 
A substantial reduction occurred in new start-ups from 1985 until 1991, or 33 fewer 
airlines started operations then, than in the period before. In 1992 start-ups increased 
again to 15 new start-ups in that year alone. The market-share of new-entrants 
increased from 1978 to 1985 by 346 percent, or from 3 to 10.4 percent market-share. 
During the same period the former local carriers gained 30.5 percent increase from 
9. 1 in 1978 to 13. 1 percent in 1985. 
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Source: The Avmark Aviation Economist, March 1993, 
4.4 Conclusion 
Most new-entrants have failed . The reasons are various but the main cause must be 
considered to be the management of these airlines. 
All jet operating regional based new-entrants have been acquired by other airlines. 
Regional based new-entrants operated usually a mixed fleet of turboprop and jet 
aircraft , Their operations were centred around feeding agreements with a major 
carrier on short-haul routes out of a hub , 
Charter based new-entrants operated on long-haul domestic and international routes. 
They operated mixed charter and scheduled operations. There are four charter-based 
new-entrants operating and two of those have had some success for a considerable 
time. Charter carriers have not found a successful niche in long haul operations with 
the exception of Tower Air. 
The former intrastate carriers still operating have had considerable success with 
Southwest being United State's most profitable carrier since deregulation. 
The number of start-up new-entrants has been phenomenal but all pre-1990 carriers 
have failed with the exception of Midwest Express. 
The next chapter will give a comprehensive analysis on the operating environment of 
the new-entrants in order to shed some light on the role of the environment in their 
failures . 
l04Inc1ude all i ued and cancelled operating rtificate, both jet and turbo operators. 
61 
5. The New-entrants' Operating 
Environment 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the attitude of the lawmaker and the regulator towards new-entrant 
airlines will be analysed. The operating environment will be analysed in terms of 
barriers to entry. The chapter will be focused on the issue from the stand-point of the 
new-entrant, first and foremost. 
An important characteristic of the airline industry is that economies of scale are not 
considered to be present. This apparent fact, discussed in Chapter 2, makes the 
airline industry theoretically easy to enter. However, as will be discussed in this 
chapter incumbent airlines have erected other barriers to entry that have been quite 
effective. In addition, infrastructure barriers have limited the availability of valuable 
scarce resources to new-entrants making competition less viable or simply impossible 
in many markets. 
5.2 The Regulator's Policy Towards The New-entrants 
When new-entrants emerge in the form of new or expanding small carriers the staying 
power of the large incumbents is certainly a barrier to entry unless there are rules to 
play by. In fact the ground-rules for the treatment of new-entrants were paved before 
deregulation. The Chicago Midway 'Low Fare Route Proceeding' before the CAB, 
dealt with two new-entrants that had made an argument for a lead-time or a 
protected corridor, against competition by the incumbents. In this case the CAB 
ruled that: 
It is one thing to grant a new entrant the opportunity to compete; one need 
have no concern in these circumstances about its ability to meet the public 
need, since others are present to provide service if it fails to do so. It is a 
very different thing to make an award to a nonoperating firm and then 
erect regulatory shields that were not there before to protect it in the hope 
h 0 Oil ° lOS t at It WI survIve. 
A dissenting member of the Board, O'Melia, found on the contrary, a reason to 
exclude incumbents from Chicago's Midway airport and, what is more, from 
105CAB order 78-7-40, at 5. 
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matching the new-entrant's fares for one year in order to protect them. 106 The Board 
stated on 0 'Melia's dissenting view that: 
New entrants if they succeed must do so in an environment that assures all 
carriers a fair opportunity to compete - not in one that requires ever 
increasing regulatory restraints of so flagrantly discriminatory a kind, even 
for limited period of time.... Moreover, if we impose restrictions to protect 
Midway Airlines today, we create a precedent for imposing a restriction on 
that carrier tomorrow to protect another new entrant. Leaving aside for the 
moment the possibility of preemption or predation by existing carriers, the 
success new entrants have in carving out their share of the market must 
depend primarily on their superior innovation or efficiency - not on such 
extreme restrictions on competition as the ones we are now excusing. lo7 
This view was the general attitude to new-entrants in the marketplace, which is not 
strange in view of the notion at the time, barriers to entry were limited. If frequent 
flyer programs, CRS bias and yield management systems had existed under 
regulation, new-entrants might have done better than they actually did in gaining 
protection. 
The Deregulation Act did, however, mention new entry, by calling for: 
... the encouragement of entry into air transportation markets by new air 
carriers, the encouragement of entry into additional air transportation 
markets by existing air carriers, and the continued strengthening of small 
• • 108 
aIr carrIers •.• 
In order to manifest the above Congress issued in a Statement of Policy, an objective 
of maintaining a system of convenient and continuous scheduled service for small 
communities. 109 However, a direct provision for the enhancement of new entry by 
new carriers was not considered necessary beside the provisions in the act where 
entry and exit was open to any carrier. Congress did, however, retain the provision 
to permit the Board to act on 'predatory' fares. l1O Nevertheless, the Senate 
Committee concerned itself with the possibility of the CAB limiting low-fare 
competition on the basis of this provision in the Act. As a result the Senate issued in 
a report, III a limitation on the application of this provision: 
Thus the Committee would not expect the Board to strike down a low-fare 
level which represents genuine competition simply because it would tend to 
decrease the revenues of less efficient carriers in the market or perhaps force 
I06It played a role in this case that Chicago's Midway airport was on the verge of failure due to lack of services 
at the time. 
I07Op. cit. (CAB order), Midway, majority opinion, at 31-32. 
I08See Section 102(a) (10) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 as amended in 1979. 
I09See Section 102 (a) (8) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 as amended in 1979. 
11 0 See Section 1002 (d)(4)(B) of the Federal Aviation Act of1958 as amended in 1979. 
111 Senate Report 107. 
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from a given market carriers who were not able to provide the price and 
service mix which the passenger in that market desired. 1l2 
The argument for the protection of new-entrants is perhaps stronger than ever in 
view of the fact that they have not been able to mount an effective long-term 
competition with the incumbents, as almost all new jet operating airlines have gone 
bankrupt or been acquired by other carriers. Thus, when the Board talks about 'an 
encouragement that assures all carriers a fair opportunity to compete' it is perhaps 
important to recognise that a 'laissez faire' attitude towards the whole industry may 
not yield what deregulation is supposed to accomplish, namely to maximise the 
consumer benefit. For, if the incumbents can create effective barriers to entry 
without long-term reduction of fares, like a new carrier could,l13 the consumer will be 
worse off. As a result a 'consumer driven' legislature will approach the maximum 
consumer benefit only by protecting new-entrants through the 'elimination' of 
predatory behaviour and unequal access to information generators. The result of 
such movement of the legislature will create increased resistance since the large 
incumbents may loose market-share. 





Deregulation ---~) Time 
Immediately when such a change in regulation will threaten t~e large in~u~be~t' s 
chance of survival forceful resistance will occur. This can be saId to be an mdlcatlOn 
that the incumben; enters what can be termed as the conflict contour in Figure 5-1. In 
fact there is a trade-off between consumer and airline benefit. As one increases it 
will' be at a cost to the other, thus, the larger the pressure and gain on the consumer 
h ° 1° °d 114 Th side the greater the resistance and inefficiencies caused on t e aIr me 51 e. e 
lI2Op. cit. (Senate report 107), p. II. 
I 13 Most new carriers have lower cost structure and can, therefore, lowe~ fares to all passengers. Furthennore, 
the sustainability of their fare structure is long term but for the large mcumbents low fares are usua11~ short-
term. 
114This is along the lines of the cost of safety. The cost.ofa.~rfectly safe car would be immense and n~tviable 
because it would cost the customer more than he IS Wl11mg to pay ... Thus, there \\111 be an eqU1hbn~ 
between safety costs and price in the market. The same goes for arrlmes as the maxlffium benefit to .e 
consumer 
is a fare approaching zero and constant departures to each des~atlOn. Such a system. IS 
. .. d'd d That h uld the system stnve inconceivable but can be approached given that the pnontles are ~1 e . IS, S O. . ~, 'J 
for low fares primarily: low fares and high frequency: low farcs, high frequency and high sen Ice standard. 
64 
long-term benefit f~r both ,:ill be more efficiency but better adapted operation to 
c?~sum~r demands III the wider sense of the word. Meaning that not only will the 
alrhne Industry approach its customers but also other stake-holders like 
environmental protection groups. ' 
The Clinton Government took a favourable stand on new-entrants as the upsurge of 
new-ent.rants and t.ougher stand ?n. anti-competitive behaviour that facilitates entry. 
The Chnton nomtnated Coffimtsslon to 'Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline 
Indust~'. ~oncluded that ~ew-entrance was important in 'sustaining future 
competItion. Furthermore, It concluded that entry of 'new competitors creates 
downward pressure on ticket prices, reduces expenses for business and individual 
travellers, and stimulates total traffic.' 115 
5.3 The General Theory of Barriers to Entry 
5.3.1 General Barriers 
One of the pertinent issues of deregulation was the freedom to enter the industry. 
This was rooted in the assumption that the entrance of new low-cost airlines would 
cause fares to come down and the incumbents to lower their costs in order to become 
competitive. The new-entrants have, however, faced effective barriers to entry not 
anticipated prior to deregulation. 
There are eleven general barriers to entry possible, these are named by Porter in his 
landmark book on competitive strategy of these seven are relevant to this analysis: 116 
(i) The first barrier is economies of scale, which forces the entrant to enter at a large 
scale risking forceful retaliation from the incumbents or to come in at a small scale, 
usually in a niche market but at an cost disadvantage. It has been argued that 
economies of scale are limited in the airline industry. 117 Moreover, the new-entrants 
are usually at a cost-advantage; (ii) the second barrier is product differentiation, 
which forces the entrant to spend heavily to overcome existing customer loyalties. A 
representation of this in air transport markets are the frequent flyer programs; (iii) the 
third barrier is high capital requirements to be able to compete. This is a particularly 
hard barrier to overcome if capital is required for unrecoverable cost areas like 
advertising or customised information systems. Also the necessity of substantial 
capital outlays to create presence in a market is definitely a barrier to entry for new-
entrant airlines. While aircraft have been available during recessions under favourable 
leasing terms they are less of a barrier than one could presume; (iv) the fourth barrier 
is switching costs, which are the particular costs of the buyer of switching the 
supplier of the product or service he consumes. In the airline industry, this switching 
cost is particularly low, thus, lowering this barrier to entry. However, the airlines 
The ultimate balance has to be a segmented equilibrimn between the service demanded and the pncc the 
customer is willing to pay. 
11 'Change, Challenge and Competition, The National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline 
Industry: A report to the President and Congress, August 1993, p.18. 
116Porter, Michael E., Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analysing Industries and Competitors, The Free 
Press, 1980. 
117 Op. cit. (Levine, 1987), p. 40 l. 
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have sought to increase this switching costs on the individual level by introducing the 
frequent flyer programs; (v) the fifth barrier to entry is access to distribution 
channels. This is a notable barrier for new-entrants as airline's distribution outlets are 
extrem~l~ dispersed making it hard to influence individual travel agents. Thus, a 
small aIrlIne may have considerable difficulty in making its presence felt in the market. 
This is due to the tendency of travel agents to book those carriers that provide them 
with volume commission overrides118 or are reputable and well known carriers; (vi) 
the sixth barrier is cost disadvantages independent of scale. These can be advantages 
of the incumbents due to location, contacts, experience and information; and (vii) the 
seventh barrier is government policy. The government can in spite of liberal law, 
limit or even hinder entry completely by making seemingly secondary regulation like 
licensing or access to necessary resources too strict for most or all potential entrants 
to overcome. This was the way in which the Australian government maintained its 
two airline policy~ it placed import embargoes on aircraft. 119 
Porter mentions relative additivity of entry barriers as the foundation of a firm's 
decision to enter or not. Therefore, if the prevailing prices which balance the 
potential rewards of entry with the expected costs of overcoming structural entry 
barriers, and risks of retaliation are higher than the forecast profits, entry will be 
unlikely. 120 
5.3.2 Levine's Air Transport Barriers 
Levine has identified three main barriers to entry in air transport. These are 
economies of scope, density and information: 121 (i) economies of scope are present 
when advantages result from the number of destinations or market segments served. 
In air transport, economies of scope can manifest itself in information efficiencies and 
efficiencies due to exploitation of principal-agent effects 122, an advantage not 
available to a smaller airline to the same degree; 123 (ii) economies of density is it 
called when greater utilisation of capacity is achieved by concentrating city-pair 
markets into a hub and spoke system that allows the gathering of few passengers 
from each origin into one common destination flight. This boosts the load-factor for 
a flight that would be otherwise practically empty if it was a return flight between one 
of the origin points and the destination; (iii) economies of information have to do 
with the advantages of name recognition and brand loyalty. It leads to a preference 
for an airline that has been present in a market for a period of time rather than for a 
118 A new-entrant can certainly offer such ovenides. The travel agent will, however, rather book a larger carrier 
that generates more booking volume. This is due to the fact that volume breaks are higher thus pressing the 
agency to book more on the large carrier in order to maximise the agency's income. 
119 A good introduction to Australian deregulation can be found in: Button, Kenneth, Airline Deregulation: 
International Experiences, David Foulton Pub., London, 1991, pp. 48-82. 
120Op. cit. (Porter, 1980), pp. 7-17. 
12l Op. cit. (Levine, 1987), p. 419. 
122The principal - agent effect refers to the principals ~ttempt to . create ~centive~ for the. agent in order t~ 
shape his behaviour due to lack of direct control and 1lllperfect informatIOn o~ his behavIOur, or conversel~ 
create incentives or strategies to prevent negative results from an agent's behavIOur. Levme, p. 419. 
l23Op. cit. (Levine, 1987), p. 419 
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newcomer, because the consumer has not established a recognition and knowledge of 
the new product. 124 In such cases it is more comfortable to select a 'known' name 
although the newcomer may be offering superior product, because the information 
thereof may not have reached the travel agent or the customer, or the carrier has not 
'proved' itself in the market. 125 
5.4 Marketing Barriers 
5.4.1 Frequent Flyer Programs 
Frequent Flyer Programs (FFP) can make a new-entrant' s strategy to gather for 
business travellers less viable. This is due to the tendency of FFP' s members to stick 
to their carrier in order to accumulate all the miles possible. Thus, the largest carrier 
that has the most extensive route network (economies of scope) becomes the best 
choice for the mileage maximising FFP member. As soon as the itineraries of the 
business person are restricted to few routes, other smaller carrier's FFP's may 
become attractive. However, a major decision in the selection of FFP's by a 
passenger, are the rewards. As the rewards are used for personal travel, vacation for 
example, the airline has to offer some exotic vacation destinations in their route 
system: Hawaii, Bahamas, Bermuda, for etc. For some smaller carriers this is not a 
viable addition to their route system. As a result, their FFP becomes less attractive to 
the FFP member. One way to break this specific barrier is to make a marketing 
agreement with some international carrier or an other US carrier having non-
overlapping route system that includes viable holiday destinations. 
Just to show how effective frequent flyer programs are in shifting traffic, one can take 
an example of Midway Airlines that in 1988 suffered in terms of the incumbents 
triple-mileage offerings diverting traffic away from the new-entrant. The result was 
to establish a first-class primarily in order to be able to offer first class as an incentive 
in their FFP. Furthermore, in order to bolster foreign destinations in their FFP a 
marketing agreement was entered with Canadian Airlines International and Air New 
Zealand. 
5.4.2 Code-sharing 
Code-sharing acts as a barrier to entry as it can exclude carriers from entering a hub 
with dominant carriers, if marketing agreement with the hub carrier( s) can not be 
secured. This is vested in the fact that the CRS system will show flights as direct on 
one carrier through the hub, even though the there is an equipment or carrier change. 
An other factor is that the incumbent may charge proportionally higher fares for 
flights terminating at the hub in order to reduce the incentive to use other than its 
own or the code sharing partner's flights out of the hub. Furthermore, the code-
sharing partner usually gets prime location of gates to minimise walking between 
124F tt Stanley E Farris Martin T Contestable Markets and Airline Adaptability Under Deregulation, awce , .,' " 
Transportation Journal, fall 1989, p, 19. 
125To be a new-entrant in a market where failures of such carriers have been frequent or entn and exit have 
occurred frequently, can raise entn barriers as potential customers and travel agents aVOid the newcomer 
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connecting flights, but the independent new-entrant may have to settle for poorly 
located facilities. 
5.4.3 CRS's 
Most of the competitive methods and tools are readily available to new-entrants in 
the air transport industry. New-entrants can establish their own frequent flyer 
schemes, enter commercial CRS' s, establish hubs, etc. Although all airlines have 
their own internal CRS' s and some have developed those to handle reservations 
solely due to non-participation in commercial CRS' s, new-entrants did not benefit 
from the advantage of a commercial CRS ownership in terms of incremental 
revenues. 126 
The whole question of CRS' s bias in this section revolves first and foremost around 
the possible effects on the competitiveness of new-entrants. Beauvais, then chairman 
of America West, stated at a Congressional hearing in 1992, the following on the 
issue of non-host carriers in a CRS: 
Our pricing is being regulated by American. Weare being regulated in our 
pricing levels and structure, and if you deviate you are punished. In our 
opinion, being regulated by an airline is not good for anything, particularly 
the consumer and the industry. 127 
Contrary to the above view held by non-host airlines the caVIA CRS partnership 
states that: 
CRS is the reason new airline entrants can immediately get their products 
in front of the people who sell them, without any up-front costs. 
Deregulation, with the entry of so many new carriers, could never have 
taken off so quickly without CRS.128 
The two quotations above show a very different views to the CRS, one says that they 
seriously distort competition for non-host airlines and especially vulnerable new-
entrants and the other says that they are an important tool for new-entrants to make 
instant market presence at minimum cost. Both views are right, but the bias 
allegation can only be eliminated ifCRS's will be de-hosted by law. 
Although it seems to be logical that the CRS vendors can use market pricing for their 
services, it is nevertheless, questionable if one group of carriers is treated 
unfavourable in comparison to others in this respect. The DoT stated in this context: 
The carriers charged the highest fees tended to be new-entrants like 
Midway that also suffered the most from display bias. These fees raised the 
costs of such carriers and reduced their ability to otTer lower fares than the 
126Incremental revenues are those revenues that are due to the user's tendency to favour the host carrier when 
booking and also from built-in biases that cause the same advantage. 
127 Op. cit. (Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992), p. 54. A statement by Beauvais of America West. 
128Op. cit. (Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992). A statement by Gregory A. Conley VP & General 
Counsel COVIA. 
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incumbent carriers. In addition, the fear of loosing access to a major system 
caused .some ca~rier~ to promis~ .a vendor that they would not compete 
aggressively against It as a conditIon to maintaining their participation in 
the system. 129 
The United States Accounting Office stated during a Congressional hearing in 1988 
that the: 
... ~arket power of CRS vendors does inhibit new entry and threatens the 
abilIty of new-entrants to survive ... 130 
The co~nter ~rgument has been that the CRS' s hosts should be in full right to charge 
for theIr servIces based on traffic feed into the system and the importance to the 
t~avel agent to be able to book on a particular airline. Both of these arguments are 
highly unfavourable to new-entrants as they provide little traffic initially and are of 
little importance to T A's, being less known and generally less trusted due to poor 
track record in the past. 
A clause limiting the ability of a travel agency to install other CRS' s, along with a 
clause that ties the lease-price charged to the agent for the CRS to the number of 
tickets the agent sells on the CRS' s host airline, limits the new-entrant' s chance of 
having equal opportunity of selling its seats in the system, based solely on price and 
quality. 
Although CRS' s host advantage may have been to the disadvantage of new-entrants 
in the past this will be negligible in the future as such systems will become 
increasingly neutral commodity-like, information source. Thus, CRS ownership will 
not be to the airlines advantage in any other form than as an investment. 131 132 
The 1984 ruling on CRS' s bias was not beneficial to all new-entrants. The reason 
being that many smaller carriers relied on connecting traffic (interlining) from the 
majors. What happened was that connecting flights fell into the third category of 
129u.S. Department of Transportation, Study of Airline Computer Reservation Systems. DoT-P-37-88-2, May 
1988. 
13°llis GAO report was quoted in a Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Public Works and Transportation 
House of Representatives on The Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992, p. 24. 
131 The CRS's owners indicated in a Congressional Hearing on the Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 
1992, that the profitability of the CRS's had been drastically reduced due to intense competition between the 
systems and low booking fees that have not followed increases in the Consumer Price Index. As most of the 
CRS's do not release their accounts it is not possible to evaluate this statement at this time. However, it 
indicates that CRS's are perhaps not as good an investment as it was in the past. Nevertheless, it must be 
recognised that the construction of such a system involves very high sunk costs as the creators of Galileo and 
Amadeus found out and resulted in partnership with the U.S. CRS's. 
132SAS decision to withdraw from Amadeus ownership reflects this shift in strategy, but SAS considered that 
ownership of superfluous benefit based on the EC's equal functionality requirement. As .the European flag 
carriers will be under increased pressure to be profitable in a competitive deregulated enVIronment they \\111 
place increased importance on disassociating themselves with the CRS's unless they will become a major 
source of income instead of a drain. In such an environment the CRS's will not playa major role as a barrier 
to entry for new-entrants. With the neutrality of CRS's the airlines \\ill, however, fmd other ways of 
creating favourable bias towards their product. These are in the form of sales-incentives or 'commission 
overrides' and 'limited availability fares' to selected 'favourable' agents. 
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screen priority. T?is caus~d serious drop in bookings as T A's have a tendency to 
book high proportIon o.f flIghts from the first screen instead of scrolling through all 
the screens before making a selection. Air Wisconsin ran into this difficulties after 
the ruling as 80 percent of their flights were made by TA's at the time and 40 percent 
of total tr~ffic as a connection with United's flights. The change in ruling led to a 
loss of estImated 20.000 passengers in the first half of 1985.133 As a result of the 
ruling on CRS bias the connecting carriers were effectively thrown into the arms of 
the incumbents, as for many the only way to survive was to get 'associated' in order 
to get code-sharing agreement and maintain previous traffic levels. 
5.4.4 Volume Incentives 
New-entrants face a particular barrier due to travel agents' volume incentives. Such 
incentives can be in the form of VIP club memberships, overbooking privileges, 
override commissions and free tickets. These incentives provide the agents with 
competition tools to favour good clients and build loyalty to their agency. 
Furthermore, commission overrides can have major impact on the agencies' 
profitability. In view of the fact that many customers leave the choice of airline up 
to their T ~ 41 percent of business travellers and 55 percent of leisure travellers do 
so according to a 1987 Travel Agency Market survey. As a result, commission 
overrides can have major impact on T A's booking behaviour. In fact the same survey 
showed that 51 percent of T A's selected the carrier they had commission override 
agreement with, some of the time. 134,135 
A new-entrant is usually much smaller than a competing incumbent carrier, so the 
potential benefit from anew-entrant' s commission override scheme is much smaller 
than that of the incumbent's, as the volume breaks are higher but booking volume 
larger, due to the larger route structure. As a result it is only logical that the T A will 
select the incumbent if selection is possible. Pricing is of course a factor in the 
selection but price matching is the usual practice of the incumbents if a lower fare 
new-entrant enters their market, thus, nullifying the T A incentive to book the new-
entrant anyway. 
5.4.5 Yield Management Systems 
Sophisticated yield management systems (YMS) can act as an barrier to entry for 
new-entrants, as these allow the high-volume incumbent carrier to under-cut any 
fares offered on joint routes at a minimum yield reduction. 136 The state of the art 
133Air Transport World, Air Wisconsin survives the CRS blues, September, 1985, p. 34. 
134The 1987 Travel Agency Market, pp. 28-45. 
135Due to the sensitivity of the question it is likely that the actual practice of selecting the incentive carrier is 
much more widespread than the above number or frequency indicates. 
136 A landmark decision regarding the reduction of FFP as a barrier to entry was the Swedish government's 
decision to require SAS to open up its FFP to Swedish new entrants, as part of the carriers approval to take 
over Linjeflyg. The Swedish approach to the FFPs would" however, rend~ the progr~s useless, as 
distinguishing marketing factor for an airline in a domestIc market, but It would shll be etTectlve 
internationally. It should, nevertheless. be acknowledged that the FFP will not be abandoned as result of 
such a move, due to their popUlarity and built-in incentive for the business person to tra\'el perhaps more 
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~~' s were not available on the open market to begin with but only available to the 
onginal d.eveloper~ like ~erican. I~ ~s also clear that taylor fitted yield management 
systems hke that m operatIon at Bntlsh Airways is not within the reach of smaller 
airline~. In that sens~ there will be some development gap between the large 
financlally strong carners and small new-entrants in terms of yield management 
systems. 
5.5 Infrastructure Barriers 
5.5.1 Congested Airports 
Congestion at airports is one of the barriers to entry in any given market, provided 
that congestion exists. Even though congestion at an airport does not exist in terms 
of total slots offered it can certainly exist in terms of slots offered at peak demand 
periods. This means that a new-entrant will be at an disadvantage by not being able 
to offer its passengers the most competitive schedule. 
At a congested airport the incumbent has a number of alternatives to hinder the 
success of the new-entrant. First of all it can monopolise the peak hour slots, 
pushing the new-entrant into accepting a less convenient flight schedule, thus, 
limiting load factors at the outset. This is especially effective if the new-entrant is 
aiming for business passengers. Secondly, it can leave the less desirable facilities to 
the new-entrant, for example, the gates furthest from the passenger lounges, older 
run down less appealing facilities, and release gates for connecting flights that are as 
far away from each other as possible within the terminal area. Such moves can 
seriously harm the new-entrant's image. Thirdly, the incumbent can charge the new-
entrant excessively high prices for ground services monopolised by an agreement 
between the incumbent and the airport authority. In such cases, the new-entrant has 
to have its passengers come in contact with the incumbent's service personnel that 
can provide poor service on purpose. 
5.5.2 Slots 
The FAA's High Density Rule is an limiting factor, as it restricts access to slots at 
four airports: Washington National, Chicago's O'Hare and New York's Kennedy and 
La Guardia. The airlines can buy and sell slots at these and other airports but refrain 
from doing so unless under a major financial pressure, because of an airline's 
tendency to protect its market position even though it does not need some of the 
slots it possesses. 
When slots are scarce and can be bought and sold like in the United States, they 
become an asset that involves cost of acquisition, upon entry in a congested market. 
The incumbents on the other hand may have acquired the slots free of charge, if 
operating at the airport before the regulation allowed slot trading. This can. ex~lude 
the new-entrant competing on the basis of low cost and fares unless the carner IS on 
than necessary. Thus, the FFP's might tum into 'conunodity' that eve~one expects to be there. but will no~ 
consider in their decision on carrier selection, given that the Swedish approach \\111 .beco~e genera11~ 
accepted in order to reduce barriers to entry. In economic t~s we can allege that the stunul~tmg effect of 
FFP's will then be distributed to all participants in the market mstead of only one, the owner ot the program 
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marketing terms with the incumbent. This is due to the fact that the incumbent can 
rely o.n number of t~ols to fight a small competitor at an airport: sandwiching, fare 
dumpmg, frequency mcr~ase and so on. This argument turns the proverb of 'it being 
better to ~e a large fish In a small pond rather than small fish in a large pond', into a 
fact. This can be seen clearly when the section on market-share is examined 137 as 
ne~-entran~ carriers operating from dominant position at an airport, like Mid~ay at 
Midway Airport, Southwest at Love Field, America West at Phoenix and People 
Expr~ss at Newark, wi~l be in a better position to protect their turf Given that they 
are gIven the opportumty to consume the capacity of the airport in peace during the 
early stages of the operation. Presidential Airways attempted to fill a gap wide open 
at Washington Dulles Airport, as no carrier had made the airport a centre of 
operations. Immediately as the operation was initiated, United Airlines as well as 
New York Air entered the airport on large scale, thus, destroying Presidential's 
niche. The most viable strategy for a new-entrant regarding initial base airport is to 
build up a high frequency service at a secondary airport in the vicinity of a major or 
congested airport in a high density area. Exactly what America West, Southwest, 
People Express and Midway did. 
Under the High Density Rule, slots were allocated by committees representing the 
airlines and the airport authorities. As new-entrants demanded access to the slot 
controlled airports the system crumbled as all the slots were controlled by the 
incumbents. Due to this problem and the resulting dead-locks in allocating slots, the 
DoT amended the High Density Rule in December 1985 by allowing slot trading. 138 
Under the new system existing slots were allocated according to the holding in 
December 1985 and in April 1986 the airlines could trade them subject to prior 
approval from the FAA. 
In order to facilitate allocations to 'other' airlines the DoT provided for a 'use or 
loose' rule that required an airline to use the slot 65 percent of the time or the slot to 
be subject to reallocation through a lottery process. The new-entrants seemed to 
have a decent chance of obtaining slots under the new system. This was not so in 
reality as the incumbents leased their unused slots making it virtually impossible to 
reallocate slots according to the use or loose clause, as the incumbent was considered 
to be using the slot although it was actually leasing it to an other carrier. What is 
more the incumbents actively acquired slots through airline acquisitions concentrating 
the majority of slots to few major carriers. This has led to a very effective barrier to 
entry for the new-entrants and a lucrative source of income for the majors. In fact if 
a new-entrant wishes to buy a slot it would have to invest large sums of money for a 
single slot at the four major airports. To lease is, therefore, the obvious ~lte:nati~e. 
However it increases the cost structure of the new-entrant dIlutmg Its competiti~eness somewhat with the incumbent. What is more, t?e in~umbent can 
actually select to lease its slots only to airlines that are not competmg directly or are 
137 See Appendix-A 
138Slot sales have decreased since trading was activated but leasing increased, which. indicates that .the 
incmnbents will retain control in order maintain this barrier to entry, as reported m: ~lme CompetitIon: 
Industry Operating and Marketing Practices Limit Market Entry, Government AccountIng Office, Report 
RCED-90-1-l7. 
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code-sharing partn.ers. F~rth~rmore,.le~sing is usually short-term, making it hard for 
a new-entrant to smk capItal.mto bUIldmg a route, which it can loose suddenly. In 
fact only 9 percent of leases m 1988 were for more than 180 days with most lasting 
only 60 days. 139 
In. order to facilitate new entry, the FAA in 1986 held a special lottery of 152 slots 
wIthheld at the High Density airports. Only new-entrants were eligible to participate. 
Regardless of this provision these slots ended up with the incumbents and only 13 of 
the 152 slots were utilised by new-entrants in 1990. 140 This shows clearly the 
problems associated with designing effective strategies to lower the slot barrier. In 
this case it would have been possible to attach a restriction on these slots, requiring 
them to be utilised by new-entrants only. That, on the other hand, would have 
lessened their value for the new-entrant holder, making them disadvantaged 
compared to the incumbent in case of market exit or due to other reason necessitating 
the liquidation of the slot asset. 
5.5.3 Restricted Access to Gates 
Even though the new-entrant can acquire or lease slots, lack of airport facilities can 
still deter entry. In the United States the airlines lease airport gates and all other 
facilities on long-term exclusive leases. This gives the airline full control and the 
ability to exclude other airlines and new-entrants, in particular, from using these 
facilities at congested airports. The federal government has, however, encouraged 
the use of 'preferential-use leases'141 to provide access to facilities that would 
otherwise be idle. The fact is, however, that gate leases made on the basis of 
exclusive use gives the lessee full control of the facility while preferential lease allows 
the airport to allocate the use of it to other airlines, if the lessee has not scheduled the 
use of the facility. If the lessee then decides to use the facility the new-comer has to 
give it up. In the case of a new-entrant it may have to negotiate the use of facilities 
under exclusive-use with the incumbent, its competitor. In such case it may be too 
easy for the incumbent to refuse such lease and, therefore, actively close the airport 
to competitors although there are unused airport facilities available. GAO reported in 
1990 that 88 percent of 3, 129 gates at 66 medium to large airports were leased. Of 
the airports surveyed 26 percent had no unleased gates and 85 percent of the gate 
leases were for exclusive use. 
The total number of subleases were 131 in 1990 of which other carriers than majors 
had 53 percent. In addition to this, 60 percent of all gate leases in 1990 had 11 or 
more years left to expire. 142 While the majors have 2,468 gates leased in 1990, the 
national airlines had only 240 and regionals 30. 143 This is 8.8 and 1.1 percent of the 
139Op. cit. (GAO, RCED-90-l47), p.28. 
140Op. cit. (GAO, RCED-90-147), pp. 22-24. 
141 A preferential-use lease grants the lessor the right to provide the facilities to other airlines if the facilities 
would otherwise be idle. 
142Op. cit. GAO (RCED-90-lel7), pp. 35 and 38. 
1430p. cit. GAO (RCED-90-147), p. 74. 
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total gates respectively. At the same time the nationals have 4.9 percent of the total 
U.S. r~venue passenger kilometres and the regionals 0.3 percent. In that sense the 
allocatIon. of gates seems fair, if it was not for the reason that gate allocations will 
actually hinder gro~h a~d pres~rve the ~ajor's size regardless of efficiency. That is 
the real problem, SInce If there IS a carner that can serve the public at a lower fare 
than. the incumbent, that airline should be allowed to serve those that are willing to 
use It. Under present system the barriers to entry are too extensive to allow such a 
simple policy to work in reality. 
What makes the picture even bleaker for new-entrants is that only 16 percent of all 
leased gates contain a 'use or loose' clause. In the cases where such provision exists 
it will usually require the lease holder to keep the gate idle for up to 3 months before 
the gate will be reallocated. 144 The outlook for small airports is somewhat better as 
37 percent reported that they did not lease any gates and half of the leased gates are 
'preferential-use' leases. 145 One of the reasons for this difference is that many small 
airports do not have loading bridges to aircraft, thus, they do not register as having 
gates. 
5.5.4 Restricted Access to Airport Facilities 
An incumbent can hoard airport facilities in order to block possible entry of other 
carriers, although, it does not intend to use those. This can sometimes be 
circumvented by the new-entrant by establishing facilities on its own, but such 
endeavour raises the entry costs dramatically. At some airports this is not even 
possible as the incumbent may have in its lease a clause giving it ability to block any 
further construction at the airport. In view of the risk for the airport to have one 
dominant large carrier that could exit the market, leaving the airport suddenly with 
much less traffic, many airports started to attract carriers by including a 'preferential 
use' clause in their leases. Such clause gives the airport authorities ability to lease to 
other airlines airport facilities not used by the lease holder. 
In addition to gates, other facilities are being leased on exclusive terms. These 
include ticket counters, passenger waiting rooms and baggage claim facilities. What 
this arrives at is that limited access to airport facilities is a barrier to entry, especially 
at concentrated airports but to lesser extent at small airports. The major carriers can 
effectively control access to facilities through their exclusive facility leases, a situation 
that puts the new-entrant in the position of having to negotiate with its competitor. 
The most effective way of solving this stalemate is if the airport is effectively building 
facilities and giving new-entrants priority. The problem with that is severing of 
relations with large customers namely the incumbents and historically a short-term 
solution as the new-entrant is more likely than not to disappear and its leases ending 
up with the incumbent carrier anyway. 
144Op. cit. GAO (RCED-90-147), p. 35. 
145Op. cit. GAO (RCED-90-147\ p. 38. 
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5.5.5 Restriction of Airport Expansion 
If we examine the expansion of airports in order to see if such developments will 
actu.ally open u~ space for ?ew-entrants, we see that the prospect is rather gloomy. 
Envlronmental lssues have Illcreased community resistance to airport expansion, as 
well have 'majority in interest' (MIl) agreements between the airlines and airports. 
!hese agreements give airlines, having majority of operations at the airport a saying 
III matters that could affect their interest, namely expansion plans among other major 
issues. l46 The logic behind MIl's is straightforward. The airports needed backing 
from the users in order to fund expansion projects often initiated by major airlines. 
The airport fees are then used to payoff the bonds. If bond payments become 
exceedingly high the only way to make ends meet is to raise the airport fees. As a 
result it is in no way strange that the airlines would in some way protect their interest, 
namely with MIl's. A problem, however, arises when the MIl's are used to block off 
airport expansion that would benefit new-entrants or other competitors. 
In fact 3/4 of airports with MIl's reported to a GAO survey that such agreement 
actually limits or delays expansion of airports. 147 The use of MIl's is in much wider 
use by medium to large size airports or 55 percent compared to 15 percent at small 
airports. 148 
5.5.6 Environmental Impact Restrictions 
Environmental issues like pollution are causing ever more constraints at airports. 
The one affecting the airlines the most is noise. Noise control has raised the barriers 
to entry for new-entrants in number of ways. First, it has led to less ability of new-
entrants to use older cheaper aircraft, as those do not in many cases, fulfil the 
requirements at airports. Secondly, some airports limit the number of operations 
effectively closing it down for new-entrants due to 'grandfathering' of slots. Such 
actions can create 'fortress' airports for incumbents, almost a monopoly power in a 
market. New-entrants operating Stage II aircraft will be limited to airports allowing 
such aircraft, thus, effectively barred from some airports. 
In order to show how environmental issues can affect new-entrants we can look at 
AirCal's problems at John Wayne Airport (JW A) California. JW A was AirCal's main 
airport. As of March 1982 the Board adopted an access plan designated to reduce 
the noise impact in the area. The plan limited authorised average daily departures 
(ADD's) at the airport to a maximum of 41, to be divided among the five airlines 
then serving JWA. AirCal was cut from 27 to 23.5 departures. The plan had also 
subsections subjecting each airline to a possible 10 percent reduction each quarter, 
dependent on how well it performs with regard to noise limitation. In December 31, 
1982 AirCal was down to 19.92 ADD's and on November 30th, 1984 it had only 
146Op. cit. GAO (RCED-90-147), p. 45. 
147Op. cit. GAO (RCED-90-147), p. 48. 
148Op. cit. GAO (RCED-90-147 ), p. 52. 
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?4.6 ADD's. The airline blamed estimated losses of$2.5 million in 1982, $15 million 
III 1983 and $17.5 million in 1984, on the ADD plan. 149 
All co~straints, including environmental issues, have led 89 percent of all medium to 
large airports to report that one or more factors hinder expansion to some extent. ISO 
5.5.7 Hubs 
For the same reasons as stated in previous sections, hubs are a major deterrence to 
entry. The hub airline, usually, governs the prime facilities at the airport and the 
prime slots, due to large arrival and departure banks, making those unavailable to the 
new-entrant. As a result, this limits the new-entrants viable route strategy from a hub 
airport to secondary markets. 
5.6 Equipment and Financial Barriers 
5.6.1 Equipment Barriers 
Equipment as an barrier to entry is not much mentioned in the industry. 
Nevertheless, new-entrance increases dramatically when aircraft are readily available 
in the market, due to recession or other causes. As mentioned before there are three 
main sources of aircraft for new-entrants; (i) used aircraft market buying/leasing; (ii) 
new aircraft from leasing companies; and (iii) new aircraft bought from the 
manufacturer. The two former ways are the two most commonly used by new-
entrants with the first one being the general option. Since the mid-1980's the noise 
abatement regulation have had serious impact on airlines' aircraft renewal and 
selection. As a result, there have been cheap older aircraft available to new-entrants 
that have not been operable to all airports due to noise restrictions. The regulator, in 
order to facilitate new-entrance has provided exemption from some of the noise 
regulation for a period of time. In fact, new-entrants that began operations 'after 
interim Stage 3 phase-in deadlines will not be subject to any Stage 3 requirements 
until the next interim deadline. 151 
A banker made it clear, following the 1990's upsurge of new-entrants, that: 
... traditional bank sources will remain sceptical about the new-entrants, 
except "banks and lessors looking to omoad aircraft.152 
These words say more than anything else on why the equipment barrier is lowered as 
well as the financial barriers during periods of excess availability of aircraft. 
The conclusion is then that the equipment barrier is lower during periods of recession 
in air transport than during growth periods, unless airlines are retiring older aircraft 
due to noise abatement laws. In those cases the retired aircraft can be absorbed by 
149 Air Transport World, February, 1984, p. 61. 
lSOOp. cit. (GAO, RCED-90-147 ), p. 52. 
151Op. cit. (Change, Challenge and Competition). p. 18. Note that th~ ~o~ssion recommended that new-
entrants should be required to meet the same requirements as other arrlmes m all aspects. 
152Quoted words by Rick Pranke of Chase Manhattan: Airfmance Journal, Fit to survive, April 1994, p. 18. 
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the new-entrant~ if th~ law ma~es those aircraft usable by exemption or if they can be 
used to operate mto airports with less stringent noise regulation. 
5.6.2 Financial Barriers 
The availability of capital to new-entrant airlines is a barrier to entry. At the dawn of 
dere~lation a number of airlines were successful to raise share capital through 
financial markets. These were carriers like Midway, People Express, Muse, New 
York Air and Jet America. 153 Airlines appearing after that were received with less 
enthusiasm by venture capitalists. In fact the whole airline industry has been poorly 
rated in financial markets since deregulation and especially new-entrants in view of 
their poor overall performance. 154 More recent carriers have used a method of self 
financing during the early period and then raise public money as the airline has proved 
itself to some extent. Such self-financing can be in the form of employees capital 
injection in addition to funding from private investors. I55 This method of initial 
capital formation appears to be the norm for past 1990 new-entrants, and will 
probably remain so until this new streak of new-entrants have proved themselves for 
a longer period. Furthermore, the availability of capital will always reflect the 
availability of risk capital for high risk endeavours. Thus, causing fluctuation in this 
barrier to entry. 
5.7 Legal and Regulatory Barriers 
5. 7.1 Legal Barriers 
Legal and regulatory barriers can be built around government policy taking 
protectionism attitude towards existing carriers. This is, however, not prevailing in 
the US deregulated market. There are, nevertheless, a number of fundamental 
problems related to the laws and regulation that can be considered to raise barriers 
for new-entrants. These are the anti-trust law, noise regulation, slot allocation 
regulation, carrier licensing, CRS' s regulations and T A's regulations. The general 
conclusion is that these are barriers that are being reduced by the lawmaker and the 
regulator, especially in terms of the Anti-trust Law, CRS regulation and by ensuring 
T A's independence from the CRS owners. 
The licensing of air carriers can also work as barrier to entry, by adopting so stringent 
requirements for new carriers, that only very few will ever get airborne. The fact of 
the matter is that very few carriers applying for licence fulfil the requirements for 
153 See Chapter 6, Section 6.5. 
154America West regardless of initial success was never rated higher than B+, United as B~+ and .Alaska 
although profitable for decades as BB+. According to S&P's rating system of the fmanclal condItl~n of 
firms for investment purposes the average grade for U.S. airlines in 1993 was B+, wl1lch IS a ffilddle 
speculative grade. 
I 55 Reno Air took this route and raised initial $2 million and took out a IPO later. Kiwi raised $} 0 million from 
its employees later the carrier took out private equity placements raisin~ ~e initial capital ba~. ya1uJe~ 
started out with $3.4 million provided from the founders, later when the arrlme had estabhshed Itselt It took 
out an private placement raising $12 million. 
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licensing. One of the FAA requirements is the production of operations manuals on 
all aspects of the operation from uniforms to emergency evacuations proving flights 
( 50 hours) and emergency evacuation tests.I56 These requirem~nts are usually 
deem~d as necessary for the safe operation of the carrier and are, consequently, not 
questIoned. Other relevant source of legislation are social legislation, involving 
labour, dru~ and alchohol testing and so forth. As social legislation (labour, drug and 
alcohol testIng, for etc.) and technical requirements are costly to meet, these raise the 
financial barrier for new-carriers. 
5. 7.2 Anti-trust and Predatory Behaviour 
If the new-entrant' s expectations as to the force of the incumbents reaction to entry is 
high, it can deter entry and, therefore, form a barrier. Many countries do, though, 
have 'fair' competition laws that can be a powerful buffer against unjust competitor's 
actions. The alleged predatory actions of British Airways against Virgin Atlantic, as 
an example, has weakened British Airways as a competitor for new entrants with 
respect to this potential barrier. This is due to the scrutiny BA will experience from 
competition authorities and the media if new cases of alleged predation occur. 
Predatory actions or intentions are an important issue for new-entrants as actions by 
the incumbents along such lines can easily crush a small airline, unless the new-
entrant has something unique and unmatchable to offer in the market. It is, however, 
almost impossible for a new-entrant to come up with a unique product due to the 
commodity nature of the airline product. In view of this, anti-trust enforcement is an 
important issue for small airlines. The meaning of 'predatory', although section 101 
of the Act referred it to that stated in the Clayton Act, is a subject to controversy. 157 
There have been two basic views of what constitutes predation: (i) that of 
offering'any price below cost'; and (ii) the 'motive' of driving a competitor out of 
business or out of a market. ISS 
An important example in this regard was Northwest's reactions to the new-entrant 
Reno Air in 1993. Northwest had terminated its service out of Reno in 1991, thus, 
leaving a market space for Reno Air, who commenced three daily flights to 
Northwest's Minneapolis hub. The incumbent attempted to 'discipline' the new-
entrant by starting a service to Reno again and issue plans to operate flights from 
Reno to three destinations in competition with Reno Air. Northwest under 
government pressure withdrew its plans in Reno. The question is, nevertheless, if 
these actions by Northwest should be termed as predatory or simply aggressive 
competition. If one looks at a similar case concerning United and Pacific Express, 
where the new entrant alleged predatory actions after United Airlines started to 
operate flights on Pacific Express's San Francisco ro~te, Unite~ defen~ed its case 
successfully on the grounds that its move was a lOgIcal extensIOn of Its network 
growth. Northwest on the other hand entered the Reno market again after it left it 
156 Airline Business, North American Niches, May 1990, p. 58. 
I57See Section 101 of the Act. 'Predatory means any practice which would constitute a violation of the antitrust 
laws as set forth in the first section of the C1a~ton Act (15 U.S.C. 12). 
158See Section 2 of the Shennan Act. 
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prob~bly on the basis o~ in~fficiency of oper~tions. Thus, it seems rather clear that by 
entenng the m~r~et. agam Just after Reno Air came about, that the sole intention may 
have been to dlsclphne the new-entrant or to force it out of the market. 
5.8 Human Capital Barriers 
5.8.1 Employee Barriers 
A possible barrier to entry is experience accumulated with time, making entry costs 
high, as the incumbents have accumulated cost saving experience not readily available 
to the new-entrant. The classic experience curve involves the increase in workers 
efficiency, layout improvement and increase in specialisation that occurs with time. 
F or the experience curve to be a barrier to entry it needs to involve experience that is 
not readily available to new .. entrants. Porter assumes that the new-entrant will have 
inherently higher costs than the incumbent at the outset. 159 In air transport this does 
not hold as most new-entrants have lower costs. 160 Thus, the general assumption 
must be that experience is not a large barrier to entry in air transportation compared 
to many other industries. 
New-entrants can usually benefit from ex-airline employees, made redundant during 
recessions in the industry. Thus, the new-entrant can gain employee experience 
instantly and often at minimum cost. Thus, it is apparent that the experience is not 
the same barrier to entry in air transport, as it would be in most manufacturing 
industries. 
Experienced employees were not as readily available during early deregulation as 
later, especially after the 1986 merger mania. As a result, it is less of a barrier than it 
was. In fact, most new-entrants established in the 90's have been established by 
employees of bankrupt carriers or employees being laid-off from the majors. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Barriers to entry are primarily in terms of market power, shortage of capital and 
congestion rather than incumbents' cost economies of scale. 
The first new-entrant, Midway Airlines, was the first to face numerous barriers to 
entry, it tried to gain protection at Midway airport but was denied as such prote~tion 
was neither deemed to be in any carrier's nor consumers' interest. That effectIvely 
laid the basis of new-entrants' treatment in the deregulated environment. 
150 Op. cit. (Porter, 1980), p. 12. 
160In fact if the classic experience curve traits are analysed we fmd that costs actually increase as an airline 
ages, workers efficiency increases in the beginning but then level ~f and may decline as occurred at P~ple 
Express when the employees were literally burnin~ out due to ~e high work load and the stresses aSSOCIated 
with providing high quality service and up-beat attItude all the tune. 
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It is mentioned that consumer pressure for change in the new-entrants' favour raises 
resistance of airlines in proportion to the increased costs to the incumbent airlines. 
An equilibriu~ can be created in order for both sides to benefit from high quality, 
low-fare servIce. 
Frequent flyers programs are the most effective loyalty tool of the incumbents in the 
past deregulation era. New-entrants have found it hard to compete with the large 
FFP programs, but have made their programs more attractive to passengers, through 
marketing agreements with other larger domestic or international carriers. 
Code-sharing was both a necessary feature of the hub operating new-entrant in order 
to gain priority on CRS' s screens after a change in regulation that demoted interlining 
flights in screen priority, causing a drop in bookings. The code-sharing agreements 
have, however, caused loss of independence and eventual acquisition by the 
incumbent due to the code-sharing partner's vulnerability in such marketing pact. 
The problem can be compared with the 'one customer' dependency problem that 
often causes bankruptcies. 
Computer reservation systems (CRS) have created market power for the hosts that 
have been the largest major carriers: United, American, Eastern and Delta. The 
systems have provided the carriers with extra revenue and profits. The extra 
revenue generated from the tendency of agents to book the flights of the system 
owner rather than the competitors is termed as 'incremental' revenue. CRS bias 
caused a large influx of incremental revenue due to the hosts display priority of own 
flights. Such biases along with number of other advantages of CRS ownership are 
being neutralised creating a more level playing ground and reducing the distribution 
barrier to entry. 
Volume incentives have been used by the airlines in order to create T A's loyalty and 
preference. Such programs are important for the T A's as the normal commission 
level is seldom enough to run an agency. The downside of this practice is that new-
entrants usually with little volume will find it hard to break the loyalty formed in this 
way. 
Yield management systems have been found to be an important competition tool for 
incumbents as they allow them to offer very low fares without diluting their yield 
seriously. Such capability raises a serious barrier to entry for a comparably low 
frequency, low-cost, no-frills and low-fare carrier. 
Airport congestion raises barriers in the densest markets, especially at t~e High 
Density Rule airports that have slot restrictions. Slot trading was allowed m 1986 
creating much wealth for the largest carriers that had most of the sl.ots at the 
congested airports. After that the new-entrants had to buy or lease slots m order to 
gain access to the largest airports. In order to do so the new-entrant had to be code-
sharing with the slot owner in order to be reasonably secure, as most of the slots are 
leased on very short leases, usually for only two or three months at a time. 
Gates are not readily available to new-entrants rather than slots .at airports, as t~e 
incumbent can acquire more of these facilities than necessary. ~~ order to. be m 
control. Such ability depends, on the form of leasing for these faCIlIties at the atrport. 
80 
Majority-in-interest (MIl) clauses can give dominant incumbent carriers the ability to 
veto expansion plans at airports, that could benefit new-entrants. Therefore, raising 
infrastructure barriers further. 
Environmental protection and health regulation, especially, noise abatement has 
caused massive changes to airlines in terms of costs and access to some airports. 
The availability of the largest single capital and cost outlay for an airline, the aircraft, 
has had much effect on the ability of new airlines to start operations. During 
recessions and industry consolidation aircraft become more readily available reducing 
this barrier to entry. 
Legal and regulatory barriers can be hard for new airlines to overcome as much cost 
is involved with fulfilling some of the requirements for carrier licensing. Such 
requirements are usually safety related and not questioned in the literature. There 
have, however, been some opposition to recent costly regulation on drug and alcohol 
testing. 
Anti-trust enforcement is important for the new-entrants as such regulation can 
hinder too much concentration in the industry and anti-competitive behaviour of the 
larger competitor. The enforcement of such regulation has, however, been very 
problematic due to the difficulty of defining and proving predatory behaviour. 
The human capital barrier is mentioned and it is concluded that this barrier is not a 
large factor for new-entrants in air transport after 1986, due to layoffs and 
bankruptcies that have created a large force of experienced people looking for work 
with the airlines. Therefore, many of the past 1990 new-entrants have been formed 
and staffed by these people. 
In the next chapter new-entrants will be examined from the standpoint of their 
structure or internal characteristics and operations. 
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6. The Anatomy of a New-entrant 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some information of how new-entrants were 
organised and operated in the deregulated market environment. The chapter's 
structure is derived from Figure 1-2, as presented in Chapter 1. 
In researching the new-entrants it soon became apparent that information is scarce on 
the smaller airlines in comparison to People Express in particular. As a result, People 
Express is mentioned to a greater extent than other airlines. This should not skew 
the findings as the general underlying principles of its initial success and then failure is 
coinciding with other new-entrants in many respects. 
6.2 Management 
6.2.1 Education/experience 
Little information is available on the education of new-entrant airlines' managers. In 
a survey conducted on new-entrant airlines' managers, as part of this research project 
(see Chapter 11), it was found that managers (n = 45) of new-entrant airlines have 
completed on the average 16.1 years of formal education. That means that they have 
on the average a bachelors degree. Of those that responded in the survey 12 had 
masters degree, 23 bachelors degree, 2 had some college education and 4 high school 
or flight school. 
Contacts and experience rather than education seem to be most valuable for founders 
of new-entrant airlines. The question of whether education makes the establishment 
of important contacts easier to accomplish is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
worth having in mind. 161 
If one examines the track record of new-entrant airlines' founders one can easily 
establish that experience in the airline industry is a prerequisite for getting the airline 
flying. Managers and staff at new-entrant airlines are usually professional people 
coming from either large incumbent carriers with the motivation of doing things 
differently or coming from bankrupt carriers wishing to stay in the industry. The 
former motive was the reason for People Express formation while the latter goes for 
Reno that was created by former Pan Am and Eastern employees as well as America 
West that was formed by ex-Continental staff. In fact jet operating airlines have to 
161 It is a fact that Harvard Business School (HBS) graduates have started the more successful new-entrants, 
like Donald I3urr of People Express, Fred Smith of Federal Express (small package service and cargo) and 
Rollin King, a HBS graduate that suggested the formation of Southwest to Herbert Kelleher. 
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have m~n~gement staff with airline experience in order to function adequately from 
the begtnrung. It must be noted, though, that People Express emphasised non-airline 
experience from its customer-managers (front-line staff) in order to smooth the job 
flexibility and team spirit, but they expected resistance to their concepts by veteran 
airline employees. 
The importance of good connections and relevant experience is apparent if Donald 
Burr of People Express is examined. He had gained very important experience as 
president of National Aviation, a Wall Street company specialising in airline 
investments and then he climbed from the executive vice presidency to presidency at 
Texas International. This experience gave him extremely good credentials and 
connections to raise capital and start an airline. His education was the highly 
regarded Harvard master of business administration degree, a degree that seems to 
open many doors in corporate America. 162 Mike Hollis of Air Atlanta had similar 
background but he earned a law degree after graduation from Dartmouth College and 
started his carrier with the investment firm of Oppenheimer & Co as VP-public 
financing. Then he ran his own law practice in Atlanta and served as an assistant to 
the DoT's Urban Mass Transportation Administrator including various other public 
sector posts. 163 What Hollis lacked compared to Burr was aviation experience, a 
factor that may have influenced Hollis optimism of the success of a premium service 
strategy in the face of total failure of such a strategy up to that time. 
Paul Quackenbush of Empire graduated from Yale University and entered the Navy. 
After earning his commercial licence and later air transport pilot licence, he managed 
a fixed base operation, an aircraft sales outlet in Hawaii, worked in marketing at 
Aloha Airlines, was employed by Air America as training and operations pilot and 
became again a Fixed Base Operation manager at Oneida County Airport from where 
he founded Empire Airlines. 164 
Mark Morris of Air 1 had considerable experience as a pilot, manager of small 
specialised airline and then of Dill.- Airways a small passenger cargo carrier. In the 
mean time he had been general manager of St Lucia Airlines for few months until it 
was nationalised. His period as a consultant got him interested in forming Air 1 after 
. "d d b I" 165 his proposals for such an operatIon was turne own y a c lent. 
Although William Lyon and George Argyros that took over AirCal in 1982 had no 
airline experience, their senior staff was highly experienced with a total of over 90 
years airline experience in 1984. 
William Slattery the original president and CEO of Braniff II came from TWA were 
he was vice president of sales and services. 
Harold 1. Pareti the founder of Presidential co-founded People Express and was 
previously employed by Texas International as assistant secretary and staff vice 
162Harvard Business School, People Express (A) Case no: 483-103, 1983, pp. 2-3. 
163 Air Transport World, Air Atlanta works toward strengthening its position, June 1985, p. 44. 
IMAir Transport World, Some said 'It can't be done,' but Empire is doing it, November 1982, p. 94. 
165 Air Transport World, Air 1 expansion planned to attain profits, August 1984, p. 47-48. 
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president of governmental affairs. 166 Most of the carrier's employees were actually 
ex-People Express employees. Thus lending Presidential considerable experience 
from another new-entrant, which was unusual as most new-entrants have been staffed 
by ex-employees of the incumbents. 
To conclude, it is clear that it is a predominant tendency of new-entrants to be staffed 
by employees of either bankrupt carriers or carriers cutting-costs by layoffs. 
6.2.2 Personality 
Ari Ginsberg and Ann Bucholtz undertook meta-analysis to establish if research on 
entrepreneurs actually proved any difference in their leadership traits from other 
business leaders. The study found that the definition of what constitutes an 
entrepreneur varied greatly among the studies making their comparison highly 
questionable. 167 If the definition approaching that of an airline founder is used one 
can cite a study by Smith & Miner that defined entrepreneurs as being persons 
involved in the founding of a business. Their study was limited to businesses 
experiencing fast growth rates, defined as an increase of more than 1.5 employees per 
year. According to the study entrepreneurs scored higher than ordinary managers in 
the sample on the following factors; self-achievement, feedback of results, personal 
innovation and for the total score of all examined factors. 168 
Autocratic and charismatic personalities are common among new-entrant airline 
CEO's. One can name El Acker at Air Florida,169 a graduate of economics and 
psychology,170 while Donald BUff, Lamar Muse and Herbert Kelleher are more on 
the charismatic side. The true benefit of the charismatic leader to a new-entrant are 
the savings in promotion costs due to the ability to get more media coverage. The 
airline's strategy has, however, to take into account this ability of the founder and 
integrate it into the airline's image. Herbert Kelleher of Southwest is well known for 
his stunts where his image was portrayed as a 'fun loving eccentric' in the positive 
meaning of the word. This image may be originally his own, or cleverly managed and 
escalated by his closest staff But the talent has to be there and Mr. Kelleher certainly 
possesses it richly. Lamar Muse used similar tactics at Muse Air, having been well 
seasoned at Southwest as he was its president until 1977. Donald BUff, although 
highly charismatic did not use the 'fun' factor as much but became a sort of a 
'saviour' of the cities he flew to, from high-fares. His charismatic features were, 
however, greater internally as his staff believed in his management philosophy and 
were highly motivated by him. In the last two operating years People Express 
experienced changed climate and the chairman seemed to change management tactics 
according to a manager of human resources, that was made to leave the company: 
166Op. cit (Harvard Case no: 483-103, 1983), p. 21. 
167Ginsberg, Ari and Buchholtz, Ann, Are Entrepreneurs a breed apart? A look at the evidence, Journal of 
General Management, VoL 15 No.2 Winter 1989, pp. 32 - 40. 
168 As reported in: Op. cit. (Ginsberg), pp. 32-40. 
169Formerly the president of Braniff. 
170Sampson, Anthony. Empires of The Sky. Coronet Books 1985, p. 274. 
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.. 1 had challenged him and asked questions. Now I think that was a 
mistake. He didn't want to hear it anymore. I7I 
The same article cites other employees that felt that the chairman had become more 
autocratic and avoiding challenges as the years passed. 172 
6.2.3 Objectives 
The personal objectives of managers can affect the destiny of their companies as was 
highly visual when Ed Acker left Air Florida to become the chairman of Pan Am Air , 
Florida's main competitor. Acker reversed Pan Am's decision to abandon Air 
Florida's routes, initiating aggressive competition with his former employer. 173 
Whether this move was made due to his dissatisfaction at Air Florida or his ambition 
to attain higher monetary rewards or more power associated with a large world 
famous old-timer like Pan Am, one can not clearly establish. Ed Acker's personal 
objectives, nevertheless, had a profound effect on Air Florida and played an 
important part in its rise and decline. 
The People Express chairman was challenged after the acquisition of Frontier that his 
real objective was to get back at his former employer Texas International. To 'steal' 
Frontier from under its nose, may have played a role for People's Express chairman, 
but whether the acquisition was driven by his need for revenge or whether People 
Express was altogether formed on this drive like Muse Air was, one can not tell and 
only speculate. 174 
The airline business has often been cited as having much status appeal, attracting 
investors and entrepreneurs alike although airline investments are highly risky and the 
likelihood of success for a start-up carrier are slim. That fact explains many persons' 
eagerness to start an airline. 
6.2.4 Locus of Control 
Duchesneau and Gartner found a link between very high locus of control and 
unsuccessful or failed firms.I75 Therefore, it is of interest whether the top executive 
is performing more than one role at once as representation of centralisation. Like 
being the airline's chairman, CEO and president or some other combination of the 
sort. Under this form he is less likely to be challenged, although decision making will 
be quicker. Such form of management suits start-up companies often particularly 
I71Business Week, Up, Up and Away?, November 25, 1985, p.64. 
l72Op. cit. (Business Week, 1985), p. 64. 
173Uoyd's Aviation Economist, Why Air Florida Failed, August 1984. p.22. 
174Op. cit. (Business Week, 1985), p. 64. Burr denies this charges in the Business Week article. 
175Duchesneau, Donald and Gartner, William B., A profile of New Venture Success and Failure in Emerging 
Industry, Journal of Business Ventruing, Vol 5, p. 305. 
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well, but the structure becomes a liability as the company grows and gets more 
complicated. 176 
The criticism of having a combined CEO and chairman is that the idiosyncrasy of the 
perso.n can influe~ce decision-making to a greater extent than if the person was 
working closely wIth a separate chairman. Argenti has proposed that combination of 
top roles to be associated with failure due to a lack of the necessary checks and 
balances. 177 
The autocratic situation and lack of balance is further escalated if the combined 
chairman/CEO nominates his own delegates to the board of directors. For example, 
People Express board of directors was composed of insiders only until 1985 when a 
Harvard professor was nominated to the board. 178 On the board where People's 
Express investment bankers and on of which was a large shareholder. This was the 
combination of the board until 1985 when the professor joined the board. 179 
Employees had no representative although they were the majority shareholders in the 
company. The chairman was quoted on this issue in an interview, in 1985: 
I'm the biggest shareholder and the founder, and I think I represent best 
the constituencies here ..... There's no need for other people [employees] on 
the board of directors. 180 
The statement indicates that the chairman was not as willing to share power with his 
employees, as the airlines' 'people attitude' could have indicated. It may have been 
to the company's benefit to have an employee nominee at the board level in order to 
represent employee issues, that had become a major problem as early as 1982, due to 
the airline's fast growth. 
Poorly balanced board of directors is cited as a common ingredient of a failed 
company. For example, if most board members are venture capitalists like 
characterised People Express there could be a swing towards their interests of 
financing expansion and acquisition. If marketing, operations and finance are equally 
represented into inside and outside directors it is more likely that the board will 
effectively perform its duties. 181 
Table 6-1, does not make a distinction between directors that have financial interest 
in the company as mentioned above in the People's Express case. Such directors are 
176See a detailed account on this issue in: Flamholtz, Eric G., Growing Pains: How to Make the Transition from 
an Entrepreneurship to a Professionally Managed Firm, Jossey - Bass Pub., 1990. 
177 Argenti, John, Corporate Collapse: The Causes and Syptoms, McGraw-Hill, 1973. p. 123. 
178 The professor was perhaps not that much of an outsider, though, as he was Burr's friend from ~e chairman's 
days at Harvard. This nomination was nevertheless important but too late to have any major Impact on 
company policy. 
179People Express Prospectus, April 26, 1983, pp. 21-22. 
180Op. cit. (Business Week, 1985), p. 65. 
181 The functions of the board of directors is the overall supervision of management and accountability for the 
conduct and policies of the organisation. Corporate Boards and Nominee Directors, L.c. Gupta, Oxford 
University Press, Delhi, 1989. 
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sometim~s regarded as insiders rather than outsiders. Unfortunately, there was not 
data avaIlable to make such distinction although it would have been preferable. 
Table 6-1 Examples of New-entrant Airlines' Composition of Board of 
Directors 
Airline 
Inside 182 Outside Total Failed? 
America West 
183 3 5 8 Chapter XI (Emerged) 
Reno Air 2 5 7 No MOM Grand Air 4 10 14 Became charter operator 
1 6 7 No 
1 4 5 Yes 
Source: Financial Statements for 1992, except for People Express where HBS case was used. 
Of the carriers mentioned above MGM Grand Air has the largest and most 
monumental board with famous names like Lee Iacocca the former chairman of 
Chrysler Co. Regardless of that the carrier has been unsuccessful from the start. A 
fact that shows well that a board with many outside directors does not insure any 
success. 184 
6.2.5 Decision Making 
Decision-making is the function that ultimately makes or breaks any company 
according to the model presented in the introduction of the thesis. This function's 
quality is affected by number resources like information quality and quantity, 
experience, environment and management aspirations. In order to present the 
importance of decision making People Express will be examined in that regard. 
If we make an example of People Express, decision-making at the carrier was until 
1985, made up of management teams, that were assisted by advisory. The decision-
making flow was from nineteen management teams, that usually bypassed staff 
committees that never had much role, to the chairman through weekly staff meetings 
or to the co-ordinating councils that would make recommendations to the chairman. 
The decision-making would ultimately rest with the chairman himself as the system 
functioned. ISS One must recognise that no other management officer (top manager) 
had much flair, as the chairman was the only person associated with daily operations, 
that sat on the airline's board of directors, as mentioned before. 
In view of the stresses that People's Express organisational structure placed on the 
employees, it is highly likely that the increased pressures of changed competitive 
182Insider in this context is someone with an executive ftmction within the company. 
183This is the board of directors until sept. 1992. After receiving a fmancial package the board was changed. 
184MGM Grand Air's majority share-holder is billionaire Kirk Kerkorian. A fact that is adequate explanation 
in itself as to why the airline has had so much staying power regardless of constant losses from the outset. 
185Harvard Business School, People Express, Case No. 490-012, pp. 7-8. 
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environment led to threat-rigidityl86 in People Express decision making. Burr as an 
individual had the greatest influence on the company's destiny in this regard due to 
his central role in all decision making. If we assume that Burr realised that a disaster 
was pending unless something was done, one can infer that his personal stress-level 
must have been fairly high. Disaster research on stress and anxiety provides some 
insight into behavioural tendencies during such situations. 
Withey reported in 1962 that individual's anxiety in crisis situation lead to 'a 
narrowing of the perceptual field and a limitation of the information that can or will 
be received', leading to a rigid response. 187 Putting this into context with People 
Express, we find that the chairman was criticised for deciding on the Frontier 
acquisition too quickly, something that could indicate rigidity in decision-making in 
view of the decisions' conformity to other airline's actions at the time; for example, 
that mergers were 'fashionable.' Previous major decisions by Burr seemed to be 
'thought-out' but the Frontier acquisition should have been seen clearly as 
incompatible with the situation at People Express. Thus, it is highly likely that 
mounting pressures from the competitive environment had increased Burr's stress 
levels to such an extent that threat-rigidity in decision-making occurred. 
Another supporting factor was the decision to step-up employee pressures in the face 
of employees frequent complaints of excessive job pressures, long-working hours and 
burnout. All this seems to point out that new original solutions to the airline's 
problems were not adopted, as the situation craved. 
6.3 Organisation 
6.3.1 Organisation Structure 
New-entrant airlines have selected to establish organisation structures that have 
allowed the necessary cross-utilisation of employees in order to attain maximum 
employee efficiency and lower costs. Employee staff-committees and advisory 
councils have been used in order for employees to have a saying in the running of 
new-entrant airlines founded on theories of participatory management. 188 Such policy 
had an added importance due to the new-entrant airlines' wish to stay non-unionised. 
Thus, if employees are owners and participate in decision-making or at least have a 
say, there would be less reason for employees to get organised within union. 189 
No airline went further into employee programs than People Express. Their 
organisation structure was highly decentralised on the surface. In 1982 it was 
composed of nineteen management teams, four staff committees and advisory 
186 For a detailed discussion on this issue see: Barry M. Staw, Lance C. Sandelands and Jane E. Button, TIrreat-
Rigidity Effects on Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis, Administrative Quarterly, Vol. 26, 
December 1981. 
187Withey, S.B., Reaction to Uncertain TIrreat, in Man and Society in Disaster, editied by G.W. Baker and 
D.W. Chapman, New York: Basic Books, p. 118. 
188Donald Burr claimed that his ideas were based on Douglas M. McGregor's book The Human Side of 
Enterprise, McGraw-Hill, 1960. 
189 Note that non-unionisation is important, not primarily to pay lower wages, but to retain flexibility in the 
organisation of the workforce. 
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councils. The advisory councils were composed of service managers, flight managers 
and maintenance managers. Then each advisory council nominated two of its 
members to the co-ordinating council that met with Burr.19O Employee cross-
utilisation was an important idea in order to increase efficiency, but seemed to have 
been made into a ritual at People Express, to such an extent that employees 
complained of being moved too much around learning no one function fully and being 
constantly wasting time re-Iearning tasks over and over again. Some employees got 
away with ignoring the concept and stayed in one line or staff function in order to 
address the growing problems of the airline's fast growth. 191 
The fast growth at People Express caused the airline, apparently, to outgrow its 
organisational structure. Hence, in August 1982 People Express introduced team 
managers as the management teams' span of control was too large. The team 
manager's role was to ensure that their team members had all the resources and 
support they needed. In 1984 there was still a major change to the organisational 
structure as the heavy emphasis on cross-utilisation lead managers to conclude that 
employees identified too much with their staff functions rather than operations. As 
the number of employees was totalling over 3000 in 1984 the team spirit of the early 
days was disappearing. 
In order to revitalise the 'old' spirit People Express introduced operations groups of 
about 300 people each. The groups were formed around aircraft types, so there were 
to begin with six 727, three 737 and one 747 group. Each group of 300 employees 
was then broken down into teams of 20 people each led by a team manager. Each 
group then controlled a section of the company like an airline within the airline, thus, 
being in charge of specific gates, routes and planes. This structure was never fully 
implemented but showed early signs of success. 192 
People Express was out of the ordinary in terms of organisation structure. Other 
new-entrants adopted a more traditional organisation structures, usually segmented 
into the marketing, operations and finance function. One of these was Southwest. 
Southwest's organisation structure is departmentalised. In 1972 to 1973 the main 
departments were operations, marketing, ground operations and the comptroller. 
Lamar Muse was at that time the president and treasurer with Herbert Kelleher being 
secretary and general counsel reporting directly to the president. 193 The structure is 
still the same in general terms. What is worth special attention in Southwest's 
organisation chart is that ground operations are separated from flight operations 
giving it increased independence. This configuration is probably the heart of 
Southwest's emphasis on fast aircraft turnaround that has maintained the company's 
high efficiency to present day. 
190Op. cit. (HBS 490-012), p. 7-8. 
191Op. cit. (HBS 490-012), p. 12 
192Op. cit. (HBS 490-012), p. 15. 
Jll:'Harvard Business School, Southwest, Case No. 574-060, p. 9. 
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It is hard to conclude that the type of organisation structure has played much role in 
new-entrants' failures. However, an organisation unable to grow as fast as many of 
the new-entrants did, certainly had an impact on their fortunes, as is depicted in 
Section 6.3.4. 
6.3.2 Employee Issues 
New-entrants adopted leaner organisation structures and were effectively paying less 
for more work. Therefore, employee issues were a matter of priority due to its 
correlation with quality service and motivation. A 'we care attitude' or 'you are 
working for yourself became the buzzwords. America West, for example, ran day-
care centres and employee assistance programs. The assistance programs dealt with 
problems ranging from substance abuse to personal financial difficulties. 194 Such 
programs ratify clearly to employees a 'we care' attitude resulting in increased 
employee loyalty and willingness to excel in their jobs. 
Cross utilisation or flexible job descriptions have been widely accepted, like discussed 
before, in order to increase efficiency. The concept was put to use very efficiently by 
People Express that called all its employees 'managers', front line people were 
'Customer Managers', the crew was 'Flight Managers' and maintenance workers 
'Maintenance Managers'. In fact the employees were trained to take on assignments 
as diverse as baggage loading to being a flight attendant, with pilots taking on such 
tasks just as well. These programs worked to begin with but the airline's growth rate 
soon created intense pressures on employees causing many of them to find a policy of 
such cross-utilisation hindering the carrier's efficiency, but the airline had actually 
declared how much time each customer manager should spend in each function. This 
system that can be said to have taken cross-utilisation to the extreme, disintegrated 
slowly due to employees not having 'time' to take it too seriously during the latter 
half of People Express life-cycle. 195 
America West did not confer the 'manager' title on all its staff like People Express, 
but defined itself as a people oriented airline, not only in terms of service to 
passengers but also internally: 
In a service business where you expect to do a good job with customers, 
your first priority is to do a good job with your employees, ..... It's a matter 
of survival.196 
America West has used 'peer review hiring' where hiring committees are made up of 
workers. The committees apparently seem to have better insight into who will 
perform and fit into the environment present. 197 To emphasise its employee policy 
even further, America West maintained an open door policy throughout its growth 
giving top managers the ability to feel the pulse and be in direct contact to what was 
194Airline Executive International, America West Leaders Learn From Lorenzo's Example, June 1990, p. 19 
JQ5Op. cit. (HBS 490-012), p. 12 
JQ0Op. cit. (Airline Executive International), p. 19 
197Op. cit. (Airline Executive International), p. 20 
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happening in the airline. 198 America West cross-utilises gate personnel so that any 
gate personnel can go on board as flight attendant if necessary. Many non-unionised 
new-entrants utilise such flexibility in order to increase efficiency without going to 
the extreme and make cross-utilisation into a philosophy like People Express did. 
Stock-participation programs became common among the new-entrants. Both 
People Express and America West had such programs. At People the employees 
were initially required to buy shares at one fourth of their market value and optional 
shares at one half of market value. l99 During the first years of operations many of the 
first employees had share-holding worth substantial amounts of money. At America 
West employees spent 20 percent of their first year salary to buy stocks at 15 percent 
below market value and optional stocks of up to 20 percent of salary after that. 20o 
Profit sharing-programs were considered important for the new-entrants in order to 
avoid labour trouble during 'good times'. This is based on the tendency of low pay-
scale employees to demand their share of the profits when they occur. In order to 
facilitate this both People Express and America West offered their employees profit-
sharing plans. At America West employees were given 15 percent of pre-tax profits 
and at People Express employees could earn as much as 30 percent of their base 
salaries under the profit-sharing program. 
The problem with profit-sharing and stock-participation programs is that they will 
dilute motivation when profits do not occur and stock prices decline, creating more 
problems than if they did not exist. The main reason for this is that the new-entrant 
airlines used these programs in order to justify low pay scales compared to the 
incumbents. Consequently, the stock-participation programs took on added value and 
importance to the employees. As soon as the stocks go down it is harder for the 
employee to accept the lower pay scale and if the climate allows he or she will start 
to look for work elsewhere. This is especially so with the pilots. People Express, for 
example, had problems retaining pilots after 1985 due to their ability to get positions 
with carriers paying higher wages, demanding no involvement in tasks unrelated to 
flying, like People did. 
Southwest, contrary to most new-entrants, has not kept costs down by paying low 
salaries, as its salary level is comparable with the industry average and even though 
the company was unionised. This actually prevents the problems People Express had 
when things turned sour as losses will not affect employees financial resources the 
way it did at People Express. 
To conclude one can say that new-entrants have emphasised good relations with 
employees in order to keep the unions away, creating highly motivating work 
environment composed of young front-line employees and experienced managers. 
The employees have received less salary than the industry average in exchange for 
stock-participation and profit-sharing programs. Use of this financial reward systems 
has, however, proved to be a two edged sword for the new-entrants. 
198Op. cit. (Airline Executive International), p. 21 
199 Air Transport World, People Express earns profit in first full year, April, 1983, p. 19. 
200 Airline Executive International, America West Leaders Learn from Lorenzo's Example, Jlll1e, 1990, p. 18. 
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6. 3. 3 Union Relations 
The ~otion after deregulation was that cost-savings had to be accomplished by 
reducmg labour costs below the industry average. The new-entrants unlike the 
in~u~bents, were in a good position to attain much lower labour costs b; hiring non-
um~~sed.labour at a muc? lower s~l~ry levels in .exchange for profit sharing or stock 
partIcIpatIon, as already dIscussed. Low salanes and prolonged losses at America 
West, for example, started to cause disillusion among the staff leading enough 
customer rep~esentatives to sign union election cards in 1987 to call for a voting. 202 
In order to raIse support for non-unionisation the management raised base pay by 16 
percent, leading to a meagre 14 percent in favour of union representation. 203 
Due to the lack of unionisation, strikes were unheard of at the new-entrants. Strikes 
have, in fact, not been frequent after deregulation if 1979 and 1980 are excluded. 
Those strikes that have occurred have been related to extraordinary situations at the 
airlines involved, usually incumbents. The strikes have usually benefited new-entrants 
by opening access to new-markets or increased demand on established routes. 
Strikes occurred frequently just after deregulation, as Table 6-2 shows, but seldom 
after 1980 and never at a new-entrant airline, with the exception of Southwest and 
Capitol in 1980. 
A further factor resulting in fewer strikes is that the unions were under increased 
pressure after the Eastern demise. The unions were accused of having overplayed 
their role resulting in severe job-losses of the people they represented by going 
against industry trends that could not be turned around. At any rate the unions have 
been under much pressure by airlines in the deregulated environment due to the major 
airlines' tendency to lower costs through wage concessions and the new-entrant 
airlines' ability to maintain low wage scales and stay non-unionised. However, the co-
operation between the management of the unionised airlines and unions, has lead to 
improved communication programs. 
20lSouthwest on the contrary often pointed out that real cost savings were fIrst and foremost achieved through 
high utilisation of aircraft through short turn-around times. 'This philosophy has made Southwest the lowest 
unit cost carrier in the United States although its wage levels are comparable to the industry average. The 
non-unionised new-entrants had, however, to offer their employees incentives in order to hire at the lower 
salary levels. The incentives were in the fonn of profIt-sharing and stock-participation programs as 
mentioned before. The new-entrants soon found out that the new-entrants had problems retaining their 
employees as the demand for air travel rose and the incumbents were expanding because the incentive 
programs provided only short-tenn gains, if any, that disappeared as soon as the new-entrant had problems, a 
trend that was usually on the horizon soon after start-up. America West, for example, was what could be 
called an 'employee fuendly' employer due to the founders vision on the issue and in order to keep unions 
away. 
202Labor organisation in the United States at non-organised companies has to go through a certain process. 
First of all there has to be employee dissatisfaction with any of the issues which the union can influence. 
These are usually wages and work conditions. If someone requests the union to come in it will arrange for a 
voting on union membership. Management at non-union companies will us~ly have or~arused therr 
management in such a way that union organisation would be unlikely, by promotmg 'people' onenta~ed statf 
policy and 'we care' attitude. Furthennore, they will in the case of 'low wages' com~a:ed to the mdustry 
average, offer profIt sharing and stock participation programs. If the ~ployee feel~ satIs~led and secure and 
the company on its way to profItability whereas the employees Wlll gam from the mcentIve programs he or 
she will not vote for an union. 
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In fact, at critical moments like financial crisis, the airlines have discovered that an 
effective communication program can actually prevent distortion during labour 
negotiations that result from going through the formal channels. 205 Thus, the three 
facets of airline labour policy that has effectively led to less tendency for disputes, is 
(i) increased union co-operation with management; (ii) increased communication with 
employees; and (iii) employee-friendly atmosphere, that works against union 
organisation. 
6.3.4 Organisation Evolution 
The organisation evolution was characterised by the fast growth that appears to 
occur at many new-entrant airlines. It causes displacement in the organisation 
structure as training and hiring falls behind and the necessary infrastructure like 
information systems lacked the necessary sophistication to follow the increased 
complication of the organisation. Internal communication that was characterised by 
informality of the entrepreneur organisation broke down as formal communication 
channels and organisation charts become ineffective and are often resisted by the 
early staff that 'miss' the informal close atmosphere of the 'early days'. 
Figure 6-1 shows a conceptual framework that represents the 'lag' that fast growth 
companies experience in hiring and training of staff to attend to the problems 
generated by growth. The management information system's (MIS) development 
takes usually only the size of the organisation at the time of installment the next 
immediate years due to the formidable costs of computer equipment and short write-
off time. Thus there will usually exist a lag between MIS's organisational needs in 
fast growing companies and actual provision in the existing information system. 
204The strike reduced Eastern's operations down to 10 percent of previous level. Dwing the strike it lost much 
of its markets that were captured effectively by the competitor's that stepped up frequency, entered Eastern's 
market and captured its customers \\1th FFP's. 
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When internal pressures require new software or development of the existing one and 
lar~er ~omputers there will be a sudden increase in computer power. If the growth is 
maIntaIned the company will gradually use up the extra capacity requiring a new 
upward shift in capacity. What usually happens is that the company will not address 
the problem until the internal pressure is intense due to the inadequate system. 
Figure 6-2 People's Express Employment Growth Rate and Proportion with Less 
Than One Year on The Job Experience. 
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Source: Compiled from DoT Fonn 41. 
The hiring gap is created due to the fast growing organisation's inability to absorb 
employees with adequate experience fast enough to actively solve impending 
problems associated with its growth. The sobering reality for an organisation is that 
hiring enough people may not be the main problem, but rather making the newly 
hired employees productive fast enough to keep up with the organisation' s need. 
The fact being that the faster the company grows the larger the proportion of newly 
hired employees not functioning properly. 
There were two factors that hindered People Express in functioning properly in term 
of employee training. First, the intense growth caused the company to reduce the 
requirements it set initially for new employees' personality to fit the organi ation. 
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Sec~nd, the r~ligious emphasis on cross-utilisation increased the training 
requIrements. This reduced the efficiency of the labour force rather than increased it 
as employees spent considerable time re-Iearning their functions as they shifted 
around, rather than concentrating on becoming specialists in one function. 
With quarter to one-half of the labour force being new employees, each year, there 
was a great extra burden on the existing employees to integrate them into their tasks, 
as existing employees had their hands full. In fact, most were putting in more than 60 
hours per week. 206 
People Express is a typical example of an organisation that was very effective for a 
while but fell behind due to changes in the environment it could not adjust to with its 
available resources. At least the course it selected was not a success, although there 
may have been another better course (see Chapter 7), the incremental change in 
People Express basic philosophy was not fast enough to counter the innovative 
developments by its. As a result People Express attempted a 'discontinuous' 
change207 in cost structure, product design and organisation structure, in order to 
shift itself to profitability. Such sudden shift is riskier for a company having ignored 
the environmental developments like People did, than if the organisation is adjusted 
incrementally. People Express could have developed a more sophisticated CRS 
system making yield management possible. It could have entered the business 
passenger segment earlier. It could have developed another organically grown hub in 
the midwest earlier and it could have grown slower in order to reduce the adverse 
effects of the Newark facilities on its service. These are of course speculations but 
they do show that the options were numerous and the vision may have been 
defective. 
6.4 Marketing 
6.4.1 Fare Structure and Yields 
, 
Yield as represented in Table 6-3 is an useful indicator of revenue trends within an 
airline but less so for comparison between airlines. The reason being that a low-yield 
carrier can have high load-factors and therefore be profitable, while the opposite can 
also apply. As a result it is important to examine yield in the context of other 
profitability factors like load-factors and specifically profit margin. Furthermore, 
sector distances affect yield in such a way that yield declines usually with increased 
sector distances, reflecting the same trend in costs. 
In Table 6-3, it is clearly apparent that regional based new-entrants have the highest 
yield per revenue passenger kilometre (.269) while charter based new-entrants have 
the lowest (.068). The former group of carriers usually operate on short-haul routes 
linking with larger carriers. Such operations incur higher costs due to higher landing, 
terminal and fuel charges per each kilometre flown due to the short sector distances. 
As a result, it is not surprising to see high yield figures for regional based new-
entrants as the costs have to be matched. The reverse is true for charter based new-
206Op. cit. (HBS case 574-060), pp. 9-11. 
207Meaning a sharp change in philosophy. 
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entrants as ~heir sector distances have been relatively long compared to all other new-
entrant earners. 
Table 6-3 Revenue of New-entrant Airlines - US cents per RPK 
Airline '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 Mean I '91 '92 Regionals 
Air Wiscoos. 0.374 0.352 0.336 0.280 0.317 0.274 0.236 0.310 
Horizon Air 0.322 0.273 0.260 0.275 0.279 0.289 0.275 0.253 0.278 
Aspen 0.236 0.254 0.213 0.249 0.238 
Empire 0.240 0.258 0.257 0.242 0.249 
Premium 
0.269 
MGMGrand 0.306 0.237 0.268 0.232 0.186 0.170 0.233 
Air Atlanta 0.289 0.186 0.119 0.198 
Midwest Exp. 0.175 0.157 0.236 0.164 0.152 0.135 0.122 0.115 0.157 
Intrastate 0.196 
Air California 0.143 0.144 0.134 0.136 0.149 0.136 0.120 0.137 
Southwest 0.107 0.108 0.095 0.097 0.093 0.089 0.084 0.077 0.079 0.074 0.076 0.072 0.089 0.088 
PSA 0.140 0.141 0.122 0.120 0.130 0.126 0.122 0.121 0.128 
Air Florida 0.106 0.099 0.095 0.071 0.092 
Start-up 0.111 
New York A 0.133 0.152 0.171 0.155 0.129 0.114 0.142 
Sunworld 0.108 0.109 0.102 0.126 0.111 
Florida Exp. 0.097 0.104 0.095 0.091 0.097 
Midway 0.300 0.186 0.156 0.137 0.188 0.133 0.102 0.078 0.090 0.089 0.080 0.140 
Presidential 0.088 0.099 0.135 0.132 0.114 
Muse Air 0.139 0.108 0.093 0.088 0.087 0.103 
Jet America 0.117 0.083 0.095 0.100 0.072 0.093 
America W. 0.080 0.081 0.085 0.079 0.074 0.077 0.083 0.074 0.065 0.078 
Braniff' II 0.076 0.070 0.061 0.056 0.068 0.067 0.066 
People Expr. 0.088 0.087 0.062 0.061 0.064 0.058 0.070 
Charters 0.101 
Arrow Airw. 0.052 0.059 0.072 0.067 0.062 
Tower 0.062 0.052 0.056 0.054 0.046 0.041 0.045 0.048 0.054 0.051 
Capitol Air 0.102 0.060 0.057 0.062 0.039 0.064 
World 0.073 0.060 0.055 0.056 0.051 0.047 0.042 0.055 
Tower 0.118 0.129 0.116 0.088 0.082 0.106 0.106 
Mean 0.139 0.116 0.118 0.124 0.127 0.138 0.110 0.144 0.155 0.148 0.141 0.121 0.131 0.068 
Comptled from: DoT Form 41. * The carner was delmquent m filmg With the DOT, the data may be maccurate as a result. All 
values are 1992 dollars. 
The high yield of premium service new-entrants (.196) is of course in direct relation 
to their high cost service in addition to relatively long sector lengths. The former 
intrastate carriers show their spectacularly low yield compared to stage lengths just 
like the start-up new-entrants. This reflects the low cost of these carriers as can be 
seen in Table 6-10. 
In the table one can observe that Southwest Airlines is decreasing its yield over the 
years but at the same time its cost per available seat kilometre stays relatively fixed. 




The capacity offered by the new-entrant is one part of the equation leading to success 
or failure. If the capacity is too much compared to demand the carrier has two 
alternatives either to cut extra capacity down or reduce fares in order to stimulate 
demand. The new-entrants have actually used both methods. Southwest, for 
example, has a clear relationship between reduction in yield and increase in passenger 





~ 0 50 ... 
0 
.... (J 
ta 40 u.. 
I 





The Relationship Between Yield and Load-Factor At Southwest 
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Source :The First Boston Corporation (Thomson Financial Networks - CD), June 11, 1993. Please note that no explanation was 
found that explains the large shift in yield and load-factor for the fourth quarter in 1987. 
If the new-entrant has homogenous strategy like People Express had from 1981 until 
1985, namely emphasising the low-fare market only, rather than mixing the emphasis 
both on business and leisure passengers, there are going to be weekday and seasonal 
fluctuations in demand. 
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As Figure 6-4 shows seasonal fluctuations at People Express became larger as the 
company grew larger. The main fluctuations follow the main summer holiday months 
of July and .August. In 1986 the September level fell below the level in 1984 a very 
large drop In demand. If the revenue passenger miles (RPM) for September each 
year are examined one can spot a trend where the reduction in RPM is increasing 
from 1983 until a large drop occurs in 1986. Conversely, an increase in demand 
occurs in March and December every year, that becomes increasingly larger until 
1986. The figure shows clearly how People Express was subject to ever increasing 
fluctuations in RPM's and its inability to counter these with increased emphasis on 
business passengers. 
Table 6-4 shows new-entrant's ASK and its yearly growth. The average growth for 
all new-entrants listed in the table is quite high or 39.6 percent from 1980 - 1991. 
The airlines showing average growth over 100 percent are Muse Air and People 
Express, but both had high growth in the year following initiation, the reason being 
that they started operations around mid year; Muse initiated operations in June 1981 
and People Express in April 1981. As a result the growth numbers become inflated 
for the following year. If the average excludes the first year the growth becomes 
49.3 percent for Muse and 76.3 for People Express. It is nevertheless apparent that 
the growth of Muse in the first one and a half years was quite high but one has to 
take into account that the initial capacity it offered was low compared to People 
Express and New York Air. 
Carriers growing in the 80 to 100 percent band were Air Atlanta and America West. 
Air Atlanta started operations in February 1, 1984 so the first year counted eleven 
months. America West started operations on August 1, 1983. In order to cast light 
on the level of growth during the first two years one can project a hypothetical full 
year operation during the first year at America West by dividing the capacity of the 
five months of operations by five and then multiplying by 12 giving the possible full 
year capacity. Upon using this method the total projected capacity for the first year 
becomes 1869.4 and the growth rate for the second year becomes 204.4 percent. 
Hence it is apparent that the growth was high even though operations began in 
August 1983. 
Airlines growing in the 40 to 80 percent band were Empire with 70.1 percent, Florida 
Express with 58 percent, World with 50.2 percent, Midway with 46.6 percent and 
New York Air with 41.6 percent. Although most of the airlines in the table have 
failed, but for Midwest Express, Southwest and Tower, it is impossible to generalise 
on whether high growth as such is the main contributing factor to the new-entrant' s 
demise. 
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Table 6-4 New-entrants' ASK Yearly Growth208 
ASK '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 
Growth % 
'86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 Afean 
growth 
Light-speed % 
Muse Air 508.3 7.5 53.5 16.9 




America W. 390.5 -1.7 127.0 94.8 16.2 12.8 34.1 11.9 85.7 Air Atlanta 123.0 47.9 
Empire 149.1 11.5 105.3 71.0 13.6 
85,5 
70.1 Florida Exp. 98.9 59.2 16.0 58,0 
World 279.8 -0.7 0.4 50.0 -1.0 -27.4 50,2 
Very rapid 
Midway 109.8 51.0 5.9 -24.8 127.1 94.8 32.9 19.4 15.0 35.1 46.6 
New York 51.0 -4.8 33.4 76.8 51.7 41,6 
Midwest Exp 34.3 4.9 69.8 77.2 43.6 9.4 39,9 
Republic 132.3 69.4 10.3 7.3 4.2 7.4 14.9 35,1 
Capitol Air 116.9 60.6 -37.9 -2.5 34,3 
Arrow Airw. 117.0 -27.0 5.1 31.7 
Air 43.7 10.6 -58.1 33.4 76.8 67.9 29,1 
California 
Aspen 67.6 4.7 19.8 9.9 25,5 
Jet America 59.9 13.6 3.0 25,5 
Rapid 
Sunworld 45.0 52.2 -22.1 25,0 
Tower 6.4 -5.5 65.5 41.5 3.3 -5.9 39.2 20.6 
Air Wiscons. 42.7 28.3 29.1 9.1 15.3 10.9 10.0 16.9 20.3 
Southwest 36.0 21.5 28.9 26.2 9.2 15.1 14.2 16.7 10.6 11.3 22.1 19,3 
Air Florida 77.1 -5.8 -19.3 17,3 
Normal 
Horizon Air 14.3 6.8 17.5 -22.2 61.9 9.2 14,6 
Braniff II -19.6 52.4 8.4 26.0 -6.9 12.1 
PSA 7.0 18.6 16.2 2.6 -10.2 49.5 4.0 12,5 
Negative 
Mid Pacific 0.3 0.7 -12.2 -11,2 
Presidential -43.2 -21.5 -32,4 
Comptled from DOT Form 41. Please note that empty cells m the table are for years durmg which the camer was not operatmg, or 
due to non-availability of data. 
However, if one examines the table it is apparent that many of the carriers increased 
capacity intensively just before their demise. Air California increased capacity by 
144.7 percent in its last two years of operations, Empire by 189.9 percent in last 
three, Midway by 35.1 percent in the last year, Muse Air by 70.4 in last two, PSA by 
53.5 in last two, People Express by 63.3 percent and Sunworld by 52.2 percent in the 
year before closing down but it cut down capacity by 22.1 percent in the last year, 
World by 50 percent two years before closing but cut down capacity by 28.4 percent 
the following two years. 
It is quite common according to the table that following high growth period there is 
sudden drop or cut-back of capacity. This shows a marked contrast with Southwest 
that grows at a rather constant rate. The reason for new-entrant' s tendency to grow 
208In his book Growing Pains, Eric G. Flamholtz proposed some rules of thlllIlb regarding classification of the 
intensity of companies' growth rates. He considered a growth rate of 15 percent per annlllIl or less to be 
'normal' growth, 15 to 25 percent as 'rapid', 25 to 50 percent to be 'vcry rapid', 50 to 100 percent to be 
'hyper' and growth in excess of 100 percent to 'light-speed' growth. Table 6.4 has been segmented 
according to this proposition in order to show the intensity of new~trants' growth. The growth rates arc 
based on capacity rather than revenue growth. 
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fast may be an urge to achieve critical mass in order to be more competitive in the 
market. 
6.4.3 Demand 
The airline's passenger load-factor is the most widely used indicator of the airlines' 
well-being. However, the load-factor has its limitations pertaining to its lack of 
indication as to the financial health of the airline. There is no use in maintaining a 
high load-factor if the demand is stimulated by too low fares. The competition 
environment does prompt airlines to offer such fares in the hope of increasing and 
maintaining market-share or fending off an aggressive competitor. 
Trends in the table worth mentioning are, for example, the fact that the two new-
entrants with highest load factors are both charter-originating new-entrants operating 
primarily on long-distance routes. Tower Air has done rather well through the years 
due to its very narrow niche, flying between the US and Israel. Capitol, on the other 
hand, had extensive problems during its period of scheduled operations, which 
indicates that the high load factor was not enough to fend off losses. American Trans 
Air, Arrow Airways, World and Carnival are also charter based, all having fairly high 
average load. 
One of the explanations of higher load-factors at charter-based new-entrants may be 
their greater liberty in cancelling flights in order to consolidate poorly booked flights. 
This is supported by the high complaint rates that indicate customer relations 
problems of this type at charter-based new-entrants. 
To further the point of non-relationship of load-factors with financial well-being of 
airlines, one can examine Braniff II, but it had high load-factors in spite of all its 
financial problems and undulating strategy. The reason was its competition at its 
Dallas-Forth Worth hub, where two stronger competitors retaliated fiercely against 
this largest airline start-up in history, leading to a scaling down of operations soon 
after operations started both in terms of applied aircraft and cities served. In fact, the 
cities served were cut down by half six months after start -up. 209 This way the airline 
maintained its load-factor although it had cost drastic fare cuts in the face of the high 
unit costs of its full service strategy. 
There are two main reasons for low load-factors, one is over-capacity on routes 
either due to too high frequency or high fares. Thus, it is not uncommon for carriers 
offering premium service geared towards business travellers to have lower load 
factors than low-fare or mixed carriers. Air Atlanta, Muse Air and Air One fit this 
profile. One can point out that Air Atlanta was well capitalised but could not sustain 
the low load-factors it had in the beginning. Although, the load-factors improved, 
the airline was not able to sustain operations. Load factors do not indicate how well 
the production plant, the aircraft, is utilised. Air Atlanta, for example, had problems 
due to the drop in traffic during the weekend, unlike People Express that had 
209The Avmark Aviation Economist, Braniff Airlines: Expansion - without repaeating history?, November 
1987. p. 16. 
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proble~s ~uring mid-week. The difference of the two carriers' problems being their 
strategIes In terms of market segments served. 
Regional based new-entrants show medium to low load-factors. These carriers are 
usually operating a mixed fleet of prop and jet equipment on very short-haul routes. 
Their operations are linked with an incumbent's operation making it less able to 
compete for load as departures are guided by the incumbent. Regional originating 
new-entrants' loads are usually composed heavily of business passengers, leading to 
higher yields. 
Table 6-5 New-entrant Airline's Load Factors 
Airline '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 Ave-
rage 
Charter 
Tower 86.5 82.9 88.9 81.7 89.3 85.5 88.7 85.7 78.4 76.0 84.4 
Capitol Air 77.4 80.4 77.9 77.0 72.5 77.0 
American Tr. 60.6 73.5 67.0 88.9 74.1 78.2 70.4 73.2 
Arrow Airw. 67.7 71.2 74.2 67.8 70.2 
World 62.2 77.3 66.5 64.8 65.3 70.8 66.4 67.6 
Carnival 65.4 69.1 63.2 65.9 
Start-up 
Pacific East 72.3 79.7 76.0 
Florida Exp. 68.0 69.4 66.7 63.9 63.1 55.9 64.5 
Braniff II 68.0 57.7 65.5 64.7 62.8 63.7 
People Expr. 58.3 61.2 74.6 69.8 61.1 57.2 63.7 
Jet America 64.6 71.3 59.3 66.4 60.2 56.3 63.0 
Air Florida 59.0 64.3 59.5 62.4 66.2 62.3 
Braniff III 56.4 66.4 61.4 
MGMGrand 69.2 63.1 73.7 56.2 53.7 50.2 61.0 
America W. 51.7 52.5 62.4 61.0 56.1 57.9 57.7 61.0 63.6 61.4 58.5 
Pacific Expr. 57.1 57.1 
Sunworld 52.6 51.9 59.3 51.7 56.5 69.1 56.9 
New York A 51.0 62.7 54.9 57.3 56.0 56.4 54.1 56.1 
Republic 50.2 54.4 50.1 58.8 60.1 55.9 
Mid Pacific 58.1 53.5 55.8 
Midway 49.2 59.7 55.4 48.4 50.9 58.1 59.0 57.4 56.0 56.8 58.5 58.8 55.7 
Midwest Exp 23.7 38.8 55.7 65.1 65.4 60.0 56.2 54.7 55.7 52.8 
Kiwi 52.6 52.6 
Air One 47.4 50.8 49.1 
Golden West 46.9 51.3 49.1 
Cascade 48.5 47.7 48.1 
Presidential 46.1 47.3 46.0 49.4 47.2 
Muse Air 35.8 41.8 50.9 47.1 47.0 44.5 
Regional 
55.0 61.8 52.6 Aspen 55.9 49.9 55.3 na na 49.8 48.9 46.6 49.5 53.2 
Horizon Air 50.4 51.4 50.4 49.9 52.3 49.6 51.5 53.6 51.1 
Air Wiscons. 55.8 51.8 46.3 42.7 40.5 51.6 48.8 46.9 na na 45.5 45.2 47.5 
lroperial 44.2 50.8 47.5 
Empire 51.2 56.1 47.8 47.3 43.4 40.7 40.6 46.7 
Markair 42.4 44.5 47.2 49.6 50.0 47.5 38.6 38.4 
44.8 
Air Midwest 40.9 41.9 41.4 
Intrastate 
Southwest 68.2 63.6 61.6 61.6 58.5 61.2 58.3 58.9 57.7 62.7 60.6 61.1 
64.5 61.4 
Air California 67.8 58.2 51.4 58.2 55.1 56.6 53.2 54.5 
56.9 
PSA 55.4 53.0 54.9 55.2 53.4 56.5 56.0 55.7 51.4 
54.6 
Compiled from DoT Form 41. 
Many of the new-entrants experienced sudden reduction in load factors in the year of 
failure. The explanation is the tendency of travel agents to 'sell away' due to 
'rumours' of imminent failure. Another explanation is of a similar nature and has to 
do with increased competition intensity from the rivals as soon as the word of 
financial problems spreads around. 
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6.5 Finance 
6.5.1 Access to Capital 
I~ti.al capitalisation is important for the future performance of any new venture. 
AirlInes ar~ especially. c~?ital intensive compared to other new-ventures, not only in 
terms .of aIrcraft a~~ulslt~on, but also in terms of financing of fast growth. Start-up 
~~ancm~ can be .dlvided mto several sources: (i) Term loans; (ii) private placements; 
(111) publIc financmg (bonds and stock); and (iv) revolving credit. 
Table 6-6 shows few examples of new-entrants start-up financing. Note that FAA 
lo~n guarantees were higher than total initial capitalisation of People Express and 
Midway. Furthermore, on can see that high capitalisation is no guarantee of success 
as Braniff II and Muse Air both folded despite being well capitalised initially. 
Term loans are usually for more than one year but less than 15 years and amortised 
regularly during the term. Private placements, on the other hand, are direct business 
loans just like term loans but with maturity of more than 15 years. Such loans are 
usually secured on assets, stocks, bonds or equipment. The advantages of term loans 
and private placements are the avoidance of costly Security and Exchange 
Commission filings, flexibility of changing the loan indenture as there is only one 
lender and less time to arrange the loan than it is for bonds or public financing. The 
disadvantages are high drain on cash as the loan is amortised regularly and places 
commitment on the borrower due to the long term relationship with the lender (the 
lender may want to be represented on the board of directors). 210 
Public financing is usually in two basic forms, bonds and stock. These are usually 
called fixed income securities. Public financing requires the service of investment 
bankers. With a bond offering, the investment banker carries some risk as 
'underwriter' that is the function of issuing bonds for distribution, during which the 
distributor bears the risk of fluctuation in bond prices.211 
2\OThe private placement market declined substantially in the early nineties due to less participation of life-
insurance companies and the increase in the availability of public fInancing to lower quality issuers. 
211 When the investment banker decides to become an underwriter for a bond issue, he will pay the company the 
face value of the bonds less the commission and then distribute the bonds to buyers, a function that can take 
a considerable time in some instances. This risk bearing of the investment banker leads to a necessity of 
good relationship between the company and the banker often requiring a considerable investigation into the 
companies affairs before the banker will accept being an underwriter. In the case of start-up companies the 
founders will have to sell the idea and prove to the bankers that it is worthwile in tenns of return on 
investment before they will consider it. Many start-up airlines never get past this hurdle and can not gain 
enough capital to start. If a company can secure the consent of an investment banker to become an 
underwriter it is called a flotation. Both preferred, common stock and bonds fall under this term. Flotation 
can be costly for the company, proportionally more expensive as the flotation is smaller. Bond flotation is 
considered to be less costly than stock flotation and common stock flotation to be more expensive than 
preferred stock offering. The cost as a percentage of the total flotation can range from as low as 0.10 percent 
for large offering of 100 to 500 million dollars up to 10 percent for offering of less than 500 thousand 
dollars. Common stock carries woting rights at annual meetings and entitlement to a share of the comparue's 
net profIt in the form of dividends. The company can, however, withold profIts if it is felt to be in the 
companies best interest to reinvest it to secure future profItability or to abstain bankruptcy. The advantages 
of common stock is that the company doesn't necessarily have to pay dividends, it doesn' have any matunty 
but is bough and sold, after issuance, on the market. Stock issuance is sometimes more recepetive on 
fInancial markets than debt issuance due to its higher ex-pected gains than bonds or preferred stock and 
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Revolving credit is a financial package that can be drawn for any purposes but are 
often ~sed to r~solve short term capital needs until other financing has been arranged. 
Am~nca West Ju~t as People Express gained the use of a revolving credit facility. In 
Apnl 1990 Amenca West secured a $50 million revolving credit that it used just like 
working-capital to bridge loans and other short-term needs. The credit was arranged 
by five banks that played a role in the carrier's secured financing. The money was 
used immediately to finance the airline's expansion applying $40 million to finance 
the acquisition of a Boeing 747.212 
There were five airlines that entered a positive market for equity financing at the 
dawn of deregulation. These were Midway,213 New York Air, People Express, Muse 
and Jet America. The later new-entrants had a harder time finding start-up capital as 
the first round of new-entrant airlines were not financially healthy. 214 
According to Ronald Schmid new entrants will not have much probability of success 
unless they are well capitalised and have access to lease finance packages. In his 
view, the reluctance of banks and leasing companies to finance aircraft for new-
airlines can seriously inhibit the access of new-entrants and undermine the regulatory 
efforts to enhance competition. 215 
Due to the recession of the 1990's there were low cost aircraft and economical 
financing arrangements available to new entrants, that led to a rising number of new 
entrants in the United States during 1992 and 1993. Thus, it is apparent that the cost 
of aircraft and the willingness of leasing companies and banks to provide new airlines 
with agreements on favourable terms is closely linked with the number of new airlines 
being formed. 
New-entrant airlines are rated lower by aircraft financing companies than incumbent 
carriers. Thus, right from the outset new-entrants are at a disadvantage. In view of 
how large a portion the aircraft acquisition is in the total cost structure of an airline 
this must be viewed as a major handicap for a new-entrant. 
One important aspect of the early deregulation in the United States was an option in 
the law to lower the financial barriers of entry for a period of time. This option was 
because of capital gains being taxed at a lower personal income tax brackets than interest on debt. The 
disadvantages are the possibility of the founder's loss of control as voting rights are extended to new 
stockholders. That is one of the main reasons why many companies avoid the issuance of common stock. 
The cost of underwriting and distributing is considerable higher than for other issuances and the dividends 
are not deductible as an expense for the company as interest payments on bonds are. Preferred stock has 
claims and rights ahead of common stock but behind bonds. Preferred stock does usually not carry voting 
rights. They usually carry a prefered dividend, meaning that the company will service preferred ~t~k ahead 
of common stock in terms of dividend payments, but the company docs not have to pay dindends to 
preferred stockholders if the operating environment does not allow such a payment. 
212 Airline Executive International, America West Leaders Learn from Lorenzo's Example, June 1990, p. 20. 
213Midway actually led the way after having spent over three years trying to obtain fmancing for their up-start, 
the followers actually benefited from their pioneering work. 
214Op. cit. (Meyer), p. 119. 
lI5Schmid, Ronald, Air Transport within the European Single Market - how will it look after 1992?, Air & 
Space Law, Vol. XVll, No. 4/5, 1992. p. 202. 
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the Deregulation Act's revival and expansion of the FAA's Aircraft Loan Guarantee 
Program. ~16 Under this scheme the FAA could guarantee a loan up to $100 million 
for a .penod of up to 15 years, given that the carrier could not obtain uninsured 
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Private contr. $1 mW 
Equity 
Loan $38m 
Equity $ 20 (Hyatt) 
222 
Cash $13 m 
Equity 11.7 m $24.1m 
Bank credit 2 m 
Equity 12m ('81) 
Principals equity 1.2m 
Convertible subordinated 
debentures 10m ('82) 
Private investors $2m. Stock and stock warrants $6.0m 
(lPO) 
$3.4 from founders, $14m private placement(IPO). 
Employees, mostly pilots $10m. Rombac $lm. Credit 
line $1.7m. $1.5m loan guarantee. 
$12m bridge loan fmancing, mutual fund and small 
nsion fund fmanein 
The Loan Guarantee Program insured the lender against default, thus, allowing the 
carriers to achieve substantially lower rates on capital than was prevailing at the time, 
given the risk involved. According to Meyer there were 149 aircraft bought under 
the scheme, by 20 carriers during an initial three year period from the beginning of 
deregulation. New-entrants received 85 per cent of the total amount guaranteed and 
216The program included commuters, intrastate and charter carners. 
217Op. cit. (Meyer), p. 112-113. 
218Common stock, $1 par value, 2.000.000 shares authorized, 1,1058,758 issued at Desember 31,1971 at $1 
par value. Capital in excess of par value $6,012,105. 
2197% convertible promissory notes. 
22°3 million shares at $8.5 per share. (No airline had raised start-up money with stock-offering before.) 
221 Burr put up $355,000; Gitner $175,000 and other managing officers $20,000 to $50,000 each. FNC Capital 
Corp., subsidiary ofCiticorp. put up $200,000. 
222From Braniff I, bankruptcy estate. Dalfort Corporation an affiliiate to Hyatt Corporation was the original 
stockholder of Braniff holding 93 percent of the voting power. 
22-'Air Transport World, Jet America is beginning to see daylight, October, 1983, pp. 49-50. 
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thereof New York Air, People Express, Midway Airlines and Muse Air 23 per 
cent.224 , 
The benefit of the Loan Guarantee Program for the new entrants, was: 
: .. loan guarantees re~uced the debt service drain on cash flow by lowering 
Interest rates, extending the loan terms available, and, most important, 
making financing possible where it had previously not been available.225 
The Loan Guarantee Program was criticised by the existing carriers as unfair. As a 
result, important changes were made to the program; first, there was imposed a $100 
million ceiling in 1982; second, there was a limit as to the size of aircraft purchased 
under the scheme. The limit being less than 60 seat and 18.000 pound aircraft. This 
wiped out the availability of this program to new jet operating airlines as they were 
all considering aircraft larger than 60 seat. 
To conclude one can state that access to capital is the single largest obstacle to 
starting-up an airline. The early new-entrants can not be said to have suffered from 
under capitalisation but the new-comers had less funding, leading to increased 
dependence on debt capital. 
6.5.2 Aircraft Acquisition 
Aircraft acquisition is the single largest cost item in running an airline and the largest 
in terms of capital intensity. Most new-entrants have had to decide whether to own 
or lease. Leasing is the most common way to acquire aircraft for new-entrants due to 
its greater flexibility and lower initial capital requirements. 226 Furthermore, leasing 
was treated as cost rather than debt, therefore, not affecting the carriers debt 
structure. As a result, there was greater flexibility to acquire capital and add debt. 227 
Examining Table 6-7 one can see that most new-entrants started by leasing aircraft 
rather than buying. People Express, however, started out by buying large number of 
aircraft in one lot of twenty two in all. No other new-entrant has taken such a bold 
step in initial equipment acquisition, until Braniff II leased 30 idle ex-Braniff I 727' s. 
It must be noted, however, that People Express bought theirs and had much lower 
initial capitalisation than Braniff II. This large initial fleet seems to have caused 
Braniff II much trouble, while People Express seemed to be able to absorb the 
224Op. cit. (Meyer), p. 113. 
22"Op. cit. (Meyer), p. 112. 
n6There are number of different leasing forms in the airline industry, (i) leveraged lease (tax-lease); (ii) 
Japanese levereged lease; (iii) US o\vnership - FSC; (iv) German tax-based lease; (v) European export 
credit; (vi) Connnission - FSC; (vii) US Eximbank; (viii) UK tax lease; (ix) French lease. See Airfmance 
Journal, Handbook 1993/94, May 1993, No. 150. 
227Following deregulation lower fares and increased disposable income in the developed world, led. to a 
thriving aircraft leasing business due to airlines rapid growth leading to their need ~o add a~rcraft \\1th~ut 
being able or perhaps willing to add debt. This development led to the formatIon of arrcraft l~smg 
companies, that reduced risk for banks as now the banks would lend the lessor that could repossess arrcraft 
much faster than the banks would, in the event of bankruptcy or lease payments default. As a result, the 
financially poor operators could acquire aircraft faster and easier and in larger numbers than before. This, 
occurred tor new-entrants just as well as other carriers. 
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capacity of its 22 Boeing 727 aircraft very quickly. One explanation is that Braniff II 
started operation in a much different air transport world, than People Express did in 
1981. 
In a growth market airlines tend to expand by acquiring aircraft at premium lease 
rates. Since the leasing companies pursue to minimise their risk and new-entrants are 
dependent on favourable lease terms in order to be cost competitive, the availability 




















New-entrant's Aircraft Acquisition 
Type of initial aircraft andfinancing 
Bought five 727-100s and arranged for sale/leaseback with General Electric Credit Co.m 
In 1984 signed up for 12 737-300s to be delivered in 1985, leased from International Lease 
Finance. 
Various schemes due to aircraft trading. Utilised the Loan Guarantee Program to fmance a $85m 
transaction, fmanced five 727-200 Ad. under 'cross-border tax leasing' (double dip) were 
lenders in the US and UK get tax breaks which they share with the airline in lower lease rates. 229 
Seven 727-100s bought from Pan Am and Piedmont for $2.5m each.no 
18 used 737-200s on lease, lease-purchase or purchased. Leased 737-200s from International 
Lease Finance. (two purchased for $5m and some from GP A) Three aircraft delivered in 84 
purchased for $39.1 m) In 1989 A W owned only 17 of its 86 airplanes the rest was leased. 23\ 
30 Boeing 727-200s in 1984 leased from Braniff's I bankruptcy trust. (initially at $2.7 million 
per month) 
Two bought directly from Fokker del. 1980, Four F-28's bought through bidding, two 
purchased from Altair Jets. Aircraft were fmanced through public offering. 
20 F28-200s, 400s(6) one halfis leased from IMM under long-term non-cancellable leases 
and the other half is was purchased by the carrier. 
Two F-28s bought 
Leased two MD-80s from McDonnell Douglas Finance Corp. and GATX. 
Three Regent Air's 727's bought in 1987 for $16.5m and three Air ltalia's DC-8-62s for $16m. 232 
Three leased DC-9-lOs from McDonnell Douglas. In 1989 the carrier sold and leased back 16 
DC-9-30 to cover the acquisition of Eastern' assets in Philadelphia of which the 16 aircraft 
belonged 233 
Two DC-9s bought for $2.7m and $3.3m and a DC-9-14 bought in 1983 for $3.5m. K-C Aviation 
a subsidiary of Kimberly Clark bought the aircraft for Midwest Express that is also a subsidiary 
ofK-C. 
Bought 30 MD-80, 20 BAe 146s, 4 DC-9-30s from 1978 to 1986. With the 146s starting 
service in 1984. 
Bought 22 737-100s for $90m in 1981. Bought 4 737-200s in 1982. Bought 20 727-200 
for $4.2m each and leased 1 747 from bankrupt Braniff, 10 used 727s from McDonnell Douglas 
at $4.2m each and 15727-200 adv. from Delta for $91m. The latter two purchases were not 
delivered all at once but was spread to 1984 also. In 1984 the carrier leased two more 
747-200 and 100. 
Bought initially four 737s for $16.2m(l971). In January 1982 it operated 25 owned b737-200 
adv., by 1986 it operated owned 17 B737-300s and owned 46 B737-200s. In 1991 it leased 
three ex-AirCal737s and bought 11 new 737s bringing the fleet to 120 737s. Southwest unlike 
other carriers tends to add used aircraft to the fleet during recessions due to better prices 
this is possible for it due to its strong financial status. 234 
228Op. cit. (Air Atlanta Works ... , ATW 6/85), p. 45. 
229Op. cit. (Air Florida ... , ATW 8/82), p. 44. 
230Op. cit. (Air 1 Expansion ... , ATW 8/84), p. 47. 
231Op. cit. (ATW 12/89), p. 30; and (ATW 6/89), p. 60-61. 
mOp. cit. (Coddling the rich ... , ATW 4/91), p. 54. 
























234Airfmance Journal, Southwest Stays in shape, May 1993, no. 150, pp. 10-12., and AlW 7/91 pp. 33-36., 
and Lloyd's Aviation Economist October 1994, p. 28. 
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When t?e market situation is reversed as occurred in the early 1990' s, lessors are 
faced wIth rentals that may not cover the loan payments or even idle aircraft. In such 
a situation the leasing company will offer terms that cover some of the loan payments 
rather than maintaining idle aircraft in the lease portfolio and face financial ruin or 
bankruptcy as a result. In this market situation the conditions for starting an airline 
become favourable. 
Many new-entrants have tried to minimise the effect of aircraft acquisition on cash-
flow and the debt structure by acquiring older aircraft during stagnation or declining 
values, usually during economic recession, leading to entry during periods of 
economic recession, when market rivalry is more intense. Nevertheless, most of the 
new entrants have enjoyed high growth rates (see Table 6-4). This has placed intense 
pressure on financial resources making leasing the most viable option to acquire 
aircraft at a faster pace without too much harm to the balance sheet. Such alternative 
does, however, place extra burdens on the airline's cash-flow. 
6.5.3 Profitability 
Airlines are highly sensitive to customer trust, as the customer usually buys a ticket in 
advance in good faith of it being honoured on the day of travelling. The ticket, 
therefore, is like a short-term investment to the customer. In the meantime, that is 
from the time when the ticket is bought until it is used, the passenger wants to be 
assured that the airline will still be around when he undertakes the trip. As a result, 
any rumours of bankruptcy will reduce the number of potential travellers willing to 
use an airline subject to such adversities. What is worse, the travel agents will avoid 
booking the airline. If they use it they might mark another airline as the designated 
airline meaning that the revenue will go to that airline first and then to the troubled 
carrier, delaying the troubled carrier's use of the cash for some weeks. This will, 
however, increase the passenger's ability to recover the fare in case offailure. Thus, 
a rumour of imminent failure of a carrier will result in sudden drop in cash-flow and 
affect profitability dramatically. In conjunction to other factors this drop in demand 
can result in large losses. 
Airlines that have been affected in this respect are America West that showed 
dramatic drop in profitability in 1991 with operating losses mounting to 104.7 
million. Other examples of a sudden drop in profitability in the last year of 
operations: Braniff whose losses ran from 13.1 million to 57.6 million in 1989, 
Midway that increased losses from 13.5 to 84.5 and People Express from an 
operating profit of33.4 million to a 123.6 million loss in 1986. The drop in demand 
is, of-course, not the only reason, but a contributing factor when financial health is 
out of hand. 
The table on the next page shows that new-entrants have not been profitable in the 
long-term, with few exceptions like Southwest amd Midwest Express. It i.s only 
recently that new-airlines and incumbents alike have started to pay attentIOn to 
Southwest's profitable strategy. No other sustainable new-entrant strategy has 
worked in the long-term, but that of Southwest. Perhaps the slow growth feature of 
that strategy is what counts more than anything else in this regard. 
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Table 6-8 New-entrants' Operating- and Net Profit 1979 - 1992 
Op.profit '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 Cumul 
Net profit $ atlve 
Regional 
Air Wiscons. 8.1 10.1 5.7 6.2 14.1 22.7 1.6 0.7 -26.8 42.4 
4.0 4.4 1.9 3.1 6.1 17.8 0.4 1.3 -37.3 1.7 
Horizon Air -3.3 -0.9 2.9 2.8 -2.5 0.6 8.0 7.3 14.9 
-9.1 -3.7 -5.1 2.6 1.9 1.1 3.6 3.3 -5.4 
Empire 1.0 -0.7 4.6 6.1 -1.5 9.5 
0.5 0.5 20.1 2.3 -4.2 19.2 
Aspen 1.4 -0.7 -1.1 -0.6 -5.4 -2.0 -8.4 
0.4 -0.2 -1.3 -0.1 -5.5 1.4 -5.3 
Intrastate 
Southwest 48.8 48.5 39.2 68.6 68.6 70.3 81.3 41.3 86.1 97.6 81.6 62.0 181.8 975.7 
PSA 2.6 -16.0 -17.4 -10.0 31.0 31.9 23.0 20.6 65.7 
4.2 22.7 18.6 -12.6 -4.8 -0.6 -3.1 -24.7 -0.3 
Air 12.2 0.3 -20.7 17.3 24.5 12.8 3.7 50.1 
California 9.9 4.4 -24.0 3.4 11.2 9.3 -1.6 12.6 
Air Florida 9.5 -12.1 -33.5 -5.8 -41.9 
Start-up 
Mid Pacific -0.9 2.4 2.4 3.9 
-1.1 0.5 2.7 2.1 
Midwest Exp -3.5 -l.6 5.3 5.7 7.5 5.1 0.6 4.1 23.2 
-l.8 -0.3 3.2 3.8 4.8 3.0 0.1 2.0 14.8 
Muse Air -5.5 -4.7 4.6 -3.3 8.3 -0.6 
-4.0 11.5 -2.0 -17.0 -8.7 -20.2 
MGMGrand 0 -0.5 na -4.1 -3.5 0.1 -8.0 
-2.4 -5.4 -2.6 -15.0 -8.9 -14.7 -49.0 
Jet America -8.3 -1.4 3.0 2.0 -1.6 -6.3 
-8.8 -3.1 -3.7 -8.5 -15.8 -39.9 
Florida Exp. -l.6 5.2 3.8 -13.8 -6.4 
-3.1 4.1 l.9 -12.1 -9.2 
Sunworld -0.6 2.5 -4.6 -18.6 -21.3 
-5.3 2.5 -5.3 -15.2 -23.3 
New York A -9.5 -12.4 8.6 -0.6 7.2 -11.1 -17.8 
-11.6 -23.3 4.5 -6.8 -2.4 36.1 -3.5 
People Expr. -7.2 10.5 19.6 20.2 33.4 -123.6 -47.1 
-9.2 l.0 10.4 l.7 -20.1 -198.5 -214.7 
Air Atlanta -19.7 -14.2 -14.4 -48.1 
-23.1 -45.5 -19.4 -88.0 
Midway -4.5 8.8 4.5 -12.3 -12.9 0.9 11.1 25.0 13.5 -13.5 -84.5 -63.9 
-4.9 7.6 0.3 -15.0 -22.0 -3.6 9.0 13.0 6.5 -21.7 -139.2 -17.0 
Presidential -26.0 -32.2 -13.1 -10.2 -81.5 
-24.0 -28.5 -15.2 -15.6 -83.3 
America W. -6.5 -8.6 18.7 4.0 -35.4 18.1 48.1 -31.6 -104.7 -97.9 
-6.3 -15.4 1l.4 3.0 -45.7 9.4 20.0 -74.7 -222.0 -320.3 
Braniff II -91.1 18.6 -12.3 -17.8 -13.1 -57.6 -173.3 
-75.4 15.2 -9.0 -10.4 -19.8 -146.9 -246.3 
Charter 
Tower -l.0 2.0 3.2 9.0 10.8 10.2 1l.7 19.0 9.1 
74.0 
Capitol Air -3.4 4.5 -13.0 -10.7 -0.6 -23.2 
-5.4 20.5 -21.2 -11.2 -1.6 -18.9 
Arrow Airw. -15.1 -0.1 -3.8 
-19.0 
-13.6 0.2 -3.8 -17.2 
World -28.8 9.6 -30.5 -1.3 -13.3 -2.0 -66.4 
-132.7 
-28.2 -20.2 -58.4 -29.4 -18.0 -14.9 -28.0 
-197.1 
Compiled from DoT Form 4l. 
6.5. -I Cost Structure 
The new-entrants had cost advantage over incumbent carriers that had been operating 
under the regulation regime where profits were almost guaranteed by the fare control 
mechanism of the CAB. As a result, there had been less incentive to control costs 
then there would be in a fully price competitive environment. Therefore, the start -up 
new-entrants could exploit the cost advantage they obtained by their youth and the 
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intr~state new-entrants could utilise their experience of operating in a competitive 
enVIronment. 
Table 6-9 Comparison of Average Pay Per Employee in 1985235 




Delta 46,862 Air Wisconsin 31,825a 
TWA 46,106 Intrastate -
USAir 44,949 PSA-Pacific Southwest 43,968
b 
United 42,792 a Southwest 36,615 
American 42,777 Air California 31,910 
Northwest 42,617 Start-up Avg. 37.498 
Eastern 41,888 Braniff II 26,663 
Pan Am 38,885 a Midwest Express 22,195 
Western 36,316 America West 21,619 
Piedmont 34,341 a New York Air 19,908 
Continental 23,205 Muse Air 18,762 






Charter Av~. 18.837 
Tower Air 21,022 
World Airways 15,514 
Av~. 18.268 
New-entrants' Average 23,359 
a b 
1984 data. 1986 data. 
The start-ups could operate without unionised staff with lower wage scales and more 
flexible job descriptions. This is reflected in Table 6-9, that shows average pay per 
employee. The table shows clearly that new airlines benefit from lower wage scales. 
In 1985 the average yearly salary per employee of the new-entrant carriers shown in 
the table, was a low $23 thousand, while the incumbents average was $40 thousand. 
This difference is very large in view of the labour intensity of airlines. Looking at the 
table closer it becomes apparent that there is considerable difference between the 
various sub-groups of new-entrants, as intrastate new-entrants have similar wage 
scales as the incumbent carriers, while start-up and charter new-entrants pay about 50 
percent less in wages per employee. 
Start-up carriers have the lowest cost structure among the new-entrants, while the 
intrastate and charter based new-entrants occupy the middle ground and regional 
based new-entrants tend to have the highest costs. This means that to be competitive 
some of the new-entrants had to focus on reducing costs just like the incumbents 
have had to do. A regional carrier like Empire, that started jet operations would have 
a cost disadvantage compared to a start-up carrier like People Express. 
23lncwnbent data: Kenneth Button, The Deregulation of U.S. interstate aviation: an assessment of causes and 
consequences (Part 2), Transport Reviews, 1989, Vol. 9, No.3, pp 189-215. New-entrant airlines data: 
Compiled from DoT Form 41. 
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Table 6-10 New-entrants' Costs - U.S. - Cents per ASK 
Airline 'SO '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 Afean 
Regionals 
Empire 0.l33 0.118 0.107 0.105 0.106 0.114 
Aspen 0.120 0.127 0.l33 0.l38 0.129 0.165 0.135 
Air Wiseons. 0.157 0.l38 0.186 0.141 0.144 0.142 0.133 0.128 0.128 0.144 
Horizon Air 0.129 0.128 0.165 0.142 0.146 0.142 0.142 
Premium 0.134 
Air Atlanta 0.10& 0.111 0.122 0.113 
MGMGrand 0.292 0.189 0.206 0.199 0.142 0.206 
MidwestExp 0.094 0.096 0.118 0.103 0.090 0.079 0.072 0.093 
Intrastate 0.137 
Southwest 0.05& 0.053 0.054 0.052 0.049 0.050 0.042 0.044 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.040 0.048 
Air Florida 0.102 0.0&0 0.0&0 0.069 0.083 
PSA 0.083 0.083 0.074 0.072 0.070 0.087 0.069 0.069 0.076 
Air California 0.094 0.085 0.079 0.076 0.078 0.078 0.069 0.080 
Start-ups 0.072 
People Expr. 0.063 0.051 0.040 0.043 0.040 0.041 0.046 
Jet America 0.058 0.052 0.053 0.051 0.045 0.052 
Muse Air 0.096 0.052 0.047 0.045 0.040 0.056 
Braniff II 0.070 0.047 0.044 0.048 0.051 0.054 0.052 
America W. 0.056 0.074 0.050 0.049 0.046 0.047 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.052 
Sunworld 0.058 0.061 0.061 0.068 0.062 
Florida Exp. 0.066 0.066 0.060 0.065 0.065 
Midway 0.104 0.099 0.086 0.076 0.090 0.083 0.060 0.054 0.052 0.054 0.056 0.074 
New York A 0.096 0.087 0.092 0.090 0.081 0.069 0.086 
Presidential 0.051 0.077 0.085 0.086 0.075 
Charters 0.062 
World 0.102 0.0&0 0.06& 0.055 0.045 0.046 0.056 0.065 
Capitol Air 0.097 0.062 0.057 0.059 0.069 
Tower 0.08& 0.099 0.094 0.082 0.079 0.088 
Arrow Airw. 0.112 0.111 0.111 
Mean 0.092 0.085 0.072 0.072 0.077 0.083 0.074 0.101 0.099 0.094 0.105 0.093 0.083 
Compded from DoT Form 41. All figures are 1992 dollars. 
Although low labour cost is extremely important for airlines, non-unionised operation 
may not be the only way to achieve low cost structure. Southwest airlines, for 
example, is fully unionised and pays competitive salaries as the table above shows. It 
has achieved low cost-structure through high aircraft utilisation that cuts down the 
size of the fleet and utilises staff better. 
The intrastate carriers were at a cost disadvantage (0.072) compared to some of the 
start-up carriers (0.062), that can be observed in Table 6-10, although Southwest 
Airlines was the exception. The higher costs indicate two things, first, that the 
Californian intrastate carriers and Air Florida had not had as much incentive to keep 
costs down as Southwest had under regulation, and secondly that they attempted to 
imitate the incumbents as they gained interstate route rights instead of developing a 
defensible niche in the market. 
The average costs according to year show some decline from 1980 until 1983, but 
then increase until 1985. In 1986 the fuel costs declined dramatically and costs per 
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available seat kilometre drop. In this year, however, many carriers failed or were 
absorbed by larger incumbents leading to higher debt structure and route 
inefficiencies, that caused an increase in costs again. The general conclusion that can 
be read from the table is that most of the new-entrants were able to reduce their costs 
over the years they operated. 
6.5.5 Debt Structure 
Corporations have two basic ways to raise capital, through equity or debt. These 
two methods differ greatly in terms of the effect on financial performance. Chow 
reported that poorly performing airlines in terms of earnings per share (BPS) tended 
to issue fixed-cost instruments, long-term debt and preferred stock. 236 This financial 
structure led, according to the authors, to reduced ability of such carriers to adapt to 
variability in earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). It is suggested that one of 
the reasons for utilising such financing schemes was to utilise interest deductions to 
shield profits. Chow mentions that the issuance of equity may indicate to the market 
that future earnings may not cover increased debt interest. 237 Thus, airlines have to 
adjust to their environment in ways that may limit their future options or increase 
leverage causing less flexibility in an adverse environment. 
The debt to equity ratio for new-entrants is usually very poor. Affecting their 
profitability seriously. Airlines in general have high debt structure although new-
entrants as a segment is higher than the average for all airlines. 238 If the last year 
reported in the table in Appendix-D is examined for each new-entrant, one can see 
that only three new-entrants Southwest, PSA and Midwest Express have positive 
equity compared to long-term debt. If individual years are considered it is apparent 
that three carriers have fared better than others in this regard, namely Southwest, 
Braniff II and Midway. Southwest stands out having had positive equity throughout 
the deregulation years. 
The poor debt to equity ratio indicates that new-entrants are highly sensitive to 
fluctuations of the economy, especially interest rates. Furthermore, it indicates that 
236Preferred stock has claims and rights before common stock but behind bonds. Preferred stock is similar to 
bonds in some ways but different in the way that the company can decide not to pay dividend in years of 
negative earnings unlike bonds whose failure to pay interest will foreclose the debendure. Bonds can be of 
a secured and unsecured nature, meaning that a secured bond will be secured against some specific assets of 
the company, while the unsecured one is not secured against any specific assets but against assets not 
already pledged. Thus, unsecured bonds are used by either financially very strong companies or fmancially 
weak companies. In the latter case the company wants to preserve their remaining assets, if any, against 
pledging for future use if necessary. Long-term bond issues call for long-term relationship between thc 
borrower and the lender that is described in the 'indenture' that is a highly detailed document of relevant 
information. Identure for stock-offerings is however much simpler in nature. Common stock carries \\ith it 
full voting rights but claims to assets behind, bond holders and preferred stockholders that do not have 
voting rights. 
237 Chow, Garland, Gritta, Richard D. and Hockstein, Ronald, Airline Financing Policies in a Deregulated 
Environment, Transportation Journal, Spring 1988, pp. 40-42 
BI!For a good overview of this high debt of the airline industry see: Op. cit. (Financial Condition of the Airline 
Industry). 
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financing through equity offerings is a problem for new-entrants due to their poor 
profitability and track record. 
People Express financed most of its debt with public debt securities that were 
typically 10 year certificates with no principal payments for the first five years. This 
led to low repayments compared to the amount of debt or $1.5 million in 1986 on 
$500 million outstanding. 239 This strategy deferred debt payments to later years in 
the hope that the restructuring of the airline would better enable it to service that 
large amount of debt. It is apparent that People Express had fully extended its 
financial abilities in terms of public debt securities and seriously severed its relations 
with the banks after the Frontier acquisition, thus, hindering the tapping of financial 
resources after the large 1986 loss. 
New-entrants are usually heavily in debt, making them less flexible in adverse 
economic environment and especially vulnerable to interest rate changes. Their 
access to equity capital has been surprisingly successful in view of their constant 
failures. This, nevertheless, has had its impact as recent start-ups have less start-up 
capital and often utilise alternative methods like employee financing. 
6.6 Operations 
6.6.1 Route Structure 
New-entrant's route structure is different depending on the new-entrant's origin. 
Charter-based new-entrants tend to operate long-haul international routes. While 
regional based new-entrants operate very short-haul feeder routes. Start-up and 
intrastate new-entrants fall into the short to medium haul category. That category 
seems to be the one category that works best as into that category fall the new-
entrants that are still operating, as well as the hyper growth new-entrants. Stage-
length, however, tells only part of the story in terms of the route structure. In fact, 
there are five basic route structures that new-entrant carriers could adopt under 
Deregulation. The first structure is 'short-haul to and from a hub', used by a hub 
carrier like America West in Phoenix or a feeder carrier like Air Wisconsin at 
Chicago's O'Hare. The second structure is 'short-haul point to point', that 
characterises the most successful new-entrant Southwest and Morris Air that was 
acquired by Southwest in 1994. The third structure is 'medium-haul to and from a 
hub to small to medium sized cities', that characterised People Express, Midwest 
Express and Midway. The fourth structure is 'long-haul international destinations', 
which was mainly the domain of the former sublemental carriers, Capitol, W orId, 
Tower and American Trans Air. The fifth structure is 'long-haul domestic', which 
was operated by MGM Grand Air, that flew between New York and Los Angeles 
offering premium service. 
The selected route structure is one of the basic features of the new-entrant' s strategy 
and will be discussed as such in Chapter 7. 
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Average Stage Length in Miles 
'80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 
214 287 333 300 321 379 
289 329 341 340 350 371 
241 296 362 381 389 
319 335 349 351 360 361 
110 105 127 
147 153 137 na na na 
149 150 163 163 169 172 
381 400 
na 




362 367 363 
123 128 na na 158 161 
156 152 165 189 186 231 
187 
397 392 428 425 
498 397 
Horizon Air 160 165 156 151 146 145 148 154 160 
Southwest 265 276 278 297 303 321 333 354 368 380 375 376 374 378 
Medium-haul 
Braniff II 734 na 1033 963 806 704 
America W. 544 456 399 402 442 458 480 544 596 629 
Midwest Exp 636 606 531 569 551 570 629 659 699 
Midway 310 347 487 442 448 489 501 598 620 614 662 636 673 
Air Atlanta 555 597 526 
People Expr. 396 538 457 531 617 630 
Air Florida 324 286 410 428 435 582 1080 
Sunworld 532 492 458 422 375 821 
Long-haul 
Jet America 1735 1428 1358 1176 887 830 
MGMGrand 2475 2475 2471 2475 2475 2475 
Arrow Airw. 1303 1353 1219 1190 1173 1033 1478 1606 1416 
Capitol Air 3173 2262 1959 1384 1,611 
Tower 2829 2889 2829 3438 3664 3670 3654 3473 3154 2810 
World 1756 1519 1512 1938 1943 1828 1606 
Source: Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, RSP A National Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, MA 
6.6.2 Fleet Structure 
Fuel efficient, small, two pilot aircraft characterise the fleet of most new-entrants 
with the exception of the regional based new-entrants that have operated a mixed 
fleet of turboprop and jet aircraft. Another characteristic has been to keep the fleet 
homogenous by operating only one type of aircraft. Southwest has been able to keep 
this rule, while People Express operated both B727's and B737's and added B747's 
when London was added to its route system. 
The Boeing 737 has been the most popular aircraft and the fleets of People Express, 
America West, Southwest and Morris Air used it. Maintenance costs are lower for 
two engine aircraft compared to three engine aircraft like Boeing 727. Furthermore, 
seating configuration in smaller two engine jets allows it to be operated with two 
flight attendants if seating is below 100. This is what Midwest Express and America 
West have utilised as a cost cutting measure with its F-28's. 
The other reason for using the two engine aircraft is the lower fuel consumption. 
America West estimated in 1989 that it was actually 22 percent more fuel efficient 
than the average consumption of other carriers or 60 ASM per gallon compared with 
industry average of 47 ASM per gallon. 
The aircraft operated is a major factor in a new-entrant's low cost structure. What is 
more new-entrants tend to enter the market when aircraft are readily available at 
reasonable leasing rates. 
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6.7 Information Systems 
6. 7.1 Injormation- and Communication Systems 
The internal information and communication system brings together information in 
the co~pany, the problems it faces and challenges from the outside. The right 
processIng and channelling of this information to the relevant sections of the 
company provides for effective decision making, given that the information is 
relevant, timely and accurate. The model in Figure 1-4 cites the information function 
as the centre for decision-making, from which the management derives its 
information for decision-making, whose quality either makes or brakes the company. 
If information is examined it can be divided into different compartments, like 
computer based information and processing systems, formal paper based 
communication systems in the form of reports, letters and internal newsletters and 
finally formal and informal interpersonal communication. 
In the airline industry are four basic internal computer based information systems. 
First, the traditional accounting system that has usually an integrated management 
information module build in. If not, the system provides the managers with financial 
status reports at fixed intervals. The second, system is the operations system that is 
centred around the airlines in-house CRS system. This system has current booking 
status of all flights operated by the airline. The in-house CRS can then funnel this 
information into management reports citing load-factors divided into classes, 
production units and yield. The last named function has actually been developed into 
a sub-function as a management tool to maximise yield, the so called yield 
management system. The third system, is the external commercial CRS system. The 
fourth system is that of operations, scheduling and maintenance. 
Some new-entrants like Southwest and People Express circumvented commercial 
CRS's, but most new-entrants have been participants or at least listing their 
schedules. In such systems, this part does generate management reports given that 
the airline is a full member of the system. The in-house system is, however, usually 
linked to the commercial CRS meaning that the most accurate up to the minute 
information are stored in-house, so there is no reason to produce reports from the 
external system unless the internal system is highly inadequate in that respect. The 
problem with People Express was that the in-house CRS was highly inadequate 
mainly due to its inflexibility and simplicity. Thus People Express did not recognise 
the importance of computerised systems when founded. Taking the stand that the 
cost savings of maintaining a simple basic system would be more important in the 
long-term than developing a sophisticated in-house CRS system. The result was the 
companies inability to respond to changes in the environment (problem generating) 
that were two faceted, first the increased importance of CRS' s as a marketing tool 
and secondly the development of sophisticated yield management system by 
American, that set the phase for other airlines. The result was People Express 
inability to respond due to financial limitations and lag caused by the time required to 
develop such a system. 
In order to understand the importance of computerised information systems and 
formal communication systems over informal interpersonal communication, one 
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needs only to look at the increase in possible linkages between employees as the 
number ~f employees increases. This explains very effectively why large companies 
loose th.elr cosy personal touch that is so often experienced by employees of smaller 
comparues and why inefficiencies and communication break -down occurs if 
computerised systems and formal communication systems are not developed. 
6.8 Conclusion 
Senior managers at new-entrant airlines have tended to be highly experienced airline 
professionals. The airline experience of the founder seems to be important in order 
for the start-up new-entrant to gain enough funding. 
The new-entrant founder's personality is important for the airline's destiny. There is 
a tendency for start-up airline's founders to be charismatic and autocratic. Traits that 
are important to get the airline off the ground but becomes a liability as the airline's 
SlZe mcreases. 
The new-entrants' chief executive officers' objectives are various. Some of the 
objectives have been stated in the media: revenge, to make profit, to prove that things 
can be done differently and to enjoy media attention. 
There is a tendency for roles to be centralised at the top at new-entrant airlines. The 
new-entrant's founders are often chairmen, CEO's and presidents all at the same 
time, thus enjoying almost unchallenged power. This centralisation may be important 
for the organisation to begin with but becomes a liability as the airline gets larger and 
more complicated, because there is a tendency to forego the necessary analysis before 
decision making. 
New-entrant airlines seem to be decentralised with highly motivated work-force. The 
fact is, though, that new-entrant airlines have usually centralised organisation 
structures. People Express was famous for its employee programs and was 
considered highly decentralised, but was in fact ruled by one person, its founder. 
Many of the new-entrants were highly 'people oriented' in order to keep the unions 
away. One of the fundamental parts of keeping costs down was to be union-free and 
pay lower salaries for more employee efficiency than prevailed in the industry. The 
usual bait for attracting employees on such terms was to offer profit-sharing and 
stock-ownership programs. These programs were two edged sword for the new-
entrants as they become a liability and disheartening for the employees when 
profitability drops or doesn't materialise. 
Fast growth of the early successful new-entrants imposed a serious strain on their 
organisation structure as large portion of the organisation was composed of 'new' 
employees that were still gaining experience and training therefore not fully useful. 
Information systems that take considerable time to develop and implement, lag 
behind making the organisation inefficient as the infrastructure is not capable of 
handling the increased complexity of the airline. 
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New-entrant airlines have grown very fast in most cases and behave differently in that 
respect from most other industries. To give in to the potential for fast growth may 
actually be the new-entrant's greatest liability. 
New-entrant's demand as represented in the passenger load-factor has been good. 
With the charter-based new-entrants at the top of the list and regional based new-
entrants at the bottom. The load-factor is not a sufficient indicator of efficiency by 
itself so it is necessary to look at yield, costs and aircraft utilisation as well. 
New-entrant's overall profitability has been exceedingly poor. The losses increase 
fast as the airline nears bankruptcy because travel agents and passengers alike start to 
avoid the airline. This implies that airlines in a financially poor condition are highly 
vulnerable to press treatment in their crisis. 
New-entrants are highly leveraged, making them vulnerable to adverse conditions in 
the economy, especially increases in interest rates. The reason is their tendency to 
use fixed cost instruments instead of equity financing. The reason for this tendency is 
inability to raise equity capital as financial health deteriorates and the founders 
attempt to retain power and abstain hostile take-overs. 
A new-entrant's cost structure is generally lower than that of the incumbents but the 
new-entrant was not able to utilise the advantage fully after the introduction of yield 
management systems. The main facets of the lower cost structure are lower salaries, 
higher employee utilisation, greater aircraft utilisation and leaner organisation 
structures. 
Aircraft acquired by the new-entrant jet carriers have tended to be second-hand, fuel 
efficient, small size two pilot jets. In order to further the savings the fleets have been 
kept as homogenous as possible. The most popular aircraft among start-up and 
intrastate new-entrants is the Boeing 737. 
Although most of the new-entrants have been acquired by other carriers many of the 
new-entrants participated in the merger 'mania' in 1986. Some of the airlines 
attempted to over-take other airlines but were not successful. The attempts were 
costly in terms of management time and money and could affect the profitability of 
the carrier involved. The mergers that occurred were usually not beneficial for the 
new-entrant involved. 
The information and communication system of the new-entrant is the central function 
that allows effective decisions to be taken. Due to the new-entrant's fast growth this 
function is often lagging behind causing information and communication problems. 
In the next chapter the new-entrants' competition strategy will be examined in order 
to examine how the new-entrants applied their resources in the marketplace. As well 
as to search for explanations for their failure. 
116 
7. The New-Entrants' 
Competition Strategy 
7.1 Introduction 
To succeed and survive in an industry. 
the firm must match the aggressiveness of its 
operating and strategic behaviours to the changeability of 
demands and opportunities in the market-place. 
- Igor Ansoff 
The following chapter covers the strategies adopted by u.s. new-entrants in 
comparison to the incumbents'. Strategy has received greater interest in the past 
decades due to increased competition in markets, especially the deregulated ones. 
The reason being that companies in markets where entry is relatively easy face intense 
competition unless they can erect barriers to entry and outsmart their competitors 
with their strategic moves. 
Although the chapter is primarily concerned about u.s. new-entrants it does give 
insights into new-entrants' strategic options within 'deregulated' Europe when and if 
the present political protectionism will be eliminated. 
The chapter will first examine the underlying principles of strategy and then 
concentrate on the new-entrants' strategic options and actions, as well as the 
incumbents' reactions. 
7.2 General Competition Strategy 
7.2.1 Introduction 
Strategy comes across as a relatively wide concept affecting all aspects of the 
business operation. In order to have a clear picture of the term's definition one needs 
to resort to known authority on the subject. Strategy is defined in the Collins 
Dictionary of Business, as: 
... a unified set of plans and actions designed to secure the achievement of 
the basic objectives of a business ... BUSINESS OBJECTIVES represent the 
goals of the organization, i.e. the economic (and social) purposes for which 
the business exists; strategy is the means used to attain these goals. 
Tregoe and Zimmerman define strategy as: 
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a framework that guides those choices that determine the nature and 
direction of an organisation.240 
The definitions state, therefore, clearly that the business has to have some 
'desti?ation' before it can select the roads that lead it there. Strategy as such is the 
selectIon .of ~he roa~s.. The problem arises when strategy is selected without any 
clea~ destln~tl0n. This IS apparent for some new-entrants, as discussed in the chapter, 
marufested In a change in the airline's basic definition of its own being: 'who am 1'. 
In such a case it can be alleged that the carrier has shifted from the 'goal' on which 
its strategy was based, to an other 'goal' that leads to a total change in the selection 
of 'roads'. Such shift can cause a major havoc among staff and customers resulting 
in a sudden increase in 'problems' facing the carrier, making it shift once again to the 
old ways in the hope of' surviving' . 
7.2.2 Porter's Competition Forces 
Porter identified four forces that affect industry competitors and cause rivalry among 
firms, whose strength determines the potential profitability in an industry: 
(i) suppliers - bargaining power of suppliers; 
(ii) potential entrants - threat of new entrants; 
(iii) buyers - bargaining power of buyers; 
(iv) substitutes - threat of substitute products or services. 241 
The forces are of differing intensity according to industries. If we examine the airline 
industry one can estimate that the bargaining power of suppliers is low, hence the 
ability of airlines to switch suppliers easily, because suppliers do not have to provide 
any specifically designed products for individual airlines: an airline can easily buy a 
Boeing instead of an Airbus aircraft. The second item, the threat of new entrance, is 
a larger force in air transportation. Although the larger airlines have been successful 
in fighting off new-entrants in the past, more and more of the competition 
instruments of incumbents are being neutralised,242 making new-entrants a greater 
threat than before. So the threat of entry is enhanced by favourable lawmaking and 
policy; a sort of government strategy to reach a goal of lower fares and more service 
through enhanced competition. The bargaining power of buyers is low as fares are 
determined by the rivalry among players rather than by the bargaining power of the 
buyers, as they are extremely many and not united. There is, however, an increased 
tendency of large corporations to bargain for volume discounts on the total travel 
budget with each individual carrier. Fourth, the threat of substitute products is a 
reality in short-haul markets where the passenger can select to drive instead of to fly. 
240Benjamin B. Tregoe and John W. Zimmerman, Strategic Thinking: Key to Corporate Survival, Management 
Review, February 1979, p. 10. 
241Porter, Michael E., Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, The Free Press, 
New York, 1985. p. 7. 
242The US Congress has held hearings that have resulted in regulation change concerning, CRS's, ~dvertising 
for ctc., in order to increase competition in an alleged 'conccntrated' industry, by ncutrallsmg antl-
competitive tools of the large carriers. 
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This is exactly what makes low fares so important in such markets and why there is 
often so much extra traffic generated when fares go below a certain level. 
The fo~al point of Porter's model is the rivalry among competitors, which is usually 
rooted In an attempt of one or more competitors to increase market-share. This is 
especially so in a period of low industry growth, when company growth can only be 
achieved through snatching customers from the competitors. 
Porter's strategy framework has been criticised by researchers for its lack of accurate 
portrayal of strategy performance and questionable generalisability.243 In fact the 
strategy - performance relationship appears to be more complicated than indicated in 
Porter's work. This view is backed by the PIMS research program and pointed out 
in Miller's and Dess work. 244 To his credit Porter does use the term 'generic' for the 
basic strategy alternatives, which indicates clearly that more sophistication is 
necessary to design a tailor made strategy for individual situations. Therefore, one 
can view Porter's work as a framework for strategy analysis and selection rather than 
a detailed strategic tool for all imaginable situations. 
7.2.3 Entry Risks and Costs 
The provisions of entry in a market is one of the fundamental aspects of effective 
competition. However, one must distinguish between entry in terms of an extension 
of existing firm's operation and an entirely new firm's entrance into a market. Thus, 
there are three facets of entry in deregulated air transport markets, namely the entry 
of existing trunk carriers into new routes, the entry of existing non-scheduled, 
intrastate or local carriers and finally the entry of entirely new carriers into the 
market. The risk level is in fact in the same order, being the least for well established 
large carrier, moderate for a carrier extending a similar operating base, but high for a 
new business entity in a new market. This can be clearly observed in the risk matrix 
in Figure 7-1. 
In addition to risk differences, there are different costs associated to entry depending 
on the new-entrant's relative industry position. Porter classified these costs into four 
groups: (i) The investment costs required to be in the new business;(ii) the additional 
investment required to overcome structural entry barriers; (iii) the expected cost from 
incumbents retaliation; balanced against (iv) the expected cash-flow from 
operations. 245 
It is apparent that small airlines will be at a disadvantage when entering new markets 
due to higher costs. The start-up costs of a new carrier entering a market will be 
243 See: Miller, A. and Dess, G.G., Assessing Porter's (1980) Model In Terms of Its Generalizability, Accuracy 
and Simplicity, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 30,. No.4, 1993, pp. 553-585. 
244Op. cit. (Miller and Dess), p. 577. The PIMS(Profit Impact of Market Strategy) shows a more complicated 
relationship of strategy to profit than Porter's generic model. See: Robert Buzzell and Bradley T. Gale, The 
PIMS Principles: Linking Strategy to Performance, The Free Press, New York, 1987. 
245Op. cit. (Porter, 1980), pp. 347-348. 
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?reater due to the. ~osts of overcoming 'resistance' or 'indifference ' by the 
mfrastructure authonttes. Such costs are likely to be lesser for a well established 
larg~ carrier starting to serve a community airport, contrasted to a new unknown 
carner that may ~ot be in business for long. Furthermore, all new companies, 
reg~r~less of therr fo~nders' experience, will add to their experience, making 
decislOns smoother as ttme passes. As a result, they are bound to incur costs of being 
at the bottom of the 'learning curve' unlike the incumbent carrier. This difference will 
dissipate with time, though, playing lesser role. 











Entry by new carriers is particularly viable in air transport when entry costs are low in 
terms of capital requirements for aircraft acquisition. This occurs when there is 
excess capacity, leading to aircraft being available at favourable terms, when the 
incumbents are financially weak and not prone to retaliate by fear of a market wide 
fare war and when the incumbents are exiting unprofitable markets. 
7.2.4 Internal and External Growth 
It is important to realise that competition intensity increases when traffic growth 
declines because then the airlines will have to extract growth by attracting customers 
from the competitors. 247 As demand increases the airlines are faced with actual lack 
of capacity or projected lack of capacity, that is rectified by ordering aircraft that may 
have long order lead time, usually counted in years. This lead time is sometimes 
extended during rapid growth and especially when major changes are occurring like 
changed noise regulation that renders a portion of the fleet obsolete. When the new 
aircraft are delivered the growth period may be over and the new aircraft adding 
unwanted capacity, while the old planes can not be sold due to lack of demand. As 
soon as there is excess capacity there will be increase in rivalry because of the 
necessity to maintain growth and to cover the high fixed costs incurred by obtaining 
the new aircraft. The only way to reduce excess capacity in the airline industry is by 
growth and aircraft retirements. 
246Based on Igor Ansofi's 'ProducUMarket Expansion Grid'. 
247Saturation of the u.s. dome tic market has definitel led to an inten ification of competltion and led the 
airlines to increase empha is on international routes. Furthermore, the pre ure on the government to 
provide 'deregulated' bilaterals ha increased a a result, thu leading to increa ed int rnational pre ure [or 
liberal air transport polic in terms of price and capacity. It 1S clear that m international marke U aulm 
are very competitive in tenn of low unit 0 ts. 
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The level of traffic growth is affected by a number of factors that can be divided into 
two distinctive groups, namely demographic growth and individual airline's strategic 
growth. The former group contains economic growth leading to an increase in 
disposable income, increase in tourism, population increases, increase in international 
trade and an increase in immigration. The latter group deals with sources of growth 
that are in the airline's domain to influence, namely fare reductions, addition of points 
served, marketing agreements and frequency increase. It is important to note that 
growth in air transportation is limited by bottlenecks in the system: ATC congestion 
and airport capacity. Figure 7-2 shows this possible sources of growth for an air 
carner. 
A firm's growth strategy can be divided into three different directions, to: (i) grow 
internally; (ii) grow externally; and (iii) determine the level of acceptable growth. 
People Express, for example, maintained the first strategy of growing only internally 
until 1985, when it acquired Frontier. The same was the case with Southwest that 
has avoided growth through acquisition but felt strategically unable to pass Muse Air 
and Morris Air into the hands of' other' airlines. 
There is however a strange relationship between 'success' in terms of fast growth and 
'failure' due to much success manifesting itself in too fast growth. Too fast growth 
will affect the company's cash-flow in such a way that it can fail, although, it is 
making profit according to the books. Similarly, growth that is achieved, through a 
merger or acquisition can seriously harm the cost-structure of an airline in good 
condition through the inevitable addition of debt. Furthermore, the harmonisation of 
two entities into a larger entity can cost in terms of deterioration in company's 
working atmosphere and quality of decisions due to more time spent on 'merger' 
tasks rather than 'strategic' tasks necessary to maintain future profitability of the 
more complex corporation. 248 
Aviation bankers have argued that airline management should focus on keeping their 
share rather than adhering to bold strategic aims of 'pursuing growth for its own 
sake' ?49 The argument is placed into context with the 'financial' institutions 
reluctance to finance poorly planned growth with no aim in itself but 'size'. With the 
airline business loosing billions on both sides of the Atlantic, prior to 1994 bankers 
were sure to be concerned. This belief has, however, ignored that growth as such is 
often related to factors like competitors behaviour and the necessity of businesses to 
grow. First, all companies that have shareholders are prone to strive for growth in 
order to maximise their shareholders' wealth. That is the yardstick on which the 
management's performance is measured by the company's 'owners', the 
shareholders. This is especially so if the company is large and has large number of 
shareholders. Growth associated with profits make it easier for the company to raise 
capital through 'markets' both debt and equity. One only needs to cite People 
248Gialloreto, Louis, Strategic Airline Management: The Global War Begins, Pitman Pub., 1986. He concluded 
in his book (pp. 41-44) that the stress of rapid growth lead to enormous costs and structural ~tress of the 
airlines involved. He mentioned the early Pan Am's merger with National and North Central Wlth Southern 
and Hughes, that brought about detrimental effects on the two carriers. Both mergers were set astray due to 
severe cost increases after the pilots where brought up to the aquiring carrier's pay scales. 
24<lAirline Business, The Growth Virus. Airline Business: The Skies in 1994, p. 29. 
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Express tha~ was praised by most analysts until shortly before its collapse, even 
though th~ signs showed that the company's infrastructure and management practices 
wer~ shaki~g as soon as 1983, but the 'light-speed' growth and profits were what the 
media was interested in. 
Figure 7-2 Sources of Passenger Growth for Scheduled Airlines 
Sources of Passenger Growth in the Domestic Market 
:~ .. a. Population growth 
b. Increase in disposable income :IF~:;;:;:;:::::riz:::::::::::::===:z::::::::::=~ ~ "' 
c. Fare reductions 
d. New points within present system 
e. New pOints in new geographic market 
f . Code-sharing with feeder airlines 
g. Code-sharing with a foreign airline 
h. Frequencyincrease 
Sources of Passenger Growth in the International Market 
a. Fare reductions 
b. Frequency increase 
c. New points in new geographic market 
.':-: 
:.: 
One must conclude that internal growth along a well planned long-term strategy, that 
contains the growth level to a sustainable level in terms of debt addition and cash-
flow, is the most viable alternative for any business. 
7.2.5 Customer Influence on Competition 
Sometimes it appears in air transport markets that the customer will accept most 
adversities in exchange for low price at the low-end, and frequent flyer miles at the 
high-end. For example, why do passengers accept the indirect route through hubs to 
their destination? The reality is far from being so simple as to assume that passengers 
are indifferent about adversities at airports, inflight or for any other aspect of their 
journey. In fact a passenger accepting hub flights might accept it, as there is nothing 
else available, but as soon as he has a choice of a direct flight at a similar fare his 
'consumer' vote will be for the direct flight. In order to see what role customers play 
in the airlines' strategy a model of 'Customer Reaction Contours'(CRC) was 
developed for that purpose. 
The underlying framework is that airlines are offering a perishable commodity-like 
product which is basically the use of a seat while being transported from point A to 
B. In fact the product is highly standardised and viewed similarly by most buyers. 
As a result, price is of an outmost importance to the majority of buyers. In fact, the 
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meaning of the time spent by the user in the seat is of negligible importance unless the 
airline violates his state of indifference or expectancy, be it to the negative or the 
positive. Accordingly, 'Dtils' can be used in order to explain the nature of the 
airline's product quality interaction with it's customers. 
The passenger moves from the Indifference Contour (IC) towards the 'Positive 
Contour'(PC) if the airline scores enough units of satisfaction with the passenger. 
Moving to the PC will leave the passenger positive but not impressed, that is he will 
not press for flying with the airline but will happily accept it if convenient. If the 
airline scores into the 'Loyalty Contour'(LC) the passenger will go out of his way to 
travel with the airline. For example, he will request to fly with the airline, pay higher 
fare than necessary or select less convenient flight schedule, in order to do so. 
If the airline scores negative units of satisfaction it will cause the passenger to show 
signs of dissatisfaction to have to use the airline again, without direct objections 
though. A travel agent might pick up this feeling and select an other airline without 
being asked to do so in order to maximise the customer's satisfaction. If the 
passenger's units of satisfaction fall within the ' Avoidance Contour' (AC) the 
passenger will go into great lengths to avoid the airline, he may select less convenient 
flight schedule orland higher fare just in order to avoid the carrier. 
Figure 7-3 
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Figure 7-3, therefore, describes the interaction of any airline's product qu~i?' with its 
passengers. It explains how airlines lose market-share from below, tha~ IS if a ~~w­
entrant with higher quality and better service features enters a market WIth prevaIlmg 
low quality by offering higher relative quality. Such airline will attract the passengers 
that have entered the AC and some of the passengers that are in the NC along with 
the innovators251 in other contours. By the same token it can be risky to enter a 
market with competitors that have high proportion of passengers in the PC or the LC 
250n is asumed that all passengers enter at 0 or in the indifference contour or if with previou ex-perience of ~e 
airline in the expectancy contour, which two are in fact the same in th~ .model. However, a pa enger \'v1th 
prior experience of the airline can enter in th~ ~egative area or ~~ po ltIve area of the model and ta there 
or hift towards indifference, increased negatIVIty or to\ ards po It1venes . 
251 Innovators are tho e that have to try e erytbing new, regardle s of their happine ' with pre ent product. 
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contours. Passengers of such airlines will only change airlines if the new-entrant 
off~r~ something absolutely unique in the market and pushes the passenger into the 
posItIve or t?e loyalty cont~ur immediately. In fact, a passenger will not accept being 
worse off, gIven, that he stnves for the maximisation of his utils. 
A loyal or positive passenger will only remain as such until the airline fails to deliver 
what he expects or when something better is offered by a competitor. The fact is that 
a passenger who is inclined to maximise his utils will not change carrier, unless he 
will gain more utils than he will lose by such a move. FFP distort this relationship, 
making switching costs higher. Thus, a customer may only leave his FFP if his loss 
of miles will be reclaimed partially or fully at the new carrier's FFP. 252 
Given what has been said above, one must recognise that airlines can never fulfil all 
passenger's needs to their satisfaction, so there are always going to be customers in 
all the contours. The issue for a new-entrant is, therefore, how large a portion of the 
incumbent's total number of passengers is filling each contour on the average. Iflarge 
portion is filling the negative and avoidance contours, the incumbent is a weak 
competitor, if not, entrance may not be viable. 
7.2.6 Competitors' Analogy 
In some industries and markets there is constant in-fighting. In view of the frequent 
fare-wars in air transport markets it is important to analyse their possible causes in 
addition to those factors already mentioned. Henderson has explained this by a 
competitive equilibrium disruption. This disruption is caused by the competitive 
relations of the market players. First, if competitors are nearly identical and make 
their living in the same way, then their competitive equilibrium is unstable. This is 
especially true for the majors. Second, if a single major factor is the critical factor,253 
then the competitive equilibrium is unstable. If a carrier achieves a major cost 
differentiation and enters with a low fare and achieves market-share at the expense of 
existing carriers, they will defend their market-share at all cost, thus, causing fare 
war. The airline industry has been market-share driven since pre-deregulation era, 
because the airlines were guaranteed a certain rate of return as a result of the General 
Passenger Fare Investigation(GPFI). Hence, large market-share would spell larger 
profits given reasonable cost-control. The same attitude prevailed after deregulation 
but for different reasons; the airlines soon found out that fast expansion was not 
viable in light of high costs associated with initiating new routes, something Braniff 
created an example of It was, however, important to gain market-share in terms of 
gaining 'market power' and economies of scope, density and information. This is not 
to say that low market-share businesses can not survive in an industry, as it is 
generally accepted that low market-share businesses need to find a niche and gain 
large market-share within that niche. The problem of protecting that niche h~s, 
however, been clearly apparent in the air transport industry due to the commodity 
nature of the product. The buyer's choice of airline will usually be first and foremost 
252Therefore, it is important to otTer mileage exchange in order to break a passenger loyalty with a competitor. 
253 A critical factor could be market-share, profitability. growth. etc. 
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guided by fare, service and quality.254 Thus, it has been fairly easy for the incumbent 
to enter a market defined as a niche by a new-entrant and destroy the niche as 
such. 255. Third, if there are many critical factors, then it is possible for each 
competitor to have some advantage and be differentially attractive to some 
customers. The greater the number of critical factors that provide advantage, the 
greater the number of competitors that can coexist. Each competitor has his 
competitive segment defined by the preference for the factor trade-offs that he offers. 
Under this structure many differentiating opportunities exist and if customers value 
these differences differently then the firms can coexist through niching. This 
coexistence lasts only as long as both carriers do not cross into each others niche. 
Fourth, the fewer the number of competitive variables that are critical, the fewer the 
number of competitors. Fifth, a ratio of 2 to 1 in market-share between any two 
competitors seems to be the equilibrium point at which it is neither practical nor 
advantageous for either competitor to increase or decrease market share. 256 
It must be mentioned as a note to these findings of Henderson, that market-share is 
not a viable strategy in itself To improve service, reduce costs and improve quality 
in order to gain competitive advantage that leads to larger market-share is, however, 
a viable strategy. 
7.3 Competition Strategy in Air Transport Markets 
Now that strategy has been covered in general terms, the definition of strategy leaves 
us with a question in mind, as to what a new-entrant's objective could be in a 
deregulated market? The Congress had an objective in this regard, by assuming that 
new-entrants would increase competition for the benefit of the consumer, in terms of 
lower prices and perhaps increased service. The new-entrant, on the other hand, has 
a more grounded objective, to: ' make a profit', 'provide employment', 'maximise the 
airline's size' or prove that a new-entrant airline 'can survive'. 
The new-entrant airlines have made profit, some of them have actually benefited 
investors immensely, if they sold their shares before the new-entrant's decline and 
failure. Some of the new-entrant airlines have grown very fast, indicating that their 
objective may have been rapid growth in order to reach large size. Perhaps in the 
believe that size was actually the only security for the carrier's survival. Whether this 
is true or not will be examined later in the chapter. Many of the new-entrants have 
been formed by former airline executives and staff possessing highly specialised 
2~It is an over generalisation that the business market is entirely price in-elastic. 1bis market can. in .fact be 
segmented into the size of businesses the business passenger represents and the small~ segment ~s likely to 
be highly clastic, while large corporations use their bargaining power to gain volume discounts oft aIr travel, 
either directly or through their travel agent. 
255Presidential identified a gap in the market out of Washington, but shortly after initiation of services both 
New York Air and United entered the market, thus, eliminating any advantage Presidential may have had. 
2~!>Henderson is the Chairman of Boston Consulting Group and the list was derived from number of articles he 
has written. The list was composed by and appeared in Kotler, 1980, p. 247 - 248. 
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knowledge. Thus, new-entrants may have been formed to provide employment 257 
but that as an objective can not stand on its own unless there is unlimited source' of 
. 1258 A . capIta. s a result, the profit mottve has to enter the equation. 
Some carriers are actually established as 'rich' man's hobby, meaning that it can 
loose money constantly without going bankrupt. An example, would be MGM 
Grand Air that is owned by a billionaire. An other motive is for retiring airline 
executives to have something to do in their retirement, that is they do not want to 
retire from the airline business. An example of such a carrier is USAfrica that was 
trying to carve out a niche on the U.S. - South Africa route. The airline's executives 
were mostly retired major airline's executives or businessmen. 259 The last item of 
'proving that it can survive' may explain why new-entrants are constantly being 
formed against all odds. The challenge of proving that it can be done seems to attract 
an endless row of risk-takers willing to prove a point. 
Due to the history of new-entrant airlines it must be concluded that new airlines(past 
1986) can only be established with the grave objective of surviving, other objectives 
can only be secondary to that. Hence, each of the new-entrants selects a strategy to 
reach its goal of survival. Of course, this objective is an umbrella rather than an 
actual stated objective of any new-entrant. As a result, past 1986 new-entrants' 
objectives may be something like 'carving out a defensible niche' or 'keep a low 
profile' in order to keep the incumbent indifferent. The problem with these goals, 
however, is that eventually the new-entrant will grow out of the limited niche. 
Furthermore, a carrier striving to keep the incumbent happy will eventually join the 
incumbent, if not peacefully then by force. 26o The early new-entrants had different 
goals, like size maximisation that characterised People Express and America West or 
profit maximisation that has been the strategic trait of Southwest. 261 
The selection of an overall strategy focuses the sub-strategies in conjunction with the 
competition environment. In order to select the strategic alternatives the airlines will 
produce an intuitive or systematic opportunity analysis: strength, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats analysis (SWOT). Figure 7-4 below shows two sets of 
hypothetical new-entrant strategies one of a very low cost airline and an other of a 
high-cost premium service carrier. The former airline will exploit its cost advantage 
by offering low fares. In order to do so it will not participate in a CRS but develop a 
in-house telephone booking system linked to an internal simplified CRS~ it will offer 
on-board ticketing in order to save on ticket counters and staff; it will unbundle 
mThis is the case for some past 1990 new-entrants, with KIWI being formed by ex-Eastern pilots that put up 
most of the start-up capital, and Reno being formed by ex-Midway staff Other carriers are being formed by 
ex-Midway staff, ex-Frontier staff and so on. 
2580ne may allege that the fundamental objective of Air France and similar government owned giants wa~ to 
provide employment, to which all other goals were secondary, including profitability, efficiency, servIce, 
quality and so on. 
2WThe CEO passed away in 1994, being replaced by the son of a retired airline executive that had a streak at 
USAfrica, but was replaced by a retired VP from American. 
260Examples include most of the independent feeder carriers and Empire, Air Wisconsin, etc. 
2611be stated goal of Southwest is to get people out of their cars on short-haul routes. 
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services in order to charge for snacks and drinks on board. The image will range 
widely from being poor for fast growing carriers to being strong for small niche 
carriers. Branding will be weak for the size maximisation carrier as it will emphasise 
fares in its advertising and save on costs associated with image building and brand 
creation. Service features will be as few as possible in order to save and quality may 
be lacking for the same reason. The carrier will strive for market-share maximisation, 
either in terms of overall market-share, city-pair market-share, airport market-share 
or some combination of those. The size maximisation carrier will sometimes enter 
niche markets to begin with but as the size gets larger and markets selected under the 
initial strategy run out, other segments will be added usually until most segments 
have been added. 
The other example is of an high cost carrier, offering premium service at business 
class fares(Regent, Air Atlanta, MGM Grand Air, etc.). Such carrier will participate 
in a commercial CRS system due to the smallness of the segment, requiring as large 
T A's catchment area as possible. In addition, the CRS booking fee will be relatively 
low percentage of the total fare. The image will be emphasised strongly in order to 
create favourable attitude of the potential customer: lavish decor, many service 
features, superb service and dependability. Branding will be emphasised in 
conjunction with image by building up named classes, but usually the airline's name 
becomes a brand in itself. Market-share is not an aim in itself nor emphasised as the 
market segment is very small. To reach break-even load factor is more important due 
to the high-costs involved with providing this sort of service. Quality is of a major 
concern as well as the service features. The service features are usually far more 
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Figure 7-4, then gives an indication of what planning is involved in strate~ selection 
to reach the overall objective of the airline. In order to cast further lIght on the 
interrelationship of all the factors involved, a discussion will follow on new-entrants' 
and incumbents' competition strategy. 
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7.4 New-entrants' Strategies 
New-entry is the fundamental prerequisite of intense competition in a market. 
However, the sophistication of the tools that firms can develop in order to outsmart 
the competitor distorts the traditional economic models of competition and has made 
the quantification of competitive reactions more or less in vain. This has been quite 
clear in the deregulated air transport industry, with the advent of yield management, 
CRS bias, frequent flyer programs and the hub and spoke route systems, that had not 
been projected by economists prior to deregulation. 
New-entrant's entry strategies, at large, in the deregulated air transport market were 
usually a combination of the following: (i) low cost structure achieved through non-
unionised staff with airline experience and low wage scales; (ii) high operating 
efficiency attained through fast turnaround at gates and efficient aircraft 
(B737,B727); (iii) highly motivated work-force, whose motivation is enhanced by 
stock participation programmes and flexible job tasks (cross-utilisation); (iv) market 
strategy geared to low fares by unbundling services, offering simple fare structure 
(peak, off-peak), non-participation in commercial CRS' s, offering high frequency, 
offering very low entry fares for promotion purposes (free coverage), non-interlining, 
service differentiation (no-frills/extra frills), quality differentiation (high quality), 
niche identification, long hauVshort haul and route differentiation (direct serviceslhub 
and spoke). 
Meyer and Oster note that a new carrier has to be concerned with differentiation 
rather than with capacity in a market served. This is due to the fact that the 'novelty' 
causes a liability to a carrier trying to create awareness in a market. Thus if the 
customer has a choice among two identical alternatives, he will choose the one he 
recognises. Thus, the new carrier must create an 'unique selling proposition' that 
creates an advantage in the mind of the customer, when he is choosing among two or 
more alternatives. A mere offer of an alternative service in a market can be 
advantageous, if the existing service is in some way 'unpopular'. 262 This advantage 
can however be overcome by the unpopular carrier, so if the new-entrant has no 
other source of differentiation it will suffer, as a result. An alternative airport 
constitutes a differentiation as is pointed out by Meyer, in the case of Southwest's 
use of the Dallas's secondary airport Love Field that was actually closer to the city 
centre than Dallas-Forth Worth International Airport and less congested. 263 
However, the importance of capacity is not secondary in small to medium markets 
like the Southwest example has proved. This is different, however, in heavily 
congested city pair markets, where demand for any service in the city pair market will 
exist. 
Some of the new-entrants have been wobbling with their base strategy. Braniff II, for 
example, started out as a full service business carrier charging full fare. It became 
apparent within a year that that strategy did not work, thus, a 180 degree tum was 
262This was the case with Braniff at its main base causing little loyalty of the commtmity regardless of a long 
period of sevice, creating a gap for other carriers to fill. 
26JOp. cit.(Meyer), p. 42 
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taken, turning the carrier into a low-fare, low-service carrier. Such moves are bound 
to alienate both the passengers and the distribution system. A similar strategy U-turn 
was attempted by Midway Airlines that wanted to reach the business market by 
establishing a separate carrier called Midway Metrolink but suffered a $22 million 
loss in 1984, as a result. Metrolink was abandoned but with the acquisition of Air 
Florida's assets the low-cost, low-fare Midway Express appeared from the 
company's design board. That carrier did not provide profitability so the carrier 
abandoned this differentiation strategy and returned to the single name Midway and 
full-coach service. 
Ifwe compare Porter's theories on strategy with the new-entrants' situation we find 
that they do seem to apply in general terms. Porter pointed out, in his work on 
competitive strategy, that there are three basic strategic direction possibilities, which 
he calls 'Generic Strategies': overall cost leadership, differentiation and focus . The 
cost leadership strategy is based on the exploitation of scale advantages, cost control, 
cost reductions from experience and cost minimisation. The effect of this strategy is 
the ability of the cost-leader to extract higher than average yields in a highly 
competitive market, given that 'spiteful' behaviour is not prevailing in the market 
place. 
Figure 7-5 Five Basic Entry Strategies 
Enter at lower cost 
Enter at lower price 
Enter a niche market 
Enter with superior quality 
Differentiation, on the other hand, gives the airline an opportunity to exploit some 
unique trait of its product offering or location. Finally, focus strategy is when the 
airline targets a specific market-, service- or geographic segment. It is interesting to 
note that the most successful carrier in terms of profitability, Southwest Airlines 
(SW), has exploited all of this strategy alternatives in combination. First, it used a 
secondary airport, Dallas Love Field - differentiation; second, it achieved the lowest 
cost structure in the market - cost leadership; third, it has focused on the ' sunbelt' , on 
direct flights and short-haul - focus .264 This unique ability of SW can be observed in 
Figure 7-5 in comparison to the successful European airline Virgin Atlantic and other 
less successful U. S. new-entrant airlines. 
Examining Figure 7-5 one could conclude that as more basic entry features are 
combined the greater the success of an airline, as the two airlin~s that can be ~e~ed 
successful have both combined, four or more basic entry strategtes. The combmatt.on 
of high quality, high capacity but low service on short-haul routes where servIce 
2<>4Op. cit.(Porter, 1980), pp. 35-40. 
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features are not a major advantage in the customer' s mind has worked well for 
~0.uthwest, while, Virg~n a~ds s~perior ~ervice with a ' fun' element. Virgin does not 
lImtate the U .S. prermum serv1ce carners, but excels at traditional service features 
u~ua~ly fou~d at the incum?ents, with few ' extras'. One must also recognise that 
V1rg1n, unl1ke Southwest 1S a long-haul carrier, giving added weight to service 
features. 












GD MGM Grand Air, Air 1, Air Atlanta, UltrAir 
• People Express, America West, Muse Air, for etc. 
~ Southwest, Morris Air 
In Figure 7-6 we can observe three strategy dimensions on which three categories of 
new-entrants are charted. Category 1 and 2 have proved to characterise failed new-
entrants, while category 3 has proved successful so far. Quality and superior service 
in addition to low cost structure and low fares seems to be an important strategic 
advantage for new-entrants, as it is harder for the large incumbents to match the 
former two in conjunction with the latter two. A smaller carrier can introduce new 
services much quicker and better than large carriers due to the inherent flexibility of a 
small organisation. 265 
Table 7-1 shows in more detail entry strategies adopted by the new-entrants under 
Deregulation. It is convenient to segregate the carriers according to service features 
as presented in the table. It shows well the main strategy directions adopted by the 
airlines. 
26)uchard Bran on has made uniqueness and qualit Virgin Atlantic Airwa 's main priorit . That airline i' ill 
fact the only new-entrant in the world combining all the features succe sfull . His philo oph ' come clearly 
accro s in the following quotation, where he compare his airline with a re taurant: 'If you run an 
independent re taurant, the \va to beat McDonalds i to make sure all the little details are right - to make it 
unique and 0 pecial and friendl that people will go out of their wa to go there.' Indepcnd nt, Vlfgm 
Atlantic - Branson's Favourite Bab Grow Up, November 25, 1991 , p. 26. 
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Th~ n~-frills. service strategy has been widely adopted by new-entrants in order to 
mal?tam. theIr . lower cost structure. The strategy has worked well for Southwest in 
conjUnctIon wIth other factors already mentioned. 
Table 7-1 New-entrants' Strategies 
Airline Fares 
No-frills 
People Express Low 
Southwest Low 
FuH-frills 
Midwest Express Full-fare 
Muse Low-fare 
Florida Express Low-fare 
America West Low-fare 
Premium Service 
MGM-Grand Air Full-fare 
Air One Full-fare 
Air Atlanta Full-fare 
Capacity Service Quality 
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High No-frills Low 
High No-frills High 
Low Full High 
High Full High 
Medium Full na 
High Full Medium 
Low Premium na 
Low Premium na 
Low Premium na 
Concept 
Low-fare, no-frills. low-cost, secondary 
markets, hubbing. 
Low-fare, no-frills, low-cost, secondary 
markets, direct service. . 
Full-fare, full-frills, one-class(business), 
direct, niche(Milwaukee)a 
Low-fare, full-frills, muhi-hubbing, 
Low-fare, full-service, hubbing(Orlando), 
incumbent avoidance, niche 
Better than average service at a lower than 
average fare primarily for the business 
traveller through a hub and spoke system. 
ATW 6/84, p. 83. 
Premium service at competitors full-fare 
coach rate. Long-haul. 
Premium service at competitors full-fare 
coach rate. Medium-haul. 
Premium service at competitors full-fare 
coach rate. Medium-haul. 
a The company is a subsidiary of Kimberly-Clark, and has about 5% of its passengers generated from that establishment. One of 
the airline's best routes is a company route i.e. between two company plants. 
The full-frills strategy has been adopted in order to gain access to the two main 
market segments leisure and business at once, like most of the incumbents. That 
strategy as such has not secured any better survival chances for the new-entrants, 
although, America West has been around for longer period than most new-entrants. 
The so called 'superior service airline', including Air One, Air Atlanta and MGM 
Grand Air, offered superior first class service at full economy or business class prices. 
The problem with this type of operations was the lack of frequency. This inference 
leads to a dilemma, as they may not have been able to reach break -even load factors 
at higher frequency due to lack of demand as the market segment is very tight. On the 
other hand, little frequency reduces the attractiveness of the service due to the 
importance it plays for the market segment. Can this strategy work then? The 
history tells us that it does not. Nevertheless, there are new carriers taking it up 
every once in a while, the last one was Ultr Air that went bankrupt soon after 
initiation. 
7. ,,/.1 Sequenced Entry 
In order to reduce risk a new-entrant airline may select an indirect route to achieve its 
goal. This is called 'sequenced entry', where the airline enters one market type or 
2ClClBased on conswner complaints records. It is aswned that airlines with conswner complaints less than I per 
100.000 passengers are 'High' quality, while those having 1.1 to 5 to be 'Mediwn' quality and those having 
5.1 and greater to he 'Low quality'. Note that quality docs not indicate the level of service otTered as 
Southwest is a high quality low service carrier! 
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operation a~d then adds a~ other. There are different types of sequenced entry in air 
transport:. (1) Low dens~~~ routes to high density routes; (ii) extending one's 
geographic market area; (111) entry from the leisure market into the business market· 
(iv) entry into international operations; (v) entry into another operation type (charte; 
to scheduled, for etc.); and (vi) equipment upgrade (turbo-prop to jet operations). 
Car~ful selectio~ of entry level strategy can reduce initial risk and reduce entry 
barners. People s Express sequenced entry strategy played a major role in its fast 
growth. First it entered short-haul underserved markets, then it started long-haul and 
with the acquisition of Frontier it entered a new geographical market instantly as well 
as leaving the business segment. In addition to this the carrier entered international 
operations to London. 
Table 7-2 Sequenced Entry Strategies 
Sequenced entry strategy 
Low density route to high density route 
Entry from one geographical market to 
another 
Leisure to business market 
Domestic to international 
Charter to scheduled 
Propeller to jet 








Availability of slots and terminal facilities, 
development of market presence, 
retaliation of incumbents. 
High entry costs, availability of slots and 
terminal facilities, development of market 
presence, retaliation of incumbents, takes 
time during which the incumbents can 
recuperate. 
High entry cost; brand conflict; retaliation 
of incumbents. 
Culture conflicts, route licences, capacity 
and fare limitations. 
High entry costs, availability of slots and 
terminal facilities. 
Availability of capital. increased costs, 
increased route distances, incumbents 
retaliation. 
Increased costs due to equipment upgrades, 




People Express, Virgin 
Atlantic, New York Air 
People Express 
Tower, World, MGM 
Grand Air 
Air Wisconsin. Empire 
People Express 
It is important to note that at every step of the way the carrier attracted retaliation on 
behalf of the incumbents, and as more entry segments were added the competition 
rivalry intensified. If the carrier builds a solid foundation, it can withstand the 
competition better, like Southwest. People Express grew too fast to secure its 
foundation, failing to benefit from sequenced entry strategy. 
Table 7-2 shows the risk level associated with each of the entry possibilities in a 
deregulated market and what airlines have adopted the named strategy. The risk 
level is based on the extension of the risk matrix presented in Figure 7-1. The highest 
risk is associated with entering large markets where large competitors dominate, a 
market were the new-entrant will be a tiny player, often under the heal of the 
incumbent due to shortages of slots and airport facilities. The move from purely low-
fare, no-frills service to offering business class is also regarded as high risk due to the 
costs involved and the possible brand conflict. Such brand conflict occurs as the no-
frills carriers gain a strong image perpetuating low service and sometimes poor 
quality, something which most business passengers want to avoid. Furthermore, as 
the airline starts to advertise heavily to gather for the new business segment, the loyal 
low-end passengers may feel excluded or even not wanted any more as customers. 
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An example of a low risk strategy is adding international operations. This is due to 
the fact that most international routes are governed by bilaterals that reduces the risk 
as only. few airline~ are likely to be competing on the international route. Other entry 
strategIes. are classIfied as moderately risky due to their tendency to involve entry into 
new. terntory: The addition of jet equipment to all turboprop operation is 
consIderable nsk due to the required changes in maintenance, operations, scheduling 
and costs. Charter carrier entering scheduled operations must establish its 
distribution, adapt to the inflexibility of scheduled operations compared to charter 
operations and harmonise the utilisation of its fleet for both charter and scheduled. 
This last item can be troublesome as charter requirements (long-haul) of flight 
equipment and that of domestic scheduled operations (short- to medium-haul) can 
differ dramatically. 
7.5 Incumbent's Reaction Strategies 
In any competitive market there is going to be competition between the small and 
large players in the market. The larger players do of course have more resources in 
order to protect their markets, but are usually more concerned with competitors of 
similar size. However, in the case of new-entrant airlines, small carriers have in many 
cases risen from being nuisance to becoming a serious threat. The words of Morton 
Ehrlich of former Eastern Airlines summarises well the reasons behind strong 
retaliation on behalf of the incumbents when a new-entrant enters their market: 
Successful aggressiveness begets more successful aggressiveness, and that 
leads to biggness[sic). Then you've got a formidable competitor. 267 
The immediate effect of the new-entrants' low cost structure was to focus the 
incumbents' management on labour costs. Re-negotiations and staff streamlining was 
the issue at the trunk carriers in the early eighties, that reached a peak when 
Continental Airlines declared Chapter XI bankruptcy in order to get rid of its union 
attachment. 268 
In the course of deregulation it has become apparent that the airlines have adapted 
and developed schemes that protect them against the effects of new-entrance to a 
degree. These are, yield management system, frequent flyer programs and hub and 
spoke operations. The yield management systems enables better management of the 
allocation of seats at different prices, which permits the incumbent airline to match 
the airfares of a new entrant with lower cost structure, without risking too great a 
drop in yields. This is possible by offering few seats at a very low price subsidised by 
the higher revenue generating seats and, therefore, destroying the promotional force 
of the low price offered by the new entrant. The frequent flyer programs work as 
passenger retention force for the large airlines. This is due to the fact that business 
travellers have been able to redeem free holiday trips incurred during business travel. 
267Upstarts in the Sky: Here comes a new kind of airline, Business Week, .hme 15,1981, p. 89. 
268For an interesting account of Frank Lorezo's union busting, see: Jennings, Kenneth M., Union-Management 
Tumult at Eastern Airlines: From Borman to Lorenzo, Transportation Journal, Summer 1989, pp. 13-27; and 
Bernstein, Aaron, Grounded: Frank Lorenzo and the Destruction of Eastern Airlincs, Touchstone, 1991. SCI.! 
especially pages 14-20 in Bernstein's book. 
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The bu~iness travel is 'less' price sensitive and, thus, the business passenger aiming 
for a tnp to Hawaii with his family will use the carrier whose frequent flyer club 
member he is, even though a lower fare is available with an other carrier. The third 
method, was the hub and spoke system, that increases the efficiency of the route 
network and boosts load factors on, otherwise, thin routes. It is, however, the power 
of the carrier dominating the hub that works as a buffer to entry on routes to and 
from the hub airport and permits premium pricing in the hub market. 
A more detailed model of incumbent's historic strategic responses to entry has been 
suggested: (i) reduction of operating costs through two tier wage structure, 
productivity increase, deunionization, staff reduction and re-equipment with efficient 
aircraft;269 (ii) streamlining of operations through hub and spoke networks and 
downsizing of equipment; (iii) [innovative] marketing strategy through development 
of frequent flyer programs, commission overrides, frequency increases, code-sharing, 
development of CRS' s, alliances with commuters, service increases, controlled fare 
matching, aggressive advertising and predatory tactics.270 
The most important items listed above are cost reduction and the development of the 
competitive tools. Although cost reduction has not provided the incumbents with 
comparable cost level to the new-entrants, the cost reductions have been, 
nevertheless, quite effective if one compares the U.S. majors with those of Europe 
(please refer to Chapter 8, for a comparison). 
To conclude, one can infer that during deregulation in a market competition intensity 
increases usually as the number of weak carriers increases. Carrier weakness is 
escalated by poor management especially in terms of over-expansion or leveraged 
buy-outs. In this type of environment the largest financially strongest carriers will 
attack the weaker ones in the hope of killing them off in order to overtake their 
markets. The driving force is first and foremost the drive for growth. 
7.6 Operations Strategy 
7.6.1 Routing 
New-entrants' route strategies have been along four general types: (i) turnaround; (ii) 
single hub; (iii) multiple hub; and (iv) independent markets. 271 The difference 
between turnaround and independent markets is that the latter is enroute multi stop 
itineraries while turnaround markets are served with frequent non-stop flights. The 
way of classification presented in this thesis is taking into account the route lengths 
and the market-sizes, as these have much impact on the overall strategy of the new-
entrant and is in that regard a better indicator of the new-entrants' strategic 
characteristics. Figure 7-7 shows these route dimensions for a hub and a direct 
service carrier. The direct service carrier has to select along the same dimensions as 
269puel efficient, lower maintenance, two pilot aircraft. Many airlines tried to increase the homogenuity of the 
fleet. 
270Williams, George, Cranfield Institute of Technology [now University], College of Aeronautics, 1990, p. 87-
88. Ph.D. thesis. 
271Op. cit. (Meyer), p. 129. 
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t~e hub carrier, that is what its haulage segments are going to be as well a the market 
SIze se~ments. The difference between the two is that the direct service carrier has to 
detefffiln~ ~het?er it is going to emphasise non-stop or multi-stop strategy and 
whet?e: It IS gomg to operate route clusters or city to city strategy. Route clusters 
are siffillar to hubs, except the carrier does not operate arrival and departure banks 
and has usually many clusters with relatively few nodes compared to hubs. An 
example of a carrier using this strategy is Southwest, while Air Florida was an 
exam~le of th~ latter. The hub carrier has to select haulage lengths that affects its 
selectIon of aIrcraft and market size segments that influence aircraft selection and 
competition intensity, being greater as the markets get larger. In the figure the dotted 
circles depict a multi-hub strategy. 












People Express altered its route strategy apparently to pursue its growth strategy. Its 
length of haulage increased from 396 miles in 1981 to 630 miles in 1986. Route 
capacity changed from being relatively high in small markets to becoming very low in 
large markets. F or most of its operating life the carrier operated a single hub at 
Newark. Then the carrier attempted to start a multi-hub operation, by acquiring 
Frontier, a move that failed. The market size emphasis moved from small to medium 
size to large markets in the last two years of operations. 
A different strategy was adopted by Southwest. Its haulage has remained short-haul 
through the years, although, the average stage length has increased slowly from 265 
miles in 1979 to 378 in 1992. The carrier does not operate hubs although operations 
cluster around many cities. 272 In terms of strategy dimensions the carrier has 
maintained its emphasis on high route capacity, roughly one type of operations with 
some cargo service and no-frills service in terms of amenities on board, but free 
mIn this regard a hub is defmed as an operation where aircraft are scheduled to and from the city in 'banks', 
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b 273 I . h aggage. t IS apparent t at Southwest has rooted its strategy on firmly grounded 
beliefs that it is not ready to drift away from. This strategic philosophy is to grow 
slowly, stick to return services, avoid full fledged hubbing, enter secondary markets 
and stay away from the big hub cities, offer high quality but few service amenities at 
very low fares . 
America West's route strategy was one of hubbing from the outset. The original hub 
was in Phoenix Arizona and soon other hubs at Las Vegas and Columbus, Ohio were 
added. The carrier entered routes usually with high capacity, although, its emphasis 
on entering large markets has limited the route capacity offered due to infrastructure 
limitations. The carrier offers cargo service and does some charter work. 
It is important to realise that a carrier's strategic drift can be away from successful 
initial route strategy due to fast growth or goal change. Figure 7-8 shows in what 
directions three major new-entrants have drifted during their operating life. All the 
carriers drifted towards increase in average haulage distance, probably related to 
segment additions due to growth, this conclusion is supported by their drift towards 
larger markets. The carriers do, however, differ on the hubbing issue, the service 
dimension and the route capacity dimension. The trade-off by entering larger 
markets is that the carrier's market-share in terms of route capacity will be much less 
than that in secondary markets due to more competition and infrastructure barriers. 






Small Medium Large 
Market size emphasiS 
High 
Medium Route capacity 
Low 
Service 
Southwest o America West o People Express 
The important aspect of most new-entrants' strategies ha.s been their emphasis on lo~ 
costs and low fares. This emphasis has affected theIr route strategy because It 
requires the carrier to reach a high load-factor due to higher break-even seat-.factor. 
In short-haul markets the new-entrants have often reached this target by enlargmg the 
273 oulhwe t Airline Flight chedule, 31 October, 1993. 
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markets they have entered by luring people out of cars and buses by offering very 
high frequency and low-fares. ' 
The new-entrants have been less successful on long-haul routes. In addition many 
new-entrants have avoided the densest routes to avoid major's retaliation as most 
majors' emphasise long-haul domestic routes. Thus, one hears very frequently, the 
new-entrant's CEOs emphasising avoidance of the incumbent's domain. Many new-
entrants started out with this policy but changed it as they had reached larger size. 
This was what characterised America's West, People's Express and Southwest's 
route strategy. To begin with they entered underserved cities, with low fares and 
high frequency avoiding the major's hub cities and head on competition. As People 
Express and America West grew larger they altered their strategy and entered high 
density routes served by the majors causing higher competition intensity. Southwest, 
although more reluctant to change its basic philosophy, seems to be doing the same 
by its 1993 entrance into the Washington DC market at Baltimore, that puts it head 
on with the financially weak USAir. 274 America West moved into the incumbents' 
domain by entering the New York City market (JFK, La Guardia and Newark), 
BaltimorelW ashington and Honolulu. Their resulting problem was not only increased 
competition but also a problem of gaining customer recognition in this large market. 
In the mid eighties the notion was that the rule for new-entrant's success was to start 
a hub in an unhubbed city. This was clear at the time looking to the two most 
successful new-entrants People Express at Newark and America West at Phoenix. In 
the nineties the impression became that the costs associated with hub structures 
excluded the ability of an airline to gain an ultra low cost structure in order to be 
competitive with Southwest and similar airlines. 275 Other carriers pursued this route 
strategy also with differing success: Midway at Chicago's Midway, Republic at 
Detroit, Memphis and Minneapolis and Air California at John Wayne airport in 
Orange County California. 
When hub traffic increased inefficiencies resulted. These are primarily due to time 
lags between arriving and leaving banks276 causing lower aircraft utilisation and 
increased waiting time for passengers. This reduces the passenger's utility opening a 
gap in the market that can be exploited by direct service airlines like Southwest. 
274People Express started off by serving secondary markets from the Wlderutilised Newark airport and then 
intitiating head on competition in 1984 with the incumbents by entering Chicago O'Hare, ~.leveland, Denver, 
Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami and Minneapolis. In the following two years more competItIve markets were 
entered intensifying the threat to the major's even further. Similarly, America ~est sel~cted secondary 
markets 1llltil 1987 when it entered Chicago O'Hare, Baltimore, New York's JFK, Philadelphia and Portland. 
Southwest on the other hand has been much more relaxed in entering primary markets. It entered Detroit 
in 1987, Denver in 1983, Indianapolis in 1989 and Los Angeles in 1984. True to its strategy the carrier 
entered Washington's Baltimore instead of Dulles and Chicago's Midway inst~ad of O'Hare. Southwest and 
America West were main competitors on more than 50 percent of their routes m 1987. Perhaps that exp~a~s 
the reason for America West's decision to enter non-Southwest type of routes. Regardless of thIS Amenca s 
West fmancial problems increased after the shift in strategy, just as occured at People Express. 
275Hub hubbub, Airline Business, August 1993, p. 24. See: 'But it is increasingly apparent that hub operations 
and Southwest's cost structure are mutually exclusive.' 
276Bank is a term for many aircnills scheduled during a short time-interval. 
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In view of how profitable and strong Southwest has become as a competitor and 
hubs inefficient as a competition tool against such carrier, some incumbents like 
Continental have selected to establish their own Southwest clones in order to protect 
their territory (CalLite). This may be the main new feature of the incumbent's 
strategy in retaliation to new-entrance. An other way would be to dissolve the bank 
concept of the hubs creating a more constant random flow to and from the hubs 
resulting in greater fleet efficiency. But such a strategy will not solve the passenger 
waiting time problem, that will remain unresolved making the incumbent's market-
share vulnerable to attack by the direct service carriers. Furthermore, such hub 
carrier strategy will cause a reduction in load-factors as fewer passengers will find it 
convenient to wait long hours for flights, making it necessary to shed flights to low 
density destinations. This can of course be offset by feeder carriers taking such 
routes over. 
Table 7-3 Changing Hub Structures277 
Daily Departures 
Cities 1990 1993 
Baltimore 
US Air 145 89 
USAir Express 104 91 
Dallas 
Delta 248 247 
Delta Connect 85 101 
Memphis 
Northwest 143 104 
Northwest Airlink 75 108 
San Jose 
American 75 51 
American Eagle 60 33 
Washington - Dulles 
United 104 52 
United Express 89 157 
The majors are leaving more of their secondary markets to the feeder carriers as can 
be seen in Table 7-3. The inefficiencies of small aircraft operations will, however, not 
lead to the necessary reduction in fares to stimulate the markets to the same degree as 
Southwest has been able to do, leaving the incumbent's route system still vulnerable. 
As a result the most viable solution for the incumbent would be to establish a 
'Southwest' clone tying together the short-haul nodes in the structure where it is 
viable for jet operations leaving no opening for Southwe~t. At t~e same. time the 
incumbent can consolidate its route structure by concentratmg on high densIty, long-
haul and international routes. 
7.6.2 Equipment 
New-entrants' equipment strategy can be divided into four main dir~ctions: .~~) 
acquisition of older second-hand aircraft; (ii) leasi~g of second-hand. aircraft; (lll) 
leasing of new aircraft; and (iv) acquisition of new aIrcraft. The strategtes had much 
m Airline Business, August 1993, p. 26. 
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to do wit? their associated costs. The costs were usually analysed in terms of up-
front capltal needed, the terms at which such capital could be obtained and the 
availability of leased aircraft to the new-entrants (more if excess capacity is in the 
market). Furthermore, as practically all the new-entrants tried to minimise costs, 
fleet homogeneity was an issue. For some aircraft types it could be a problem to 
acquire enough aircraft of a type, such was the case of: F okker F28 and BAC 1-11. 
The first strategy is the lowest cost and most viable on short-haul routes where the 
higher fuel consumption of older aircraft was less of a factor than on long-haul 
278 Th b . routes. e uylng strategy turned out to be useful for many new-entrants when it 
came to raising capital as their fortunes turned bitter, as debt could be secured on the 
equipment or it sold and leased back. 279 
The second strategy was to lease used aircraft. These were usually aircraft 
repossessed by leasing companies from bankrupt or troubled airlines or returned at 
the end of the leasing period by the original lessor. The new-entrant would then get a 
very good leasing rate, making it possible to keep the cost structure at a minimum. 
The third strategy of leasing new aircraft was not used very much by new-entrants, 
probably due to the leasing companies reluctance to place brand new aircraft into the 
hands of high risk ventures. It was a totally different story when it came to returned 
equipment whose usable-life had been mostly consumed. The fourth strategy to buy 
brand new aircraft has not been utilised much due to new-entrants' lack of capital or 
credibility in fmancial markets. This is of-course a different story for the established 
new-entrants like Southwest, that has been launching customer for some B737 types. 
An other carrier KIWI placed an order for 11 Rombac's BACI-III's against an 
equity capital injection from the manufacturer of $1 million. 
The most striking strategy and most influential in the 1990' s was ultra high aircraft 
utilisation on short-haul routes. This cost saving strategy has been mastered by 
Southwest Airlines by achieving fast turnaround at gates usually around 15 minutes 
for compared to at least 45 minutes for the hub operating competitors. This allows 
Southwest to operate fewer aircraft to produce a comparable output of a competitor 
operating more aircraft. A low aircraft utilisation increases cost structure 
dramatically as more aircraft are required, crew, maintenance and management staff. 
Thus, if the airline can gain greater utilisation from aircraft it will achieve lower cost 
structure instantly, other factors remaining the same. 
7.6.3 Code sharing/interlining/feeding 
Many new-entrants avoided interlining in order to maintain as low a cost -structure as 
possible. Interlining was, however, highly important for the regional based new-
entrants as they were already generating a large portion of their passenger flow by 
interlining with the large majors. Thus, it was only logical that they maintained t~s 
relationship after jet-operations started. These carriers kept, however, low profile m 
278Many of the used aircraft acquired or leased by the new-entrants were less fuel efficient than n~wer aircraft 
at the time: 80eing 727-100's, 8737-100's and similar. The cheap used long-haul types acqUIred by new-
entrants were usually very fuel in-efficient: DC-8's, 8707's, 8747-100's, LlOII's and DC-lO-lO's. 
279This was a major factor in People Express fmancial stf'dtegy. 
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order to be able to work with the incumbent rather than against. Empire, for 
e~ampl~, generated forty two percent of its passengers from interlining in 1981 and 
thirty eIght percent were interlined from Empire to other airlines. Air Wisconsin had 
eve~ higher proportion ~r seventy five percent in each direction. Midway, a start-up 
carner, generated only eIght percent of its traffic through interlining, while Air Illinois 
gained sixty five percent of its passengers from interlining. 280 
The general rule is that carriers operating to and from a hub airport dominated by a 
major carrier have high proportion of their passengers interlining with such a carrier. 
Thus, it is necessary for the new-entrant carrier to have an interlining agreement in 
order to maintain adequate load. A carrier like Southwest, on the other hand, 
offering point to point service and operating only small hubs where it is the dominant 
carrier is not dependent on interlining. However, carriers mixing international and 
domestic operations need to offer interlining as large portion of the international 
passengers need to get on to other destinations. Hence, carriers like Air Florida had 
to offer interlining, but thirty percent of their passengers interlined from other carriers 
and twenty percent to other carriers. 281 
After a change in CRS regulation on neutrality, feeder carriers that interlined with the 
incumbents experienced a drop in display priority on CRS' s. The result was 
increased emphasis on marketing agreements with incumbents in order to gain code-
sharing. Code-sharing is, therefore, effectively an accepted loop-hole in the 
regulation that resurrects the feeders that experienced dramatic drop in demand after 
the regulation change, but at the same time pushed the feeders into the arms of the 
incumbents that gained more power over them, than before. 282 Code-sharing has, as 
a result, brought immense problems to the code-sharing feeder partner. In fact it is 
stated that no code-sharing feeder will survive a sudden termination of a code-sharing 
pact. Thus the code-sharing agreement is comparable to the 'one big customer' 
problem frequently cited as one of the reasons for company bankruptcy. 
In order to reduce the dependency on one incumbent major, some of the independent 
feeder airlines have made more than one code-sharing agreement. Air Midwest, for 
example, had code-sharing agreement with the Texas Air's airlines and Trans World 
in 1988. The real meaning of code-sharing and the CRS bias regulation for a new-
280 Air Transport World, Special Report: Interlining an institution in transition, April, 1982, pp. 17 - 24. 
281Op. cit. (ATW 4/82) 
282 A code-sharing agreement is usually part of a marketing agreement between a major carrier and a feeder 
carrier at a hub. Under such an agreement their schedules are integrated and airport facilities shared. The 
schedule integration involves the use of the same flight code for an entire trip from city A to a hub. and on 
with the code-sharing airline to a city B. So on the ticket the flight is shown as flight XXX from CIty A to 
city B and no mentioning of change of planes or the hub in between. The present regulation says though that 
upon booking the passenger must be informed that he/she is buying a code-shared flight, thus, indirect. 1?e 
origin of code-sharing can be attributed to the regulation on CRS bias that pushed interlining flights as third 
priority on CRS displays. This led to serious difficulties for feeder carriers that had marketin~ agreements 
with majors as their flights would suddenly be pushed from the ftrst screen to perhaps the ~d or fourth 
screen. Given that T A have a tendency to book from the ftrst screen this carriers lost lIDIDcdIatcl\ 
substantial part of their traffic after the change was effected. Thus, the interlining carrier had only o~e \\3\ 
of beating the system and maintaing its traffic level, that was to make an marketing agreement \Vlth the 
major involving code-sharing. 
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ent~ant is to foreclose a non-code-sharing new-entrant's ability to reach the majority 
of mcumbent' s passengers using a hub airport, due to the ease and convenience for 
the p~ssengers to use a code-sharing partner. Furthermore, a flight terminating at a 
hub a~rport may actually be proportionally more expensive than a through flight, thus, 
redUCIng the passenger's fare incentive to use a non-partner's flight for the onward 
journey out of the hub. 
The incumbents, in order to secure their feed, set the system up so that the feeder 
could not change partners. Through equity injection and outright acquisition the 
incumbents then set out to gain full control of their feeder airlines. Furthermore, it 
made sense for the incumbent to make initial agreements with more than one feeder 
carrier although the feeder's routes overlapped. Then as the feeder was depended on 
the code-sharing traffic the major could consolidate the traffic by either terminating 
the agreement and force the code-sharing partners it did not want to co-operate with 
into bankruptcy, or make an acquisition offer. The reason for such moves would be 
to control the feed in the hub area by eliminating independent commuter carriers and 
make it harder for other competing majors to gain foothold in the area. Code-
sharing, is viewed positively by the public( and regulatory authorities) as it does 
provide small communities with linkages to hubs, services that would not be viable 
otherwise. 
Code-sharing agreements have led to frequent lawsuits, where the feeders claim that 
the incumbents are trying to push them out of business, often in an attempt to favour 
one partner over an other or plainly to acquire the feeder carrier cheaply. 
Presidential, one of the noted start -up new-entrants, made code-sharing pacts first 
with Continental and then with United. The agreement with Continental 'wasted' 
management time as the carrier moved its operations from Dulles to Newark after the 
People Express acquisition. Harold Pareti Presidential's CEO estimated that the 
carrier's loss was in the vicinity of $30 million due to lost traffic centred around the 
Continental feed. In order to re-establish traffic, Presidential entered a code-sharing 
agreement with United which it later claimed to have pushed the airline to 
bankruptcy. The reason, claimed by Pareti, was that United overtook some of the 
more lucrative routes in the Presidential's route system. 283 
Code-sharing can be, as the paragraph above shows, a large factor in regional based 
new-entrant's demise especially if franchise-type marketing alliances accompany it. 
Although, it is not a one isolated cause of failure, it plays a large role in making the 
code-sharing feeder vulnerable due to the dramatic effect the cancellation of the 
code-sharing agreement has on the traffic levels of the smaller code-share partner. 
The regional based new-entrants did not have much choice, due to their mixed fl~et 
and high costs, but to avoid competition with the incumbents. Thus code-shanng 
was the only way to forge growth but at the same time the carrier's lost their i~entit~. 
A carrier that looses its traffic and identity will not survive for long. The relatIOnship 
with the incumbent is, therefore, a one way street full of risks, especially if the smaller 
code-sharing carrier is gaining from a marketing agreement that provides favourable 
slots and airport facilities that wil be revoked if the agreement is revoked. 
283Airline Executive International, Could Presidential Have Survived?, September 1990, pp. 32-34. 
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As ~ome of the new-entrants became very large they needed feed like any other major 
car~ler. People Express, America West and Midway needed feed as they set out to 
be lndependent hub operators rather than feeder carriers, unlike most of the regional 
based new-entrants. People Express lacked feed to its Newark base, but gained from 
the vicinity of La Guardia and John F. Kennedy airports. In order to gain presence in 
other regions the carrier acquired Britt and PBA shortly before its demise. America 
West on the other hand started to feed itself from scratch by acquiring DHC-Dash 8s 
in 1986. America West did sign a feed agreement with Northwest Airlines in 1985 
whose purpose was to provide the latter carrier with feed at Los Angeles for 
international flights to the Far East and at Phoenix for the Minneapolis hub, Detroit 
and Milwaukee. 284 The agreement was not in the spirit of traditional feeding 
agreements at the time as America West was not sacrificing any of its independence 
and Northwest was looking for feed to its international routes first and foremost. 
Although, feeding is necessary for a large hub airlines in order to maximise their 
potential loads, new-entrants have not adapted the incumbents' strategy of creating a 
network of feeders carrying their name. New-entrants have rather been feeders 
themselves or fed themselves if necessary. 
To conclude, the customer is both better and worse off with code-sharing and feeding 
depending on how one views it. In terms of making equipment change and ticketing 
smooth the customer benefits but if the customer likes to know whether he has to 
change planes enroute he can not detect such equipment change under code-sharing 
unless he is informed, but that is often omitted by T A's. The new-entrant, however, 
is in a similar situation as the customer, it needs the association with the incumbent to 
survive in the hub environment but that very co-operation is usually fatal in the long-
term. 
7.7 Marketing Strategy 
7. 7. J Pricing 
Pricing strategy is of an outmost importance in air transport, but at the same time 
very restricted of viable options for differentiation. Airlines can divide the aircraft 
into different product sections and the same product can be differentiated into price 
categories by attaching restrictions to the fares offered. Hence, a major differentiation 
becomes troublesome for individual airlines that are seeking to establish themselves 
on price or uniqueness. This is especially so for new-entrants because the basic 
airline product, the use of a seat from point A to point B, does not play any great 
importance to the passenger's ultimate benefit from a trip. Thus, it is no wonder that 
the People Express285 low-fare, no-frills product became as popular as it did. The 
2R4Air Transport World, Northwest/America West combination strengthens position, July 1985, p. 54-55. 
285People Express was granted a certificate by the CAB to offer scheduled passenger .se~ice between Newark 
and 27 major cities in 1980 and got its operating certificate April 1981. The arrlme offered unbundled 
service that is no-frills, where the passenger had to pay for a picknic basket on board, pay for checked 
baggage and pay for his ticket on board. As a result the company offered comparab~y very low far.es and 
high frequency. The employees were shareholders and everyone was a manager. This seemed to gIve the 
staff a greater feeling of responsibility and flexibility. as most staff members could attend to more than one 
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rea~o.n is that for the low-end of the market, price is the most important part of the 
decIsIon to fly. However, if the full service competitor can match the fare and 
provide frequent and convenient departure times, the passenger will of course select 
to be pampere.d. for no extra charge with 'free' meals and baggage allowance. 
Therefore, an atrlIne can not assume customer loyalty to any degree if the passenger 
can buy a better or cheaper product elsewhere. 286 In fact a carrier can only assume 
customer loyalty as long as it provides consistent high quality product at similar or 
lower fare than the competitors, that is either superior or at least not of a lesser 
quality. Furthermore, the passenger has the short-term view of not considering the 
long-term effect of his decision, meaning that he will select the incumbent if it 
lowered its fares, although it will lead to the exit of the new-entrant causing an 
increase in fares again. It is the tendency of the higher cost carrier to raise its fares as 
soon as a lower-cost carrier has been pushed out of the market. This erroneous 
consumer behaviour will always be present due to imperfect information and the 
tendency to get as much for the money as possible although that will be a short -term 
privilege. 
The early new-entrants attempted to provide low fares, peak and off-peak, as their 
primary differentiation feature. Such fares had proved to be highly advantageous for 
pre-deregulation intrastate carriers like PSA and Southwest, that were small low-cost 
carriers. 287 Such fare structure was simple enough for the passengers to know what 
his approximate fare would be next time they travelled and the travel agents would 
not have to find the fares in their CRS' s, but could refer to the airline's tariff with 
confidence. A schedule listed in the CRS' s that included the tariff was usually 
enough. Southwest and People Express are the most noteworthy carriers that used 
staff function. The airline grew very fast and ran into fmancial difficulties that resulted in an acquisition by 
Continental in 1987. 
286This was one of the things that Freddy Laker discovered and mentioned to have surprised him when the 
incumbents matched his fare and the passengers flocked away from Laker Airways. But this was no wonder 
as the incumbents provided a higher frequency and more convenient distribution system. Only a small 
portion of their trans-Atlantic capacity at the low fares would easily eat up Laker's market-share. 
287The operating environment prior to deregulation had diverse effect on intrastate carrier's strategy at the 
beginning of deregulation. The intrastate carriers had more experience operating in a competitive 
environment prior to deregulation than the incumbents. Although, PSA and Air California had monopoly 
status on some intrastate routes that were not served by the interstate carriers, they were in competition with 
the interstate carriers on intrastate routes. PSA had experienced success against the CAB regulated tnmks 
in California, but with the advent of Air California its success dissipated. The Public Utilities Commission 
had been inclined to approve rates considered to provide only 'reasonable' rate of return. Moreover, the 
Commission divided the markets between PSA and Air California on routes not served by the interstate 
carriers.287 These developments just prior to deregulation, may have affected PSA's experience of full 
fledged competition as can be hypothesised by high increase in operating cost between 1978 and 1980. 
PSA, strangely enough, was therefore forced by the Public Utilites Commission to maintain its low fare 
structure prior to deregulation but needed to raise fares due to costs that were higher than the fares co~ld 
sustain. Thus, PSA saw deregulation primarily as an instrument for raising fares and a way to abandon Its 
'forced' fare strategy. Southwest, on the other hand, kept its fare strategy, as its operation philosophy and 
cost structure was in line with it. 'The battle [with Braniff] provided a case study in airline marketing and 
the lessons learnt have stood Southwest in good stead not only in its intra-state eX-paIlsion but, post-1978 in 
its operations outside Texas.' Source: Southwest Airlines: the alternative route to low costs, Lloyd's Aviation 
Economist, October 1984, p. 29. 
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this fa~e strategy and Southwest still does. These were, however, not the only fare 
startegles adopted by new-entrants. 
Other fare strategies adopted by the new-entrants, were: (i) low overall fare 
r~?a~dless 0: prevailing fare~; (ii) far~ adjusted to the competition in each market; and 
(lll) normal fares for premIum servIce. If capacity and product characteristic enters 
t~e fare eq.uation ~he strategies become something along these lines: (i) low fares, 
h!g~ capaCIty relatIve to market size and homogeneous but reliable product;288 (ii) 
sImIlar fares as the competition and low capacity in the market;289 and (iii) marginally 
lower fares, low capacity in the market and high quality product. 290 America West, 
People Express and Southwest all followed the low-fare, low-cost, strategy and initial 
entry into secondary markets that are overcharged, under served or both and served 
by higher cost carriers. Air Florida, altered its fares according to the competition in 
each market, leading to less market stimulation than Southwest and People Express 
generated with their comparatively low entry fares. Air Florida's strategy was among 
other factors due to its higher cost structure compared to People Express and other 
comparable start-up new-entrants. The low fares of People Express and Southwest 
reflect their low cost structures, while Air Florida and Midway, with higher cost 
structure, had to maintain higher yield in order to account for their higher costs. Due 
to Midway's high market-share at Midway airport an uncongested Chicago airport, it 
was able to charge higher fares, especially, due to the airport's easy reach from 
Chicago compared to O'Hare. This may be one of the reasons why Midway survived 
longer than People Express under deregulation despite the lower cost structure of the 
latter. The pricing strategies of the former intrastate carriers were, however, derived 
from pre-deregulation 
Taking account of the intrastate example most start-up new-entrants took the stand 
of being price leaders. What is more they entered secondary markets and avoided 
primary markets dominated by the incumbents. Regional new-entrants, on the other 
hand, serving the incumbent's hub airports took the stand of keeping a low profile in 
terms of pricing and capacity in the hope of avoiding retaliation by the incumbents. 291 
288In this case the airline might enter the markets of weaker incumbents and drown them with high frequency 
at low fares and when the airline has gained enough critical mass it will go for the trunk routes of the 'big' 
carriers. This was the strategy of People Express and America West. 
289Here the airline maintains low profile, basically hoping the customers will select them although they do not 
have any unique selling proposition. This strategy is basically defimct as the passenger not having any 
incentive like low price, will select the more 'reputable' carrier unless that carrier is providing 'terrible' 
service compared to the new carrier. TIris strategy resembles, Midwest and World. 
290Highly competitive strategy, but can be low growth oriented. The carrier usually pursuing low profile hopes 
that the incumbent wont bother with it in view of its low market share. Furthermore, it may be dangerous 
for the incumbent to retaliate if such carrier is able to skim most of the more lucrative markets, as fare war 
will harm the incumbents more than the newcomer, given that the newcomer can brcak-cven at a much 
lower fare levels than the incumbents. TIris type of strategy facilitates a strong USP by achieving 
outstanding and highly flexible product. TIris type of a carrier is Virgin Atlantic. 
291 For a small new-entrant entering primary markets the story was entirely different as it certainly doesn't 
make any sense for an incumbent to cut fares in a lucrative market to force out a new-entrant havrng 
negligible market share. Air Atlanta was one such carrier operating out of ~tlanta in competItlon \nth Delta 
and Eastern. Their strategy was based on premium service at standard pnces: 'Anybody can match a pnce 
strategy. But I know that tlle major airlines are too musclebound to react to a senrice strategy ~at a.trects 
only a small part of their sy'stem' (Neil Effinan, Air Atlanta). If the new-entrant mtends to grow fast m the 
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Whose ultimate peace keeping was to secure a marketing agreement with the 
incumbent. 
Mey~r . concluded that there were three basic incumbent pricing strategies in 
retaha~lOn to a new entrant threat during early deregulation: (i) Introducing a new 
~~tching lo,w.-fare category; (i~) adj2~~ting the range of an existing fare category; and 
(111) streamhrung the fare offenngs. The first strategy often resulted in a fare that 
was below cost for both the new-entrant and the incumbent. As the incumbent had 
usually much larger market-share its relative loss was much larger, as the new fare 
was usually offered for all capacity on the route. Then the new-entrant tended to raise 
fare levels until it was profitable for it but not for the incumbent because of its higher 
cost structure. The second strategy was to allow the new-entrant to build market-
share until it became substantial and then match its fare. The third strategy was to 
match or under-cut the new-entrant but only for limited capacity restricted to the 
leisure market. In view of the fact that the incumbent had usually much higher 
frequency it could easily offer as many seats at partial capacity at the same fare as the 
new-entrant at full capacity. Furthermore, the incumbent often added frequency in 
order to leave as little incentive as possible for the consumer to travel with the new-
entrant, and to pick up the extra demand that resulted from the fare reductions. The 
only reason a new-entrant carrier would survive such a strategy was if substantial 
portion of the incumbent's passengers were in the Avoidance Contour or Negative 
Contour of the model presented in Figure 7-3. A fourth reaction strategy, capacity 
controlled fares managed by yield management systems, became the norm after 1986. 
The system allowed the incumbent to adjust fares weekly or even daily according to 
the projected sales to higher paying passengers. Further reaction strategies by the 
incumbents was to match the new-entrant's fares without reducing the service. This 
effectually became the 'unique selling point'(USP) in the mind of the customer that 
preferred full service over limited service at the same fare. A further fare strategy 
alternative, was to increase service without increasing the fares. 
The advent of the yield management systems (YMS) caused a major changes in fare 
strategy after 1985. American Airlines had developed their in-house CRS system to 
such an extent at that time that they had produced a highly advanced competition tool 
that allowed them to compete with other carriers by offering multiple fares on a 
single aircraft, sometimes up to 10 different capacity controlled adjustable fares. 
People Express could not compete effectively with this new development due to its 
unsophisticated computer reservation system. The off-peak and peak pricing was not 
effective anymore as American could undercut such fares easily for limited seating, 
generating high demand that would sell the low-fare seats easily and generate further 
market and has the facilities and means to do so, like People Express and America West, an entirely 
different stand may be taken by the incwnbent. An example of such entry was when New York Air started 
service to Detroit from New York's La Guardia offering a $69 and $49 off-peak fare where RepublIc offered 
a $128 fare. Republic, true to its policy of matching any fare offers in its markets, dropped its fare to the 
same level and when New York Air dropped its fare further to $39, Republic did the sanlC and offered 
passengers' 50 percent bonus coupons on some routes. The m~ve ~ullified New York Air's attempts and 
fares rose again as a result. This is a typical Bertrand Duopoly SItuatIOn as was dIscussed ill Chapter 2. 
292Op. cit. (Meyer), p. 134. 
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sales at higher prices. People's Express chairman Donald Burr stated in an article293 
that the development of the sophisticated yield management system at American was 
the final bite into his airline, causing its collapse due to dramatic reduction in 
demand. 294 
The picture for a new-entrant competing solely on price was, consequently, rather 
bleak after the advent of YMS, unless there was a strategy that counteracted the 
incumbents ability to match fares. The only strategy that appeared to have worked in 
the deregulated environment is that of Southwest Airlines whose simple fare-
structure was, in combination with other factors, successful. 295 As mentioned before, 
its strategy is basically to enter underserved medium to high fare routes, with direct 
service, high frequency, high quality and very low fare. 
Service features offered have major impact on fares due to the associated costs, as 
the next section will depict. 
7.7.2 Service 
The new-entrants selected three main strategies regarding service: (i) no-frills service 
in order to keep fares down; (ii) full-frills service in order to match service at lower 
fares; and (iii) premium service at 'normal' fares. The first strategy was important in 
order to keep costs down and being able to offer very low fares. The service 
amenities missing in such cases were usually, as is apparent from Table 7-4, hot 
meals, interlining and ticket offices. All of the airlines offered, however, meals 
although very low-cost carriers like People Express charged the passengers for it. 
Such strategy is in fact unbundling of the service features, meaning that the 
advertised ticket price is very low, but most passengers will have to add the cost for 
checked baggage and meals if those service features are used. 296 The second strategy 
was to keep costs down but match the incumbents in terms of service features. 
Carriers following this strategy attempted to offer all the same features as the 
incumbent but at a lower price due to lower costs. Lower cost was achieved through 
leaner organisation structure and lower pay scales. Thus, lower fares was the way 
they intended to eliminate the customers' incentive to select the incumbent for the 
sake of more service. The problem with the strategy was, however, that when price 
equilibrium formed, particularly after the advent of capacity controlled fares, 
passengers would rather select the incumbent due to its name recognition and extra 
service for the same price. The third strategy, premium service, is costly for the 
carrier but is usually offered at first or business class prices. The problem with the 
strategy is its segment, the business passenger, it requires high frequency in order to 
build passenger loyalty. These services have not been able to match the frequency of 
293Cancelled Flights, CIO, April, 1989. pp. 48-54. 
294Op. cit. (HBS 490-012), p. 19. 
295Southwest airlines was established in 1967 and started intrastate operations in 1971, in Texas Southwest 
has been profitable for most of its operating life. 
2%In 1985 People Express charged $3.0 per bag, $3.0 for light snacks on afternoon and night flights 
Furthermore, the camer offered meals on transcontinental and international flights. 
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the incumbent carriers, therefore, suffering in terms of demand. 
carriers depending on only one segment, experienced large weekly 
fluctuations in demand. 
Furthermore, 
and seasonal 
To the contrary of what may be believed People's Express service levels may not 
have been the reason for their collapse as much as their explosive growth. Of course 
the quality of service suffered as a result of the fast growth, especially at the crowded 
terminal in Newark. Nevertheless, it must be understood that the customer segment 
People Express aimed for was ready to sacrifice traditional airline service amenities in 
exchange for lower fares. The problem was very real when the incumbents offered 
the same fares but full service. In that case the passenger would of course maximise 
his benefit and choose the low fare and full service carrier. 
Table 7-4 Service Offered by Early New-entrant Airlines297 
Airline Interline 
Snacks and Food tickets and Ticket Automatic On board Ticket by 
drinks ticketin ticketin mail 
Air California Yesa No Yes No Yes 
Air Florida Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Capitol Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Jet America Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Midway Yes No Yes No No No Yes 
New York Air Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Pacific Express Yes No Yes No No No Yes 
PSA Yesa No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
People Express Yesb No No No No Yesc No 
Southwest Yesa No No No Yes No No 
World Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
The survey was conducted in spring 1982. a. Service on some flights. . No free services c. Added this feature soon after the survey. 
One of the reasons that America West has survived longer than People Express was 
that the carrier gathered for business passengers as well as the leisure passenger, 
avoiding weekly and seasonal traffic cycles to some extent. In 1987 the year People 
Express was absorbed into Continental, SO percent of America's West passengers 
were business travellers. 298 
If we look at the new-entrants beyond service features and at quality, they seem to 
have reached fairly good marks by their passengers if DoT complaint rates are used 
as an indicator (see Chapter 3). This conclusion is reached if the charter based new-
entrants are excluded, but they achieved very high complaint rates in the system. Fast 
growth does not seem to have been particularly harmful in terms of service quality, 
although, People Express complaint level is relatively high. Conversely other fast 
growing carriers had low complaint levels: Muse and America West, for example. 
To conclude, it is clear that it was not enough to offer low prices and good service, 
the new-entrants had to be able to reach the potential customer, as the next section 
will demonstrate. 
20 ' As reported in: E. Bailey, Airline Deregulation, MIT Press, 1985, p. 104. 
2Q8Fenger, Helena, America West Sets a Risky New Course, Arizona Trend. Vol. 1, ISS:5, Jan 1987. 
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7. 7.3 Market Penetration 
Figure 7-9 shows the cost associated with CRS participation and T A's emphasis. 
There are four combinations possible: (i) emphasise T A's and participate in a CRS~ 
(ii) emphasise T A's but not participate in a CRS; (iii) de-emphasise T A's but 
participate in a CRS; and (iv) de-emphasise TA's and not participate in a CRS. For a 
low-cost, low-fare new-entrant it would become a major cost as percentage of total 
ticket price to pay both booking fees and T A's commission. The new-entrant will, 
therefore, have to decide what distribution strategy it wants to select on the basis of 
distribution costs. 
The lowest cost new-entrants tried to circumvent CRS' s use. F or example, People 
Express did not use commercial CRS' s until after its Frontier acquisition in 1985. 
Furthermore, Southwest299 was only listed on CRS' s, meaning that travel agents 
could check its flight schedules but bookings had to be made with Southwest directly 
through the phone system. This, like discussed before, has allowed the carriers to 
avoid booking fees that added on T A's commission amounted to a considerably 
greater proportion of their ticket price than that of the large majors were fares tended 
to be higher and better controlled through yield management systems. 
People Express, Southwest and Air Florida depended almost entirely on the phone 
system, employing a large force of telephone-sales people. The systems worked 
adequately to begin with, but the problem starts when the growth level is high and 
special promotions occur causing major peaks. This causes excessive demand on the 
telephone reservation system leading to frustrated customers and the 'bad service' 
stamp. This became the single greatest customer barrier at People Express, as well as 
at Air Florida during the latter part of their life-cycles. 
Figure 7-9 Travel Agent and Commercial Reservation Cost Matrix 
Commercial CRS Emphasis 
Yes No 




Attempting to circumvent this problem, People Express had a stand-by. option for 
passengers, their system had, therefore, a component independent of booking systems 
2QQ Southwest does now participate in a CRS system allo\\ing bookings on a l~w level. This change was 
implemented due to policy change by the CRS 0\\ ners as described in the [oIlO\\1ng paragraphs. 
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both CRS' s and telephone reservations. 300 People Express, nevertheless paid 
commission to travel agents if passengers wanted to use them, but the necessity was 
at a minimum. This sort of a service was no problem for students and tourists on 
flexible schedule but less desirable for business travellers and passengers interlining 
with other airlines. 301 
An other important issue of the new-entrants' distribution strategy is T A's 
commission levels. The commission level can work as a tool to make the airline more 
attractive to the T A's by offering higher commission than the competition or more 
free travel, which the T A's can use to reward their best customers, or use for staff 
Those new-entrants that are not emphasising T A's as their primary distribution outlet 
are consequently paying less commission as can be seen from the level of commission 
paid as percentage of revenues by Southwest Airlines. Carriers operating 
international flights pay higher commissions on those routes. 302 


























Commission as % of revenues 
1989 1990 1993 
7.6 7.9 8.5 
8.4 8.1 
7.7 10.7 
7.4 7.1 7.7 
7.6 7.7 
8.8 8.2 
6.3 6.3 6.5 
0.6 
Major's 
American 7.08 7.72 9.6 9.9 10.1 
United 7.35 7.56 14.7 16.8 19.6 
US Air 6.33 6.23 7.6 7.5 8.8 
Northwest 8.54 8.84 17.3 17.9 19.6 
Delta 5.72 7.00 10.7 10.4 11.3 
Eastern 6.34 6.98 10.2 9.3 
Note that 1982 and 1983 levels are domestic commissions only, while 1989 and 1990 levels include international. Northwest 
pays, for example, much higher commission on international travel than domestic, causing inflation in the percentages shown. 
It is clear that the new-entrants will have a problem surviving with only their own 
distribution system (phone-reservations, Internet reservations) as the newest action 
300The system was organised in such a way that the passenger would list, upon ~val at the airport, on flrst-
come flrst-served basis instead of booking through a TA or the phone. A booking through the phone was 
actually no guarantee of a seat due to the heavy overbooking practised by the airline. Furthermore, payment 
was collected on board reducing further the necessity for extensive sales-offices or the use ofTA's. 
30) That explains the serious problems the carrier had with building an image for the business segment during 
the lattcr part of its life-cyclc 
30~ew-entrants that do not emphasise TA's usually run a phone-reservation system, but no new-entr~t carrier 
known of, has refused commissions to TA' s using the phone reservation system. In fact some ot the new-
entrants have provided TA's with separate reservation lines. 
303Air Transport World, October 1984, pp. 83-86. ,and Air Transport World, November, 1991. pp. 117-119. 
Air Transport World, October, 199 .. L pp. 102-105. 
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by the commercial CRS' s is to refuse carriers to be only listed on their CRS' s. This 
means that now the new-entrants' using this feature (Southwest) have to pay for 
lowest-level participation or disappear from the system. This move alone will raise 
the new-entrants' cost structure unless other strategies are adopted. So in the future 
it is hard to see that new-entrants will be able to avoid the CRS' s and circumvent the 
T A's to any large degree as their size increases (see the discussion on People Express 
and Air Florida in this Section). 
One way of creating demand for a carrier in the distribution system is to operate 
some sort of a loyalty scheme to increase customer retention, as will be discussed in 
next section. 
7. 7.4 Customer Retention 
The origins of frequent flyer programs (FFP) can be traced to American's Airlines 
launch of the American Advantage Scheme in 1981. The purpose of the program 
was to reward business flyers that flew frequently but usually on coach class at higher 
fares than economy passengers. In order to distinguish this passengers and retain 
their loyalty American developed the named program. 
The FFP's have become a major strategic tool in maintaining passenger loyalty in a 
customarily low loyalty business. Furthermore, the programs have enabled the 
airlines to identify an important target group for promotion purposes. 
Table 7-6 shows clearly the importance of frequent flyers to an airline in terms of 
number of trips. Those taking twelve or more trips per year, although being only 1.7 
percent of the total number of flyers, generate 31.6 percent of the total number of 
trips. Not only do these passengers fly more, they also pay higher fares as they are 



































Frequent flyer programs (FFP) are often cited as one of the. l~gest ob~tac~es to 
effective competition by smaller carriers and new-entrants. This IS embodIed 10 the 
fact that the passenger will select the carrier in which FFP he is a ~ember, often 
without a concern for the possibility of lower fares or schedule converuence of other 
carriers. The reason for this is that a business person will earn the 'mileage' points 
flying on behalf of the employer, but the 'rewards' will be used for personal travel. 
304Uoyds Aviation Economist, FebruarylMarch 1986. The s~udy was undertak~ in the United States by 
Gallup for the Air Transport Association of America on the alf transport market m 1985. 
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Thus, the higher the mileage the more lavish destination on the FFP's carrier's route 
system ~nd class of travel, he can select. As a result, exotic holiday destinations 
become Important for the carrier as they increase the popularity of its FFP. This fact 
alo~e often makes the FFP's of smaller carriers and new-entrants unappealing to the 
busmess per.son. As. a result, it is of a primary importance for new-entrants to gain 
access to a lInk-up wIth the FFP's of larger airlines. 
Many new-entrants will attempt to forge a 'joint marketing agreement' with an 
incumbent carrier and include a tie-in with the larger carrier's FFP thus the 
disadvantage of their size is minimised. Table 7-7 shows examples of su~h tie-ins in 
the past between new-entrants and incumbent carriers. 















American AdvantagetNorthwest OrientFree Flight Programme 
Continental One PasstNorthwest OrientFree Flight Programme 
Canadian International Airlines and Air New Zealand 
Continental One Pass 
Continental One Pass 
Continental One Pass 
Delta Automated Mileage Programme 
Northwest Orient Free Flight Programme 
Northwest OrientFree Flight Programme 
TW A Frequent Flight Bonus Program/USAir 
United Airlines Mileage Plus 
United Airlines Milea e Plus 
Frequent flyer programs of larger carriers are obviously of greater benefit to the user, 
supporting further the stronghold of large-market share carriers. The next section 
will cover market-share and its importance for new-entrant carriers. 
7. 7.5 Market-share 
The airline industry has, as mentioned before, put market-share strategy high on the 
agenda, based on the assumption that 'survival' as well as profitability depended on 
large proportional market-share. This theory is however debated by many, that argue 
that market-share driven strategy will lead to cut-throat price competition leaving the 
whole industry worse off. An other argument is that market-share strategy for the 
sake of market-share, can not work, simply because the increase in market-share has 
to be substantiated by other factors like: relative product quality, niche-marketing or 
cost leadership?06 In order to cast some light on what argument is nearest to the 
actual fact in air transport markets, the U.S. General Accounting Office(GAO) 
performed a detailed study307 on the impact of market-share on fares. A general 
305Travel & Tourism Analyst, October 1987. 
306F or a more analysis on new-entrants' market-shares in comparison to the inCllll1bents, please refer to 
Chapter 3. 
307The Base-Case Market-Share Equation with 'Endpoint Dominance' was: Intercept, ... 136: Scheduled 
service(the capacity devoted between the two airports) 0.156; distance(equals the one-way. straight-line 
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finding associated with the arguments produced above, was that market -share 
a~ual~y affects pricing in such a way that a 23 percent market-share advantage due to 
a nse In enplanements was associated with 2 percent higher fares on the average. 308 
The GAO produced an econometric model on the 'Effects of Airline Market 
Concentration and Barriers to Entry on Airfares'. 309 The model showed that a 65-
percent increase in an airline's average enplanement shares at the airports on a route 
was associated with 21-percent higher market share. Furthermore, if the largest 
competitor of a given airline increased its enplanements share by 45 percent it caused 
a 6 percent decline in market-share on a given route. The model implied as well that 
an airline's market share tended to be higher if it owned a computerised reservation 
system that was dominant at the endpoint cities and had a large proportion of the 
gates in the same cities. 310 
The GAO findings presented above are average findings. Meaning that the effects of 
the findings are not uniform for all situations. If the largest three carriers increased 
their enplanement-share by 65 percent it would lead to 15 percent higher fares on the 
routes involved, compared to a non-significant increase in fares for the other 
airlines. 311 
If the GAO findings are compared to the PIMS Strategic Institute (see Chapter 10) 
findings one can see that there is a similarity, supporting the GAO results. Market 
leaders(largest three) in the PIMS data-base were enjoying average return on sales of 
12.7 percent, compared to 4.5 percent for firms that ranked 5th or less in market-
share.312 This indicates that market-share leaders enjoy a price premium compared to 
the smaller share businesses. 
Referring back to Porter's theories, he stated that rivalry would increase as growth 
levelled off and companies started to strive for growth by snatching customers from 
each other. The airlines as such invite intense 'rivalry', as high fixed cost is a 
mileage of a route), -0.106; route direct percent( measures the proportion traffic on a route that is direct 
rather than connecting), 0.078; relative directness(percentage of direct traffic on a route compared with the 
percentage of direct traffic offered on the route by all carriers), 0.119; CRS(based on revenues booked 
through carriers' CRSs, measures the degree to which the given carrier has a CRS advantage over other 
carriers on the route), 0.082; relative preferences(a relative preference variable that is equal to the given 
carner's preference rating divided by the average rating for all carriers serving the route. Based on the IAP A 
survey), -0.038; traffic volume(mesures the total number of origin-to-destination passenger directional trips 
on a route), -0.179; enplanements of others( equals the largest enplanement share of any carrier other than 
the given carrier at either endpoint airport of a route), -0.134; relative costs(equals the weighted average of 
the cost per available seat mile of all carriers serving a route divided by the cost per available seat mile of 
the given carrier), 0.562; endpoint do~ance(enplanement-share .that.equals the average of the 2~er's 
share of enplanements, or passenger boardings, at each of the endpomt arrports of a route), 0.323. R - .57, 
n = 3,331. All variables were significant at the 1 percent level. 
308The United States General Accounting Office, GAOIRCED-91-1 0 1, Airfare Econometric Model, April 1991. 
309Op. cit. (GAOIRCED-91-1Ol), p. 6. 
]lOOp. cit. (GAOIRCED-91-101), p. 6. 
311Op. cit. (GAOIRCED-91-101), p. 7. 
mRobert D. Buzzell and Bradley T. Gale, The PIMS Principles: Linking Strategy to Performance, The Free 
Press, New York, 1987, p. 76. 
ch~rac~eristi~ of airlines creating strong pressure to fill capacity, in other words to 
mamtam a high load factor. If excess capacity is present as has been in the airline 
ind~~t~ from ~ 9:0' fare war will occur if one competitor disrupts the fare 
equlhbnum. This IS because the reacting competitor can not stay inactive under the 
threat of loos~ng mark.et-sha:e. In additio~ if firms are many or quite similar they 
tend to enter mtense nvalry m order to win market share, because they are battling 
for the .same customers, especially if the industry has low customer loyalty. If there is 
an undisputed leader, he can induce discipline if there is an attempt by the weaker 
player to disrupt the fare equilibrium. Such discipline can be in the form of threat to 
dump prices in a hub city of major importance to the disciplined player, hence 


















Comparison of Majors' and New-entrants' Number of Airports with 
Market-share in Excess of 10 Percent 
1981 1986 1991 
Market-share Intervals in Percent (Number of Top 50 Airports) 
10-30 31-50 51+ Tot 10-30 31-50 51+ Tot 10-30 31-50 51+ Tot 
3 0 2 5 3 2 1 6 6 1 3 10 
- - - -
3 1 0 4 2 2 0 4 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 - - - -
3 0 0 3 5 0 0 5 - - - -
7 0 0 7 1 1 1 3 - - - -
14 3 0 17 9 3 0 11 11 3 1 15 
18 1 0 19 11 2 1 14 18 2 4 24 
14 3 1 18 11 2 1 14 11 3 3 17 
7 1 2 10 5 2 1 8 8 2 7 17 
10 3 0 13 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 2 
4 1 0 5 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 6 
11 7 0 18 12 4 0 16 5 1 0 6 
.. Based on MaldutJs 1991. In order to examme mdtvtdual new-entrant aIrline's top 50 aIrports' market-shares, please refer to 
Appendix A 
When looking at the new-entrants in terms of market-share one can quickly assess 
that large market share at airports is important in order to fend of retaliatory action 
on behalf of the large incumbents and also in order to maintain higher yield. In fact 
Appendix ~ shows that the new-entrants that gained dominant market -share at one 
or more airports tended to survive longer and enjoy greater overall success than 
those that did not. In fact one can establish from Table 7-8, that carriers obtaining 
substantial market-share at major airports fared better than those carriers achieving 
minor shares. 314 This is clearly apparent if one examines: Southwest, Midway, 
People Express and America West, which all gained large market-shares at secondary 
airports near to large cities. 
313Porter's theory may not apply to air transport as the increase in entry occurs when there is excess capacin 
reducing the 'fmancial barrier' to entry and when the incumbents are weak due to a recession. According to 
Porter the airlines should be having intense 'rivalry' at that time. TIle fact of the matter is, however, that this 
rivalry occurs only for a period of time during the downward swing but seems to fade otT as the economy 
passes the bottom of the curve, creating opportunities for new-entrants. 
~14One must recognise thal some of these carriers turned these airports into major airports by serving them. 
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In view of this findings it is apparent that market-share as such does matter in the 
o:erall. abilit~ of the airline to earn higher returns. It is, however, also apparent that 
high cIty-paIr market-share is important in addition to high market-share at the 
airports on each end. This is exactly what Southwest airlines has practised in their 
route strategy, to cluster their operations at many secondary airports, although, 
hubbing is not their feature they aim for substantial market-share at each airport 
served.315 
Then the question of the impact of relative quality on market-share remains. Namely 
whether high quality carriers are gaining market -share for that reason rather than 
forcing up its market-share through price cuts and use/abuse of dominant position. 
Southwest had an average complaint rate of 0.70 complaints per 100.000 passengers 
from 1981 until 1991, while America West had 1.73 from 1984 to 1991, and Midway 
2.47 from 1984 to 1991. The average for all jet operating airlines from 1981 to 1991 
was 3.22 and 3.63 for NEs only, and from 1984 to 1991 it was 2.95 and 2.4 for NEs 
only. All of the airlines are below the averages except Midway that was slightly 
above the NEs average. Unfortunately exact complaint data was not available for all 
the operating years of the airlines involved, making comparisons and conclusions 
problematic. At any rate, there seems to be a relationship as no airline with 
complaint rate above the median (based on the average) survived for a substantial 
period of time with the exception of World (charters have been in and out of 
scheduled operations). The same goes for market-share as none of the carriers 
having above average complaint rates reached major status or near major status, 
except People Express. 
The PIMS program reported on the issue of superior product's effect, that it was 
more important for lower-share businesses in terms of ROI. Thus, it is likely that a 
strategy of a superior product may be important for new-entrants. Not only that but 
also that superior perceived quality is necessary if market-share increase is to 
generate increased ROJ. Thus, it is evident that new-entrants are unlikely to survive 
without the two, especially if one cites the successful new-entrants, Southwest in the 
U.S. and Virgin Atlantic in Europe. 
7. 7.6 Promotion and Advertising Strategy 
In the early days the new-entrants gained considerable free promotion by being 
newsworthy. Carriers like Southwest and Muse knew from the outset the importance 
of maintaining high profile in the media and integrated into their image a 'fun' 
element in order to keep the airlines in the news. Another method of gaining free 
media coverage was to offer a comparatively very-low promotional fare that would 
attract major media coverage, treating the new-entrant as the low fare saviour from 
the high fare incumbent, contrasting incumbent as the 'bad guy' exploiting the 
community.316 The result, was an immediate presence in the market reducing 
315Southwest's routes center at following cities: Reno, Sacramento, Oakland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
Phoenix, Albuquerque, El Paso, Dallas Love Field, Houston Hobby, San Antonio, Midland/Odessa, Kansas 
City, St. Louis and Chicago Midway. Some other airports have fewer linkages, that is one to three. 
316Op. cit. (Levine, 1987), p. 480. 
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substantially promotional and advertising costs. As entry by new carriers became 
more common-place, new-entrant carriers began to exit markets and incumbents 
gained experience in dealing with the new-entrants, free media coverage played a 
lesser role in entry as well as in maintaining good-will for the new-entrant. As a 
result entry costs increased and new-entrants had to look very carefully on their 
promotion schemes. 
New-entrant's promotion schemes are usually much weaker than those of the 
incumbents due to the lesser size of the new-entrant. Thus promotion has to be 
highly targeted in order to be effective. Braniff II for example emphasised personal 
visits by company sales people to travel agencies in destination cities in order to 
explain the company's plans and assure the agents that the new Braniff was a 
different story than the old Braniff. Such promotion is, however, very difficult for 
any airline due to the very many T A's operating. As a result, such strategy can only 
work in a very concentrated fashion, for example, in a city market, which the airline is 
entering. 
Promotion strategies have varied as much as the carriers involved. In order to give 
some examples one can name Braniff's II, 1986 promotion 'Penalties Stink' in order 
to battle with American Airline's fares that had 50 percent penalty on date changes 
on their 30 day advance purchase fares. The promotion increased Braniff s load 
factor allegedly from 56.3 percent to 66.7 percent during the month following the 
campaign. The fare strategy had its cost, as yields dropped as a result. 317 This move 
by Braniff against the competitor's actions gives an example of a promotional 
strategy that became effective and came towards a segment of the market that wants 
to pay low fares but needs the flexibility of changing ticket dates due to various 
reasons. In fact marketing at new-entrant airlines, demands constant creativity in 
order to cancel the competitors hostile moves without sacrificing profitability. 
Incumbents' advertising soon took the stand of battling the low-fare oriented 
advertising of the new-entrants. That was actually a diversion from the pre-
deregulation emphasis on service. The incumbent carriers were often able to rebuff 
an advertising campaign by a cost efficient low-fare new-entrant, by engaging in low-
fare advertising citing fares that did not actually resemble the real cost to the 
passenger due to imposed black-out periods, low seat offerings and continued 
advertising after the low fare seats were sold-out or when the black-out period was in 
effect. As a result the new-entrant did not receive the attention it could have and the 
sales people of the incumbent carrier had the opportunity to divert passengers to the 
higher fares on offer, knowing that a certain percentage of callers would actually 
accept a higher fare. 
An important part of any promotional strategy is the image of the carrier and 
branding of the products, as will be discussed in the next section. 
317 Air Transport World, Braniff Changes Strategy, October, 1 984, p. 42. 
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7. 7. 7 Branding and Image 
Airlines have had considerable difficulty creating an image that is unique and 
defensible. Airlines have for a long time competed on service features for their 
business class or first class, but on price when it comes to economy class. How do 
the airlines then create their image and brand their products? New-entrants have 
allegedly placed less importance on image creation than crude advertising in order to 
stimulate demand. Advertising focusing on price has been the main policy of new-
entrants in the United States. The low-cost structures geared toward being able to 
offer low fares has not allowed the new-entrants' to spend much on image advertising 
per se. This has led to poor passenger retention as soon as a competitor matches or 
under-cuts the new-entrants fares as large part of any new-entrant's customers are 
bargain hunters. Having said this one can cite an exception, Southwest airlines, that 
has considered its image carefully, just as its former competitor Muse Air did. These 
two airlines carefully created an image of 'fun', as mentioned before. Such image, 
apparently, fits new-entrants quite well as the older established airlines will hardly 
follow suite. The image of 'fun' is geared towards the younger people and the 'baby 
boomers' that are entering the top layers of society and those that are bored with the 
'sameness' that characterises airlines' image in general. 
Muse Air used in its inauguration advertising, airline 'personification' to position 
itself among the competition . 
... Southwest, with its irreverent approach, would be Bo Derek. Braniff 
International, projecting a grand dame, high fashion look would be Sophia 
Loren or Princess Grace. Texas International's zany peanut fares 
advertising made it a Suzanne Sommers or Goldie Hawn. American would 
be Dallas Cowboy football player turned business man Roger Staubach -
confident, stable and almost too serious, while Delta could be the no-frills, 
humorless and literal coach Tom Landry. If this were accurate, then Muse 
Air was to be the Urbane, classy and smooth Peter Graves, Bill Blass, or 
even George C Scott.3lS 
The quotation above shows one aspect of Muse Air's image creation, namely that it 
was going to be humorous, as well as classy, like its aircraft paint scheme portrayed 
with its signature style name. The interior was to begin with a single class layout 
with high profile leather seating and three lounge areas. The interior look was 
designer made and harmonised with flight and ground crew uniforms and airport and 
boarding decor. 319 Leg room was generous, seating was pre-assigned and there was 
an unique no-smoking policy on all flights. Whether the careful image creation was 
effective in differentiating Muse Air from the competitors spelled into greater demand 
is not clear. In the inauguration year load-factors were only 35.8 percent, rising to 
47.0 percent in 1985, with 1983 peak of 50.9 percent. That is perhaps not poor in 
view of the carrier's emphasis of offering service to the high-end of the market. 
318 Airliners, Class Act: TIle Muse AirffranStar Story, No. 21, Spring 1993, p. 26. 
mOp. cit. (Airliners), p.26. 
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Strangely, enough, People Express had a very strong image as the ~peoples friend' 
that was on a crusade to beat the high fares of the big 'unfriendly incumbents', but it 
soon developed into an image of poor quality service. The created image worked 
e?ormo~sly well. for the carrier as long as it was able to offer a substantial price 
dIfferentIal, despIte the negative image it soon earned. As soon as People Express 
started to enter other market segments like the business segment, the initial concept 
of serving the low end of the market, 'People' became a liability and the 'old' image 
caused a conflict in the customers mind as to what the carrier stood for. Advertising 
was suddenly geared towards the business person, whose image of the carrier was 
rather poor in terms of quality and the leisure traveller got the notion that the carrier 
was going up-market, cutting down on the fabulous offers it had been geared to in 
the past. In this way the carrier strived for something it could not get and alienated 
its old customer base in the process. 320 
7.8 Financial Strategy 
7.8.1 Costs 
Louis Gialloreto proposed a model of 'U. S. industry airline carrier types' whose basis 
is very much grounded on cost strategy. Type 1, is high-cost, full-service; Type 2, 
low-cost, low-service; and Type 3, is low cost, low to medium differentiated service 
levels. The first type was the pre-deregulation type, while the second type was the 
opposite and characterising many new-entrants. The third type is low-cost as the 
second type but offering a differentiated product based on Type 1, full-service or 
'premium service', offered by Air Atlanta, Air One and similar. 321 The concept 
explains well that the airline can basically select three cost strategies that very much 
shape the carrier's other strategies, due to the importance of the cost basis in the 
determination of fares, equipment selected, routes served and so on. The fact of the 
matter is, however, as Gialloreto states that no airline selects the Type 1 strategy in 
the deregulated environment and those that started out as Type 1 tried to approach 
the Type 2 concept. Thus, there are only two basic viable cost strategies available to 
new-entrants, to enter at low-cost and low service, in order to keep fares at a 
minimum, or to enter at low-cost but with differentiated product. The latter strategy 
is, of course, higher cost but the relative cost of producing the 'premium' product is 
relatively low compared to the Type 1 incumbents. Some of the new-entrants went 
back and forth between Type 2 and 3 strategies. Midway started Midway-Metrolink 
and became a Type 3 carrier as a result, just like New York Air that increased their 
service in order to match that of Eastern. In addition, People's Express, the Type 2 
carrier, started to approach the Type 3 carrier by stepping up its service in order to 
gather for business travellers. America West started out by providing comparable 
service as the incumbents, thus, being classified as Type 3 from the start. 
The Gialloreto model as such is useful for classification purposes of airlines, but it 
does not make a clear distinction between ordinary low-cost full service carrier and 
the quite different 'premium' service carrier. The operating costs, operating 
120See also: William H. Davidow and Bro Uttal, Harvard Business Review, July-August, 1989, p. 78. 
mOp. cit. (Gialloreto, 1988), p. 50. 
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chara~teristics and marketing is different between the two groups, to such a 
magrutude that they should not be classified under the same group. Furthermore, the 
ordinary full-service carrier has enjoyed considerable success but premium-service 
carriers have all failed, so far. 
As Meyer et aI., have observed, the cost advantage that many new-entrant carriers 
have had over the incumbents is not as important as it may seem at first. The reason 
being that the new-entrant is likely to base its pricing on the fully allocated costs, 
whereas, the incumbent is more likely to base it on the marginal costs. However, 
what Meyer does not clearly state is the importance of the incumbent's capacity in a 
market were a new-entrant appears. If the new-entrant offers a seat at a price of 50 
and the incumbent has an average price of 70, the incumbent may be selling, lets say, 
10 per cent of its capacity based on marginal pricing of30. The problem for the new-
entrant in this situation is that 10 per cent of the capacity sold at this very low price 
may be greater than the total capacity provided by the new-entrant in the market. 
Therefore, the new entrant's pricing strategy falls 'between' at the price of 50 and the 
airline looses the potential price advantage. One apparent way of preventing this is 
for the new-entrant to select secondary routes served by a weak carrier where fares 
are relatively high and capacity low. Therefore, as the new entrant enters the market 
it gains immediate superiority by offering lower prices and relatively high capacity. 
Thus, the incumbent will have problems immediately, as further increase in capacity 
will reduce load factors. Moreover, 'Spiteful' behaviour by the incumbent will not 
pay unless the incumbent has greater staying power and reduction in fares by the 
higher cost incumbent, will harm the new-entrant's profitability. 
In many industries mergers can lower costs if there are cost economies of scale 
present, but cost economies of scale do not apply in air transport to any large degree. 
Nevertheless, mergers and acquisitions became frequent in the deregulated air 
transport market, as will be discussed in next section. 
7.8.2 Mergers 
Airline acquisitions and mergers are very costly for any firm in terms of capital and 
management time. Even though an acquisition deal does not materialise it is a costly 
endeavour. An example of such adversities was Horizon's unsuccessful attempt to 
merge with Cascade that was claimed to have cost Horizon $4 million during the 
process.322 
Costs involved with bringing together often distinctive company cultures can also 
drain the new entity. An example of such occurrence was when People Express 
acquired Frontier, a highly unionised high cost carrier very unlike People Express. 
Furthermore, an acquisition often brings with it problems in merging different 
strategies that are costly to change. If we still take the F~ontier example, it. had. a 
strategy of full service that was not only costly to change tn terms of alteratIons tn 
operations(to no-frills) but also in terms of lost business when passengers used to the 
full service flocked into the arms of the competition. 
m Air Transport World, Horizon refuting management to hold northwest domination, October, 1986, p. 113. 
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Southwest Airlines acquired the full service carrier Muse Air in 1985 and turned it 
into a separate entity called TranStar but still maintaining its characteristics. The 
carrier lost money and became a liability on Southwest that lost $9.2m in the first six 
months of 1987, after 55 quarters of straight profitability.323 As a result of these 
losses Southwest dissolved the carrier in 1987. 
Mergers are usually justified in terms of reaching new markets, neutralising a 
competitor or achieving the 'necessary' critical mass in order to become profitable. 
This aims of the merger are usually fraught with contradictions as the shear increase 
in problems that are created by a merger sometimes leave the acquirer in a worse 
situation after the merger. Herbert Kelleher of Southwest opposes the need for large 
size in order to be competitive: 
It is said you have to be a certain size to survive these days, ..... but we 
haven't been able to determine what that size is. [Southwest] tries to achieve 
mass in individual markets rather than on an overall basis, ... 324 
The importance of the already mentioned mergers was first and foremost strategic for 
the new-entrants involved. The benefit was, however, at large meagre, causing 












Acquisitions by New-entrant Airlines325 
Muse Air '85 
Frontier '85 
Attempt for Air California 
Mississippi Valey '85 
Florida Express ('87) 
Attempt for Braniff('83) 
Air Florida assets ('84) 
Attempt for Eastern Shuttle '89 
Air Ore on '82 
Acquisitions 
Morris Air '94 
PBA '86 
Fisher Brothers '87 
Trans Western '83 
Britt '86 
Eastern assets in Philadelphia '89 
Attem t for Cascade '85 
In order to throw some light on the meaning of the Frontier, Britt and PBA 
acquisition for the downfall of People Express a detailed account will follow. One 
has to have in mind, though, that the acquisition was not the actual cause of People's 
Express problems that led to its failure, it was rather one of the symptoms. 
I. People Express acquired Frontier in 1985 after a relatively short courtship. The c~~rs 
financial procedure for acquiring Frontier was by providing $95 million of the $307 llllllion 
purchase price, while the rest was funded by cash and short-tenn investments of Frontier and 
Frontier Holdings. . 
II. The acquisition of Frontier was done by gaining the banks approv~ t~ fonn a hol~l~g 
company. People Express Airlines the subsidiary then raised $125 mIllIon through Jomt 
extendible tenn securities and used $100 million of it to buy Frontier stock through People 
Express Holdings. 
mThe Avrnark Aviation Economist, Changing fortunes of Dallas star, August 1987, p. 19. 
324Air Transport World, Southwest Airlines: Different but very much the same, May 1987, p. 51. 
325Air Transport World, 1980 - 1994. 
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III. The acquisition of the securities caused considerable uneasiness among People's banks. As 
a result, People Express made a public offering of Secured Equipment Certificates "alued at 
$115 million. 326 The results were used to payoff the banks that refused the redrawal of a 
revolving loan after People Express offered to pay it down given that the carrier could redraw 
in the third quarter of 1986. 
IV. People Express acquired both Britt and PBA. The price for Britt was not disclosed but 
coul~ have been in the vicinity of $25 million according to a SEC filing for $35 million public 
offenng that was supposed to be loaned to People Express to restore funds, with the exception 
of $6.5 million, used for other purposes. PBA was acquired for $10 million.3~7 
The mergers undertaken as the chronological account above shows, limited 
unnecessarily People Express financial flexibility and increased the carrier's perceived 
risk in the eyes of its financiers and customers. Soon afterwards People Express 
disappeared from the scene like so many new-entrants before as well as after. 
7.9 Conclusion 
Air transport has been first and foremost market-share driven, which explains the 
reason for the low profitability and the intense rivalry. If Porter's Competition Model 
is examined, one finds that the threat of new-entrance has been minimised by the 
development of competitive tools by the incumbents, the bargaining power of 
suppliers and buyers is little and the threat of substitutes is small. Although the four 
forces mentioned in the model do not explain the intense rivalry in air transport, other 
factors like; excess capacity, commodity nature of the product and the importance 
placed on market-share, do. 
The learning curve as such is not the main barrier to entry in air transport markets. 
Of greater importance is entry strategies and the identification of a niche that can 
effectively be protected. 
Growth plays a major importance in the competition behaviour of airlines due to the 
tendency to extract growth, hence, market-share from the competitors. This 
characteristic leads to an intense rivalry in markets. 
During deregulation incumbents have learned effectively to compete with low fare, 
low cost new-entrants by price matching or undercutting for limited capacity only, 
optimised by sophisticated yield management systems. The only way for a new-
entrant to compete is then apparently to form an alliance with the incumbent or to 
enter a niche market that is defensible. Both of these options are problemsome for 
the new-entrant as the cooperation with the incumbent is potentially dangerous for 
the new-entrant and to find a defensible niche market is extremely hard. 
The experience shows that new-entrants can operate without commercial CRS 
systems. This has been proven by Southwest, People Express and Morris Air. The 
problem starts when peaks occur in demand and the system can not handle the 
incoming calls. In such cases a CRS system accessible by T A's would preserve the 
airline's good will. 
326Lloyd's Aviation Economist, Pushing B~ck the Final Frontier, May 1986, pp. 23-24. 
~27 Airline Business, Time for Caution, July 1986, p.23. 
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The risks associated with entry are different depending on the background of the 
new-entrant, being highest for a start-up carrier and the lowest for an intrastate based 
new -entrant. 
Growth plays a major role in new-entrants' strategy. Many early new-entrants 
strived to maximise their size in the hope of becoming more competitive. This 
strategy was not proven to be useful. Recent new-entrants have rather tried to 
identify a niche market and are more geared towards surviving, deriving lessons from 
the history of new-entrant airlines in the deregulated market. Growth can come from 
two sources growth in demand from external sources or from strategic moves that 
transfer customers from one carrier to another. The latter source of growth is bound 
to increase rivalry in the market during stagnation or declining demand. 
Customers do influence competition, although, their role is sometimes overlooked or 
ignored by the airlines. A model of Customer Reaction Contours is presented in 
order to explain how airlines ignoring quality will lose market-share as a competitor 
with superior relative quality enters the market at a similar price. 
The Henderson's 'market equilibrium disruption' analogy is used in order to explain a 
market's tendency to enter a condition of 'price war.' It was found that in order to 
create a reasonable stability niche marketing has to be possible. It is concluded that it 
is not straightforward for an airline to create niches, nor to protect such niches if 
found. 
The primary goal of any new-entrant formed after 1986 is plainly to 'survive'. 
Researchers have stated that new-entrants should be concerned with differentiation 
rather than with capacity in the market. The problem with that is, however, the 
limited ability of a new-entrant to differentiate in any meaningful way. 
There are five basic entry strategies mentioned: (i) at lower-cost; (ii) at lower fare; 
(iii) a niche market; (iv) with superior quality; and (v) with superior service. The 
combination of the first four seems to be the common trait of 'successful' new-
entrants. 
The competition intensity apparently increases as more entry segments are added. 
Sequenced entry where the financial basis of the carrier is build before the next entry 
segment is added makes the carrier better prepared to fight the increased competition 
intensity associated with each added segment. 
There are four general route strategies available to airlines. Two are most common 
after deregulation 'hubbing' and 'direct service'. The only remaining 'successful' 
new-entrants' are direct service carriers. 
A strategy of short-haul, non-hub, short-haul, no-frills service, seems to work well if 
the carrier sticks to the basic underlying philosophy. America West and People 
Express changed their successful basic philosophy and failed, while the successful 
Southwest has not done so in any marking way. 
New-entrants have usually selected two pilot, fuel efficient, short-haul aircraft. They 
have also tried to maintain a homogenous fleet in order to minimise maintenance and 
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training costs. In short, fleet strategy has been geared towards cost savings first and 
foremost. 
New-entrants that have become feeding carriers for the majors have in most cases 
lost their identity and eventually been acquired by the incumbent. The change in the 
CRS regulation harmed the ability of feeder carriers to stay independent, thus, 
lessening their survival chances. 
New-entrants have found it difficult to cash-in on their lower cost structure due to 
the incumbents sophisticated yield management systems. The simple fare system is, 
nevertheless, in full swing at the successful carrier Southwest. Thus, it is apparent 
that the simple fare strategy is route dependent (short-haul, secondary markets) 
rather than unworkable as frequently cited by those looking at People's Express 
collapse. 
The new-entrants have selected three basic service strategies: (i) no-frills; (ii) full-
frills; and (iii) premium service. The last type of service has not worked for the new-
entrants in any form. The other two concepts have worked better with Southwest 
being an example of the former and Midwest Express of the latter. 
With regard to market penetration the new-entrants have had to decide whether to 
participate in a CRS and emphasise T A's. The low-cost new-entrants tried to 
circumvent both of these options by setting up telephone booking systems. Such 
systems harmed the carriers' image and were inadequate as the airlines got larger. 
New-entrants targeting the business segment have been at a disadvantage due to the 
majors' FFP's that have secured the loyalty of business passengers. New-entrants' 
programs are usually smaller and less appealing in terms of exotic destinations to 
cash-in rewards. Furthermore, the NE' s route systems are more limited making it 
harder for the frequent flyer to build up mileage unless he travels to few destinations 
laying within the NE' s system. In order to account for this some of the new-entrants 
have entered into marketing agreements with other larger carriers where the two 
FFP's are joined. 
Market-share is important for new-entrants, especially, to gain a dominant share at a 
niche airport near a large catchment area or to gain dominant route share on 
secondary routes. 
The low-cost new-entrants have emphasised prices in their advertising, making image 
building troublesome. Two new-entrants, Southwest and Muse made fun a part of 
their image. This seems to work well for the new-entrants due to the reluctance of 
the majors' to follow suit. The early new-entrants got the image of being the people 
saviours from high prices. This image soon changed into an image of poor quality 
and little dependability as the new-entrants started to exit unprofitable markets. The 
free media coverage many new-entrants enjoyed at first disappeared, making entry 
costs higher and community exposure lower, especially when large markets were 
entered. 
Branding is concluded to be little used by airlines, although, n~~s for b~~i~~ss 
classes have been adopted. The sameness and limited differentiatlOn pOSSibilities 
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make branding in air transport problematic. A change in basic strategy is the cause of 
'brand' conflict, that occurred at People Express when it attempted to gather for 
business passengers. 
Most new-entrants decided to offer lower fares than prevailed in order to exploit 
lower cost structure than the incumbents had. Simplicity in fare-structure and non-
participation in CRS' s lowered costs and directed the passenger away from the travel 
agents that further reduced costs. Most new-entrants redirected their strategy 
towards using the CRS' s and travel agents as their size got larger and the craving for 
further growth overpowered their fundamental operating philosophies. The simple 
fare-structures worked well until American and other incumbent airlines initiated a 
highly efficient yield management systems that abled them to manage their capacity in 
order to under-cut or match the new-entrant's fares for limited capacity without 
lowering yields as much as before on new-entrant' s competition routes. 
Large market-share at large airports, is linked to new-entrant's longevity. This is 
especially important in terms of governing a secondary airport to a large city. 
New-entrants enjoyed free media coverage in the early days that reduced their entry 
costs in new markets. As deregulation progressed they had to spend more to make 
their presence felt. This was not as much of a problem in small cities but was a major 
problem when the new-entrant began operations to large cities dominated by the 
incumbents. New-entrants had very little to offer in primary markets besides fares. 
As a result they have not fared well in such markets at all, due to the incumbent's 
hard felt presence. 
Code sharing has been highly troublesome for the regional based new-entrants due to 
their loss of identity and control over strategy. Most code-sharing new-entrants fail 
or are acquired by the incumbent partner. This is due to the 'big customer' problem, 
because if the incumbent partner severs the relationship the feeder losses the majority 
of its customers overnight and probably fails as a result. 
The effect of the merger strategy is discussed with detailed reference to the People 
Express case. The conclusion is that mergers are highly risky endeavours for new-
entrants and probably never successful unless the acquired airline is much smaller and 
offering similar product. It is concluded that internal sustainable growth, based on a 
long-term plan, is superior to the merger strategy. 
In order to give a perspective of new-entrants in Europe for comparison purposes, 
the following chapter was included. 
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8. Air Transport Liberalisation in 
The European Union 
8.1 Introduction 
In the following chapter the new term European Union (EU) will be used exclusively 
instead of European Community (EC), although many of the directives, agreements 
and events discussed took place before the creation of the EU. 
Although the thesis is primarily concerned with U.S. new-entrants, it will make 
inferences from the application of findings to European carriers. 
The chapter will cover the legal developments that led to liberalisation in Europe and 
its implication for new entry in air transport markets. 
8.2 The Move Towards Liberalisation in Europe 
8.2. J Introduction 
Competition within Europe has been characterised by monopoly, duopoly and 
collusion of carriers in order to minimise the 'harmful' effect of competition both in 
the domestic and international markets. Furthermore due to the very high cost 
structure of European airlines and relaxed attitude to market, development, charter 
carriers more and less govern the low-end of the air transport market while the 
scheduled-carriers emphasise the high yield business passenger. This environment 
has created less convenient and less efficient air transportation system for the public, 
especially, if one looks to the United States for comparison. 
The most striking and perhaps the greatest driving force of the European 
liberalisation is the difference in fares between European and US carners. Fares in 
Europe have been comparatively much higher for scheduled operations than in the 
United States, especially after deregulation. 
U. S. deregulation has shown that low fares increase market size through the 
redirection of travellers from the private car, railways, busses and even acting as a 
stimulant to take a trip that otherwise would not have been taken. The potential of 
deregulation in Europe is therefore, first and foremost a public issue. The wider 
impact of deregulation in Europe will be an increase in trade through increase in 
tourism and business travel and the facilitation of the unification of the European 
Union. Such change may, however, cause a major dislocation in terms of other 
transportation modes like passenger rail. 
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8.2.2 The Treaty oj Rome 
The Treaty of Rome, on which the European Union (EU) is founded, is designed to 
prevent trade distortions within the community and to ensure the freedom to supply 
services within the EU. In fact, the third article of that treaty declares that the EU 
should ensure that competition is not being distorted. This facility had not been 
effected within the Community for air transport although other industries had been 
subject to increased control by the Community since 1962. Until the first 
liberalisation Package,328 air transport services between Member States had been 
regulated by restrictive bilateral agreements that controlled fares and capacity. 
The first proposals of a common air transport policy appeared in 1979 as a 
memorandum that resulted in a debate that led to the adoption of legislation 
regarding co-operation between Member States and the provision for inter-regional 
air services. A further memorandum was presented in 1984 on a common air 
transport policy. In this memorandum it was proposed to split the reform into air 
transport between Member States and between Member States and non-EU 
countries, with emphasis on the former to begin with. The result facilitated the 
flexibility of the existing intra-EU bilateral agreement and increased competition. 
It was, however, the 'Nouvelles Frontieres' case before the European Court of 
Justice in 1986 that pushed the competition articles into the forefront. The case 
involved a Travel Agency's alleged infringement of the French Civil Aviation Code 
by selling airline tickets below the government approved tariff The major test of the 
case was whether, the Government's approval mechanism was in breach of Articles 
85 and 86.329 The Court's findings confirmed the applicability of the Articles to air 
transport and specified their implementation, as Articles 88 and 89 had provided for 
the exclusion of air transport in the implementation of Articles 85 and 86. 
The court's findings were as follows: 
(i) The competition rules - particularly Articles 85 to 90 - do apply to air transport. The 
existence of bilateral and multilateral air transport agreements does not preclude a national 
court from considering possible breaches of those rules. 
(ii) In the absence of a council regulation under Article 87 to determine how the rules are to be 
applied, the appropriate 'authorities' in individual states have powers under Article 88 to rule 
on the admissibility of agreements in relation to the competition rules and the Commission has 
powers under Article 89 to take steps 'to remedy the situation'. 
(iii) Tariff agreements (and, by implication, other actions of airlines potentially infringing 
Articles 85 and 86) are not contrary at this time to the competition rules simply by their 
existence. They may, however, be declared contrary to (or in confonnity with) the rules by 
specific action of individual states or by the commission. 
328Liberalisation was presented by the Commission in so called 'packages', but they were three. 
329"Article 85, which prohibits and makes unenforceable anti competitive agreements~ decisions and concerted 
practices which eliminate, reduce or distort competition unless specific cxe~ptlOns have bee~ granted~ 
Article 86, which prohibits an abuse of a dominant position within the Commuruty or any part of It so as to 
atIect trade between EEC member States. ", Doganis, Rigas. Flying OtT Course, Routledge, 2nd cd. 1991, p. 
84. 
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(iv) If states or the Commission decide that certain airline actions (such as tariff agreements) 
are. contraJ?' to the competition rules, states cannot subsequently approve such actions under 
natIonal, bllateral or multilateral air transport arrangements. 330 
These findings increased the possibility of the Member States breaching the 
Competition Rules and in an attempt to solve that puzzle the Commission made a 
proposal to liberalise the intra-community air transport. 
8.2.3 The Gradual Liberalisation Process 
The liberalisation of the European Union's air transport was in three stages labelled 
'packages'. The first Package agreed by the Council of Ministers in September 1987 
took effect on January 1 1988; the second Package agreed in July 1989 took effect in 
June 1990; and the third Package agreed in June 1992 took effect on January 1, 
1993. 
The first Package allowed price fixing and capacity sharing but according to certain 
procedures. The main aspects of the rules were four: (i) A procedure for applying 
Article 85 and 86 to air transport; (ii) relaxation of fare control; (iii) relaxation of 
route access limitations; and (iv) increased freedom with regard to capacity sharing. 
The second Package was aimed at further enhancement of competition by 
encouragement of fare reductions by opening up markets, increasing freedom to alter 
fares and further provisions for the application of the competition rules. 
In Table -8-1 the liberalisation development is shown by comparing the main features 
of each Package. 
The third Package had provisions regarding licensing of airlines, air fares and 
cabotage. After the enactment of the regulation, carriers have to fulfil EU standards 
that are uniform for all Member States. Regulation governing air fares were relaxed 
to a large extent, leaving only few safeguards relating to a Member State's freedom 
to require fares between Member States to be filed with the authorities at least one 
working day before enactment and domestic fares to be filed not more than one 
month before enactment. Furthermore, a Member State was given the authority to 
remove excessively high fares given certain safeguards for the profitability of the 
carrier and excessively low fares when the fares are deemed to deviate from seasonal 
fluctuations and cause serious losses among all carriers involved. The Commission 
has to be notified on such fare withdrawal fourteen days before proposed enactment. 
The Commission may investigate the withdrawal upon request from a member state 
or any other legitimate party. 
Full domestic cabotage was limited until 1 April 1997, but limited cabotage was 
allowed. A Member State has to allow cabotage if such service is an extension to or 
from the state of registration, also if the carrier does not use more than 50 percent of 
its seasonal seating capacity on the cabotage route. Furthermore, if a carrier 
operating aircraft of less than 80 seats on a route with a capacity of less than 30.000 
:noWeatnoft, Stephen and Lipman, Geoffrey, Air Transport in a Competitive European Market Problems, 
prospects and strategies, The Economist Publications Ltd., 1986, pp. 57-58. 
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seats per year, the concerning Member State can refuse to grant permission for an 
other carrier to operate on the route for up to two years, unless the petitioning carrier 
intends to operate an aircraft with 80 seats or less. Moreover, the Member States can 
regulate the distribution of traffic between airports within an airport system given that 
it does not lead to discrimination among carriers. In the case of environmental or 
congestion problem it is allowed to impose conditions, limit or refuse an airline with 
traffic rights to exercise that right given that competition is not distorted. This 








Summary of the ED Liberalisation Process 
331 
1stPackage 
Traffic rights created between 
regional airports and main airports 
(with exceptions) 
States can designate a second 
carrier on intra-Community routes 
when traffic levels pass certain 
levels 
Fifth freedom rights granted for 
airlines on routes between two 
other Community States (for 30% 
of seats on the route) 
Up to 55% share by one country's 
airline(s) allowed 1988-1989 and 
up to 60% in 1990, i.e. 50:50 
sharing abandoned. 
Governments must agree fares if 
they reflect costs 
332 
2nd Package 
Further relaxation of multiple 
designation thresholds. 
Maximum capacity share by 
airlines of one country, to be 
increased up to 75% over 2 
year period 
Any fare which is set within 
the conditions and scope of 
one of the zones is to be 
automatically approved by 
States 
Zones for discount fares within Additional third zone. 
which the airlines are free to set 
fares given specific conditions 
Conditions applicable to zones 
changed, to enable airlines 
greater freedom to charge fares 
of their choosin 
333 
3d Package 
Unrestricted traffic rights between 
States but limitation of cabotage 
rights on domestic routes to 50% of 
capacity. 
Provision for States to limit access 
to a route to one carrier for a period 
of up to three years, when capacity 
is under 30.000 seats per year 
Full fifth freedom rights for airlines 
between two other Community 
States 
Unlimited capacity on interstate 
routes. Cabotage rights for up to 
50% of seasonal capacity on 
extension service from, or as a 
preliminary of a service to the State 
of registration. 
Any fare which is decided by the 
carrier is to be automatically 
approved by states 
Although, the third package has freed the air transport market within the EU 
substantially, it has not reduced fully the barriers to entry for new or expanding 
smaller independent airlines. The existing barriers are limited access to congested 
airports, state aid to unprofitable flag carriers and alliances of the incumbents. 
331Op. cit., (Doganis), p. 88. For reference to the actual regulation see EC Regulation 3975/87 and new 
procedure to approve fares, Council Directive 87/601/87. 
~32 Briggs, Martin, The English Summer of 1990 - Further Progress Towards Deregulation of the Aviation and 
Travel Industry Air Law, Vol. 16, No.2, 1991, pp. 52-55 . 
. , 
mCouncil Regulation on fares and rates for air services, EEC June 1992. 
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8.2.4 Liberalised Bilaterals 
In 1990 the Commission introduced a proposal to transfer negOtlatIOns of air 
transport agreements with third countries to itself by 1993. The proposal was then 
amended to transfer the enactment date from 1993 until 1998. The proposal was 
seen as a step towards total integration of the EU's air transportation market and 
strengthening of the Commission's negotiating position in order to preserve unity of 
member states with regard to air transport policy. 
In March 1993 the Council rejected the proposal on the basis of Article 84(2) of the 
EU treaty. As a result, the council decided that member states should keep each 
other informed of negotiations with third countries and to form a panel of experts 
from the commission and the member states, who would have the following function: 
(i) Exchange information and to consult each other on relations with third countries; 
(ii) study areas of potential conflict of interests among Member States and possible 
infringement of EU law; and (iii) identify areas of common interest among Member 
States with a view of having Community negotiations authorised by the council on a 
case by case basis. 
Although the decision does not provide the community with direct negotiating 
power, member states will have to seek permission from the Council of Ministers 
when entering negotiations of air transport agreements. The powers of the council 
rest with the fact that it can block the agreement by majority decision based on 
violation of EU's interests. As a result of such blockage the Commission can 
negotiate on behalf of the Union. One of the reasons for such provision was the US-
Netherlands bilateral, that was important for the United States in order to spread 
freedom in the air and open up growth opportunities for U.S. carriers. In fact the 
United States Government has introduced liberated bilaterals by regulation as section 
1102 of the F ederal Aviation Act states that U. S. negotiators of bilateral agreements 
should pursue an increase in the number of non-stop United States gateway cities and 
opportunities for carriers of foreign countries to increase their access to United 
States points. The US negotiators have, through liberalised bilateral agreements 
pursued this aim and reached an agreement with the Netherlands that among other no 
less important factors led the European Union to propose that it should gain an 
uniform ability to negotiate bilaterals on behalf of all Member States. 
The U.S. - Netherlands bilateral has the following main provisions: (i) Freedom to 
operate to any destination within the USA and vice-versa; (ii) flexible fare 
mechanism; (iii) access, capacity and frequency unrestricted; (iv) unrestricted code-
sharing arrangements; (v) access to CRS's on a non-discriminatory basis; (vi) 
freedom to operate own ground-handling systems at overseas ports; and (vii) 
freedom to transfer earnings. 
The problem with the bilateral in this form between one EU country and the United 
States is that the Netherlands are not providing many viable ports, except 
Amsterdam, because of the country's small size. The United States are on the other 
hand, a huge market with many potential ports for KLM Dutch Airlines.. S~ch 
bilateral would of course be a greater concession for other larger countnes hke 
Germany, France and Great Britain. Thus, the Commission has felt strong urge to 
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gain negotiating powers for the EU as a whole, in order to prevent clashes between 
Mem?er States as a result of such an agreement. It is, however, likely that eventually 
~he bIlateral be~een the US and EU Member States will be deregulated. Cabotage 
IS, however, an Issue that must be resolved as many US airlines hold fifth freedom 
rights within the EU, but no such rights prevail within the United States for European 
carriers. Therefore, it is important for the EU to negotiate with the United States as 
one block, either to remove US air carrier fifth freedom rights within the Community 
or gain cabotage rights in the US domestic market. 
The importance of this development of bilateral negotiations and possible EU wide 
negotiating powers, for new-entrants, is that it will allow entrance on international 
routes without most of the traditional restrictions. Moreover, as the European market 
is smaller in terms of geographical area and more developed in terms of public 
ground-transport utilisation than the US, liberalisation of bilaterals has greater 
meaning for new-entrants in Europe than for new-entrants in the strong US domestic 
market. The drawbacks are, however, the size and low cost structure of US carriers 
that would certainly cause major problems for incumbent European carriers if free to 
enter. 
8.2.5 The European Economic Area (EEA) 
The member States of the European Economic Area334 became part of most of the 
provisions in the first and second 'package' on 1 January, 1994. Sweden and 
Norway, who are members of the EE~ had already liberalised by adopting the 
provisions of the first two packages by special agreement with the EU in 1992.335 
When the EEA took effect on January 1, 1994 the EEA agreement superseded the 
special agreement. 
The main provisions included in the EEA agreement are on fares, market access, 
capacity and airfreight. The agreement is important as it extends the radius of the EU 
route network. This may be important for small airlines extending their service or 
new airlines as the fares within the Scandinavian countries have tended to be high due 
to SAS' s exclusive rights on international routes from Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway, although some competition has occurred in the domestic market of these 
countries by airlines like Braathens SAFE, Maersk and Swedair, etc. With 
liberalisation these airlines have been able to extend their services. 
With the adoption of the third package in the EEA countries on July 1, 1994 any 
European carrier can take advantage of viable routes under the provisions of the 
package. 
334The Member States are the European Community Member States, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of 
Finland, the Republic ofIceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom 
of Sweden. The Swiss Confederation rejected the EEA in a referendum and will not become part of the 
agreement. See EC document, SEC (92) 814 fmal. 
335Council Decision of 22 June, 1992 (92/384IEEC), concerning the conclusion of an agreement between the 
European Economic Community, the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of Sweden on civil aviation. 
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All the fo.rmer EFT A countries except Iceland and Switzerland have applied for 
membership to the EU. As a result, they will be fully integrated into the Union. 
Switzerland, that rejected the EEA in a referendum, is pursuing bilateral negotiations, 
while Iceland, that belongs to the EEA but has not applied for EU membership, has 
already taken up most of the provisions in the third package in accordance with the 
EEA agreement. 
8.3 Industry Structure 
8.3.1 Mergers 
Strategies of European airlines have been coloured by the US deregulation 
experience. For example, the assumption that size is important is directly adopted by 
the European carriers leading to frequent acquisitions like those of Air France of 
UT A that gave full control over Air Inter~ British Airway's acquisition of British 
Caledonian and later of Dan Air along with a 49.9 percent stake in TAT; and SAS's 
stake in British Midland. 
Mergers are occurring just like in the United States, thus, creating a more 
concentrated industry. The reason is, looking to the US example, that the regulator 
has very little alternative but to accept a merger proposal if one of the carriers is 
facing bankruptcy. This is due to the fact that if the carrier is allowed to go bankrupt 
the social consequences are much greater than when the carrier is acquired by a 
competitor, allowing a portion or all of the employees to keep their jobs. As a result, 
the Commission will very likely allow mergers in the future in order to minimise the 
social disruption of deregulation as competition becomes more intense. In merger 
cases the Commission has usually approved but forced the carriers to give up a 
number of routes and/or slots at congested airports. When the Commission agreed 
on an alliance between Sabena World Airways (SWA) and Air France, where the 
latter took a 38.6 percent stake, it required the two airlines to give up some 
European and African routes where the two carriers were considered to gain 
dominant position following their merger. Furthermore, a rule was implemented that 
prevents the two carriers to hold more than 75 percent of the slots at Brussels in any 
one hour period, or more than 65 percent in any consecutive two hour period. 
Regulation on 'block exemptions' that took effect on 1 July, 1993, will define what 
co-operation between the EU airlines is allowed in the deregulated market. There 
has been in force a block excemption that allows airlines to operate joint CRS 
systems given that the system is open to all interested airline parties. However, the 
basic purpose of the block excemption is to allow co-operation where there is scope 
to lower costs and improve service but limit such co-operation where consumer 
benefit is better safeguarded by effective competition. 336 
The Commission approved the merger of Dan Air and British Airways on the 
grounds that the combined market share of the two airlines on the route between 
London Gatwick and Brussels was below the set threshold for merger regulation, that 
336Miert, Van, European Commission Press Release: IP/93/521 , .hme 25, 1993. 
170 
the two airports were open to new-entrants and that no dominant position would be 
created as a result. 
The Commission has extensive powers to take action against companies suspected of 
abusing dominant market position. This instrument is of major importance and has 
been used in the Commission's ruling in the BAlBCal merger. The Commission, 
empowered by Articles 85 and 86, exercised its powers in the merger, when it forced 
BA to give up number of routes and runway slots at London's Gatwick airport. 337 
This move opened up slots, for example, for Virgin Atlantic Airways and Air Europe, 
allowing the latter to launch up to 15 scheduled routes from Gatwick. The 
commission had to ensure that if that merger was to take place it would not limit the 
ability of other carriers to access the routes shared by the two merged carriers. The 
merger became in fact the Commission's test as to its authority to regulate the air 
transport industry, following the conclusion of the 'Nouvelle Frontiers' case. The 
merger was authorised by the Commission on the grounds of conditions, some of 
which were for BA to give up 8 intra-community British Caledonian routes to other 
air carriers (Paris, Brussels, Nice, Athens, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Rome and 
Stuttgart), limitations on the use of slots at Gatwick airport and restriction on the 
extension of services at Heathrow airport. 338 BA was free to reapply for the routes 
surrendered but further concessions limited this right and BA agreed not to reapply 
for Hamburg, Stuttgart and Rome for service commencing earlier than in April 1991. 
Amsterdam and Frankfurt were excluded from further concessions. BA accepted, 
however, that Milan should be given priority in terms of new service. In addition to 
this BA agreed to place a four year 25 percent ceiling on the slots available to the 
merged airline at Gatwick airport and not to transfer services from Gatwick to 
Heathrow 'in a way that would be detrimental to the interests of consumers or 
competition' .339 
The Air France, UTA and Air Inter merger was also agreed on by the Commission on 
the grounds of concessions in order to provide for some competition following the 
merger. In order to do this companies that were not part of the Air France group 
could operate new services both on domestic and international routes within and 
outside the Community. Air France was then to sell its 35 percent shareholding in 
the fourth largest French carrier TAT in order to facilitate its development into an 
independent carrier. However, TAT has now been acquired by BA and cannot be 
considered to be an independent carrier as BA has 49.9% interest and an option to 
acquire the remaining part prior to April 1998. Therefore, it can be alleged that the 
largest European air carriers are dividing the smaller competitors between them 
without any serious blockage on behalf of the EU. The view of Ben Van Houtte 
could if adopted, be a more serious blockage of complete dominance of few 
European carriers: 
:mOp. cit. (Doganis), p. 85. 
3380wen Richard and Dynes, Michael, The Times Guide to 1992: Britain in a Europe Without Frontiers, Times 
Books, 2nd ed 1990, p. 132. 
339 Commission of the European Communities, Press release 9 March, 1988. European Commission Announces 
Major New Undertakings By British Airways on Its Merger With British Caledonian Aimed At Safeguarding 
Airline Competition, p. 3. 
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The function of competition review in airline mergers cases appears to be 
twofold. First, it must ensure that the restructuring process does not go so 
far as to jeopardise the competitive structure of the Community airline 
industry and lead to unacceptably high levels of concentration. Second, 
care must be taken to avoid dominance of important individual markets -
routes, airports or catchment areas of airports - by single powerful 
airline.340 
8.3.2 Alliances 
Intra-European air carrier alliances are formed for three reasons primarily~ first to 
protect present market-share and prevent uncontrolled market entry of competitors~ 
second, to gain access to foreign domestic markets~ and thirdly to secure feed to 
'hubs' . 
















Corse Mediterranee, Air Littoral, Brit Air 
Sabena(38%), Belgium 
Austrian(1.5%), Austria 
Euro Berlin( 51 %) 
ATI, Avianova (50%) 
Deutsche BA(49%) 
Brymon Aviation (100%), UK 
TAT European (49%) 
CityFlyer Express, UK 
Aer Lingus Commuter (l 00%) 
Austrian Air Services (100%) 
Rheintalflug 
Karair, Finnaviation (98) 
Binter Canarias (100%) 
Binter Mediterranee (100%) 
East Air(21 %), North Air(35%) 
KLM City Hopper(100%) 
Transavia (85%) 
Air UK (l5%), UK 
Lufthansa CityLine (100%) 
Contact Air, UK 
Cimber Air, Denmark 
Business Air (38%), UK 
Eurowings, Gennany 
Luxair( 15%), Luxembourgh 
Lauda Air (49%), Austria 
Euro Berlin (49%), Gennany 
Maersk Air UK 
Sabena Cimber Air, Denmark, SAS, Scandinavia, Delta Air 
Transport, Belgium, OAT Air Wallonie 
SAS Swedair, Sweden, Linjeflyg, Sweden, Airlines of 
Britain Group (40%), UK 
Swissair Crossair (520 0). Switzerland 
Business Air 38%, UK 
Source: The ,\vmark Aviation Economist, October 1993, p. 13. 
Remarks 
Planning regional group under Europa Air title 
Acquired Maersk Air's stake in 1993, when Birmingham 
European wa<; demerged. 
Expected to increase equity to [100% in 1998.] 
First BA Express brand airline. 
Plans low-cost subsidiary Aer Lingus Express. 
Qualiflyer member. Will partner Lufthansa or Alcazar. 
Regionals plan to merge in 1994. 
Operate independently but wholly by Iberia. 
Plans to segregate domestic operations into separate 
company. 
Air UK has significantly increased role into SchiphoL 
Expanding routes. 
First UK codeshare partner. 
Former Brymon partner to BA Regional based in 
Birmingham. 
Partner on Dan-air. Sabena is 39"10 owned by Air France 
Crossair taking over more Swissarr routes 
~40Houtte, Ben Van, Community Competition Law in the Air Transport Sector (I): A Survey of the First Five 
Years, Air & Space Law, Vol. 18, No.2, 1993, p. 69. 
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In view of the i~uenc~ of the US example it is clear that such anti-competitive 
schemes as mentIoned 10 the first reason can only last in the short-term as full 
deregulation and privatisation of airlines will tum the market forces loose. The 
second reason will, however, be extremely important in order to gain market access 
sooner than now possible under the present competition regulation. The latter 
method has been successfully applied by BA with the aquisition of TAT that allows 
?ackdoor access to the French domestic market. The third reason is extremely 
lmportant as European carriers start to operate in other EU countries than their own. 
One other reason for the popularity of alliances between carriers rather than outright 
mergers, like occurred in the United States, is the political benefit of being a 
nationally identified carrier, that makes mergers of flag carriers inconceivable until 
capital injections and state ownership will be eliminated. 
8.3.3 Charters 
Charters have a strong foothold in the European leisure market, an effective blockage 
to the schedules entering effectively on a number of intra-European holiday 
destinations. In 1984 charters had 48.6 percent of the total intra-European 
international and domestic passenger RPK's, while the Association of European 
Airlines (ABA) scheduled carriers had 31.6 percent, other scheduled carriers had 3.2 
percent and ABA carriers had 18.6 percent charter traffic. That means a stunning 
65.2 percent of total intra-European RPK's produced, were on charters.341 
Charters as new-entrants have nor fared well, although, Air Europe enjoyed fast 
growth and had become a substantial force in European air transport with its mixed 
charter/scheduled operations. The same goes for Dan-Air, although, in a less 
spectacular fashion. Other large charter carriers have entered scheduled operations 
but on a very small scale. Britannia still operates one scheduled route only after 
having axed its intentions to enter scheduled operations on a larger scale. 
Due to the high cost structure that characterises most European scheduled carriers 
there has been increased pressure to mount effective cost cutting strategies. 
Furthermore, the important international sector will become increasingly liberalised, 
because of the U. S. liberal bilateral policy. In view of this it is clear that the charter 
market will be under increasing threat as scheduled fares approach those of the 
charters. Furthermore, travel habits are changing in the direction of increased 
independence in travel behaviour, thus, reducing the traveller's dependence on ready 
made package tours. Therefore charter airlines will either have to scale down their 
operations in the future or what is more likely, maintain their market share by 
entering scheduled operations. In view of this it is conceivable that the European 
charters will eventually become the most effective new-entrants and competition 
within the European air transport market will shift towards much tougher price 
competition. 
341 The Avmark Aviation Economist, 'Charter versus scheduled in a liberalised Europe', October, 1986,p. 20. In 
1991 charters had 50 percent of the total intra-European international and domestic passenger haulage, 
while the Association of European Airlines (AEA) scheduled carriers had 37 percent and other scheduled 
cmriers 13 percent. 
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8.3.4 Degree oj Monopoly 
Of the 50 most frequent international intra-EU routes in July 1993, 40 percent had 
three or more carriers, while 58 percent had two carriers and one route was a 
monopoly route. This is reversed when it comes to domestic routes as 18 percent 
had three or more carriers, while 36 percent had two carriers but 46 percent were 
monopoly routes. 342 
The most striking feature in the table is the large increase of international scheduled 
routes entered by the charter carrier LTU, who has entered 61 routes, with low 
frequency of only 9 round trips per month on the average. This indicates that the 
carrier is acquiring as many routes as possible in a short period of time. This is a 
similar strategy as was adopted by Braniff in the United States with dear 
consequences. Another German carrier Condor has adopted a similar strategy on a 
smaller scale though, entering 11 routes with average frequency of 11 round trips per 
month. 
Of the flag carriers Lufthansa has the largest number of monopoly routes due to lack 
of competition out of Germany, but two of the early challengers, German Wings and 
Aero Lloyd, soon went out of business. This will of course change if Condor and 
L TU can mount effective competition. 
Table 8-3 EC Airlines on International Intra-Community Routes - July 1993 
Airline Country Routes Monopoly % Monopoly RoundTrips Average RTs 
Routes Routes per Month per Month per 
Route 
Flags 
Lufthansa Germany 127 49 39 5215 41 
KLM Netherlands 45 24 53 3724 83 
British AUways UK 73 22 30 5557 76 
TAP Portugal 41 19 46 891 22 
Luxair Luxembourg 23 19 83 866 38 
Air France France 64 16 25 4101 64 
Sabena Belgium 40 16 40 2229 56 
AerLingus Irish Rep. 28 16 57 2161 77 
Iberia Spain 45 11 24 2158 48 
Olympic Greece 27 10 37 555 21 
SAS Scandinavia 28 6 21 1277 46 
Alitalia Italy 48 2 4 2498 52 
Independents 
LTU Gennany 61 43 70 573 9 
Air UK UK 17 9 53 1151 68 
Air Littoral France 8 8 100 198 25 
Meridiana Italy 12 8 67 294 25 
TAT France 7 6 86 43 6 
Viva Air Spain 15 4 27 387 26 
British Midland UK 10 2 20 1388 139 
Condor Gennany 11 2 18 56 5 
Ryanair Irish Rep. 5 1 20 553 III 
ContiFlug Gennany 1 1 100 14 14 
Business Air UK 1 1 100 22 22 
Virgin Atlantic UK 1 0 0 31 31 
.. , Source: C. \1\.. Airlme Competrtton m The Smgle European Market. November 1993, p. 120. 
In the European Union States there are 763 domestic city ~airs. The l~rgest 
countries take of course the highest proportion of these routes With the exceptIOn of 
~42Op. cit.(CAA-CAP 623). pp. 122 and 127. 
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UK that has the second largest number of domestic routes. Of the total number of 
intra-ED domestic routes 91 percent are monopolies, 7 percent duopolies and 2 
percent are operated by two or more carriers. 343 Due to alliances and equity stakes 
of carriers effective domestic competition is even less than the numbers indicate in 
Table 8-4. 
It is striking how a large percentage of European airlines' routes are monopoly 
routes, both in the case of independents and flags. This indicates how well regulation 
has prevented competition and divided routes among carriers in each country. 
Furthermore, after liberalisation the change in the direction of competition has been 
slow to materialize. First and foremost, due to the close ties of independents with the 
flags and the reluctance of aviation authorities in many important ED countries to 
take up a pro-competition stand. 
Table 8-4 Selected Ee Airlines on Domestic Routes - July 1993 
Airline Country Routes Monopoly % Monopoly RoundTrips AverageRTs 
Routes Routes per Month per Month per 
Route 
Flags 
Olympic Greece 52 52 100 3379 65 
Iberia Spain 32 29 91 3816 119 
Lufthansa Gennany 53 28 53 7490 141 
Alitalia Italy 19 14 74 2270 119 
British Airways UK 30 12 40 3643 121 
TAP Portugal 11 8 73 861 78 
AerLingus Irish Rep. 6 6 100 395 66 
KLM Netherlands 5 4 80 343 69 
SAS Scandinavia 4 3 75 539 135 
Luxair Luxembourg 1 1 100 62 62 
Air France France 3 0 0 251 84 
Sabena Be!gium 0 0 0 0 0 
Independents 
95 1543 37 TAT France 42 40 
Meridiana Italy 26 22 85 1366 53 
Air Littoral France 21 21 100 794 38 
Air UK UK 25 13 52 1458 58 
British Midland UK 16 9 56 1516 95 
Business Air UK 6 4 67 305 51 
LTV Gennany 0 0 0 0 0 
Viva Air Spain 0 0 0 0 0 
Condor Germany 0 0 0 0 0 
Ryanair Irish Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 
ContiFlug Germany 0 0 0 0 0 
Virgin Atlantic UK 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: CAA, 'Airline Competition in The Single European Market', November 1993, p. 128. 
8.3.5 Fifth Freedom and Cabotage Rights 
The third package allowed cabotage rights to be refused on the basis of other 
convenient transportation modes being readily available. 
The Italian authorities have utilised the clause to block Lufthansa's petition to serve 
on the Naples - Palermo route. Lufthansa gained, however, rights to ser:e Frankfurt 
_ Genoa - Naples and Frankfurt - Rome - Bari but exited due to low Yields on the 
J.t"\Op. cit. (CM CAP 623), pp. 125-126. 
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cabotage part of the routes. Furthermore, Air France ran into difficulties when it 
attempted to gain route rights between Turin and Bari on a flights originating in 
Paris. 
The refusal was based on a clause in the third package that grants local authorities 
the right to refuse route rights where an airline has been granted exclusive rights to a 
domestic route before January 1, 1993, given that there are no other forms of 
transport readily available. In spite of this, 12 carriers had taken advantage of the 
third package provisions in different forms, by February 1994. 
Table 8-5 European Airlines' Utilisation of the Provisions in the Third Package 

















































TAP Air Portugal (Lisbon)-Copenhagen-
VLM 
Stockholm (Antwerp )-London-Liverpool 
Total 14 4 4 7 
Source: Airline Business, (June) 1994. 
8.4 Financial Structure 
8.4.1 Profitability of European Airlines 
European flag carriers were profitable until the recession of 1990 and the Gulf war 
took its toll and demand dropped. Many carriers would not recouperate until their 
governments injected capital into the operations. This is the case for Air France, 
Iberia, TAP, Olympic and Aer Lingus. Other airlines have been able to recover on 
their own. 
Dan-Air and Air Europe's problems were, according to industry analysts, not linked 
to lack of profitability but rather sudden drop in cash-flow. Due to the two airlines' 
high debt structure the airlines could not service their debt under the circumstances 
that occurred in 1989 and 1990. Air Europe specifically had with its management 
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buyout attempted to go ahead with its expansion schemes without the interference of 
the 'City.'. ,In fa~, Air Europe's relationship with the City had deteriorated following 
the carner s WIthdrawal from the stock-market. That on its own limited the 
company's financial options if one compares the options Dan-Air had in its crisiS. 344 
An important facet of the state owned carrier's profitability is the importance of 
profitability as a prerequisite for privatisation. Privatisation as such is important to 
level the competition environment in Europe. Lufthansa's preparation for 
privatisation was based on the carrier's negotiation of running its pension plan on its 
own. That and the carrier's profitability in 1994 will allow the government to divest 
its 51 percent stake. 345 The same situation is with Lufthansa, Iberia and Olympic. 
These carriers will not be privati sed until the carriers have been profitable for some 
period of time. If that will be achieved remains to be seen, but a tougher stand on the 
injection of state capital may render these carriers bankrupt before the profitability 
target will be achieved. Then the question arises if a state owned carrier will be 
allowed to go bankrupt? 
8.4.2 Subsidies 
The Commission, after taking a stand against subsidies, allowed state subsidies due to 
the recession and the Gulf war. These concessions were initiated due to a rising 
pressure to postpone the whole third package due to the recession. The Commission 
decided not to delay in any way the liberalisation process put forth in the third 
package but took the stand that it would look favourable on state aid which was 
intended to compensate for extra costs incurred as a result of the Gulf war. 
Furthermore it would allow Member States to defer the collection of ATC charges 
for up to two years. After concessions by the Commission the French government 
agreed on a $396 million capital injection for Air France, Alitalia received $300 
million and the Belgian government injected $1,030 million as a restructuring 
package for SABENA. In July 1992 Air France received a further capital injection 
from Banque National de Paris for 8.8 percent stake in the airline. 346 The 
Commission decided also to approve a $1,200 million state aid from the Spanish 
government to Iberia, under the provision of Article 92 of the Treaty as an aid to 
long-term restructuring of the Spanish carrier. A further source of state aid to Iberia 
has been under the regional development clause of Article 92(3) to maintain air 
transport services on unprofitable routes that are necessary to maintain regional or 
island links. As a result of the precedence the government of Portugal injected aid to 
TAP Air Portugal to cover losses on services to Madeira and the Azores. 
In 1994 the European Commission (BC) allowed a further Fr20 billion or $3,6 billion 
assistance to Air France. The capital will be used by the carrier to restructure and 
will be paid to the carrier in three parts first Fr1.5 billion that will be used 
immediately to pay down French Government Loan that did not conform to EC rules, 
344 Airline Business, 'Too Close To The Slll1', May 1991, pp. 24-26. 
345Aviation Week & Space Teclmology, May 9,1994. p. 33. 
346The bank is 70 percent state-o\\11ed. 
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the rest .will be paid in 1995 and 1996 upon satisfactory adherence to the 
r~s~ructunng pl~n. At the same time Olympic Airways gained approval for Dr545 
bllhon or $2,3 billion with the condition that the carrier will not act as a price leader 
on the Athens - Stockholm and London routes. In addition the carrier will not gain 
an extension for the island services after the monopoly extension runs out in 1998.347 
Strong opposition to these capital injections have been expressed by the Member 
States whose airlines are private or not funded as a matter of policy, these include the 
UK and Denmark along with the European independent airlines and the United States 
of America. The blocking of further state aid is extremely important for the smaller 
carriers and potential new-entrants as scaling down of the unprofitable state-owned 
flag carriers would give those an opportunity to gain access to congested airports. 
8.4.3 Fare Structure 
Although high intra-European fares were one of the motivations for liberalisation, 
substantial fare reductions have been slow to materialise. 
The three routes experiencing the greatest fare reduction were liberalised through 
bilateral negotiations before EU-wide liberalisation. These are London - Amsterdam, 
London - Paris and London - Dublin. 
Barrett concluded that fares on the liberalised Dublin - London route did not increase 
from 1986 to 1989 although the consumer price index rose by 10 percent in Ireland 
and 18 percent in the United Kingdom. This development contrasted highly with the 
pre-deregulation increase of 72.6 percent from 1980 to 1985. In an article Barrett 
followed the developments on the route, which explain well the competitive 
relationship between a flag carrier and an independent. The flag carrier Aer Lingus is 
now in serious financial trouble and is being restructured( 1994) with the assistance of 
the government. R yanair has been in financial difficulties as well although it still 
offers competitive fares. The competition between the two carriers led to a division 
of routes between the carriers, imposed by the Irish Government, in order to improve 
their financial health prior to the full enactment of the Commission's liberalisation 
1· 348 po ICy. 
There were two new-entrants on the liberated London - Dublin route; Ryanair that 
entered in May 1986 and Virgin Atlantic that entered in June 1988. Virgin 
subcontracted the operation of the route but cancelled the whole affair in 1989 along 
with an identical operation to Maastricht on the grounds that the returns were 
minimal especially in view of management time invested. 349 British Airways and Aer 
Lingus operated under a revenue pool agreement until April 1988. The two new-
entrants were not subject to such agreements or limitations after 1986, but Ryanair 
was restricted to 44 seat aircraft until then. The fare savings according to Barrett are 
31 percent compared to pre-deregulation fares. The growth was 107 percent from 
347Flight International, 3 - 9 August, 1994, p. 4. 
348Sean D. Barrett, Deregulating European aviation - A case study, Transportation, Vol: 16, 1990, pp. 311 -
327. 
:W)More Than a Toe in the Water Now, Air Transport World, June 1990, p. 19 
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deregulation until 1989 compared to 2.8 percent from 1980 to 1985. The fares were 
lowered between 48 to 66 percent for peak and off-peak unrestricted fares by the 
new-entrants but the incumbent fares were subject to restrictions. The new-entrants 
created, therefore, a substantial market stimulation in an otherwise stagnant market. 
When Ryanair introduced services from Dublin to Manchester offering unrestricted 
low fares the frequency jumped from 14 per week in 1987 to 50 per week in 1988, an 
estimated 240 percent increase in the incumbent's frequency. New entrants are of 
course vulnerable to such competitive reactions by the incumbents as their size allows 
cross-subsidising of fares. 350 
The London - Amsterdam route is another example of a highly competitive market 
open to new entrants. The route's only limitation is the lack of prime slots out of 
London. The result has been less low fare offerings out of Heathrow than Gatwick, 
Stansted, Luton and London City Airport. This is not surprising in view of the fact 
that new services and new airlines on the route are mostly limited to those secondary 
London airports. British Caledonian and Transavia operated on the Amsterdam route 
from Gatwick and British Midland(BM) from Heathrow. Most of the route's growth 
has been stimulated by the new-entrants due to the low fares stimulating the leisure 
market: 
When British Midland entered the route on June 30 in 1986 it offered a £39 one way late saver 
and £69 Super Pex return undercutting substantially the standard one-way £69 and £119 day 
return charged by British Airways and KLM. Few days later British Airways relaxed its 
economy fare restrictions, thus, converting the £73 one-way fare into a full economy without 
booking restrictions. In March 1987 BM introduced a low three day return fare, claiming to be 
offering 30 percent lower fares than the competition on the route. In 1989 the frequency was 
stepped up to eight weekday and four weekend return flights. This move led the carrier to 
become the highest frequency carrier on the route, with KLM's seven and BA's six daily return 
flights. 351 
Restricted fare promotions are increasing slowly with one notable example being 
Sabena's introduction of the 'Skypass' for the UK - Belgium market in 1993. This 
concept allowed five trips or alternatively unlimited travel over three month period at 
substantial savings. British Midland (BM) matched this offer partially by offering a 
comparable offer to Sabena. BM, however, introduced network-wide a new product 
called 'Diamond EuroClass' for business passengers at a comparable fare to the 
competition's economy fare. The incumbents responded on routes served by BM but 
did not match the offer network wise. Such a reaction is of course sensible by the 
larger airlines as there is no sense in diluting yields on low competition routes under 
352 h' b' d . their present cost structures. However, suc actIOn may e Vlewe as antl-
competitive. 
350 Op. Cit. (Barret 1990). 
151 Source: Reuters T extline. 
mOp. cit. (Reuters Textline) 
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8.4.4 Cost Structure 
The cost structure of European airlines has historically been higher than that of US 
carriers like mentioned in previous chapters. R. 1. Windle reported US advantage in 
'total productivity' over European carriers. Total productivity is computed as the 
ratio of total output to total input using a translog multilateral index procedure. 353 
Using the resulting TFP's Windle arrived at the conclusion that in 1983 U.S. carriers 
had 19 percent advantage in total productivity over Europe. In terms of unit cost the 
advantage was 6.9 percent. He reported further that if the characteristics of the 
sample firms are examined, European airlines had advantage in labour costs and 
materials price, but disadvantage in terms of fuel price, capital price and output. 
Windle notes that in 1983 the labour cost advantage for European carriers was 
offsetting the productivity disadvantage in terms of total costs. As exchange rates 
became disadvantageous and the dollar fell in comparison with the British pound this 
cost advantage was reduced in real terms. Therefore, in the long term it is only 
productivity that can provide true cost advantage. In fact the largest U.S. carrier's 
advantage over European carriers, according to R. 1. Windle, is traffic density, or 
23.9 percent in 1983. The second highest difference is 10.5 percent higher unit cost 
due to government ownership. That leads to higher inputs at European carriers to 
produce similar output as that of U. S. carriers. 
Table 8-6 Characteristics of Two Regions in Windle's Sample 
Variable 
Output 
Stage length (miles) 
Load factor (%) 
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The study by R.1. Windle is useful to show the difference between U.S. carriers and 
carriers from other world regions at one point in time, 1983. It does not, however, 
show the trends in the variables over a period of time when many changes occurred in 
Europe. Nevertheless, it is likely that the findings have held for most of the variables 
until the liberalisation process started. 
8.5 Competition Tools and Strategies 
8.5. J Frequent Flyer Programs (FFP) 
Frequent flyer programs were slower to gain following in Europe than in the United 
States. Initially these programs were Club-programs, that provided frequent flyers 
:mThis method was proposed by Caves, Christensen and Dievert: Multilateral Comparisons of Output, Inp~t, 
and Productivity Using Superlative Index Numbers, Economic Journal, Iss. 92, pp. 73 - 86., as .reported ill 
Robert J Windle: The World's Airlines: A Cost and Productivity Comparison, Journal ot Transport 
Economics and Policy, January 1991, pp. 31 - 49. 
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~ith privileges like lounges, hotel room upgrades, car rental upgrades and all sorts of 
dlsco~nt programs. These type of programs lacked seriously in competition with the 
Amencan FFP that gained increased acceptance in the European business world. The 
European airlines feared the costs involved and waited until the move could not be 
postponed unless loss of valuable passengers was to occur. 
New-entrants in Europe just like in the United States are at a disadvantage when it 
comes to FFP as they will not be able to offer as attractive benefits to their 
passengers as the larger carriers can. The small UK new-entrant Virgin Atlantic 
Airways has tried to solve this problem, as so many other small carriers, by offering 
rewards other than air travel. Such rewards come at a higher cost for the airline as it 
will be in the form of outright cash, while air travel awards will fill in empty capacity 
at marginal cost. The benefit for the airline is there as long as the cost of the reward 
is lower than the revenue gain of maintaining the passenger's loyalty. 
An other way to circumvent the limited scope of the new-entrant' s FFP is to engage 
in a major's FFP. This has been relatively easy for European carriers by joining a 
U.S. carrier's FFP. The benefit for the U.S. carrier in this sort of co-operation is to 
gain feed from each other. Co-operation of European FFP is also increasing as 
British Midland and Virgin have joined forces. The relationship is quite important as 
British Midland is a short-haul carrier on intra-European routes but Virgin a long-
haul carrier on international routes. British Midland is also part of SAS' s FFP as the 
latter carrier holds 40 percent stake in the British carrier. 
Frequent flyer programs have, like in the US, gained huge importance in travel 
behaviour of the business community and will do so in the foreseeable future. The 
question then arises if the FFP will distort the competitive equilibrium seriously in 
Europe between the smaller and larger carriers. This is not necessarily so as the 
FFP's co-operation is increasing and awarding rewards that are not necessarily in the 
form of air travel. Thus, an airline that does not fly to exotic holiday resorts may not 
be at such a great disadvantage if some exotic alternative rewards are offered. 
Furthermore, a small carrier participating in a large carrier's FFP may reduce the 
disadvantage of its limited route system. In addition to this, there have been 
discussions relating to the regulation of FFP along the lines of the CRS. Meaning 
that if an airline offers a FFP any other airline should be able to participate in that 
FFP. Thus making the FFP more like a commodity. The only country that has 
passed regulation in this fashion, is Sweden that required SAS to open their FFP to 
smaller carriers. The general consensus is, however, that such regulation would not 
be in the airline's best interest as it would render the programs useless to the airlines. 
8.5.2 Computer Reservation Systems 
The European CRS development was an important advancement in the EU's 
unification in terms of air transport and enhancement of competition. Perhaps not 
foreseen entirely at the outset, but later, as regulation changed the playing field. The 
reason for this was that each European flag carrier ran its own small internal CRS 
that was usually dominant in the domestic market but had no international coverage. 
As a result, the airlines allowed mutual access to each other's systems where system 
compatibility became an issue. This conduct was adequate for the large carriers but 
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less so for small players as they did not possess large computer systems nor the 
financial strength to acquire such systems. If the carrier was not able to gain access 
t~ ~ne of the larger. a~line's systems their distribution network would be highly 
hrmted and presence hrmted to local markets. In this regard large commercial CRS' s 
were in fact an important development for European's smaller carriers. 
The two European systems Galileo and Amadeus are recent developments that have 
been fraught with development problems and political tensions. One only needs to 
look at the organisational structure of Amadeus to realise that the system was not 
build with economy in mind as it is fragmented into three centres in three different 
countries. The host airlines based their participation in the systems on the notion that 
it would provide them with host advantage and incremental revenue as had been 
realised by their US counterparts. During the development period important change 
in competition regulation and attitude towards CRS' s advantage made these 
advantages less than anticipated. An advantage still intact is the ability of the host 
airlines to develop sophisticated information systems deriving data from the CRS' s in 
order to enhance the airline's competitive advantage. Smaller airlines do not have the 
financial scale to develop such systems and will therefore have to rely on other ways 
to keep track of trends in the competitive environment. 
An early issue was whether the CRS' s host airlines could access sensitive marketing 
data that was bound to accumulate in the CRS' s. As a result, the question of 
'hosting' or 'de-hosting' of the CRS arose. De-hosting means that the CRS would 
be run like an independent company and no one airline would, hence, be able to 
access an other airline's marketing data. The route taken within the EU was 
approved in October 1993 by a change to the 1989 CRS regulation, that did not 
require the CRS' s to be de-hosted but required the CRS' s to have legal identity 
separate from their host airline. Furthermore, there had to be functional separation 
that excludes any airline from accessing sensitive data. In order to enforce this 
separations regular CRS audits would be conducted. The early EU CRS Regulation 
of 1989 followed the US Regulation closely in many important respects (see Section 
3.4.1) in terms of removing bias from the systems. 
The passing of the legal identity requirement was an attempt by AEA airlines to limit 
SABRE's entrance into Europe as it had been extending its services into that market 
since the 1990's. Another feature in the regulation requires an airline that owns part 
of a CRS to participate in a competing system. This levelled the ground for 
competition as a flag carrier could thereafter not refuse participation in a competing 
CRS as that effectively secludes the competing CRS from that market, as T A's will 
not subscribe to a system that does not contain flights on which a majority of 
bookings are made. In addition to these changes the 1993 regulation allowed the 
coverage of charters within the CRS' s. AEA carriers had lobbied for ongoing 
seclusion of this part of the industry. However, the Third Package removed the 
regulatory distinction between charters and schedules, therefore, leaving no reason to 
exclude charters from CRS' s. 354 
~~.IThe Avrnark Aviation Economist, Do airlines still need to 0\\11 CRSs, April 1994, p. 17-18. 
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Given the increased neutrality of the CRS' s the systems have become less a barrier to 
entry than before. In fact the systems do provide new-entrants with instant access to 
a large pool of T A's. The question still remains if reality actually conforms to the 
ideas underlying the regulation. The CRS' s could still discriminate on the basis of 
price, functionality and access to information retrieval. Regulation 83 from 1991, is a 
block exemption from Article 85( 1) that prohibits co-operation agreements. 
Therefore, a co-operation to run a CRS system is granted given certain conditions. 
On of which is that the smaller airline's are sheltered against discrimination on behalf 
of the CRS' s host airlines. Furthermore, the conditions state that: (i) all carriers 
should be allowed to participate in the CRS; (ii) the CRS vendor can not attach to the 
participation unreasonable or supplementary conditions which have no direct 
relationship with the participation in a CRS; (iii) participating carrier may switch from 
one system to another given a six month notice, without penalty; (iv) the fees charged 
must be related to the cost of the service provided; ( v) the vendor must provide 
proprietary information on practices, fees, facilities, editing and display criteria used; 
(vi) the system vendor must provide a principal display which must include data 
provided by the participating carriers on schedules, fares and seats available for 
individual purchase; (vii) a vendor must ensure that subscribers do not manipulate 
information provided by the CRS that would lead to inaccurate, misleading or 
discriminatory presentation of information to consumers; (viii) a vendor may not 
impose any obligations on subscribers to accept technical equipment but may require 
the use of equipment compatible with the system; and (ix) a vendor may not conduct 
his business in such a way that competition between systems is in any way restricted. 
The conditions do, as can be seen from the itemised list above, provide for a level 
playing field for new-entrants in terms of CRS' s. The question that is left in relation 
to new-entrants and CRS' s is then to what extent new-entrants were disadvantaged 
before the passing of these regulation and whether there are still any biases left 
associated with CRS's. To answer this the new-entrants were basically 
disadvantaged to the extent to which their own CRS were inadequate or they lacked 
access to a major carrier's CRS' s, as commercial CRS' s were not in general use. 
8.5.3 Predatory Behaviour 
The U.K. has perhaps, along with the government of the Netherlands, the most liberal 
view towards competition in air transportation. In the U.K. liberalisation has been 
exercised for a considerably longer period of time than in most other European 
countries. The country has enjoyed more airline start-ups than any other European 
country for a number of years. In a Statement of Policies that took effect on 1 
August 1993, the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has laid down firm policy on 
anti-competitive behaviour, where such behaviour constitutes of: (i) 'the changing of 
fares and rates at levels which are insufficient to cover the costs of providing the 
services or facilities to which they relate or which are otherwise unreasonable low;' 
(ii) the payment of commissions at rates which are higher than the airline otherwise 
pays;' and (iii) 'the addition of excessive capacity or frequency of service; where such 
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behaviour would have or would be likely to have or is explicitly intended to have the 
effect of crippling, excluding or driving off a competitor. 355 
Consequently the enforcement of the competition rules is extremely important to 
ensure the survival of new-entrant carriers. According to the EU Directorate General 
for Competition, dominant airlines must not restrict competition or take advantage of 
their market power. This is especially pertinent to fare agreements, travel agents 
commission overrides, sinister use of a CRS system, refusal of interline agreements, 
manipulation of airport arrangements in order to cause disadvantages to competitors 
and the use of predatory pricing.356 
The items listed should benefit new-entrants if the regulator will effectively pursue 
the policies aim. The experience in the U.S. and in Europe shows, however, that 
such actions can be hard to follow-up simply due to the complexity of proving such 
adversities. It is interesting to note that both the EU and the US Justice Department 
have effectively used non-legal procedures in rectifying alleged violations of the 
competition law, simply by implying that they will 'look further into the matter, 
unless the alleged violator will withdraw from the conduct. ' 
The Commission's formal process in such cases is to act after receiving a complaint, 
reach internal decision on wheather the matter infringes the Competition Articles, if it 
does, it will issue a statement of objection. Then there will be a formal hearing after 
which, the Commission will issue a final decision and give the airline in violation with 
one of the Articles, time to rectify the matter. 
This is what happened when British Midland Airways (BM) complained to the 
Commission over Aer Lingus' refusal to interline with BM on the Dublin - London 
route in April 1990. The Commission issued an objection to Aer Lingus. Following 
a formal hearing, the Commission gave a final Decision that found that the Irish 
carrier had infringed Article 85( 1) and 86 by withdrawing interlining facilities from 
the British carrier. Aer Lingus was fined ECU 750,000 and required to provide 
interlining for two years to BM and was given two months to comply.357 
8.6 Environment 
8.6.1 Government Ownership of European Airlines 
Government ownership of airlines in Europe has a long tradition that is still 
prevailing. After the third liberalisation package was initiated, increasing pressure 
has been on governments to dispose of their ownership, due to regulations that 
restrict their ability to provide the airlines with funds. Such development is highly 
beneficial from the standpoint of new-entrants, as government owned flag carriers 
will have to cut costs by trimming their route systems, creating room for smaller 
carriers and new-entrants. 
1))CAA 'Civil Aviation Act 1982: Statement of Policies on Route and Air Transport Licensing - May 1993: 
extra~t from Official Record Series 2, 25 May 1993, CAA London, May 1993, p. 3. 
356This issue was addressed by Dr. John Temple Lang, see: Emerging Rules, Airline Business, September 
1989. For a swnmary discussion, see: Op. cit. (Doganis), p. 84-85. 
1~'l)ecision no: 213/921EEC, published in OJ 1992 L 96. 
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Table 8-7 shows that five flag carriers were 100 percent owned by governments. All 
five of these carriers have posted substantial losses along with Alitalia that is 84.9 
percent owned by the Italian Government. 






































































Vir' Atlantic 0.0 
Source: Airline Business 1994. 
8.6.2 Congestion 
Ownership status 
J. Klimitz 41.8%, Air Charter Market 36.1 %, R. Braumer 22.1 % Lufthansa has option to buy 50°0. 
Tour operator Owners Abroad 100%(Thomas Cook 21 %) . 
Grupo Hidalgo 58%, Politours 25%, Rotavia 15°0. 
Euralair 35% 
KLM 14.9% 
State holding company IRl 84.9%, publicly listed 15.1%. 
Swissair 10%, All Nippon Airways 9%, Air France 1.5% 
Shipping Group Braathens 100% 
Thomson Travel Group 100% 
Publicly listed. 
SAS 40% of parent Airlines of Britain Holdings. 
Swissair 56.1 % (59.8% voting) 
lbree banks 51 %, British Airways 49%. 
Publicly listed 20.3% 
State holding company INI 100%. 
Icelandic Steamship Co. 34%, employees 23°0, publicly listed. 
Listed on Amsterdam, Zurich and New York stock exchanges. 
Niki Lauda and IT AS 52.9%, Condor 26.5% 
Federal government 51.4%, local governments 4.4%, other state concerns 2.3%, publicly listed. 
Luxair Group 13.2%, Lufthansa 13%, three banks 38.6%, telecommunications co. 1.21 °'0. 
Shipping group A P Meller 100% 
Nedlloyd 49.2%, KLM 29.8%, ABN Amro 21% 
Airfm 63%, Fimpar 11.75%, two banks 25% Controlled by Aga Khan 
49% to be sold. 
Finacta 38.5% (Air France 66.7%, four Belgian banks 33.3%), Belgian institutions 0.7°0. 
ABA(Sweden) 42.9%, DDL (Denmark) 28.6%, DNL (Norway) 28.6%, (all three 50% government 
owned) 
Tour operator Viajes Marsans 51 %, SAS Leisure 49%. 
Delta Air Lines 5%, Singapore Airlines 2.7% 
Airport congestion is a major problem for new-entrants in Europe. The London 
Heathrow airport is the most congested European airport, suffering from lack of 
runway capacity, terminal capacity, aircraft bays and surface access. Other airports 
subject to some form of congestion are: Athens, Berlin, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, 
Heraklion, Madrid and Milan. Airports about to become congested in peak periods 
are: Barcelona, Brussels, Copenhagen, Corfu, Geneva, Helsinki, Lisbon, Manchester, 
Oslo, Palma, Paris (CDG, Orly) , Stockholm and Zurich. 358 Of the 50 densest intra-
. I d' 359 EU routes, 65 percent lOVO ve congeste airport. 
358Op. cit. (CAA CAP 623) p. 6. 
,wOp. cit. (CAA CAP 623) p. 123. 
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In view of the fact that ECAC has visioned the doubling of aircraft movements by the 
year 2000, it is hard to observe the present airport system coping. This will of course 
b~ ~ major obstacle for the expansion of small airline's services and especially new 
arrhnes as has been observed by Prof R. Doganis : 
On many routes the benefits of increased competition will not materialise 
because new entrant airlines cannot get sufficient runway slots to mount 
effective competition.360 
In January 1993, the European Council of Ministers approved new rules for slot 
allocation at Community airports. The rules that took effect in February 1993 and 
became part of the Community's law, give the Airport Co-ordinator the responsibility 
to allocate the slots available at congested airports, like the lATA system did. The 
rules, however, make it the responsibility of the member state to designate what 
airports are classified as 'congested' and, thus, to be co-ordinated. 'Grandfather 
rights' are in effect under the rules, but airlines must show that they have used the 
slots 80 per cent of the allocated time. If the slots have been used less they will be 
pooled for re-distribution, 50 per cent of which have to be given to new entrants. The 
distribution of airport slots between airlines themselves, will be allowed by the 
Commission, granted a number of conditions to make sure that the slot allocation 
process is open to all interested airlines and that slot allocation is transparent and non 
discriminatory.361 Due to the level of airport congestion in Europe, slot allocation is 
of a major importance and one of the greatest barriers to entry to the most lucrative 
markets. As is evident from the discussion on slot trading and provisions for new-
entrants in the USA (see Section 5.5.2) there is no simple solution to the problem. 
As a result, it is recognised that new-entrants in Europe will find slot access a major 
barrier to entry and there will probably not be any agreeable solution to the problem 
due to its nature. However, new-entrants in the United States have been able to 
circumvent the slot problem by adopting a strategy of entering secondary airports at 
comparatively lower price. As mentioned before the European situation is certainly 
much different from the USA, but one must conclude that there is an ample scope for 
European new-entrants to adapt such strategy and serve secondary airports (see 
Section 7.6.1). 
Berend J. H. Crans and Steven P. Cras conclude in a review of the Slots Regulation: 
In our view the Slots Regulation does not qualify as a tool to facilitate 
access to the air transport market for new entrants, but rather as a 
confirmation of anti-competitive practices which have characterised this 
°d t 362 In us ry ... 
360 Rigas Doganis, The hnportance of the Competition Rules for Fair Competition - An Economist's View, a 
paper given at the Royal Aeronautical Society, 1993. (Undated) 
361 EC Ministers Approve Slot Allocation Rules - Airspace Allocation Legislation, Flight International, 27 
January, 1993, p. 6. 
362 Bernhard J.H. Crans and Steven P. Cras, EC Aviation Scene, Air & Space Law, Vol. XIX, Number 1, 1994, 
p.34. 
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It is only non-use of slots by the incumbent carriers that can provide new-entrants any 
opportunity to access congested airports but that rule is useless in itself for the new-
entrants as the incumbent can easily utilise such slots in various ways to prevent it 
going to the new-entrant, besides any slots coming up for such consideration would 
generally be off-peak slots. As a result, the most likely access of a new-entrant to a 
congested airport is through capacity increase of the airport and concessions of 
incumbents before the EU due to challenged mergers or alliances. 
The Air Traffic Control system is also a major constraint. Various measures have 
been taken by the EU in order improve the ATC capacity. Due to lack of 
standardisation the EU has proposed compulsory technical and operating 
specifications for the procurement of ATC equipment. The directive requires 
member states to ensure that (i) automatic data transmission between air control 
centres by 1998; (ii) complete coverage of inter-operable radar by 1996; (iii) 
computer assisted air traffic management by 1996 with 5 or 10 nautical mile standard; 
(iv) and the optimisation of the work of ATS routes and airspace structure backed by 
area navigation from 1994. The EU considers EUROCONTROL to be the co-
ordinator of the air traffic management system. This body is establishing a common 
traffic flow management system and centralised air traffic control system. The results 
will according to plan, reduce ATC congestion and delays and therefore create some 
of the necessary capacity increase. These steps are very important for small existing 
and new carriers as the prevailing carriers will resist fiercely any attempts to overtake 
or redistribute slots already in use. 
8.7 New-entrants Within the European Union 
8. 7.1 New-entrants in The European Union 1987 - 1993 
The number of airlines starting or exiting scheduled operations in each EU country 
from 1987 until 1993 are quite many. In fact, this rate has been close to or higher 
than that of the fully deregulated market in the US. 
The table takes only into account the net number of carriers operating per year and 
does therefore not indicate exit by one carrier and entry by another carrier within the 
same year. 
Table 8-8 New-entry by Country 1986 - 1993 
Coun 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 2 -1 
Denmark 0 0 2 -I 0 0 
France -2 2, 2 6 5 -5 
Gennany 1 3 3 -I -3 1 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Irish Republic 0 0 -I 0 0 0 
Italy 2 2 0 0 -3 - 1 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 1 0 1 2 - 1 
0 0 0 1 1 0 Portugal 
0 1 -1 2 0 Spain 0 
8 1 -3 -1 -6 0 UK 
Source: Based on 'Airline Competition in the Single European Market', CAA 1993, Annex 2, p. 96. A minus in front ofa number 















The numbers for the UK, Germany and France show that aviation activity in terms of 
number of new airlines formed is greatest in these countries, but at the same time 
airline failures appear to be most frequent. The reason for this activity in these 
countries is the size of Germany and France, and Britain's geographic separation 
from the mainland Europe that increases the demand for air travel. 
An increased activity occurred in 1993 and 1994, as industry barriers were lowered 
due to readily available aircraft and the conclusion of many test cases on anti-
competitive behaviour since the passage of the Second and Third liberalisation 
packages. In the first eight months of 1994, 31 European new-entrants of all types 
were set up, although most were regional carriers. Reed Travel reported that in the 
same period 20 carriers ceased operations. 363 
8.7.2 Who Were The New-entrants? 
There have been quite many start-up operations in Europe in recent years as 
Appendix-B, shows. The most noteworthy jet operating new-entrants have been Air 
UK, Dan-Air, British Midland, Air Europe, Virgin Atlantic Airways, German Wings, 
Ryanair, Lauda Air and Aero Lloyd. 
Table 8-9 European Jet Operating New-entrant Airlines 
Airline 
Aero Uoyd Flugreisen 
Air Belgium 
Air Europe 
Air Europe SpA 
Air Liberte 
Air Minerve 
Air Outre Mer 
Air UK 
Alinord 






















































TAT European Airlines France (68) 













Started with three Caravelles. Acquired by Lufthansa 
Operations to Pahna. 
Started as a charter carrier. 
Charter operating scheduled flights to Montreal. 
Merged with Air Outre Mer and fonned Air Must. 
Merged with Minerve and fonned AOM 
Sold to Unifiy, which collapsed in 1990 and took Alinord with 
it into bankruptcy. Operated domestic routes. 
Began scheduled operations in 1953. 
Initial operations from London City Airport to Berlin. 
BA took over routes and assets. 
BA has 49.9% stake with option on the rest in '97 
Source: Air Transport World 1980 - 1994, Flight International 1980 - 1994. The numbers in brackets show initial start-up date, 
other dates are the approximate starting dates of scheduled operations. 
British airline start-ups have been frequent due to the government's pro-competition 
policy. German new-entrant carriers, however, faired poorly against .Lufthansa: 
German Wings folded soon, Aero Lloyd sold out to Luft?ansa and ContiFlug ~ent 
bankrupt. Charter carriers in Germany are now entenng scheduled operations, 
namely LTV and Condor, but the latter is a Lufthansa owned company. L TV has 
:-t>:-Flight International, 31 August - 6 September, 1994, p. 11. 
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been especially aggressive in terms of entering routes. The carriers' individual route 
frequency has, however, been thin. 
France, on the other hand, has been among the most protective European countries 
especially in regard to its state owned flag carrier Air France. In fact, Air France wa~ 
allowed to acquire two of the largest independent French carriers Air Inter and UTA, 
resulting in the flag carrier becoming dominant both in international and domestic air 
transportation in France. The merger resulted in Air France giving up its stake in 
TAT, which was taken up by British Airways that plans to acquire the carrier fully in 
1998. 
8.7.3 European and U.S. Differences With Regard to New-entrants 
European new-entrants differ in comparison to u.s. new-entrants in numerous ways: 
(i) higher cost; (ii) subject to greater airport congestion; (iii) subject to greater 
competition from other transportation modes; (iv) subject to greater political 
influence favouring flag carriers; and (v) less access to international route licences 
due to bilaterals. 
European new-entrants have higher costs than US new-entrants due to lesser 
productivity than their US counterparts. European new-entrants are subject to airport 
congestion at almost all major European airports, while slot control in the United 
States is only at four airports. Thus, slots to new-entrants are usually not available 
until a merger occurs like that of BA - BCal, BA - Dan Air and Air France - Air 
Inter. Because these mergers are frequently allowed on the basis of concessions by 
the acquiring carrier in terms of slots and routes. 
Other transportation modes like trains, ferries and busses, not mentioning the 
highways, are highly developed in Europe. This means that due to lesser distances 
the option to use one of these modes has greater incentive than in the United States. 
This makes the harvesting of very short-haul routes problematic in comparison to 
possibilities in the United States. The effect of ultra-low prices on very short-haul 
routes (' Southwest effect')has, however, not been tested out effectively in most 
European countries. Meaning that the 'Southwest effect' may well work there just as 
in the United States. One factor supporting that notion is the increasing highway 
congestion in Europe. The utilisation of the aircraft could in fact be relatively easy 
on domestic routes in this regard if city airports like London City Airport would be 
readily available in more city locations. The problem has, however, been the 
marketing and pricing of such services. 
Yield as represented in Table 8-10 indicates that European new-entrants charge 
higher fares than U.S. new-entrants. That is not abnormal as most of the new-
entrants have been affiliated to a larger airline and/or avoided fare competition. 
Furthermore, larger portion of passengers are business passengers in Europe, than 
prevails in the US where larger portion of passengers using new-entrant airlines are 
leisure travellers. 
The costs per available seat kilometre(ASK) are much higher for European new-
entrants on the average than US new-entrants. Revenue per RPK is decreasing 
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?etween Euro~ean and US carrier~ based on the airlines in the table indicating 























Comparison of Revenue ($) Per RPK (Yield) and Cost Per ASK for 
Selected European and US Carriers 
1982 1986 1990 
Rev.perRPK Cost per Rev.perRPK Cost per Rev. per Cost per ASK 
ASK ASK RPK 
0.092 0.054 0.094 0.054 na na 
na na 0.062 0.038 0.069 0.046 
0.107 0.059 0.080 0.047 0.075 0.052 
na na 0.123 0.075 0.126 0.074 
0.065 0.037 0.066 0.033 0.071 0.042 
na na 0.044 0.076a 0.042 0.076 
0.104 0.060 0.089 0.054 na na 
0.060 0.035 0.045 0.032 na na 
0.0856 0.0490 0.0754 0.0511 0.0766 0.0580 
na na 0.727 0.487 na na 
0.248 0.123 0.260 0.133 0.341 0.198 
0.241 0.149 0.201 0.108 0.290 0.155 
1.059 0.594 0.734 0.421 0.613 0.405 
0.249 0.166 0.575 0.326 0.471 0.569 
na na 0.049 0.035 0.069 0.048 
0.4493 0.2580 0.4243 0.2518 0.3568 0.2750 
525 527 563 493 466 474 
a .. 1985. Source. ICAO Fmanclal Program, DOT Fonn 41. Due to lack of data avallablhty UK carners are over represented, but 
they tend to be lower cost than carriers from other European countries. 
Political influence is still a large factor in Europe, meaning that flag carriers receive 
large capital injections under various schemes and situations and protection at the 
local level. Whether such injections will be stopped in the future remains to be seen. 
It is highly unlikely that a government will maintain 'hands off' attitude if its flag 
carrier faces bankruptcy. Furthermore, both federal and local governments have 
attempted and will attempt to protect their own carriers by using all possible 
loopholes and permissions in the EU regulation in order to do so. U.S. carriers are of 
course also subject to political adversities at the local level. The difference is, 
however, that the scale of such influence is much larger and probably more 
nationalistic due to the diversity of the European countries. 
Most denser routes within Europe are short-haul domestic or intra EU routes. Long-
haul routes to points outside the EU are international, meaning that they are 
governed by bilaterals. The bilateral usually limits the number of airlines, fares and 
capacity allowed on the route. This reduces the ability of new-entrants to enter 
lucrative international routes unlike in the United States were all domestic long-haul 
routes are open to new-entrants. International routes out of the U.S. are then subject 
to the same limitations as the ones in Europe. 
What this leaves us with is that new-entry in Europe is less viable in Europe than in 
the United States. Therefore, jet operating European new-entrants not affiliated with 
the incumbents through equity stake, are prone to failure. In fact, the incumbents are 
now using new-entrant airlines to gain access into other EU countries in order to 
prepare for 1997 and secure feed. 
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Of ~ll the items mentioned above it is government capital injections into their flag 
carners that skews the competition environment in Europe the most. If the flag 
carriers would have to become profitable they would have to scale down their 
operations opening up routes and slots to new-entrants. 
8.8 Conclusion 
European air transport has been characterised by monopolistic competition. The 
frame of mind that characterises the management of such monopolistic companies 
builds on the manager's ability to lobby the national government for favouritism that 
enhances the company's profitability. As management of European airlines has not 
shed this attitude their strategies have been characterised by anti-competitive 
behaviour and attempts to forge alliances in order to prevent full-force competition. 
This has raised major barriers to entry for new-entrants in Europe. 
Mergers have been approved by the Commission without exception, but with 
conditions aimed at increasing competition. Such provisions have included giving up 
slots at congested airports forming a fund to enhance competition from independent 
carriers, or selling off subsidiary companies. 
Alliances have become widely used by European carriers. Not only have the larger 
carriers formed alliances, but they have acquired equity stakes in most smaller 
carriers. This has segregated European air transport into 'peace' blocks. The result 
has been much less impact, of liberalisation, on fares than anticipated. 
Charters were expected to enter scheduled operations extensively after the 
liberalisation process began, several did and then collapsed or pulled out. As large 
scheduled carriers lower their costs fares will come down. As a result, the charter 
'advantage' will be reduced, pushing such carriers towards scheduled operations or 
loose market-share otherwise. 
European carriers were usually profitable before liberalisation. After the Gulf war, 
the recession and the resulting rise in fuel prices, the most inefficient carriers 
experienced extensive losses, Many independent carriers went out of business but 
State owned carriers have received unprecedented amounts of state aid. This has 
skewed the competitive environment. If the carriers had been forced to scale down 
their operations by shedding the most unprofitable routes, new-entrant airlines would 
have gained slots and been able to mount more effective competition. In such an 
environment the public would have gained from lower fares but might have lost out 
due to sudden drop in service on thin routes like occurred in the US. 
Fares have come down more on major routes served by one or more new-entrant 
airlines in Europe, especially on the Dublin - London, London - Paris and London -
Amsterdam routes. 
The greatest barrier to entry on some routes in Europe is ~irport congestion. In 
order for European air transport to develop adequately this problem has to be 
tackled. 
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New-entry has been most extensive in the UK due to the pro-competition attitude of 
the recent Government. New-entry has been extensive on the regional level in 
France, Germany and Denmark. Failures have been frequent in all of these countries. 
UK new-entrants have achieved larger size and more success than their counterparts 
in other EU countries. Bankruptcies have by the same token been more spectacular 
due to their large size, if one names, Dan-Air, Air Europe and Laker Airways for 
example. Three large new-entrants remain in Britain: Air UK, British Midland and 
Virgin Atlantic. 
European new-entrants have higher costs than their US counterparts due to lower 
productivity. Operating revenue per employee was much lower in Europe until 1986 
but has increased considerably in comparison to US carriers. Costs and yields are 
much higher in Europe than the US. This is due to a different composition of the 
passengers along with less productivity as mentioned before. The difference in 
passenger composition is due to the European airlines having left the leisure market 
more or less to the charters. 
Political influence on air transport will still be much greater in Europe than the US, 
lessening the benefits of fullliberalisation for years to come. 
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Part III. 
The Issue of Failure 
The issue of failure will be explored in this part from two standpoints. First, an 
extensive exploratory survey of the literature is performed on cited reason for failure, 
both by practitioners and academics. Furthermore, failure will be contrasted with 
success in order to explore the relationship between the two sides of this issue. 
Secondly, failure prediction models will be explored, especially in the context of 
empirical models. 
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9~ The Question of Success or Failure 
Continued adaptation mean continued pain, .. 
And it could hardly be otherwise, because pain 
is one half of the power to form judgements. 
Any form of life which insulates itself too successfully 
against pain fails to notice any change in its environment until it is too late. 
Hermann Korn 
9.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the following chapter is to identify the pertinent research already 
performed on corporate success and failure and to explore theories on the subject. 
Knowledge on corporate failure can be divided into four parts: (i) Findings based on 
manager's 'hands on' experience of success or failure; (ii) case studies of successful 
or failed companies; (iii) construction of theoretical models of failure; and (iv) 
empirically derived prediction models offailure or non-failure. 
9.1.1 Definition of Failure 
There are many different definitions on what constitutes corporate failure, E. I. 
Altman cites the following: 
•• the situation where the realised rate of return on invested capital, with 
allowances for risk considerations, is significantly and continually lower 
than prevailing rates on similar investments.364 
Weston and Copeland make an important distinction between economic and financial 
failure. The above definition would, according to their distinction, fall under the 
economic criteria. In their view failure in economic terms means that the firm's 
revenues do not cover its costs. They go further and say that it can also mean that 
the rate of earnings on its historical cost of investment is less than the firm's cost of 
capital. A financial failure, on the other hand, can be divided into two types. First, 
technical insolvency constituting a situation where the firm cannot meet its current 
obligations, even if the assets of the company exceed its total liabilities. Second, 
bankruptcy where total liabilities exceed the assumed value of the total assets. 365 
364 Altman , Edward 1., Corporate Bankruptcy in America, Heath-Lexington Books, 1971. 
365Weston, 1. Fred and Copeland, Thomas E., Managerial Finance, Eight Edition, The Dryden Press, 1986. 
See: pp. 951-974. 
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This account can not exclude Dun and Bradstreet, who publish annually the 'Failure 
Record', that has to do with statistical analysis of corporate failures. Their definition 
of corporate failure is as follows: 
Business failures include those businesses that ceased operations following 
assignment or bankruptcy~ ceased with loss to creditors after such actions as 
execution, foreclosure, or attachment~ voluntarily withdrew leaving unpaid 
obligations, were involved in court actions such as receivership, reorganization, or 
arrangement; or voluntarily compromised with creditors. 366 
The definition is more practical in terms of identification of failed firm from statistical 
sources, while Weston's and Copeland's is more financially oriented. Beaver 
suggested even broader definition of failure, while constructing an empirical failure 
prediction model. He defined failure as a situation where any of the following events 
have occurred: bankruptcy, bond default, an overdrawn bank account, non-payment 
or a preferred stock dividend. 367 This definition is very broad as an overdrawn bank 
account is a frequent occurrence in the course of doing business and most firms have 
fixed overdraft permissions used as short term loan-facility. Stuart Slatter, on the 
other hand, observes a decline stage prior to failure. 368 Such decline state is 
important in terms of failure as during the decline state the symptoms of failure 
become apparent. Stuart Slatter has defined this decline state in terms of a 
turnaround situation where a firm whose real profit before tax has declined for three 
or more successive years. 369 
For the purpose of this thesis, a simple definition was constructed, where a new-
entrant airline is considered failed: if it filed for bankruptcy under Chapter XI or VII, 
or was overtaken as a result of poor financial record. 
9.2 The Legal Framework of Bankruptcy 
9.2.1 Bankruptcy Law in the United States 
In the United States there are different types of bankruptcy filings possible, Chapter 
XI and Chapter VII. Chapter XI is for cases initiated on voluntary basis and deals 
with reorganisation of the company involved. The latter route on the other hand is 
for involuntary filing, usually by a creditor. When Chapter VII is initiated the 
company is liquidated and the proceeds distributed among the creditors. The process 
is as follows: (i) The judge issues automatic stay, so creditors cannot press suit for 
366D & B do statistical analysis of corporate failures, see: The Failure Record (Annually), Dun & Bradstreet, 
New York. 
J67Beaver, W., Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure, Journal of AccOlUlting Research, Jan. 1967, Vol. 5, pp. 
71-111. 
368 01' course this is not true in all situations, as companies can flUl into sudden catastrophic problems. 
369Slatter referred to 't 970 prices' in this definition, this has been omitted. Stuart Slatter, Corpof'dte Recovery: 
A Guide to TurnarOlmd Management, Penguin Books, 1984. p.19. 
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repayment, debts are frozen, secured creditors can ask for hardship excemption from 
debt freeze~ (ii) unsecured creditors form a committee who can ask the court to 
appoint an examiner to investigate possible fraud or mismanagement, usually leading 
to the apointment of a trustee to run the company; (iii) the committee and company 
negotiate a reorganisation plan that contains among other things a repayment for 
frozen debts; (iv) creditors approve the plan following negotiations that can run from 
few months up to years, the approvement is based on the majority voting in favour of 
the plan by creditors owning more than two-thirds of the debt; (v) bankruptcy court 
judge approves the plan; (vi) the reorganised company emerges from bankruptcy 
having to meet the terms of the agreed repayment plan. 
Under both types of bankruptcy filing, the debtor continues to operate the company 
unless the assigned bankruptcy court decides otherwise. Such a decision usually 
involves the appointment of a trustee that has broad powers according to court order. 
He may bring in new managers and replace existing ones. His role is basically to run 
the company, to minimise losses and sell it or parts of it as a going concern to 
maximise the returns from the liquidation for the creditors. The debtor can regain 
control from the trustee by filing a bond as required by the court. Reorganisation on 
the other hand, has the specific purpose of protecting the company from its creditors 
in order to return the company to profitability. 
9.2.2 Bankruptcy Law in the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom the Company's Act of 1893, 1948 and 1981, made it possible 
to appoint a receiver and a manager instead of a liquidator, which was the only 
alternative before the Companies Act of 1893. The receiver's role is to realise the 
assets of the company for a client who is usually a creditor and in doing so he has to 
keep the interest of other creditors in mind. When the receiver has collected for his 
client he leaves the company and normal business resumes, or the liquidator is called 
in to distribute the remaining assets to the creditors and shareholders. 370 
9.3 Bankruptcies and Exogenous Influence 
9.3. J Introduction 
Bankruptcy is often explained by adverse influence from the external environment. 
The most frequent causes cited have been recession, change in government policy, 
high interest rates, labour disputes and acts of god, etc .. Furtherm~re, it is co~on 
to see statistics that show that the age of failed comparues as contnbutor to faIlures, 
that is the 'liability of newness' . Although these factors may be contributors they 
cannot be blamed on their own. 
The following section reviews the pertinent literature, in order to ~stablish the 
relationship between external variables and the age factor on corporate faIlures. 
:HOOp. cit. (Slatter), p. 19. 
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9.3.2 Environment's Influence 
Goudie and Meeks found a relationship between the effects of exogenous 
macroeconomic shocks on the failure rate. Their research shows that a variation in 
the exchange rate can cause failures among large companies?71 It is known that 
exchange rates can influence a company's ability to compete in international markets 
where the dependency on such markets is considerable. This is a fact for companies 
that have a limited domestic market but incur a large part of their costs in the 
domestic currency. This is a fact for many international airlines to name but one 
industry example. In terms of the macro-economic model, nations with small 
domestic markets but large exports are bound to be affected by this relationship. 
Desai and Montes found that changes in the interest rate and the growth of the 
money stock (M1) influenced the failure rate among companies.372 
Altman concludes that many reasons attest to the increase in failure rates among US 
businesses despite the overall expansion of the economy(GNP): (i) chronically sick 
industries; (ii) high real interest rates; (iii) increased international competition; (iv) 
increased leveraging in corporate America; ( v) deregulation of key industries 
(aviation, financial services, etc.); and (vi) relatively high new business formation 
rates. 373 
Table 9-1 Number of Failures and The Failure Rate in The US (1971-1991) 
Failure Rate 
Year Number o/Failures (Failures per 10.000) 
1984 52,078 107 
1985 57,253 115 
1986 61,616 120 
1987 61,111 102 
1988 57,097 98 
1989 50,361 65 
1990 60,746 75 
1991 87,266 106 
Source: As reported in: Edward I. Altman. Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, 1993, p. 14. 
Note that numbers compiled after 1983 included more industries, thus, rendering comparison with D&B numbers compiled before 
1984 inaccurate, as a result, years prior to 1984 were not included in the table. 
:l7I G di A' d Meeks G. The Exchange Rate and Company Failure in Macro-Micro Model of The UK ou e, . an " 
Company Sector, Economic Journal (UK), Vol. 1001, Iss. 406, May 1991. p. 456. 
372D . M d Montes A A macroeconomic model of bankruptcies in the British economy, 1945-1980, esru, . an ,., 
British Review of Economic Issues, Vol. 4, pp. 1-14. 
m Altman, Edward I., Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, 1993, pp. 
14-15. 
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The high failure rate from 1984 to 1987 and 1991 is blamed on recessions during the 
periods. Thus, recessions crush the weak companies lacking financial flexibility to 
account for reduced growth or decreasing revenues. 
As stated before these variables discussed so far are contributors, but do not explain 
a company failure as such. That applies to liability of newness discussed in next 
section. 
9.3.3 Liability of Newness 
Lane and Schary's study on business failures found that the age of a firm is highly 
correlated with its susceptibility to failure. The predicted probability of failure by age 
of the firm shows that for the period from 1984 to 1990, the probability of two year 
old firm to fail within one year is 0.94, three year old 0.84, four year old 0.70, five 
year old 0.60 and for a ten year old firm it is 0.40.374 Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) the 
leading source of bankruptcy statistics have reported age related findings. Their 
findings show fewer failures in the first year but then increasing in the following two 
to three years and then decreasing for each consecutive year thereafter. However, 
the total number of failures in a 10 year period from establishment, reaches 70 to 80 
percent. 
Table 9-2 Age of Failed Businesses in The USA 
Proportion of Total Failures f'~) 
Age (Years) 1980 1990 
1 Year or less 0.9 9.0 
2 9.6 11.2 
3 15.3 11.2 
Total in 3 Years 25.8 31.4 
4 15.4 10.0 
5 12.4 9.4 
Total in 5 Years 53.6 49.8 
6 9.8 7.2 
7 6.3 5.3 
8 5.2 4.5 
9 4.3 3.8 
10 3.4 3.5 
Total in 10 Years 81.7 74.1 
Over lOY ears 19.3 25.9 
Total number offailures 11,742 60,432 
Source: As reported in: Edward I. Altman, Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy, 2nd ed., John Wdey & Sons, 1993, p. 19. 
Furthermore, the table above shows that in 1990 compared to 1980, failures in the 
early years are increasing, this seems to be especially so i~ the ~rst year. The 
increase seems to be related to increase in deregulated mdustrIes that attract 
increased number of new-entrants. Furthermore, Lane and Shary found by regression 
374Lane Sarah J. and SchaI) Martha, Understanding the Business Failure Rate, Contemporary Policy Issues, 
Vol. '9, October 1991, pp 93-105. The probabilities cited are calculated \\1tb.in the sample of faIled 
companies not all companies. 
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analysis that the age effect is twice as large as the macro effect for three year old 
firms but reducing gradually until the firm reaches the age of nine when it is about 
equal. 375 
In conclusion, it is important to recognise that the age factor as such is not a causal 
factor of failure at all. The underlying reason for the failure of a younger company, 
can be the founder's inexperience, lack of financial resources, marketing of a product 
that is not needed and therefore lacks demand, inability to sustain a low income 
period while the company is penetrating the market, lack of interest, bad health of the 
founder and so forth. 
9.4 Causes and Symptoms of Failure 
9.4.1 Introduction 
John Argenti stated in his book 'Corporate Collapse: The Causes and Symptoms', 
that it was necessary to make a distinction between the causes and symptoms of 
corporate collapse. 376 As a result there have been number of attempts to come up 
with causal factors which explain why companies fail. It is apparent from the 
literature that there are a number of factors that differ from one research to another 
although there are certain similarities. 
A survey by D&B in 1980 has indicated that over 44 percent of all corporate failures 
are linked with inexperience, unbalanced experience or incompetence.377 In fact one 
can infer that success or failure will always be crystallised around the management 
factor. It seems that one can allege that there are causal layers of failure: (i) 
management ability; (ii) management actions; and (iii) the symptoms of management 
actions. This is, however, too simplistic finding calling for research into what 
constitutes ' good' management and how such a feature is integrated into the 
organisation and the internal and external forces. 
It is apparent that the causal factors can be extremely varied. As a result, it can be 
hypothesised that the causes of corporate decline and failure cannot be attributed to 
few variables only. 
In the next section the literature on success and failure will be explored. This 
literature review can be divided into three parts: (i) causes of failure according to 
individual accounts in terms of experience or observation; (ii) case determination of 
success and failure; and (iii) systematic academic research. 
mLane, Sarah 1. and Schary Martha, The Determinants of Business Failures: 1960-1990, working paper, 
Boston University, July 1991. 
376Op. cit. (Argenti), pp. 121-123. 
mOp. cit. (Altman), p. 17. 
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9.4.2 The Question of Failure 
John Argenti observed that corporate failure prediction models were not good 
indicators as to what has gone wrong in bankrupt companies although such models 
could predict corporate failure for up to three years in advance with fairly high 
certainty. Therefore, Argenti came up with his three-part sequence of decline: 
defects, mistakes and symptoms. His observation was that corporations can have 
defects in their system if we think of the corporation in terms of a holistic system. 
Then he assumes that there are only three mistakes that can lead to failure, 
overtrading, the 'grand project' and excessive financial gearing. He alleged that 
companies making these mistakes were virtually doomed to failure and the result 
would be the appearance of the symptoms. The' symptoms' can present themselves 
as creative accounting, deteriorating financial ratios, overtrading, big projects and 
high gearing.378 
Argenti states that there are three different paths to failure and one path that 
characterises successful companies. His findings were that type one firm would never 
really take off in terms of performance and fail soon after formation; the type two, on 
the other hand, would take off very rapidly reaching high performance and receive 
much attention, but then decline as rapidly and fail; the type three would grow to 
excellence and then decline gradually until failure; while type four the successful 
company would achieve success along the'S' curve and stay successful. 379 
Figure 9-1 Ar ., T' . 380 gentI s rajectones 










Source: Jolm Argenti, Corporate Collapse: The Causes and Symptoms, McGraw-Hill, 1976. 
Argenti stated that accounting information was lac~ng in failing companies especially 
in terms of ineffective budgetary control, non-eXIstent cash flow forecasts, lac~. of 
costing systems and incorrect asset valuation. Furthermore, he alleged that fathng 
~78As cited in (Lane and Schary), pp. 93-105. 
~79Op. cit.(Argenti), p. 148. 
380Op. cit. (Argenti), p. 157. 
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companies lacked vision in terms of forecasting change, due to deficiencies in the top 
team. 381 Argenti's findings have been criticised due to their lack of research backing. 
D ' Aveni concludes that Argenti' s findings may not necessarily be defective but the 
findings, nevertheless, needing confirmation and further explanation. 382 
David Clutterbuck and Sue Kernaghan reported in their book 'The Phoenix Factor' 
based on a survey of most of the groups of people associated with company failure a 
profile of corporate failure causes. Their questionnaire was sent to 300 organisations 
and the reply rate was just over 15 percent. The most frequently cited causes for 
failure were poor financial information (40)383, lack of control in general (34), 
insufficient working capital(33), management inexperience (33), lack of strategy (30), 
poor understanding of the market (29) and insufficient margins(27). The survey 
concluded that the aggregated main causes of failure were: (i) Inadequate information 
and controls; (ii) poor understanding of the market and the product; and (iii) 
inadequate strategic vision and implementation. 384 Although the study is based on a 
small portion of the total sample it is not uncommon when executives are surveyed. 
Their survey did not assess the external environment that has to be a contributing 
factor to corporate success or failure (market growth, GNP, etc.). 
In order to give a comprehensive overview of frequently cited causes of failure in the 
literature, Table 9-3 was constructed from a number of studies annoted in Appendix 
C. 
The most frequently cited reasons for failure, according to the aggregated table 
below, are: (i) improper pricing with regard to cost structure, (ii) high gearing, (iii) 
insufficient working capital, (iv) over dependence on one customer, (v) management 
inexperience, (vi) unbalanced top team, and (vii) inadequate control systems. The 
meta-analysis, thus, backs most of the findings proposed by Argenti, as discussed 
before. 
One source of failure and success elucidation are from company 'doctors' or 
'recovery' specialists. These are usually brought in to try to return the corporation to 
profitability after insolvency or when the directors find no other way or are pressured 
to do so banks. In a 1991 article the three leading British insolvency specialists 
David James, Roger Cork and Adrian Lickorish had a panel discussion on the subject. 
Their discussion revealed that the role of the non-executive directors is crucial in 
decline and failure as their purpose is to guide the company's direction. Furthermore, 
they found that a good banking relationship based on trust and loyalty could benefit a 
381Op. cit.(Argenti), p. 123. 
382Op. cit. (D'Aveni), p. 577. 
383Numbers in parenthesis denote frequency of cause marked by respondents. 
384 C lutterbuck, D. and Kernaghan, S., The Phoenix Factor: Lessons for Success from Management Failure, 
Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1990, pp. 79-80. 
201 
company running into problems, although, this does not have to be so 
circumstances. 385 In all 
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Source: As reported in Appendix-C. The numbers in the brackets indicate the frequency of each factor's appearance in the 
literature. 
The bank that is asked to furnish a rescue loan needs to know the company in detail 
in order to analyse the recovery changes. In fact the company insolvency specialists 
often provide security to the banks if they have a string of successful rescues. 
Furthermore, they mentioned that over-enthusiastic funding of growth out of 
proportion to the company's real value frequently causes corporate problems. 
Similarly, the management buyouts have added immensely to the corporation's debt, 
3R5The Laker case was a point, as the bank called in the receivers over relatively small default compared to the 
total turnover of the company. That decision, however, could have been based on a long-term view of the 
company's destiny. 
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often during periods of low interest rates, making the companies vulnerable during 
rising interest rates. According to the three insolvency specialists, directors of 
troubled companies are prone to run into a 'siege' mentality and fail to admit their 
need of rescue until very late in the downward spiral. 386 
The company insolvency specialists' discussion reinforces further the findings 
presented in this section that place much responsibility and blame with the company 
directors. They just as well as Argenti point to the importance of the board of 
directors and especially the non-executive directors that can 'distance' themselves 
from the day to day operations in order to see the 'big' picture. Clutterbuck and 
Kernaghan point out, however, that insolvency specialists are usually brought in late 
in the decline process gaining only 'second hand' knowledge on the actual causes. 
The authors claim that venture capitalists do possess more information on the real 
causes of decline and failure due to their participation in the corporate saga from the 
outset. 387 In fact a survey conducted by Gorman and Sahlman concluded that 
venture capitalists saw shortcomings in general management as the main cause of 
failure in their portfolio companies. Table 9-4 stipulates these findings relating to 
venture capitalist's views on corporate failure. 388 
Table 9-4 Venture Capitalists' View on Corporate Failure Causes389 
Frequency Average 
% Rank Std.Dev. 
Management problems 
Ineffective senior management 95 1.6 1.0 
Ineffective functional management 50 2.5 1.1 
Market problems 
End user market failed to develop as expected 43 2.7 1.9 
Company failed to capture share due to: 
a) Poor channel selection/channel resi!>iance 35 3.3 1.5 
b) Competition 34 3.0 1.3 
c) Poor productlmarket fit 28 3.5 1.7 
Product problems 
Development delayed or unsuccessful 51 2.4 1.4 
Manufacturing failure 11 2.9 1.4 
Poor product performance 18 4.2 1.4 
Inadequate quality control 13 4.7 2.4 
Column 'Rank' refers to the rank of importance each factor was assigned by the respondents, while 'Freq~ency' refers to the 
frequency of mention across the sample. The column for standard deviation is for the ranks. Ranks: 1 = most unportant, 1 = least 
important. 
Venture capitalists, themselves, are cited as a cause of corporate failure by Gorm~n 
and Sahlman due to: (i) their aid to capitalise highly uncertain ventures; and (11) 
provide less capital than necessary to minimise own risk. 390 
386 A panel discussion with David James, Roger Cork and Adrian Lickorish: How not to go bust, Director, 
April 1991, pp. 46-52. 
387 Op. cit. (Clutterbuck), p. 79. 
1R8Gonnan, Michael and Sahlman, William A, What do Venture Capitalists Do?, Journal of Business 
Venturing, Vol. 4, pp. 231-248. 
389Op. cit. (Gonnan), p. 239. 
390Op. cit. (Gonnan), p. 238. 
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9.4.3 The Question of Success 
Many of books have been published that take a set of successful companies and 
derive lessons on why they are successful. The book by Tom Peters and Robert 
Waterman, 'In Search of Excellence', provides insight to the reasons behind specific 
company success, according to the authors view, at a point in time.391 Peter and 
Waterman in their work do not provide an underlying theory of success that is 
reinforced by time. The reason being that many of the companies cited as an example 
of excellence in the book have had poor returns since. Varadarajan and Ramanujam 
criticise the Peter's and Waterman book on various accounts; (i) generalisations not 
timeless; (ii) omission of factors like proprietary technology, market dominance and 
control of raw materials; and (iii) definition of 'excellence' faulty.392 
An other similar account was made for Britain in the book, 'The Winning Streak', by 
Goldsmith and Clutterbuck. In their book they cite that the factors that distinguished 
the successful from the unsuccessful were: leadership, autonomy, control, 
involvement, market orientation, zero basing, innovation and integrity. 393 These 
items are similar to the items cited in Table 9-5, reinforcing further the general ideas 
on what constitutes success. 
The Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) database of the Strategic Planning 
Institute is the largest and best known research project linking success with strategy. 
The PIMS program has established that performance is related to: (i) investment 
intensity; (ii) relative product or service quality394; (iii) labour productivity; and (iv) 
vertical integration. 395 
The PIMS program has lead to the following findings: (i) selling price inflation of 
over 10 percent has positive impact on profits; (ii) markets that involve big 
transactions are less profitable than those involving smaller transactions (less than 
$1000); (iii) products that are important for the customer affect profits negatively;396 
391peters, Tom and Waterman, Robert, In Search of Excellence. Lessons from America's Best-Rtm Companies. 
New York, 1982. 
392Yaradarajan, P. Rajan and Ramanujam, Yasudevan, The Corporate Performance Contmdrum: A Synthesis of 
Contemporary Yiews and an Extension, Journal of Management Studies, Yol. 27, No.5, 1990, p. 466. 
393 Goldsmith, Walter and Clutterbuck, David, The Winning Streak: Britain's top companies reveal their 
formula for success, Penguin Business, 1985. 
394Op. cit. (PIMS), p. 42. The PIMS methodology uses relative quality measure~ent~ which is based on a 
questionnaire where respondents are led through a 'quality profiling' where they IdentIfy the key ~roduct and 
service attributes that cOtmt in the purchase decision. These attributes are then rated by the subJccts on. an 
additive scale totalling 100. Then they rate their performance along with performance of leading 
competitors for each attribute on a scale from 1 to 10. 
395Op. cit. (PIMS), p. 42-43. 
~%This is measured in terms of the customer's proportion of total budget spent on products. Those that have 
high relative proportion are classified as 'important' . 
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(iv) large market-share397 corporations have relatively higher profits than their smaller 
share rivals;398 (v) market leaders offer higher priced, superior products relatively to 
competitors; (vi) successful low-share businesses were found to offer high relative-
quality; (vii) for R&D and marketing intensive businesses the ROJ of the average 
market leader is 26 percent greater than the ROJ of the average small business, the 
comparable number is 12 percent for manufacturing, thus, market-share has more 
profit impact for high-tech industries; (viii) in investment intensive businesses, market 
leadership has lower payoff than in industries of low investment; (ix) when a business 
doesn't have quality advantage, market-share building can be very costly; (x) when 
superior quality and large-market share are both present profitability is virtually 
always present; (xi) the best way to beat competitors is by achieving superior 
perceived quality and/or superior conformance quality;399 (xii) superior perceived 
quality leads to an ability to charge premium price or offer better value for the same 
price; and (xiii) there is a negative relationship between capital intensity and 
profitability. 400 
The PIMS database has also indicated that leaders are more prone to lose market 
share than gain, this is in direct proportion to their market-share. Thus, it is clear that 
smaller businesses gain from leaders on the basis of an ability to be innovative in 
ways, which the leader is most reluctant to follow. 40 1 
Table 9-5 shows an overview of factors cited in the litterature as success factors. 
Most of the articles found on the issue tended to provide rather generalised if not 
superficial words of an advice. However, reading the articles it was found that few 
major issues are important. First, to be a leader in terms of quality, price and any way 
that distinguishes the company from the rest. Second, to do careful planning in all 
aspects of the business, but especially in the financial and market aspects. Third, to 
know the competitors well in order to be able to plan moves. Fourth, to stay in touch 
with the customer and know his needs and wants. However, the first item, high 
relative quality, appears to be the most important item of all and the key to success if 
one has in mind the articles examined. 
397It is important to note that the PIMS program doesn't look at market-share as causing anything, large market-
share is the result of causes like high relative quality, low price, etc. Thus, the pursuit of large market-share 
in itself is useless and not sustainable unless it is built on concrete product features. 
398Op. cit. (PIMS), pp. 72 and 76. The PIMS reports that share compared to the three largest co~petitors to be 
the best measure of relative share and competitive advantage. The advantage of market-share IS reported as 
being primarily the difference in pretax-margins on sales. Market leaders enjoy an average of 12.7% return 
on sales while businesses with market-share rank of five or less earn only 4.5%. (PIMS). 
, 
1\NBeing more effective in conforming to appropriate product specifications and service standards. 
400This stems from an aggressive and often destructive competition. heavy capital investment acts as an barrier 
to exit, management may strive for 'normal' profit to sales target, but unrealistically so. 
401Op. cit. (PIMS), p. 190. 
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One of the main defects of the studies and opinions voiced in the articles is the lack of 
systematic research and the development of theory on the subject of success. One 
might conclude that the construction of theory on business success is impossible due 
402Richard Hall, The Contribution of Intangible Resources to Business Success, Journal of General 
Management, Vol. 16, Iss. 4, Summer 1991. 
403Graham, John R., What's Essential to a Five-Year Plan for Business Success?, Managers Magazine, Vol. 66, 
Iss. 7, Jul 1991. 
404Maren, Michael and Rose, Ronit A, Skinflint Strategies: By Slashing Waste, These Trailblaizers Turn Their 
Companies into Profit Juggernauts, Success, Vol.: 38, Iss: 5, Jllll 1991. 
405 Ray , Russ, The 21 st Century Manager: A Survey of Futuristic Business Studies, Review of Business, Vol. 
13, Iss. 1,2, SummerlFall1991. 
406Berg, Deanna, In Defence of Disorder, Discomfort and Discontent, Journal for Quality & Participation, Vol. 
14, Iss. 5, Sep 1991. 
407Douchesneau, Donald A and Gartner, William B., A Profile of New-Venture Success and Failure in an 
Emerging Industry, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 5, 1990. 
4ORDahl, Dan and Sykes, Randolph, Life Goals=Self Motivation=Business Success, Manage, Vol. 41, Iss. 2, 
Aug 1989. 
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to the inherent dynamism of corporate entities. In fact the authors of the book on the 
P~~ Pri~!ples. shy away. from attaching their findings to any underlying theory or 
pnnclples. This conclUSion may be acceptable today to an extent but less so in the 
near future due to advancement in computer power that makes the simulation of 
complex systems possible. Thus, one can expect that theories will start to appear on 
the highly complex systems of human interaction and corporate behaviour in terms of 
success and failure. 
These generalised conclusions of this section are not particularly useful for large 
businesses, a more detailed research is needed. Such research can be found in the 
next section where a research project called COMPASS contrasts failure with 
success. 
9.4.4 Success Contrasted to F ai/ure 
KrUger examined 96 successful and unsuccessful companies in Germany to determine 
what factors explain corporate success and failure. Furthermore, his objective was as 
well to assess the possible implication of these factors for management. 
The project called COMPASS (A Concept for Multidimensional Planning and the 
Analysis of the Strategic Components of Success) was divided into causal segments, 
those were then further divided into twenty one components of success. In order to 
distinguish the 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' companies, they were selected on the 
basis of extremities in performance measured through financial ratios. Then he 
analysed reports on the companies in the various business magazines, to determine to 
what extent the various components were responsible for success or failure. 410 The 
components were grouped into people responsibility, culture, strategy, structure, 
systems and implementation potential. 
The most important groups in terms of unsuccessful companies was strategy (51 % ), 
people responsibility (50%), structure (45%) and implementation potential (370/0). 
On the other hand, the most important groups in terms of success were strategy 
(48%) and then far behind, implementation potential (31 %), systems (30%) and 
culture (28%). The potential contribution of this study is to uphold that failure as 
such is due to an interaction between number of factors. The surprising conclusion is 
that success, according to the findings, is attributed to much fewer factors. In fact, it 
is primarily one factor, product/market concept, with profit and revenue orientation 
and marketing/distribution/market research trailing far behind.411 
It is pointed out in the article that sample and cultural discrepancies can attribute 
somewhat to biases in the findings. For example, research and development may gain 
less share as companies in the service sector do not have R&D departments. Both 
409 Op. cit. (PIMS), p. 2. 
410Krilger, Wilfried, Patterns of Success in Gennan Businesses, Long Range Planning, Vol. 22, No.2, 1989, p. 
106 . 
.JIIOp. cit. (KrUger), p. 109. 
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ind~stria~ and. service ~ompanies. may, on the other hand, rate innovation high on the 
basIs of ItS wide mearung, covermg both technical and service aspects. Furthermore 
as the stu~y is ba~ed on the literature (business magazines) there is the potential bia~ 
of what IS considered 'newsworthy'. In addition, it is highly unlikely for the 
ma~agement of a successful company to be criticised for incompetence in the 
busmess press, although a firm may have landed such a profitable industry niche, that 
the company makes profit in spite of poor management. 
Table 9-5 Factors Associated With Success and Failure in German Firms412 
Unsuccessful firms Successful firms Percent difference 
Factor ~/O) ~/O) ~/O) 
Product/market concept 80 79 1.3 
Profit and revenue orientation 80 57 29.8 
Management qualification 67 26 61.2 
Organisation of top management 65 23 64.6 
Financial potential 61 38 37.7 
Marketing/distribution/market research 53 57 -7.5 
Production 47 38 19.1 
Managerial Behaviour 45 23 49.9 
Adaptiveness 43 30 30.2 
Management motivation 37 13 64.9 
Human capital 37 26 29.7 
Innovation orientation 35 40 -14.3 
Forming of subsystems 35 28 20.0 
Co-ordination 35 13 62.9 
Management systems 27 36 -33.0 
Accounting and information systems 24 19 20.8 
Planning/steering/control systems 20 34 -70.0 
Existence of corporate visions 18 28 -55.6 
Cost orientation 18 34 -89.9 
Research and development 18 21 -16.7 
In ut oods 8 4 -50.0 
9.4.5 Success as a F ai lure Factor 
Success can lead to failure according to number of industry observers. The cause of 
this predicament is the inertia caused by the positive strokes of success, leading to 
resistance to change. According to Taucher this leads to over-management and high 
overhead costs. As a result, successful companies must always continue to grow and 
extend.413 
Danny Miller carried out a study that identified four trajectories that explain why 
outstanding organisations are so seduced by their success, that it leads them to 
failure. The relevance of his study to new-entrant airlines is that many of them were 
412 Op. cit. (KrUger), p. 107. 
mTaucher, George, Atler Success. What Next: Success as a Barrier to Change, European Management 
Jownal, Vol. 11, No. I, March 1993, pp. 9-17. 
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very successful in terms of growth and profits to begin with but failed as they 
matured. This kind of behaviour of successful companies was previously identified 
by Argenti, as mentioned before.414 Miller identified four trajectories, which he 
named: Focusing, Venturing, Inventing and De-coupling. The Focusing trajectory 
characterises companies which are marked by Craftsmen organisation that emphasise 
engineering culture, orderly structure, quality as a goal and quality leadership as 
strategy. Success reinforces this characteristics to the extreme through focusing 
which leads to the structure becoming rigid; the culture, technocratic; the goals, 
perfection; and the strategy, technical tinkering. Finally alienating the customers with 
perfect but irrelevant offerings. The second trajectory of Venturing converts growth-
driven 'builders' companies managed by resourceful entrepreneurs into impulsive 
greedy 'imperialistic' companies: The strategy of building becomes over-expansion, 
the goals of growth become grandeur, the culture of Entrepreneurship becomes 
gamesmanship and divisionalised structure becomes fractured. The third trajectory of 
Inventing changes 'pioneers' into utopian 'escapists': The strategy of innovation 
becomes high-tech escapism, the goals of science-for-society becomes 'technical 
utopia', the culture of R&D becomes think-tank and organic structure becomes 
chaotic. The fourth trajectory of De-coupling changes 'salesmen' organisation into a 
'drifter' organisation: A strategy of brilliant marketing becomes bland proliferation, 
the goals of market share become quarterly numbers, the culture of organisation man 
becomes insipid and political, and the structure of decentralised-bureaucratic 
b . lb· 415 ecomes oppressIve y ureaucratlc. 
The study cited above gives strong indication that positive reinforcement has come 
around due to extreme success causes overemphasis on key success factors which 
carries the company away from the very balance of resources, products and 
marketing that generated the success in the first place. 
One other aspect of success is fast growth. Excessive growth causes failure. In the 
chapter on US deregulation we found that most of the new-entrant airlines 
experienced high growth but failed nevertheless. This is according to popular view, 
due to the company outstripping its human, production and financial resources.
416 
Many rules of thumb have been assigned to what constitutes healthy vs. unhealthy 
growth, one quoted by Stockton, from Clemens of Durkee/Sharlit looks at yearly 
growth in excess of 40 percent as 'trouble' .417 At any rate, too fast gro~h will 
increase receivables and inventories relative to sales, reduce cash-flow and mcrease 
debt servicing. 
Aragon has proposed a formula (see formula 9-1) based ~n: (i) pr~fit after .taxes 
earned on each dollar sales; (ii) percentage of net income remvested m the busmess; 
414 Op. cit. (Argenti), p. 157. 
415Op. cit.(Miller), p. 5. 
116Stockion, Richard B., Symptoms of an Ailing Business, The Financial Manager, January/Februar\'. 1989, pp. 
14-2l. 
4J7 Op. cit. (Stockton), p. 18-19. Quoted from Durkee/Sharlit Associates, Los Angeles. 
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(iii) maximum amount of liabilities available or desired on each dollar of equity- and 
(iv) the dollar amount of assets needed to support one dollar of sales. 418 ' 
Growth = _-'--( M~)(-,--R--.:..)--=-(l_+_D_/ _E....:...-)_ 
(A) - (M )(R)(l + D / E) (9-1) 
Where: M - Ratio of net income to sales, R - Ratio reinvested income to income before dividends, DIE _ Ratio of total liabilities to 
net worth, A - Ratio of assets to sales. 
An other alternative method was proposed by Weston and Copeland419 based on the 
idea of sustainable dividends, 
Sustainable growth rate = T x m x L x b (9-2) 
Where: T - asset turnover, m - margin on sales, L - fmancialleverage, b - retention rate. 
Both formulas are supposed to capture the full range of the underlying management 
decision making relating to growth potential of the corporation. 
9.4.6 Human Capital and Corporate Mortality 
In most studies touching the question of the actual causes of failure, the single most 
frequently cited cause is, management. Three main facets can be intuitively inferred to 
constitute 'bad' management: (i) incompetence, that is combined by lack of 
education, experience and success relaxation(arrogance); (ii) single-mindedness, 
made up of problem denial, too much self-reliance and quick decision making that 
lacks analysis(high risk taking); and (iii) constraint, ignorance that is composed of 
poor environmental realisation, lack of delegation, poor identification of relevant 
information and over emphasis on central contro1.420 Argenti concluded that 'bad' 
management was the main cause of failure. In his book he concluded that 'bad' 
management was characterised by: (i) 'one-man' rule where one person dominated 
his colleagues rather than to lead them, he would make decisions despite their 
hostility or reticence, he will not allow discussion and will not hear any advice; (ii) 
non-participating board that is composed of individuals that will not participate in 
discussions unless it affects their own vested interest; (iii) unbalanced top team, that 
is composed of individuals from similar backgrounds( all engineers, all finance men, 
etc.); (iv) weak finance function, meaning that control systems are inadequate; (v) 
lack of management depth; and (vi) combined chairman and chief executive. 421 
There are number of warnings of imminent business failure that can be observed in 
management behaviour, according to Sharlit: Isolated, obsessed, angry, indecisive, 
418Op. cit. (Stockton), p. 19-20. Quoted from George A. Aragon. 
4l9Op. cit. (Weston & Copeland), pp. 233 - 234. 
420This last item is sometimes a cause ofunder-fmancing because share-capital will not be sought unless it \\111 
not dilute the founder's control. 
421 Op. cit. (Argenti), p. 123. 
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capricious and a workaholic executives.422 Denis Hickey confirms these observations 
through his consulting but identifies the signals as: denial, bad-luck, lack of balance, 
high life-style, follower attitude, impulsiveness, lack of values, harmful relationships 
and old age. 423 Clarence Farrar concluded after having had an experience with 
bankruptcy of own company that the early warning signals of failure were: 
management complacency, lethargy, egotism and greed. Then he alleges that sales 
deteriorate causing a chain reaction due to the central function of sales in the business 
survival. When sales decline inventory increases, as well as payables, expenses 
increase as percentage of sales and cash becomes short.424 The above accounts of 
experience, give an indication into some of the symptoms of failure from the 
management side. These management disstress symptoms can give earlier warnings 
of imminent failure, than deterioration in financial ratios. The problem with this sort 
of indicators is, however, the lack of adequate measurement devices rendering the 
use of this information in failure detection highly questionable. 
Having in mind the characteristics and symptoms of 'bad' management and 
management disstress, what constitutes then 'good' management? Duchesneau 
examined three types of factors to establish a profile of new-venture success and 
failure in an emerging industry: (i) the characteristics of the lead-entrepreneur, (ii) 
start-up processes undertaken during the founding of the firm, (iii) firm's behaviour 
after start-up, including management practices and strategic behaviours, associated 
with new venture success and failure. The research was based on 26 small young 
firms in the United States, divided into two halves one successful and the other 
unsuccessful. The research indicated that lead-entrepreneurs of successful firms had 
greater and broader business experience; (i) they believed that they had less control 
of their success in business; (ii) they work long hours; (iii) have personal investment 
in the firm and are good communicators; (iv) the successful firms were initiated with 
ambitious goals; (v) the lead entrepreneur had a clear broad business idea that was 
necessary to overcome adversity; (vi) confrontation and, sometimes, troubled 
financial situation; (vii) an effective start-up required broad planning that took into 
account all sides of the industry and the firm; (viii) they spent more time planning and 
used professionals and advisors to solve problems during start-up along with advice 
and information from suppliers and customers; (ix) they were more flexible, 
participative and adaptive; (x) the successful firms strived for growth; (xi) selected 
broad sectors of the market to sell to; (xii) and they had higher market shares that 
I d · high 425 resu te 10 er returns. 
It is obvious from the review so far that managers have quite varying styles that do 
affect their performance. According to Nahavandi's and Malekzadeh's Strategic 
422Sharlit, Ian, Tobias, Paul and Weinwrum, George F., Six Early Warnings of Business Failure, Executive 
Psychology, March 1990, pp. 26-30. 
423Hickey, Denis, Look Beyond the Balance Sheet: Behavioural Warnings of Troubled Businesses, Commercial 
Lending Review, Vol. 6, No.4, pp. 54-59. 
424Farrar, Clarence, Early Warning Signals: S)mptoms of a Troubled Company, Retail Control, March 1990, 
pp. 10-13. 
4250p. cit. (Duchesneau), pp. 302-304. 
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Leadership Dimensions (SLD) there are four types of leaders, charted along two 
dimensions. Low challenge-seeking leader avoids risk and seeks to maintain the 
current state of affairs. This he accomplishes by initiating only strategies that require 
minimal change. Challenge-seeking leader, on the other hand, is risk taking, 
entrepreneurial and future oriented. On the other dimension, control, a leader 
exercising low control will emphasise employee involvement tolerance and the 
encouragement of diversity. In contrast, if a leader maintains high control he 
maintains high centralisation and little delegation. Such high centralisation will 
reduce employee participation and diversity.426 These management types can 
obviously provide a very effective generalised way of classifying executives of firms 
into four groups. However, it could be that different company situations crave for 
different 'types' of managers. For example, a highly innovative technology firm may 
need Type II manager in order to unleash the staffs' creativity in order stay 
competitive. An other type of firm could be that of a financially distressed company 
in air transportation that needs to tum-around. In such a situation a Type I manager 
would be needed in order to force cost cuts through and implement the necessary 
changes to restum the company to profitability. In fact it could be an option in some 
situations to alter the types of top leaders according to the situation at hand, given 
the constraints of necessary stability. 
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An other dimension in the leader influence on success or failure of a company is his 
experience, often rpresented by age. Peter Preisendorfer and Thomas Voss 
researching German registrations and de-registrations ~ou~1 tha~ there. is a .co~vex 
relationship between founders age and company mortalIty. This rel~t1~nship IS an 
indicator of other variables that are associated with the age factor, but It IS clear that 
founder's age as such does not affect a firm's mortality directly. In order to establish 
426Nahavandi, Afsaneh, Leader Style in Strategy and Organizational Perfonnance: An Integrative Framework, 
JOWllal of Management Studies, Vol. 30, No.3, May 1993, p. 414. 
427Op. cit. (Nahavandi), p. 415. 
42Rpeter Preisendorfer and Thomas Voss, Organisational Mortality of Small Firms: The Effects of 
Entrepreneurial Age and Human Capital, Organisation Studies, Vol. 11, No. L 1990, pp. 107-129. 
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such linkage a pure physical or mental relationship would have to be found. 429 This 
research indicates that there is an underlying factor that affects company failures. It 
can ~e conclu~ed,. however, that management style does change with age as 
expenence sets ln, hke the findings by Preisendorfer's and Voss support .. 
Some theories state that firms will decline and eventually fail regardless of human 
influence, just like all organism that go through a life-cycle. 
Next section will reveal these theories as they have been applied to organisations. 
9.5 Organisational Life-cycle Theories 
9.5.1 The Organisational Life-cycle Concept 
Theories stating that companies have a life-cycle are similar to the product-life cycle 
concept. The life-cycle concept is derived from ecology theory that originates with 
Darwin and Herbert Spencer that applied his theory to the evolution of social 
organisations. 43o Many studies have been made in order to chart the characteristics of 
the different organisational life-cycle stages. A table in Appendix-N summarises a 
number of these studies. 
The reason for associating the life-cycle concept to organisational failure is that if we 
assume that organisations have the same traits as organisms, there will be birth, 
maturity and decline leading to death. Researchers have found that organisations 
seem to follow this trait in most aspects, although the life-time span is very different 
from living organisms. In fact a corporation can extend its lifetime, in theory, 
indefinitely it adapts to its environment perfectly. The fact of the matter is, however, 
that inefficiencies are created with age due to rigid 'old ways' and employee 
shielding,431 that limit the efficiency of the organisation leading to its inevitable 
decline. 
The behaviour of organisations is then characterised much by their size and age, a 
factor that has to be recognised in research on corporate failure processes. These 
characteristics are charted in the table in Appendix-N. The important attribute to 
recognise is that growth can cause serious conflicts within the organisation if it is 
429The researchers conclude that since the youngest and the oldest account for the highest mortality rates it is 
doubtful whether entrepreneurship and self-employment can be effective antidotes against unemployment. 
This conclusion shows that the researchers do not recognise the employment potential of some of the start-
ups that become successful and eventually very large employers. The fact of the matter is that renewal of 
the business flora has to come from start-ups and spin-offs. Therefore, the age related matching with 
business mortality can only be a linked as source of further research but not to make political conclusions 
like the researchers have found urge to present. 
430 David R. Hampton, et aI., Organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management, 4th. ed., Scott, 
Foresman and Co., pp. 813-814. 
4~1 Layoffs are sensitive in organisations so if the organisation does not pro:ide for constan~ education ~d 
training of employees it \\;11 accumulate inefTcctive staff that are pushe~ ill.tO no~-productl:e roles, while 
others have to be hired to do what needs to be done. Thus, the orgarusatlon W111 suffer from employee 
'inflation' with age. 
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~ery fast. The reason being that size in terms of employees requires dramatic changes 
10 terms of motivation, communication and overview of management. Such 
adaptation is often behind causing serious problems for organisations that grow 
exceptionally fast. 
It is possible to hypothesise that an organisation's decline is also linked to its market 
decline rather than its internal decline solely. The PIMS program has features in order 
to chart the life-cycle of markets and concludes that markets show life-cycle 
characteristics. According to the PIMS program markets show erratic behaviour of 
growth in infancy and instability in technology, market structure and competition 
strategy, followed by rapid growth after a company shake-out. Then there is a period 
of maturity and stability that can last for long or short period depending on the 
characteristics of the product. Finally the markets will decline because of the 
introduction of new products, superior technology or changing life-styles (needs).432 
One would of course expect that responsive management would, through innovation, 
offer new products in order to reduce the impact of declining markets on the 
organisation. That is precisely one of the factors that effectively distinguishes 
between successful and declining firms, according to research conducted by Danny 
Miller and Peter Friesen. They concluded, in a study based on the life-cycle 
concept:433 (i) that steady increases in information processing and decision making 
sophistication occurred at least until the revival phase; (ii) that successful companies 
have more decision making complexity, especially in analysis, multiplexity and 
integration; and (iii) that the successful phases had higher level of innovation-related 
activity with the exception of risk taking.434,435 
In addition to the research mentioned already, one can not exclude Eric G. Flamholtz, 
that uses the life-cycle 436 concept to explain why firms run into problems as they 
grow. He concludes that many firms develop an organisational development gap, 
which he names 'growing pains'. The gap can occur for two reasons, namely too fast 
growth or poor adaptation of infrastructure to size increases. His findings list the five 
'most common organisational growing pains' as: (i) employees' feeling of being 
unable to cover their daily tasks; (ii) constant firefighting; (iii) lack of communication; 
(iv) lack of vision; and (v) few good managers being around.437 
432Op. cit. (PIMS) p. 54. 
433In their study they divided the life-cycle into the following phases: Birth phase, growth phase, maturity 
phase, revival phase and decline phase. 
434Their study showed in the successful periods there is high level of risk taking in the b~-pha~e, but the 
opposite is true for the decline phase where the unsuccessful companies are more prone to nsk taking. 
435 Miller, Danny and Friesen, Peter H., Successful and Unsuccessful Phases of the Corporate Life Cycle. 
Organizational Studies, Vol. 4, 1983, pp. 235-236. 
436His life-cycle stages are seven: (1) New-venture, (ii) Expansi?n,.(iii~ Professionalization, (iv) Consolidation, 
(v) Diversification, (vi) Integration, and (vii) Decline and reVItahzatIOn. 
437Eric G. Framholtz, Growing Pains: How to Make the Transition from an Entrepreneurship to a 
Professionally Managed Firm. Jossey - Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1990, pp. 53-5 .. L 
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Gap = Growing Pains 
Many differing views are on the number of stages and what characteristics they have. 
However, the table in Appendix-N shows in the first column an aggregated life-cycle 
model that gives an indication of what is to be expected at each stage. 
9.6 Conclusion 
There is a considerable relationship between a firm's age and likelihood of 
bankruptcy. This relationship is an indicator of causal relationship, like 
underfinancing, inexperience, diminished interest of founder and so on. There is also 
an established relationship between macroeconomic variables like interest rate, 
deregulation of industries, recession and increased competition intensity, and failure. 
It is important to distinguish between the symptoms and causes of failure. Symptoms 
of failure as represented by deteriorating financial ratios has had relatively high profile 
in the academia, while research on the actual causes has lagged behind. The causal 
relationship is complex and dynamic. 
Most researchers on failure as well as specialists, like venture capitalists and company 
'doctors' agree on general management being the main cause of failure. The 
literature provides, however, few well established systematically researched 
conclusions on what constitutes 'bad' management. Argenti provided explanations, 
but they lack adequate confirmation by research. 
The most frequently cited causes of failure are (i) improper pricing; (ii) high gearing; 
(iii) insufficient working capital; (iv) over-dependence on one customer; (v) 
management inexperience; (vi) unbalanced top team; and (vii) inadequate control 
systems. Company insolvency specialists have cited inadequate participation of non-
executive directors as a leading cause of company problems escalating out of hand. 
438Op. cit. (Flamholtz), p. 48. 
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A number of studies have been conducted on what characterises successful 
companies. Such studies usually lack rigour in research design making their 
conclusions obsolete as soon as some of the 'successful' companies become 
'unsuccessful' although they still apply the apparent 'successful ways'. This implies 
that researchers have not discovered any underlying principles of success. 
The PIMS Program has come up with number of fmdings, but one of the most 
important ones is that relative quality is highly important and one of the foundations 
of low market-share businesses earning profits. Furthermore, the program does not 
look at market-share as cause of profitability on its own, but rather that a 
combination of features like high quality and low cost bringing about increases in 
market-share, which in-tum will increase profits further. 
Growth plays an important role in failure. As very fast growth will outstrip the 
company of its resources, especially, financial resources. 
Management's personal traits are an important factor in company failure. The 
problem of facing the failure sometimes leads to 'blocking' that sinks the company 
deeper into problems before help is sought. Personal factors like lack of education, 
lack of experience, too much self-reliance, jumping to conclusions (lack of analysis) 
and problem denial, are all factors that contribute to failure. 
A German study found a convex relationship between founder age and 
deregistrations. Thus, initiations of companies seem to be for different reasons and 
affected by different factors and intensity according to founder age. The physical or 
mental relationship between age and company mortality has not been established. 
Corporations seem to go through a life-cycle, although, decline can sometimes be 
avoided or companies revitalised. The life-cycle concept is important as it shows that 
fewer and fewer companies exist in a population established at a given year, as time 
passes. The, theory, does not prove, however, that all companies or organisations for 
that matter will eventually die. In fact a company having perfect ability to adapt to its 
environment will survive indefinitely, although, such company may not necessarily 
exist in reality. Furthermore, an adaptable company may be engaged in a totally 
different business after 50 years from foundation. 
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10. Failure Prediction Models 
10.1 Empirical Research On Failure Prediction 
10.1.1 Introduction 
What is the purpose of constructing a failure prediction model, one may ask. A 
failure prediction model can be used by financial institutions in order establish the 
viability of making a loan to a specific company or to assess the financial health of a 
company in order to calculate the likelihood of recovering the loan. Furthermore, 
prediction models can be used as a warning system in order to initiate change or pro-
active turnaround. The latter case is where the problems start. If a empirically 
derived failure prediction model indicates that a company is highly likely to fail, the 
very same model does not indicate in any way 'what' has gone wrong, as the model is 
based on financial ratios that are symptomatic rather than causal by nature. Examples 
are known were managers with such knowledge have tried to improve the ratios in 
various ways without addressing the real problems. There are also examples of the 
use offailure prediction models to focus managers' attention on the real problems.439 
As a result, it is of much interest whether models can be developed that are based on 
variables that are more indicative as to the cause of firms' problems or wellbeing. 
10.1.2 Theory Formulation 
Failure prediction models are in most cases purely empirical and lack theory on which 
the selection of predictive variables is based. Robertson suggested anterior 
determinants of failure: trading stability, declining profits, declining working capital 
and increase in borrowings. He suggested also market share patterns as indicators of 
company health: market size, market share variance and market share in relation to 
growing, stagnant or shrinking market. 440 
Many unobservable factors exist that influence the vulnerability of an individual firm, 
which is a drawback of any methodology used to model a phenomenon with limited 
data. These factors may include the unmeasured qualities of assets, the ability of 
management to perform well under new and adverse circumstances, random events in 
either the internal or external environments, and activities of regulators and courts of 
law. An econometric model containing only financial statement information would 
43l)Edward 1. Altman, Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., pp. 272-
277. 
440 1. Robertson, Research Directions in Financial Ratio Analysis, Management Accounting, 1984. 
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not provide highly accurate classification of failed and non-failed firms. Martin, 
discussing bank failure, recognised this fact: 
These excluded variables (most of which cannot be directly observed) 
determine how vulnerable, in terms of the included variables, a bank 
would have to be in order to fail' .441 
Zavgren reinforces Martin's conclusion in her research: 
These factors determine for each firm a critical level of vulnerability, or a 
'tolerance for vulnerability,' above which the firm will fail.442 
The classification error of failure prediction models can be explained partially by the 
fact that company's are dynamic identities that can at any time return to profitability 
due to management change process or extraordinary circumstances. In view of that 
fact there will always be misclassification. This is not pertinent to the statistical 
process as it takes into account only misclassification of companies that are actually 
non-failed and failed. 
10.1.3 The Use of Ratios 
The financial ratios applied in most of the studies differ as each sample set has 
differing characteristics. However, the use of ratios as such is important to control 
for the systematic effect of size on the variables under observation. The control of 
size is for two main reasons; (i) to control for the increased size of individual 
components of the ratio over the years, like increase in equity; and (ii) to fulfil the 
requirements of the statistical technique employed. 443 
There is relatively little conformity on what ratios are the best indicators of failure as 
Table 10-1, indicates. The studies cited in the table show that the sample drives the 
selection of ratios in such a way that only two identical ratios are used in more than 
two models and six ratios are used in two models. 
441 Daniel Martin, Early Warnings of Bank Failure, Journal of Banking and Finance, 1977, p. 257. 
442Christine V. Zavgren, The Prediction of Corporate Failure: The State of The Art, Journal of ACCOlll1ting 
Literature Vol. 2, 1983, p. 25. 
14'Baruch Lev and Shyam Sunder, Methodological Issues in The Use of Financial Ratios, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 1, 1979, pp. 187-188. 
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Table 10-1 Occurrence of Ratios Used in Failure Prediction in Five Studies444 
Ratio 
Cash flow /total debt 
Quick assets446/current liabilities 
Cash/total assets 
Current assets447/current liabilities448 
Inventory/sales 
Net income/total assets 
Total debt/total assets 
Current assets/total assets 




Current liabilities/current assets 
Current liabilities! equity 
Debt/total capital 
Dummy variable for total assets> total liabilities 
Earnings before interest and taxes/total assets 
Equity/sales 
Funds flow/current liabilities 
Funds from operations/total liabilities 
Log (total assets/GNP price level index) 
Market value equitylbook value of total debt 
Net income/total assets 
Net quick assets/inventory 
Net working capitallsales 
No credit interval 
Quick assets/sales 
Quick assets/total assets 
Quick flow ratio 
Rate of return to equity 
Receivables/inventory 
Retained earnings/total assets 
Sales/net plant 
Sales/total assets 
Total income/total capital 
Total liabilities/total assets 
Variability and trend of net income 
Variability and trend of net quick assets/inventory 
Working capitallsales 
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Beaver came up with a theory of ratio analysis based on a cash-flow model which 
was employed to explain the results of the ratio test. He looked at the company as a 
system of inflows and outflows and defined the solvency of a firm to be when the 
444Sources: Deakin, Edward B., A Discriminant Analysis of Predictors of Business Failure, Journal of 
ACCOWlting Research, Spring 1972, pp. 167-179. Beaver, W., Financial Ratios as Predictors of 
Failure, Empirical Research in AccoWlting: Selected Studies, 1966, supplement to vol. 5, Journal of 
ACCOWlting Research, pp. 71-111. Edmister, R., An Empirical Test of Financial Ratio Analysis for Small 
Business Failure Prediction, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, March 1972, pp. 1477-1493. 
Blum, M., Failing Company Discriminant Analysis, Journal of AccOlmting Research, Spring 1974, pp. 1-25. 
James A. Ohlson, Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy, Journal of ACCOWlting 
Research, Vol. 18 No.1, Spring 1980. 
44'~Net cash flow: Profit after tax plus depreciation plus increases in deferred tax minus dividends. 
44°Quick assets: Current assets less stock. 
447 Current assets: Stock, debtors and cash. 
448Current liahilities: Liabilities due for payment within one year following the balance sheet data. 
44QWorking capital: Current assets less current liahilities. 
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outflo~s exceeded the inflows.45o As a result of this framework he put forward the 
followmg cash-flow based propositions: 
1. The larger the reservoir, the smaller the probability of failure. 
[applies to liquid assets] 
2. The larger the net liquid-asset flow from operations (i.e., cash 
flow), the smaller the probability of failure. 
3. The larger the amount of debt held, the greater the probability of 
failure. 
4. The larger the fund expenditures for operations, the greater the 
probability of failure. 451 
The propositions lack the element of relativity as he states 'amount' rather than 
'proportion' to some indicators like sales. This is of course established with the 
ratios in his analysis but should be emphasised in the propositions as well. Beaver in 
his study and Blum in a separate study both apply cash-flow based theories to their 
ratio analysis. 452 
Ratio analysis does have its pitfalls that are important to address in any research using 
that methodology. Morley talks about five main dangers: (i) ignorance of accounting 
policies; (ii) disregarding of the unique characteristics of the industry; (iii) improper 
comparisons; (iv) technical errors in constructing ratios; ( v) and relying exclusively 
on ratios.453 The first point, ignorance of accounting policies constitutes, for example, 
comparison of firms: using different accounting policies, from different countries, 
applying different depreciation schedules and so on. The second point does not apply 
to this project as the comparison is only on airlines in the USA. The third, point does 
not apply as the comparison will only be in terms of probability of failure and not a 
comparison of the financial ratios themselves. The fourth, pitfall is basically to 
observe what should be used as numerator and denominator during calculations. The 
fifth point, is not to rely exclusively on ratios but to research the accounts to check 
for possible 'window dressing', which involves major transactions just before the 
balance sheet date. 454 
Non-financial ratios have been used in number of failure prediction models but are 
usually pseudo-financial or accounting procedure linked. Keasey and Watson tested 
18 non-financial variables and found that companies with few directors, longer than 
average submission lags of financial statements and had secured loans held by banks, 
were more susceptible to failures. Furthermore, companies were more likely to fail if 
450Op. cit. (Beaver), p. 79-80. 
451Op. cit. (Beaver), p. 80. 
452M. Blwn, Failing Company Discriminant Analysis, Journal of Accounting Research, Spring 1974, pp. 1-25. 
Blwn applies theory to his ratio analysis based on cash-flow. 
453Morley, Michael F., Ratio Analysis, Gee & Co Ltd, 1984, p. 35. 
·l~·l Op. cit., Morley, p. 35-B. 
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they had received an audit qualification in their last report. 455 On the basis of Keasey 
and Watson, Innes~ Aitken and Mitchell derived a set of non-financial variables along 
. ·1 1· 456 sImI ar meso The non-financial variables employed in the above models do not 
address the underlying causes of failure but address symptoms like the financial 
ratios. In that regard the findings are of limited value if one excludes the possible 
increase in failure predictability. 
There is one question that remains to be answered, why one does not simply refer to 
analysis of the means of ratios for segregating a sample of firms into the two groups 
failed and non-failed? To answer this can refer to Beaver457 and A1tman458 two of , 
the early researchers in field of bankruptcy prediction. Beaver used univariate ratio 
analysis to classify corporations into failed and non-failed groups. Altman, on the 
other hand, concluded that the univariate approach would not provide comprehensive 
profile of the firm when each individual ratio was assessed independently. Multiple 
linear discrimination (MDA) on the other hand combined those ratios, having 
optimum discrimination powers, into a single formula that could be used to predict 
bankruptcy of non-sample companies. In that sense MDA and logistic regression 
analysis are superior to univariate analysis. 
In view of the reasoning above, discrimination models, are superior to simple analysis 
of the means, taking into account the more complex relationship of the variables and 
returning this relationship in near optimum discrimination function. The statistical 
methodology of failure prediction will therefore be analysed in the next section. 
10.1.4 Statistical Methodology 
The first attempts to develop a statistically based model to distinguish between failed 
and non-failed companies for the purpose of making inferences about non-included 
individuals were by Beaver using Univariate Ratio Analysis (URA) in 1966 and 
Altman in 1968 using multiple Discriminant analysis (MDA). Some research on the 
subject appeared prior to World War 2. Two of those showed differing ratio 
measurements for failed and non-failed companies. 459 
455Keasey and Watson, Non-Financial Symptoms and the Prediction of Small Company Failure: A Test of 
Argenti's Hypotheses, Journal of Business Finance and ACCOlll1ting, Autumn 1987, pp. 335-354. 
456hmes, John., Colin Aitken and Falconer Mitchell, Prediction of Small Company Failure, Credit 
Management, September 1991, pp. 37-42. This article is a description of a pilot project and results 
therefore not fully developed. 
457 William Beaver, Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure, Journal of Accounting Research, Jan 1967, Vol. 
5, pp. 71-111. 
458As reported in C. V. Zavgren, The Prediction of Corporate Failure: The State of The Art, Journal of 
Accounting Literature, Vol. 2,1983, p. 15. 
lWCited in Altman(l968) p. 590: RF. Smith and A. H. Winakor, Changes in the Financial Structure of 
Successful Corporations., University of lllinois: Bureau of Business Research, 1935., and C. Merwin, 
Financing Small Corporations, New York: Bureau of Economic Research, 1942. 
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Beaver used a matched sample of 158 companies 79 failed and 79 non-failed to 
construct a URA model. This use of matched samples is frequent in financial ratio 
analysis for corporate bankruptcy prediction in order to reduce the bias caused by 
dissimilarity between companies in the sample in terms of size, geographic location, 
turnover and industry category. The URA method was applied in the way of 
arranging the 30 ratios for the firms segregated by the dichotomous variable. Then 
he visually determined the cut-off point that minimised the percentage of incorrect 
predictions. 460 As mentioned before, this methodology lacked in terms of 
representing complex relationship between the variables under observation. This 
apparent lack was addressed by Altman in his research. Altman pioneered the use of 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) to distinguish between failed and non-failed 
companies in 1968. MDA is a statistical method used to distinguish between 
dichotomous variables, failure versus non-failure in our case. The variables in this 
model were based on financial ratios. F or further account on ratios and their 
selection please see Section 10.1.3. 
Figure 10-1 MDA Statistical Methodology461 
A 
y 
~ ____________ -= __ ~~~___________________________________________ x 
z 
The MDA concept is described in the plot in Figure 10-1, that was presented by 
Edminster. It shows a group of data segregated into two groups, failed (I) and non-
failed companies (II). The two variables X and Y are positively correlated, thus, 
intersecting at A. Z is drawn perpendicular to A. The points in the X and Y space 
can then be projected to Z and the resulting Normal Curve shows the overlap 
between the two distributions. Point b segregates the space into two regions whose 
probability is membership in either group I or II. The Discriminant function is 
represented by ~ that is located on Z. 
Altman's sample was composed of 66 manufacturing companies that were s~gre~ated 
into two groups failed and non-failed. The firms in the sample were operatmg m the 
460Op. cit.(Beaver), pp. 83-85. 
4<» Source: Robert O. Edminster, An Empirical Test of Financial Ratio Analysis for Small Business Failure 
Prediction, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, March,1972, p. 1483. 
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US during 1946 to 1965 and half of those had filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 10 
of the National Bankruptcy Act and had mean asset size of $6.4 million ranging from 
$0.7 to $25.9 million. The sample was paired, recognising the differences in asset 
size and industry, using stratification based on size and industry. The data was 
derived from financial statements one year ('reporting period') prior to bankruptcy.462 
Altman included twenty two ratios from which five were finally selected as the 
greatest discriminators of the dichotomous dependent variable. 
The model took the form 
Z = .021X 1 + .014X2 + .033X3 + .006X4 + .999X5 (10-1) 
where Z is the overall index and Xl is Working Capital/Total Assets, X2 Retained EamingslTotal Assets, X3 Earnings Before 
Interest and TaxeslTotal Assets, X4 Market Value ofEquitylBook Value of Total Debt, and Xs is Sales!Total Assets. 
These ratios were empirically selected from the set of twenty two as the best 
discriminators of the dichotomous variable. In evaluating the statistical significance 
of the Discriminant function Altman used: (i) traditional evaluation of the statistical 
significance; (ii) intercorrelation among the discriminating variables; (iii) predictive 
accuracy of the Discriminant function; and (iv) researcher's judgement. 463 
The principal aim in failure prediction is to reduce the misc1assification error of the 
models in order to increase the predictability of the model. This feature of the 
models can be tested on a hold out sample that represents a similar characteristics as 
the sample on which the model is based. 
A summary by Zavgren, appears in Table 10-2, that shows the classification error of 
Altman's model increases three years prior to failure, in comparison to the rest of the 
models. However, Deakin's probabilistic model shows better results in terms of 
misclassification, especially more than one year from failure. Wilcox reported good 
results as well based on his theoretical Gambler-ruin model, discussed in Section 
10.3, having 24 percent overall error rate five years prior to failure, while Altman's 
model had 64 percent, Beaver's 22 percent, Deakin 17 percent and Blum 17 percent. 
462E. Altman, Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy, The Journal 
of Finance, Sept. 1968, pp 589-609. 
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Misclassification Rates of Representative Bankruptcy Prediction 
Studies464 
Altman Deakin Diamond Wilcox Blum 
MDA Prob. MDA Pattem-recogn. Gambler-ruin 465 MDA466 
(3) (2) (3) (5)(6) 
Type Overall Type (4) Type Overall Type (1) (8) (9) Overall 
I II I II Overall I II I II 
% % % % % 
(13%) 22 5 (27%) (4) (21) (22%) (9%) (3) (10) (5%) 






(21%) 34 8 (6%) (15%) (21)15) (20%) (16)(24) 
2 18% 18% 28 6 41;2% 3 6 10 12 18 12% 
(23%) 36 8 (12%) (20%) (20X20) (30%) (29) (32) 
3 21% 52% 41;2% 6 3 12 21 22 20°0 
(24%) 47 3 (23%) (20%) (12) (26) 
4 24% 71% 21% 16 25 10 14 25 14°0 
(22%) 42 4 (15%) (31<l0) (33) (29) 
5 22% 64% 17% 25 9 24 30 28 17% 
(1) Figures m parentheses test agamst holdout sample. Figures not m parentheses are tested agamst same sample from which dichotomous 
classification test was estimated. 
(2) Type I error is misclassifying a failed fIrm. Type II error is misclassifYing a non-failed fIrm. 
(3) Type I and II errors were only presented for the fIrst two years. 
(4) Figures in parentheses represent test against randomly selected sample. Figures not in parentheses represent test against sample from 
which discrimination function was estimated. 
(5) Results from using the Discriminant plane with Bayesian predictor. Prior probabilities of failure and non-failure are set at 10"10 and 90"/0 
respectively, and cost of Type I errors assumed to be 38 times the cost of Type II error. ' 
(6) Figures in parentheses indicate validation was performed against an (n-l) holdout sample. 
(7) Reported by Wilcox. Type I and II errors were not reported. 
(8) Replication by Kinney using a restricted subset of data. 
(9) Discriminant analyses conducted by Kinney on Wilcox's data. 
(10) Error rates based on Discriminant function for four years of data. 
In the years following Beaver's and Altman's work, an ongoing process took place 
where attempts were made to improve the predictability of the models. In 1977 
Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan published an improvement of Altman's original 
model. In the new model fifty three bankrupt and fifty eight non-bankrupt firms were 
used, of those, sixty one were manufacturing firms and fifty were retail firms. It is 
worth attention that the model mixes two industries, a practice that must be 
considered controversial in bankruptcy prediction. Classification accuracy rose 
considerably from the previous model. The overall classification error for the linear 
model was 7.2 percent one year prior to failure, 11 percent for the holdout sample 
two years prior to failure, 16.5 percent for the holdout sample three years prior, 20.2 
percent for the holdout sample four years prior and 23.2 percent for the holdout 
I fi ".c. "I 467 samp e ve years pnor to lal ure. 
Edminster reached quite good results in his model that utilised dummy variables to 
indicate upward or downward trend in ratios. Thus, requiring three consecutive 
464 Source: Clrristine V. Zavgren, The Prediction of Corporate Failure: The State of Art, Journal of Accounting 
Literature, Vol. 2, 1983, p. 4. 
46:'iUpdate of the original model based on linear gambler's ruin model where the score is defmed by lOX + N, 
which indicated a firm's distance from the best diagonal line in X N space. (Sourcc: Altman ,1993, p. 234) 
4<>OBIlll11 did not utilise searching to determine the ratios for the prediction model. He used a concept of ratio 
selection like Beaver based on the firm being 'a reservoir of fmancial resources \\ith the probability of 
failure being expressed in terms of expected cash flows.' (Source: Altman 1993, p. 224.) 
467 Altman, Edward I., Robert G. Haldeman and P. Narayanan, Zeta Analysis A new model to identifv 
bankruptcy risk of corporations, Journal of banking and fmance, Vol. 1, p. 38. 
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financial statements to predict failure, while Altman, Beaver and Blum concluded that 
only one was needed. 
10.1.5 The LOgistic Regression Methodology 
The third frequently used statistical method for failure prediction is Logistic 
Regression Analysis (LRA). It estimates a logistic regression equation and then uses 
a critical level of Z to distinguish between the two classes: failed or non-failed. 
Collins and Green find the logistic method to have much more theoretical appeal to 
bankruptcy prediction, than MDA. One of the reasons, according to them, is that 
the logistic cumulative distribution function is a 'sigmoid curve' (S-curve) that has 
the 'threshold' trait that bankruptcy forecasting problem logically needs. 
Furthermore, they mention the fact that the LRA formulation is more robust to 
distribution assumptions due to the possibility of several distribution assumptions. 468 











Critical region of failure 
3 
The determination of the 'threshold' is important, as if the probability score falls 
along the lower bend of the curve, p (0 to .2) the probability of failure is practically 
zero, however, if the score passes the bend and falls along the growth section of the 
curve, p (0.2 to 0.5), the probability of failure increases dramatically. There is, 
however, little increase in the probability of failure as the change in the ratio falls 
along the upper bend of the curve p (0.8 to 1). Thus, the 'breaking' point falls 
somewhere in the middle of the growth section of the curve p ( 0.5), for example. 
The logistic regression function produces a Z ~alue th~t is trans~o~ed by the 
probability function into a probability. The Z IS the hnear combinatIOn of the 
resulting model. The function takes the form, 
1 
P (failure ) = -z 
1 + e 
(10-2) 
where. 
Z =BO + Bl Xl + B2X2 + ............. + BpXp 
e = 2.718 (the base of the natura11ogaritbins) 
468Collins, Robert A. and Green, Richard D., Statistical Methods for Bankruptcy Forecasting, Journal of 
Economics and Business, Vol. 34, p.351-352. 
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Logistic regression, applied to failure prediction, has the advantage of having few of 
the proble~s of:MDA analysis. Ohlson states, nevertheless, that certain discipline in 
data .collectIOn has to be adhered to. For example, the data has to be available prior 
to fallure so that the model can be evaluated realistically. 469 
Many deviations, additions and improvements have occurred in the methodology 
described in this section, too many to cover in this thesis. The basic conclusion has 
to be, though, that these advances have not moved the understanding of failure 
processes much, but rather improved the statistical methodology in segregating the 
two states in the dichotomous variable. 
Due to the good statistical qualities of the probabilistic :MDA, through the Logistic 
Regression technique and good reported results by Deakin and other researchers, it 
was decided to use that technique for model construction in the thesis. 
10.2 Alternative Failure Prediction Models 
10.2.1 Catastrophe Theory 
The Catastrophe Theory (CT) is an attempt to describe, in mathematical terms, a 
discontinuous behaviour in a system. The theory is an approximation of an situation 
where a continuous change in independent variables causes a discontinuous change in 
the dependent variable. The theory has been applied to corporate bankruptcies by 
Scapens et aI., Francis et al and Gregory-Allen and Henderson. The first study used 
CT to show the relationship between accounting data and behavioural responses of 
creditors. Their results showed CT's explanatory ability rather than predictive 
capacity and that variable identification was crucial but problematic. The second 
study included exogenous forces on the model and is unlike other CT bankruptcy 
studies for that sake. In other terms the two studies yield similar models and 
results. 470 The third study was based on Francis and concluded that there was a 
strong indication of parameter shift and that the presence of the shifts along with 
heteroscedasticity is consistent with CT.471 
All models are composed of one 'state' variable (X), one 'normal' variable(N) and 
one 'splitting' variable(S). The selection of only three variables is according to the 
'cusp' model that requires all selected variables to be collapsed into the three main 
variables. The three variables define the three dimensional space within which the 
system behaves. 
469Op. cit. (Ohlson) p. 113. 
470Scabens, Robert W., Robert J. Ryan, and Leslie Fletcher, Explaining Corporate Failure: A Catastrophe 
Theory Approach, Journal of Business Finance and ACCOllllting, Vol.: 8, Spring 1981, pp. 1 -26., and 
Francis, Jack C., Harold M. Hastings and Frank J. Fabozzi, Bankruptcy as a Mathematical Catastrophe, 
Research in Finance, Vol. 4, 1983, pp. 63-89 . 
. P1Gregory-Allen, Russell B. and Glenn V. Henderson, Jr., A Brief Revie\\ of Catastrophe Theol)' and a Test in 
a Corporate Failure Conte:\.i, The Financial Review, Vol. 26, No.2, May 1991, pp. 127-155. 
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The Catastrophe Theory is an important addition to the bankruptcy prediction 
methodology although it does not add to the understanding of the failure process. 
10.2.2 Neural Networks 
Neural nets were proposed and researched as early as the 50s and 60s but were at 
that time found to be limited due to their limited learning ability. Advancement in the 
field has caused increased interest in the applicability of such networks for number of 
differing fields, among those is corporate failure prediction. 472 
The neural net is composed of interconnected computation devices that can be 
represented as mathematical functions. Rumelhart et al., proposed the following 
function 473 
Ii = L jW ijOj+ CPi (10-3), 
where 
Ii = input of unit i, 
o i = output of unit i, 
W ij = connection weight between unit i and j, 
tPl = bias of unit i. 
and 1 o i = 1 + e Ii (10-3) 
The function works as described by Tam and Kiang: 'A unit i receives input signals 
from other units, aggregates these signals based on input function Ii , and generates 
an output signal based on an output function OJ (sometimes called a transfer 
function). The output signal is then routed to other units as directed by the topology 
of the network. ,474 
Table 10-3 Comparison of Mis classification Rates of Various Models475 
% 
One- ear Prior Two- ear Prior 
Model T e I II T I II T 
DA Multivariate Discrimination Analysis 18.2 13.6 (15.9) 30.0 5.0 (17.5) 
Logit Logistical Regression Analysis 31.8 4.5 (18.2) 15.0 0.0 (7.5) 
INN k Nearest Neighbour 40.9 4.6 (22.8) 20.0 25.0 (22.5) 
3NN k Nearest Neighbour 36.4 9.1 (22.8) 30.0 10.0 (20.0) 
ID3 Decision Tree 22.7 18.2 (20.5) 40.0 5.0 (22.5) 
Neto Neural Network no hidden units 31.8 4.5 (18.2) 20.0 12.6 (16.3) 
Net Neural Network 10 hidden units 18.2 11.4 14.8 2.5 20.0 11.3 
Tam and Kiang found in a misclassification test on a hold-out sample of 44 banks (22 
failed and 22 non-failed) in one and two year periods, that the neural net remained the 
best classifier in terms of few type II errors and total errors. This can be observed in 
4720ne development was the back propagation learning algorithm to train a multilayered network that can 
reproduce the XOR fimction. 
m Source as reported in: Kar Yan Tam and Melody Y. Kiang, Managerial Applications of Neural Networks: 
The Case of Bank Failure Predictions, Management Science, Vol. 38, No.7, July 1992, p. 929 
474Op. cit. (Tam and Kiang), p. 929. 
~7.'iOp. cit. (Tam and Kiang), p. 940. 
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Table 10-3, where the Neural-Network representing 10 hidden units achieved the 
second lowest total error rate of 11.3 percent, compared to a low 7.5 percent of the 
Logistic Regression model applied on the same data. 
Now that empirical and artificial intelligence models have been explored, it is not out 
of the way to examine, perhaps the most important source of models, those based on 
theory. 
10.3 Theoretical Models Failure Models 
10.3.1 Introduction 
There are number of simple theoretical models that have been developed on 
corporate failure. A simple model cited by J. Scott assumes that a firm goes bankrupt 
if its debt exceeds the liquidation value, stated as 
(10-4) 
where, D] is the debt and V] is a random variable of the finn's value at a end of period. 476 
Thus if the bankruptcy is specified on the Normal Curve the firm will go bankrupt if 
O'v O'v 
(10-5) 
where IJv is a location parameter, and 0v as scale parameter. 
The gamblers ruin models proposed by Borch,477 Tinsley,478 Wilcox,479 Santomero 
and Vinso 480 is based on a capital variable that changes randomly according to 
positive or negative effects on the firm's cash flow from operations. When the firm 
encounters negative effect on K it has to liquidate assets until K becomes negative at 
which stage it goes bankrupt, stated as 
J.1 z + K 
(J (10-6) 
476 James Scott, The Probability of Bankruptcy: A Comparison of Empirical Predictions and Theoretical 
Models, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 5, 1981, p. 326. 
477K. Borch, The theory of risk, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 1967. 
478p. Tinsley, Capital structure, precautionary balances, and valuation of the fIrm: The problem of fmancia1 
risk, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1970. 
4791. Wilcox, A Gambler's ruin prediction of business failure using accounting data, Sloan Management 
Review, Spring, 1971. 
4ROSantomero, A and 1. Vinso, Estimating the probability of failure for fIrms in the banking s! stem, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Sept. 1977. 
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where K is the stockholder's equity and JJz the mean and 0 .. the standard dc,iation of the nex1 
period's change in retained earnings. "-
Models with perfect access to external capital assume that stockholders do not need 
to sell assets in order to meet losses but can sell debt or equity instead. Thus stated as 
J1 x + S 
ax 
(10-7) 
where S is the market value of equity and JJx is the mean, and Ox the standard deviation of next 
period's net income. 
If the firm has imperfect access to external capital, the model takes the form 
f.l x + 11K + S / (1 + c) 
(10-8) 
where L1K is the optimal change in stockholders' equity, given that the firm is faced 
with earnings losses, and c is the proportional flotation costs. The hindering of 
perfect access to capital, according to Scott, may be based on the costs incurred 
when floated or personal tax system that favours internally funded corporate 
investments. 481 
As can be detected from the models discussed, theoretical based failure prediction 
models are based on financial factors exclusively and do not, therefore, address the 
underlying causal factors. Such models are apparently less useful than empirically 
based models to predict bankruptcy. 
10.4 Discussion 
10.4.1 Empirical Failure Prediction Models 
The main criticism of Altman's model has been its limitation in terms of prediction 
ability more than two years before failure. This could be considered limited 
predictability, in view of the fact that most analysts will already have detected all the 
signs of imminent failure or turnaround necessity by then. Furthermore, as is with 
most failure prediction models it is not based on theory. Therefore, it has limited use 
in turnaround situations as deterioration in financial ratios represents symptoms 
rather than causes of decline and eventual failure. In addition, the model is based on 
published accounts that may have been polished through creative accounting, 
especially in failing firms. This criticism applies, however, to all models based on 
financial ratios. 
There are number of problems with the application of Discriminant analysis to failure 
prediction according to Eisenbeis: (i) the variables used in the model are assumed to 
-l81Op. cit. (Scott), p .. 132. 
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be multivariate normally distributed, although, it is more likely that deviations from 
normality is more frequent than not~ (ii) group dispersion matrixes have to be equal 
across all groups~ if this assumption is relaxed it will affect the significance test for 
the differences in group means; (iii) the Discriminant model does not allow the 
determination of the relative importance of the variables, as the output is simple 
ordinal ranking;482 (iv) the reduction of dimensions has limitations for the same 
reasons as stated in part 2, if the group dispersions are unequal; thus it may be unwise 
to reduce dimensions or variables if classification483 is the primary goal of the model. 
The effect must be established and the decision of keeping or dropping variables and 
dimensions must be related to the efficiency of the classification.484 
In spite of the advantages of logit regression for bankruptcy prediction it has been 
found to provide little advantage in terms of increased predictability. It was found, 
though, to provide a modest increase in the overall classification and reduce 
substantially the type I error rate.485 The reasons for this lack of the models 
predictive capability, although it is theoretically better than MDA: is the lack of 
theoretical basis on which failure prediction models are based, the already high 
prediction capability of existing models and, therefore, limited scope for 
improvement. 
10.4.2 Theoretical Causal Models 
Wilcox abandoned his functional model but constructed an empirical model based on 
the variables derived from the earlier model. The classification accuracy of his 
empirical model was very promising, but lacked verification, as it was not tested on a 
hold-out sample. 486 Theoretical models suffer due to their simplicity and use of 
superficial causal explanation of failure causes. This conclusion is based on their 
emphasis on financial variables, in lieu, of accepted academic view that the change in 
the financial variables are actually symptomatic rather than causal. 
10.4.3 Alternative Failure Prediction Models 
Catastrophe Theory has been criticised in its application to the social sciences on the 
basis of lack of understanding of the social phenomena itself rather than the 
482Some work has been done on the possibility of determining the importance of individual variables in 
Discriminant analysis. See Cooley and Lohnes (1962), (1971), Eisenbeis and Avery (1972), Joy and 
Tollefson (1975), and Mosteller and Wallace (1963). 
483Dimension reducing methods have traditionally been concerned with the contribution significance of the 
variable to the statistics used to in testing hypothesis about the equality of group means. See Eisenbeis and 
Avery (1972). 
484Eisenbeis, Robert A, Pitfalls in The Application of Discriminant Analysis in Business, Finance, and 
Economics, The Journal of Finance, June 1977, pp. 875-900. 
485Op. cit.(Collins), p. 352. 
486Op. cit.(Altman, 1993), p. 235. 
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mathematical theory. 487 This cntlclsm has been rebuffed by other researchers 
claiming that the model does apply but has its weaknesses as any other mathematical 
method, requiring caution on behalf of the user.488 
The Neural Network (NN) methodology has its shortcomings as to identifying the 
importance of individual variables in segregating the dichotomous variable. In 
addition the NN does not yield any symbolic formula as to its segregation function. 
This is not a limitation as to the evaluation of its prediction accuracy but more so if 
individual inputs need to be tested for significance. Furthermore, there is no method 
available to derive the network configuration for a classification task. 489 
10.5 Conclusion 
Empirical failure prediction models gained acceptance in the 1960' s. These models 
have, however, lacked theoretical foundation. Most empirical failure prediction 
models are based on financial ratios, but there is little conformity on what ratios to 
use and each model seems to come up with its own set of empirically selected ratios. 
The most popular statistical method for failure prediction is Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis. That method makes more demand on the sample design than Logistics 
Regression Analysis that returns probability of failure instead of a Z value where a 
cut-off point has to be determined. 
Most researchers have emphasised the improvement of the predictability of the 
models by using increasingly sophisticated statistical methods. It is unlikely that any 
great advancement will occur in these terms in the future based on the statistical 
methodology on its own. Further, advancement has to come from theoretical 
advancement in terms of actual causes of failure. 
A number of alternative methods of failure prediction have been used, like 
Catastrophe Theory and Neural Networks. These models show some promise, but 
do not provide any increase in overall predictability. Furthermore, such models do 
not provide any advances in terms of explanation of causal factors of failure. 
Simple theoretical models have been developed on corporate failure. These models 
suffer from too much simplicity and reliance on financial variables. 
4R7See Hector 1. Sussmann and Raphael S. Zahler, A Critique of Applied Catastrophe Theory in the 
Behavioural Sciences, Behavioral Science, Vol. 23, Sept. 1978, pp. 383-389. 
488See Terence A. Oliva and Christel M. Capdevielle, Critique and Comment: Sussmann and Zahler: Throwing 
the Baby Out with the Bath Water, Behavioural Science, Vol. 26, April 1981, pp. 153-162. 




In this part fundamental components of the failure prediction models' construction 
are presented. First, the questionnaire survey is described and its analysis presented 
in terms of differences of the means for the dichotomous variables. Secondly, the 
construction of models from the questionnaire survey and the new-entrants data-base 
is performed. Finally, the models are discussed in terms of the thesis and their 
application. In addition, opportunities for further research will be examined. 
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11. Questionnaire Results 
11.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the questionnaire survey was to provide means for using qualitative 
variables for construction of failure prediction models. A developed method was not 
found in the literature on bankruptcy research. As a result, it is hoped that the 
method presented here will provide some foundation for using qualitative variables in 
failure prediction. 
11.2 Questionnaire Results 
11.2.1 Questionnaire Construction 
In Part I of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to state their degree of 
agreement or disagreement with statements on various aspects of organisation and 
management constructs on a five point scale. In Part II, the respondents were asked 
to indicate on a scale of ° to 10, the importance managers placed on various factors: 
in the past, at the present and as expected in the future. 
The reason for emphasising the rating of 'importance' of each factor was to distance 
the rater from the actual causes of 'non-failure' and 'failure'. This was done in order 
to prevent the manager from judging his own performance, as such measurement is 
bound to be biased, especially, in the face of losses or failure. 49O Thus, it was found 
highly appropriate to associate the importance placed on the factors with failed 
versus non-failed and loss-making versus non-loss making results in the airlines' 
operation. 
The selection of variables to be tested in the questionnaires was based on number of 
sources. Factors of success and failure were partially based on empirically developed 
categorisation491 that identified nine primary categories: Personnel-human resources, 
Strategic, Operations, Marketing, Production-manufacturing, Management, MIS-data 
processing, External-environmental and Communications. To facilitate identification 
with categories used throughout this theses the following categories, based on 
Cowan, were used: Personnel-human resources, Strategic, Operations, Marketing, 
4QOThis believe of managers' willingness to justify their actions or seek explanations from the environment 
situation for losses or failure, is clearly apparent from the literature (see Chapter 9). 
491David A. Cowan, Developing A Classification Structure of Organisational Problems: An Empirical 
Investigation, Academy of Management Journal, 1990, Vo1.3}, No.2, 366-390. 
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Management, MIS-data processing, External-environmental and Communications 
and Production-manufacturing. In the thesis presented here, Personnel-human 
resources was collapsed into management, MIS-data processing and 
Communications was combined into information- and communication system and 
Production-manufacturing became operations. Gowan came up with 17 additional 
categories which are omitted here as their occurrence is infrequent. F or detailed 
chronology of each test item and its rudimentary reason for inclusion in the 
questionnaire is described in Appendix-I. 
An important aspect of the questionnaire, that may render it unconventional was the 
necessity of its convenience for a statistical classification methodology. Furthermore, 
due to the small population of new-entrant airlines and time limitations it was not 
possible to produce a large scale pilot of the factors presented in the questionnaire. 
This resulted in rather large variable set geared towards the prevention of information 
loss. In order to reduce the variable set and find underlying factors, factor analysis 
was applied. To maximise the interpretability of the results two methods were 
selected. The first method was to divide the total variable set into the same groups as 
in the questionnaire; and the second method, was to select together all variables that 
could possibly be related. The factor analysis, however, was found to be unreliable 
as a basis for selecting variables into the discrimination models and was, as a result, 
not used for that purposes. The results are, nevertheless, important for data 
reduction in future research and are included in Appendix-K. 
The purpose of the first part of the questionnaire was to investigate manager's 
attitudes on various items related to the management of a new-entrant airline. The 
second part had the purpose to assess the perceived importance of various factors 
also itemised by the Underlying Model of Analysis presented in Chapter 1. The third 
part was used for classification purposes of the two previous parts. In addition, many 
variables were added relating to revenue-classification, number of passengers carried, 
losses and profits and so on. One of the reasons for having two basic parts was to 
test whether there was a difference in terms of prediction quality of the two types of 
question formats. 
Due to the possible sensitivity of the information that respondents provided, much 
emphasis was placed on confidentiality in the cover letter and introduction text and 
also to identify with an organisation (Cranfield) in order to facilitate the feeling of 
security and increase the response rate. 
As mentioned before, two basic methods of attitude measurement were adopted, a 
Likert five point scale for Part I and a ten point numerical scale for Part II. . Both of 
these methods are common in social research but subject to controversy lIke most 
attitude scales. 
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Hoinville et. al., conclude in a widely used book on survey research practice, that 
much literature is available on the advantages and defects of attitude scaling methods, 
but: 
... since a rating scale is not a absolute measure of attitude but a way of 
placing people in relative positions on a dimension, there is no particular 
way of presenting scales that is intrinsically better than others. The 
object should be to find the way that discriminates most effectively 
between respondents.492 
Having this in mind and the characteristics of the task (discrimination) the selected 
scales were considered to suit it well. 
The questionnaire includes mostly factors that could not be measured by other 
sources in order to add dimension to numerical data. This was deemed necessary due 
to the conformity in the literature that the main cause of failure is the management of 
the failed organisation. As a result, it must be the importance that the management 
has placed (a function of decisions) on various factors that makes or breaks a 
company. The questionnaire research is based on this presumption and the 
hypotheses that there is difference between the management as cause and other 
possible causes of failure like that of the environment. 
The statements in Part I of the questionnaire were in the first instance based on the 
concepts of David Hall as presented in the book 'The Hallmarks for Successful 
Business. ,493 During the course of the questionnaire development these statements 
underwent changes and adaptation to the task at hand. The factors presented in Part 
II, were all developed on the basis of intuition, and literature research and comments 
on the pilot questionnaire. 
The length of the questionnaire was a considerable issue, as a major pilot study for 
item reduction would take too much time and reduce the sample available for the 
final survey. Thus, it was decided to go ahead with the questionnaire in the form it 
was. The questionnaire can be considered to be of medium length, although, the 
answering process may have placed considerable demand on the rater's attitude to 
various issues. However, no statement or factor required information that was 
necessary to search for in company records. Please refer to Appendix-N for samples 
of the questionnaires and cover letters. 
11.2.2 Sample Construction 
A simple sample of new-entrant airlines was not considered adequate in this research 
due to the various backgrounds and the diversity associated to the new-entrants 
402Hoinville, Gerald and Roger Jowell. Survey Research Practice, Gower Pub. Co. repro 1989, p. 35 . 
.jo:-Hall, David. The Hallmarks for Successful Business: Survival-Change-Growth. MercUI) Books 1992. 
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under examination. Furthermore, it must be made clear that a sample was not actually 
drawn from from a population, but it was included as a whole. A stratified sample 
was n~cessary in order to recognise the differences in the origins of the jet494 
operatmg new-entrants, resulting in the identification of four populations: (i) failed 
new-entrants (failed new-entrant is an airline that has failed totally or called in the 
receivers or filed for Chapter 11495)~ (ii) recently established carriers of less than 
three years operating life before the survey (established in 1991 or later) ~ (iii) 
established carriers that had been operating for more than three years when the 
survey was conducted (established before 1991); (iv) and specialists, that are 
observers of new-entrants Gournalists, academics or consultants associated with 
aviation in general and/or new-entrant airlines). The four populations required four 
different questionnaire formats. Reason being that 'recent' new-entrants could not 
answer questions on the past, 'failed' new-entrants on the present and industry 
specialists on the airline specific questions in Part I of the questionnaire. 
Furthermore, the questions in the questionnaire for 'failed' new-entrants had to be 
worded in the past-tense. 
New-entrant airlines included in the sample and associated managers were derived 
from two main sources, the Air Transport World's World Airline Report and the 
Flight International's World Airline Directory. Airlines included in the population 
were jet operating airlines established or expanding operations after deregulation of 
domestic market or bilateral route. This allowed cross-sectional analysis of new-
entrants, meaning that the survey would give indications as to different importance of 
factors along the new-entrant's life-cycle (size). One executive from each functional 
area within each airline, was selected. This was a non-random selection of subjects, 
guided by the pre-set requirement of every subject being a member of the executive 
team of the airline. This led to the inclusion of all such managers listed in the named 
sources for most airlines. In few cases, where there was an alternative the more 
senior executive was chosen. As a result, the likelihood of at least one response from 
each airline was raised. By using this method each airline received 3 to 16 mailings 
to various individuals (average 7). The specialists were, however, selected on the 
basis of their association with issues relating to new-entrants, an association derived 
from written articles and listed specialisation in the World Aerospace Directory. 
4941bis criteria of jet operating new-entrants was to ensure comparability and to exclude plain feeder, and 
commuter airlines which operate under different philosophy than new-entrants serving general markets. 
General markets being interstate and international markets in particular. The comparability requirement is 
necessary to exclude fInancial structures and operating characteristics of smaller turboprop carriers .which 
are quite different from all jet carriers. First of all sector distances are shorter for turboprop ~ers. m 
general, direct costs are higher, indirect costs are lower due to simpler overhead structure and hes \\1th 
trunck carriers are usually effective by feeder agreements or plain ownership. 
4l)'iIn Chapter 2, there was a discussion on different defInitions of failure, in this study, however, the following 
defInition was adopted: An airline is considered failed if: (i) has filed for bankruptcy under chapter 11 (US), 
but keeps on operating; (ii) called in the receivers (UK); (iii) taken over byan other airline due to f~ancial 
difficulties; (iv) ceases to operate due to bankruptcy; (v) ceases to operate \\lthout bankruptcy proceedmgs. 
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11.2.3 Response Statistics 
The total number of respondents was 61, but two responses were rejected: one on 
the basis of being heavily positive biased compared to other responses from the same 
airline, and an other for being very incomplete. Fourteen responses were received 
from specialists that got a shorter version of the questionnaire containing only Part 
11496, and forty five responses were received from airline managers at 26 airlines in the 
United States and Europe. 
The average response rate for all four populations by individuals was 27.9 percent 
while it was 67.7 percent by airlines. This means that subjects from 67.7 percent of 
the airlines in the population responded. To gain fairly good overall response rate 
from airlines was actually one of the main objectives of the survey. 
Effective mailings i.e. mailings that actually should have reached the persons involved 
was high for most strata with the exception of failed new-entrants, where little 
information was available about the strata. 
Table 11-1 Survey Statistics 
Population Sample Number of Effective Responses Number of Responses 
mailings mailings by airlines by airline 
individuals 
Established new-entr. Whole 136 129 33 (26%) 23 16(70%) 
population 
Recent new-entrant Whole 30 25° 8 (32%i 6 5(83%) 
popUlation 
Failed new-entrant Whole 32 Unknownc 5 (15%) 11 5(45%) 
popUlation 
Specialist All linked with 44 44 15 (34%)e 
new-entrants 
242 na 27.9% 40 67.7% 
a One airline went bankrupt just before the questionnaire was sent out, unknown to the researcher. b Two airlines went bankrupt 
during the survey execution period. C Present residence of ex-managers of failed airlines was inferred from International Aerospace 
Directory. As it is extremely hard to track these managers, poor results were anticipated. d One response was seriously positive 
biased and was rejected on the basis of two other responses from the same airline. e One response was incomplete and was rejected. 
f One airline went bankrupt in 1994. g The 59 effective responses were received after taking into account notes d and e. 
11.2.4 The Problem of Small Sample Size 
The small number of respondents is first and foremost the result of the small 
population of airlines fitting the project's aim. In that sense the number of responses 
from airlines was quite good as mentioned before. The problem of interpretation 
then arose: Are the results reliable? To answer this it has to be recognised that due 
to the high proportion of responses from the population being researched one has to 
conclude that the results are reliable for that particular population. Ongoing research 
must establish whether results of the research are representative for other cases 
within the same population at an other point in time. Thus, it is possible that the 
results are sample specific. 
496 See Appendix-N. 
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11.2.5 The Pilot Survey 
The initial pilot survey was conducted by distributing the questionnaire to selected 
staff members (n = 3) of the College of Aeronautics, at Cranfield. This resulted in 
changes in question wording, improvement of cover letter wording, a change from a 
100 point to a 10 point numerical scale and segregation of factors into groups. The 
scale alteration was performed due to the tendency of subjects to rate in ten point 
intervals making the scale inadvertently equal to a 10 point scale. 497 
In the second pilot survey of the questionnaire, ten airlines in Europe and the US, 
were selected. Of those, three had actually gone out of business, unbeknown to the 
researcher, just prior to the mailing and no responses were received from those 
airlines. Due to the small size of the jet operating new-entrant population, the pilot 
was tested on turboprop operating new-entrants in order to avoid cutting into the 
actual population. 
In total twenty nine questionnaires were sent out addressed by functional title. Cover 
letters were not market by the Cranfield logo nor the questionnaire form. The 
questionnaire form was photocopied on a cream coloured paper. Of the twenty nine 
questionnaires sent five were returned undelivered and three responses (10%) were 
received. However, a reminder was not sent to non-respondents due to time 
constraints. 
No serious faults were found with the questionnaire based on the responses beside 
the low response rate that was a fault in itself. The low response rate was attributed 
to the following causes: (i) lack of identification with a recognised institution; (ii) 
pilot performed on a non-representative sample; and (iii) the use of titles instead of 
actual names of receivers. The following changes were made as a result: (i) Cranfield 
logo inserted on questionnaire; (ii) use a cover letter with Cranfield letterhead; (iii) 
questionnaires sent to a named person; (iv) wording of few questions was changed; 
(v) layout made more professional (quality paper and professional copying); and (vi) 
coding information inserted on last page rather than first page. 
With these changes it was hoped that the response rate would increase, which it did, 
although not to an optimum level. 
11.2.6 Survey Management 
The survey management was according to a standard process as depicted in Figure 
11-1. To begin with a pilot survey was performed on a sample of new-entrant 
turboprop operators in Europe and USA as discussed before. Following alterations 
from the pilot survey, the first questionnaires were sent, along with a cover letter. 
Approximately one month after the initial mailing a follow up letter was sent. Two 
months after the initial mailing a second follow up letter was sent. This applied to all 
populations except that of the failed new-entrants, where a search letter was sent to 
4Q7This actually supports the view that attitudes are too imprecise to be rated on wide scales that imply more 
accuracy than they actually provide. 
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all 'names' identified as possible ex-executive of a failed airline. The letter asked if 
the person would be willing to provide the names and addresses of fellow executives 
at the failed carrier. The response was very limited or only two in total. After 
further checks of the name lists in the International Aerospace Directory the 
questionnaire was mailed to the identified names. The results were disappointing as 
only five responses were received. However, number of bankruptcies during the 
research process raised the number of failed carriers in the research. Nevertheless, it 
was deemed necessary to change the original intentions and segregate the carriers 
into loss (LM) and non-loss (NLM) making airlines. 
Figure 11-1 The Survey Process 
P~ot H L ~ ___ T~ __ oP_roP_N_E ______ ~r 
Name and address data base Prepare questionnaires 
Serial number construction and cover letters. 





Book in completed 
questionnaires against 





11.2.7 Subjects versus airlines 
Pilotl 
Inhouse 
Prepare envelopes with labels 
• Mailing envelopes 
. Self addressed return 
envelopes 
Mail 1 st reminder to 
non-f"espondents 




___ R8S_U_ItS ___________ __ 
In the analysis of the questionnaire most of the results are based on the subjects 
rather than the aggregated results of airlines. This is due to the necessity to anal~se 
the dependability of individual raters in bankruptcy prediction. In .order t~ .exanune 
the dependability of this approach the agreement of raters from partIcular rurlmes was 
analysed giving the results in Table 11-2. 
Table 11-2 Agreement among raters within the same airlines: Questionnaire 
Part I and Part II. 












na ~ Could not be calculated due to missing values. Numbers in brackets indicate that correlallon lS calculat~ fo~w.er =~kth~ 
actual number of raters due to missing values. Only airlines having two or more res~~dents are sho\\1l. \um m a~ e 
indicate that correlation is calculated for fewer than the actual number of raters due to Ollssmg values. 
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As the table shows there was a significant positive correlation (p. < 0.05, or better) 
between respondents from the same individual airline for all airlines having two or 
more respondents, except airline 114 and 122 that were slightly negatively correlated. 
In 55 percent of the cases for Part I the positive correlation among raters is above .5, 
in 82 percent cases it is higher than .3. For Part II the correlation for all valid cases 
(correlation could not be calculated if there were missing values) was above .3 and 
for 38 percent of cases above .5. The overall agreement of raters from the same 
entity can therefore be judged to be satisfactory, based on the results presented in 
Table 11-2. 
11.2.8 Reliability Analysis 
Reliability testing was used in the questionnaire analysis to establish whether the 
scales were reliable. These tests were done separately for Part I and Part II of the 
questionnaire, based on Cronbach's Alpha. 498 The Cronbach's Alpha for Part I was 
0.9272, and for Part IIa it was 0.9391, Part lIb 0.9369 and for Part lIe 0.9480, 
indicating that the scale is quite reliable499 for all parts of the questionnaire. 
11.2.9 Responses by Category and Geography 
The questionnaire responses fell almost evenly between US and EC carriers. The 
largest discrepancy was unfortunately in the 'failed' category, where the US is 
overrepresented. The critical factors were, therfore, verified by constructing a 
separate category of loss and non-loss making airlines. 
Table 11-3 Responses by Category and Geography 
Area Established Recent Faile~ Specialist Total Percent 
res onses 
US 14 4 4 7 29 49.0 
EC 18 4 1 7 30 51.0 
Total 32 8 5 14 59 100.0 
Five responses counted in the Established column and one in the Recent column were classified as failed in the analysis, as the 
fonner respondents were employees of an airline operating under Chapter XI and the latter was an airline that failed shortly after 
the survey was conducted. 
11.2.10 Responses by Functional Category 
The number of responses by functional category varied from 6 to 13. As expected 
fewest responses were from top managers and financial managers or six responses 
from each. Upper management response to surveys is usually poor due to time 
pressures and the reluctance to provide information that could prove sensitive or 
498The Cronbach's Alpha is based on the 'internal consistency' of a test. 'That is, it is based on the average 
correlation of items within a test, if the items are standardised to a standard deviation of 1; or on the average 
covariance among items on a scale are positively correlated with each other because they are measuring. to a 
certain extent, a common entity. If items are not positively correlated to each other, we have no reason to 
believe that they are correlated with other possible items we may have selected.' Marija 1. Norusis, 
SPSSIPC+ Statistics 4.0, 1990, p. B-190. 
499The Cronbach's Alpha can be interpreted as a measurement of the correlation between the actual scale and 
the other possible scales measuring the same items. 
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useful to competitors. Furthermore, in this survey on failure this likelihood of non-
response is escalated further due to the sensitivity of the issue. Eleven marketing 
(18.60/0), nine operations (15.3%), six finance (10.2%) and six top managers 
(10.2%). Managers that could not be classified into the traditional functional areas, 
were thirteen (22.0%), while specialists responding, were fourteen (23.7%). The 
distribution of responses is fairly good across the functional areas, although, a higher 
response rate from financial managers would have been advantageous. 
Table 11-4 Responses by Functional Category 
Functional category 





Specialists (consultants, journalists, academics) 
Total 

















Most of the managers had at least undergraduate education (BSc or BA) or 83.4 
percent. It was expected that more of the managers would have a pilot licence as 
primary qualification, but only two did. The general conclusion is that managers of 
new-entrant airlines are well educated professionals. 

















a Specialists were not asked to specifY their education 
















The largest number of respondents were in the age group 40-49, as expected. But 
during this age-interval most people peak in their work carreer. The age span of 30 
to 59 contained the maj ority of respondents or 90.7 percent. 
Table 11-6 Age Distribution of Respondents 
Agegroupa Frequency Percent 
20-29 2 4.4 
30-39 12 26.7 
40-49 17 37.8 
50-59 10 22.2 
60-69 2 4.4 
Missing cases 2 4.4 
Total 45 99.9 








11.2.13 Respondents' Airline Size Distribution 
In order to conduct life-cycle analysis it was necessary to break the respondents' 
airlines into groups based on some sort of size measurement. If the US Federal 
Aviation Administration's (FAA) classification is used it will result in four groups: 
small regionals, large regionals, nationals and majors. 500 The problem with that 
scheme is that it has too much spread in the revenue band for large-regionals and 
nationals. A more realistically based classification would take into account the 
internal changes and organisational pressures within the airline as the size 
increases. 501 In order to account for this a three category classification scheme was 
constructed, shown in Table 11-7. The 'new-entrant' stage covers the revenue band 
of up to $100 million, while the 'transitional' stage from $100 to 500 million and the 
'interim major' stage $500 million plus. The transitional stage represents the period 
during which the airline is changing from entrepreneurial organisation into semi-
professional organisation and the interim-major stage is when the airline has 
incorporated most of the characteristics of professional management and functional 
organisation and is starting to encounter problems of large size. The findings 
pertinent to the stages are described in Appendix-G. 
Table 11-7 Airlines' Size Distribution 
Size Classification Revenue band $ Respondents frequency Percent Airline Percent 
New-entrant 0-100m 13 28.9 34.6 
Transitional 100-50Om 20 44.4 50.0 
Interim-major 500+ 12 26.7 15.4 
Total 45 100.0 100.0 
11.3 Factor Importance 
In Appendix-F, a table showing the mean of each item for past, present and future 
can be observed. From that table it is apparent that employee productivity and 
relations are regarded highly important along with the related factors of flexible job 
descriptions, company culture and union free operations. Aircraft utilisation which 
affects unit costs, is rated as highly important. That factor is influenced by fares, 
passenger load-factors and costs. The strategic factors expansion into new markets 
and price leadership in served markets are rated fairly high as well. Which indicates 
a level of strategic aggressiveness being regarded as important in the past. Price 
leadership is usually related to low cost structure so it is no surprise to see cost 
control among factors highly emphasised by new-entrant's management. 
500F AA airline classification scheme: $0-10 Small Regional; $10-100 Large Regional; $100-1 bn NationaL 
$1 bn+ Major . 
. 'i01 An interesting account on this issue are the fmdings of: Eric G. Flamholtz. 'Growing Pains'. Jossey-Bass 
Publishers, 1990. 
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Senior executives of new-entrant airlines have placed less importance on alliances, 
mergers, code sharing, feeder airline agreements, diversification into other industries 
and hub and spoke operations. This result is surprising in view of all the emphasis on 
these issues in the media. Frequent flyer programs are among the least important 
factors, probably because of new-entrant airlines inability to offer attractive programs 
in competition with the large carriers, who can usually offer attractive holiday 
destinations in their programs. It is likely, however, that managers of established 
major carriers like American and United, would rate this factor higher than new-
entrants' managers. The basic results looking at the importance rating of the factors, 
are that factors relating to efficiency, aggressive marketing and image, are rated high; 
information, distribution and vision are rated in the middle; management, employee 
motivation, operation and non-core aspects of airline commerce are rated low. 
The general trend is an increase in the emphasis of most factors from the past to the 
present and from the present to the future. The meaning of that development may be 
associated to wishfulness to improve things going awry in the past. These issues that 
will be increasingly emphasised in the future are, according to the survey: costs, 
image building, information systems, distribution and company vision. One more 
factor involving external co-operation (code-sharing, feeding and alliances) was 
identified as becoming more important in the future, while its overall emphasis was 
low. The most striking finding was that all factors regarding information systems 
gained substantial increase in emphasis from past to future. This indicates that airline 
managers view information competence as one of the crucial aspects of running an 
airline in the future. It may also indicate that this aspect of airline management is the 
one needing the greatest improvement. 
A factor showing negative change from past to future surprisingly enough, is service 
quality. The factor scores very high in comparison to other factors meaning that the 
managers view this factor as one of the most important in running their airlines, thus, 
the reduction may not mean that less emphasis will be placed on service quality, 
rather that they find little scope to increase emphasis on an already highly emphasised 
factor. 
Factors showing little change or negative trend are: achieving critical mass, weight 
load-factor, diversification into other industries and long-haul routes. All of these 
factor receive relatively little emphasis by raters, especially the last two factors. 
Although long-haul routes are not emphasised much by the raters, the fact of the 
matter is that average stage length increases gradually over the life-cycle of the new-
entrant airline. This means that airlines will increasingly enter medium and long-haul 
routes to maintain adequate growth. However, the raters may not have seen this 
factor as one of unavoidable necessity and definitely not of strategy. It has also been 
stated in this thesis that new-entrants emphasising long-haul have fared particularly 
poorly. 
The basic message read from the questionnaire responses is that new-entrants intend 
to stay in their core business, transporting passengers, as the factor on diversification 
into other industries shows. This factor was rated very low by the respondents and 
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o~ decreasing importance in the future. This is perhaps not surprising in view of the 
high de~r~e of ~pecialisation involved in air transport. In fact, the idea advocated by 
some alrhnes In the past, notably SAS, was that 'airlines were in the travel 
business,502 and should as such operate 'total travel' service, involving ground 
transportation, hotels, business services, travel agencies, car rentals and travel 
information services. The concept has failed for most airlines just as it has for many 
co~panies trying to enter industries that involve different concepts from the one they 
are In. Of course, there are success stories, but for airlines they are few and far apart. 
This has left the general feeling that airlines are best to concentrate on their core 
business. 
11.4 Analysis of The Means for The Dichotomous Failure Variable 
11.4.1 Introduction 
Due to the small sample size the results for failed carriers versus non-failed carriers 
can only be used as an indicator. However, the next section of loss making versus 
non-loss making carriers has larger number of respondents. As a result, the factors 
that distinguish between the carriers in that group and also belong to the factors 
distinguishing failed and non-failed carriers, reinforce the findings for the failed and 
non-failed groups of carriers. The factors belonging to both groups are shown in 
italics in the tables. 
11.4.2 Management Assessment: Failure 
Analysing the means for the dichotomous failure variable for Part I of the 
questionnaire, leads to the results presented in 
Table 11-8. The environment related statement, The airline's success is largely 
dependent on factor out of its control is very highly significant. Analysis of the means 
for the statement indicates that raters of failed airlines agree slightly (3.5), while 
raters of non-failed airlines disagree (2.1). This implies that managers of distressed 
carriers are more prone to feel out of control. 
Examining the marketing variables it becomes apparent that customer service 
variables appear to distinguish well between the two groups. This includes the 
statements, Our service has a range of features that make it distinctive, which 
implies that service differentiation is important; We are innovators in customer 
service, is linked to the previous statement but emphasises the leader's aspect of 
customer service; Our customer loyalty is strong, is agreed with by raters of non-
failed carriers (4.3), while raters of failed carriers feel more neutral (3.3) on their 
customer loyalty; We plan and allocate sufficient resources to developing new 
markets, is disagreed with by raters of failed carriers (2.4) but raters of non-failed 
carriers fall between neutrality and agreement (3.6). This indicates some constraints 
in terms of resources or it might represent a poor planning function at the airlines 
involved. 
'i02These ideas of wider defInition of business areas were fIrst initiated by Theodore Levitt in his landmark 
article called Marketing Myopia in Harvard Business Review, July - August, 1960. 
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Raters of failed carriers .are less s~cure about their airlines' ability to secure capital for 
growth (1.8) before fallure, while raters of non-failed carriers are neutral on the 
statement (2.8). The general finding is that capital is not readily available to either 
group. The second statement, classified into the financial group, We usually have 
enoug~ r~sou.rces to plan for the future, is disagreed with by raters of failed carriers 
(2.3), mdlcatlng a weak planning function within failing airlines while raters of non-
failed carriers are neutral (3.2). ' 
Table 11-8 Significant Differences Between Failed and Non-failed Carriers: 
Questionnaire Part I. 
Statement Group Mean Sig . 
..................................................................................................... ............... ¥..q!.~~~~8.. .. ~ We fulfil our customers' needs well F~ii~d"i")""···································4:00o·T···* ........ . 
Non-failed(34) 4,559 1 
Our service has a range offeatures that make it distinctive Failed( 11 ) 3, 182 1 ** 
Non-failed(34) 4,412 ~ 
We are innovators in customer service Failed(ll) 3,200 1 
Non-failed(34) 4,118 l 
Our customer loyalty is strong Failed(ll) 3,273 l 'f' 
Non-failed(34) 4,324 1 
We plan and allocate sufficient resources to developing new markets Failed(ll) 2364 i 
Non-failed(34) 3:647 1 
l'inance ~ ···Z;;;k·;j;;;p;t~i"~iii"~·;i·i;;;;;t·~~;·g;~;ih············· .................................................... ··F~i~(·i·i·j·····································i":8"i8"1 • 
Non-failed(34) 2,853 l 
We usually have enough resources to plan for the future Failed(ll) 2,364 l 'f' 
Non-failed(34) 3,235 l 
Environment 
···Th;-;;i~ii~;·,~·;~~~~~;·i;·i~;g~iy·d~p~~d~~·i~~·fo;t~;·;~i·~jit;·~~~t;.~i"················ ··F~ii~d(·i·i·j·····································3:545"1 .*. 
Non-failed(34) 2,088 j 
Management l 
···E~;ry~~~·i-;;~·~;·~i·;ii~·~··~·~d~·;~t~~d;·~~;·i~~g··i~;;;;·~i~~·~~d~·bj:~·~ti~~~············· ··F~ii~d(·i"i·)····································io9·i"i .* 
Non-failed(34) 3,500 l 
The airline has a vision of the future shared by all the employees Failed( 11) 2,636 1 •• 
Non-failed(34) 3,824 1 
Our staff provide us with a competitive advantage Failed( 11) 3,636 1 'f' 
Non-fail 34 4,353 ~ 
• * .* * Note: = p < .001; = P < .01; = P < .05; '¥ = P <.1. The statements were rated on a five point scale. Italicised statements are 
significantly different for both non-failed/failed and non-Ioss/loss groups. 
Statements falling into the management group were three, two of which showed 
highly significant difference between the means of the two groups. These two were 
related to the airlines' vision, which appears to be a good distinguishing factor 
between failed and non-failed carriers. It is, however, apparent that non-failed 
carriers do not agree strongly with these statements, although, the latter statement 
The airline has a vision of the future shared by all the employees, is agreed with by 
raters of non-failed carriers (3.8), while the other group is almost neutral (2.6). The 
former statement, Everyone in our airline understands our long-term aims and 
objectives, receives a mean, for non-failed carriers, midway between neutrality and 
agreement (3.5), while being disagreed with by the other group (2.1). 
A slightly more positive trend appears in the rating of the statement, Our staff 
provides liS with competitive advantage, as the mean for non-failed carriers is slightly 
greater than mere agreement (4.4), while slightly greater than neutral for failed 
carriers (3.6). This difference was significant at the p.< 0.1 level. 
11.4.3 Factor Importance: Failure 
Only questionnaire Part II, Past is analysed for differences between Failed and Non-
failed carriers as respondents of failed carriers were not asked to rate the factors for 
the present. The italicised statements are significantly different for the two groups of 
both dichotomised variables, Jailure and distress. 
Highly significant difference was found between the components of the dichotomous 
failure variable, for following elements: Hub and spoke operations, yield 
management system, delegation, operations without unionised staff and achieving 
critical mass. 
Table 11-9 Significant Differences Between Failed and Non-failed 
Carriers: Questionnaire Part II, Past. 
Statement Grou Mean ~ Si 
Operations ~ 
~ ........... --..................................................................................................................................... : ........................................................ ~ ...••...... 
Hub and spoke operations Failed(10) 7,727 
Code sharing 
Matching of aircraft size with route requirement 
Long haul routes 
Frequency in served markets 











































Managers' incentive program 
Marketing 
....................................................................................................................................... ··F~ii~d(· .. ·i·O)··· .... ··· .. ········ .. ·· .. · .. ·(;:8"i"8 .. 1 • 
Market-share . 
Non-failed(27) 4,444 ; 
Finance 
....................................................................................................................................... ··F~i~d(·i·O)· .. ···· .. ······ .... ···········8·j·64··1 ••• 
Achieving critical mass Non-failed(27) 4,885 ; 
• Failed(lO) 7,909 ; 
Non-failed(27) 6,269 i Fuel costs 
Environment 
...................... •• .. • .. • .... • .. 1 
....................................................................................................................................... ··F~ii~·i·O)···· 6.700 1 
Competitor analysis . 
Non-failed(27) 4,741 1 
................................................................................................................. !.~!~:.'!!.~~~~.. ..F~ii·~d(i·O)· .... · .. · .. ······ .. ············:ij·64··j ••• 
Yield management system Non-failed(27) 3,593 
Failed(lO) 7,000 
Non-failed(27) 5.482 Computer reservation system 
Failed(10) 7,000 
Non-failed 27 5,000 
Market-intelligent information and communication system 
Note: ... = p < .OOL .. = p < .01; • = P < .05: 't' = P <.1. The statements were rated on a ten point scale. Italicised statements are 
significantly different for both non-failed/failed and non-Iosslloss groups. 
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It is interesting and worth noting that the factors showing Highly significant 
~ifference of the means are distributed evenly between all the categories represented 
in the table. All of these factors are rated higher by the subjects of failed carriers 
indicating that there is some underlying factor interfering with the results. Afte; 
careful consideration a concept of Increased Activity was arrived at, which is 
explained at the end of this chapter. 
Further analysis on the implications of individual statements and factors can be found 
in the next section, that uses a dichotomous distress variable to analyse the two 
groups. 
11.5 Analysis of The Means for The Dichotomous Distress Variable 
11.5.1 Introduction 
The reason for using loss-makers (LM) rather than failed airlines only, is the fact that 
the response rate of managers of failed airlines was low, besides being important 
issue for research. 
Thus, an assumption was made that operating loss has a string of causes that are the 
same as that of failure. As a result, airlines making operating losses for number of 
years will show the same characteristics as airlines that have already failed. However, 
loss making airlines can turnaround the situation, making losses a rather unreliable 
basis for bankruptcy prediction. Nevertheless, there were number of identical factors 
showing significant differences of the two groups both for the dichotomous failure 
and distress variables. 
Airlines were only selected into the distress category if they had made operating 
losses in 1992 or 1991 and during three of the last five operating years counted from 
the last available financial data. The assumption is therefore that losses for three out 
of five consecutive years cannot be due to environment's influence or catastrophic 
events alone. All the failed airlines were included in this category as well. The basis 
of classification of each airline into the two categories can be observed in Appendix-
1. 
11.5.2 Management Assessment: Distress 
The results of the survey, as illustrated in Appendix-E and Table 11-10, show that 
managers of new-entrant airlines feel that their airlines are performing well overall. If 
each critical factor is examined separately, we discover that there were seven 
statements that showed significant difference between loss- and non-loss. Measuring 
the attitude on access to capital, LM felt that lack of access to capital might limit the 
growth prospects of the airline (2.1}, while NLM's were overall neutral (3.2) on the 
statement. 
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The general finding on this issue, appears to be that capital is a limiting factor in new-
entrants' growth prospects. NLM's felt strongly (4.3) on their ability to fulfil their 
customers' needs, while LM's showed agreement (4.3) overall with the statement. 
LM's (3.0) showed neutrality on the statement on planning and allocation of 
resources to developing new markets, while NLM's were more in agreement (3.7). 
This must be viewed as one of the fundamental processes for reducing the risk of 
growth, as entrance into new markets can be viewed as the highest risk areas in 
running an airline due to the costs involved. Careful planning must therefore be 
viewed as highly important. The finding therefore supports the notion that loss-
makers are more prone to allocate less resources to this function, leading to greater 
costs and somewhat poorer route network than that ofNLM's. 
The LM's feel that their success is somewhat out of their control (2.8), while NLM's 
disagree (2.0) with this statement. Non-loss making new-entrants agree more (4.2) 
that their airlines are innovators in customer service, while loss-making new-entrants 
fall between neutral and agreement (3.6). It is clearly apparent that innovation is an 
important critical factor, in view of its relationship with other management factors. 
This stems from the fact that innovation in customer service has to be employee 
supported to work, hence needing resourceful personnel management. The last 
factor, supports this view, as NLMs feel stronger (3.6) on the statement, everyone in 
our airline understands our long term aims and objectives, than LMs (2.8). This 
supports the notion that employees of non-loss making airlines are better guided than 
those of loss-making airlines. 
Loss-makers agree more readily (3.6) with group consensus being the usual way to 
make decisions, while non-loss makers are more neutral (2.9). This is the only 
additional factor to the ones identified in the failed/non-failed group. The reasons for 
loss makers having greater consensus on decision making could be numerous. One 
of the likeliest explanations is that the individual airlines having experienced losses for 
years are putting an extra effort into turning the airline around. This will involve 
among other things increased team effort involving consensus on action plans and 
individual decisions. 
An other totally converse explanation could be that group consensus is actually 
slowing the decision making capacity of the organisation. Such situation could 
develop in an organisation where risk aversion is prevailing to the extent that all 
major decisions are avoided by attempting to gain group consensus. 
Next we will examine the factors in Part II of the questionnaire survey, in relation to 
the dichotomous distress variable. 
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Table 11-10 Significant Differences Between Loss and Non-loss making 
Carriers: Questionnaire Part I. 
Statement Group Mean i Sig . 
................. : .................................................................................................. M.q!.~~!i.~g.. . 
We are Innovators in customer service ··~23) .................. · .... ···"3:s65 .. ·t .. -,; ........... . 
We plan and allocate sufficient resources to develop new markets No-loss(2l) 4,286 Loss(24) 3,000 'I' 
Non-loss(21) 3714 
We follfil our customers' needs well Loss(24) 4:290 'I' 
....................................................................................................................................... ..~~:!~~(~J.) .................... ~!~~~ ••• 
l'inance : 
···D;;k-;;j~-;;pit~i'';;,tii'~~·i·ii;;;it·~;·g~~~ih··············· .................................................. ··~·~24)····· .. ···················2;o83···j ** 
No-loss(21) 3,190 i 
Environment ~ 
····Th~ .. ;;i~ii~;;~··~~~~~~;·i~·i~~g~iy·d~p~~d~~t·~~·fo;i~~~·~~t-;;jii;·;~~;~i'·············· ··L;;~24)····· .. ···················2:833···i * 
No-loss(21) 2,000 i 
Management ~ 
···E~;ry~~~·i~·~·;;~·~i·~ii~~·~-;;d;;~i~~d;·~~~·i~~g··i~;;;;·~i-;;,~·~~d~·b;~~ti~;~····· .. ····.. ··~~~24) .. ······················ .. i792 .. ·~ * 
Non-Ioss(21) 3,571 i 
Group consensus is the usual way we make decisions Loss(24) 3,625 i 'I' 
No-Io 21 2,905 1 
••• .* * '¥ 
Note: =p<.OOl; =p<.Ol; =p<.05; =p<.l. 
11.5.3 Part II 
Loss-makers show higher emphasis both in the past and present on hub and spoke 
operations indicating a possible relationship between such operating strategy and 
poor results. A second striking result was the persistent difference in the emphasis on 
job rotation in all three time periods. Where LM's emphasised this management 
practice more. It is possible that highly emphasised job rotation policy creates 
inefficiencies that are highly linked with the airlines overall profitability. More 
research is needed in order to substantiate such conclusion. Regardless, this item is 
highly discriminating of the two and is useful in a failure prediction model as such. 
Non-loss makers show higher emphasis on marketing items like service quality, 
brand image, expansion into new markets and media advertising. These items are 
usually regarded as playing large role in airline success today. The survey further 
substantiates that believe. Furthermore, NLM's also emphasise more cost reduction 
and aircraft utilisation. In fact the latter item has been emphasised greatly in the last 
few years as a result of the success of Southwest Airlines, that emphasises aircraft 
utilisation very much in its strategy. Cost reduction, on the other hand, was highly 
important during the period in which the survey was conducted, due to a recession in 
air transport. Thus, it is no surprise that emphasis on cost reduction and non-loss 
making go hand in hand. The noteworthy aspect of this finding is that loss-makers, 
regardless of their distress appear to be emphasising this aspect of turnaround to 
lesser degree than the non-loss makers. This could be due to less scope for cost 
reduction at distressed carriers, although, that can hardly be substantiated from the 
literature. An other explanation could be that management of such carriers is weak in 
terms of initiating and following through unpopular cost cutting programs. The latter 
explanation is probably more likely, although more research on this issue is necessary. 
T' _ L i _jj .jj 
.a. U.V.l~ i.i i.i 
Past Present Future 
Statement I Group Mean G'" _. _ roup Mean Group Mean 
__ ... _: ............. : .. ; .... : .... ~~r.f!.~~!'!.~.. . ...................................... . Aircraft UllhsatlOtl .. ···················L;~20)···············;~~~~·'P········ ................................................. . 
Non-Ioss(20) 8,850 
Loss(20) *u Loss(20) 6,000 5,400 
Non-Ioss(17) 1,412 Non-Ioss(19) 2,895 
Hub and spoke operation 
···D~~~~ii~d·~~7~;fi~:~~~·· ...................................................... ·······~~20)·························*················ ........................................ . 
structure 6,250 Non-Ioss(19) 4,263 
Loss(19) 5,158 * Loss(20) 5,800 *** Loss(22) 5,773 
. Non-Ioss(17) 2,706 Non-Ioss(19) 3,158 Non-Ioss(19) 3.579 
Job rotation 
........... : ............. : .. ; ..... Mq:.~f!.~~~8'.. . ....................................................................................................... . Media advertJ.smg Loss(20) 5,500 .... . .................................................... . 
Brand image 
Service quality 
Merger/aC4uisition to gain 
market-share 
Alliance with the incumbents 



































Finance ···A~;;;~~;~g·~;iti~~i·~~~~············ ···L;;~(20)·······················~·8~~·'P·············· .............................................................................................. . 
Non-Ioss(17) 4:824 
Off-balance sheet fmancing of Loss(20) 6650 'l' 
aircraft Non-loss(17) 4:765 
Loss(20) 7,500 • Loss(22) 8,136 • 
Non-Ioss(20) 8,700 Non-Ioss(20) 9,100 Cost reduction 
···c~~p~~t~;·;~·;~;;f;t~·'?!·q·t!.~~·· ···L;~~(·20)·······················6·600·*············· ................................................................................................ . 
system Non-Ioss(18) 5:167 









Environment ···fu~~~~;·~itit;";d~·t~~;~······ ··L;;;~(20)·······················7~lOO·*················ ............................................................................................. . 
the new-entrant Non-Ioss(17) 4,710 











••• .* • '¥ Note: = p < .001; = p < .01; = P < .05; = P <.1. The statements in italics are statistically significantly different for both 
failed and non-failed and loss and non-loss making carriers. Note that only Part II, Past was tested for the failed/non-failed group. 
In the future one new item appears that was neither in the past or present item list, 
namely Market-intelligent information- and communication system. One of the 
reasons for LM's to emphasise this item to a greater extent than NLM's in the future 
may very well be less satisfaction with past and present information systems, 
compared to NLM's. Thus, lack of market information may be an important source 
of difference in profitability between LM's and NLM's. 
There is a considerable shift in terms of factors relative importance between the Past, 
on one hand, and the Present and Future on the other hand. It is apparent that the 
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shift is towards the distribution network (Favourable attitude of travel agents and 
Computer reservations systems) and brand image through service quality and 
company culture. As labour costs are one of the most important areas for cost 
reduction, it is apparent that the airlines are seeking an alternative way to reduce 
labour costs namely to increase labour productivity. In order to do so the airline has 
to maintain good employee relations that facilitate co-operation and strong 
motivating company culture. 
11.6 The Increased Activity Phenomenon 
It is apparent from the questionnaire that the raters of the failed airlines rate the 
importance of the factors in Part II, higher for those factors that are significantly 
different between the two groups. There are two possible explanations to this 
phenomenon; first, the raters could be concerned about their own performance prior 
to the airline's failure, thus, overrating the importance placed on the various factors; 
second, the raters may actually be rating the importance placed on the factors during 
the trouble period just prior to failure. The latter explanation is more likely in the 
case of failed firms. This is due to the fact that all activity in the airline increases 
during the problem period in an attempt to rectify the 'causes' of the airline's 
problems. The actual causes are namely in many cases the previous inactivity of the 
management in terms of these factors that suddenly gain so much importance when 
the airline is facing failure. Therefore, one can infer that the responses for the failed 
airlines on Part II are accurate for the failed airline just prior to failure but do not 
indicate clearly, which factors where neglected before the increased activity. 
Figure 11-2 shows a situation where an airline has been indifferent to its environment 
both internally and externally until a 'catastrophe' occurs, causing a sudden increase 
in activity. The catastrophe can be caused by a year of a very large loss, losses for 
period of years causing a reaction of creditors or shareholders, or a market entry of a 
more efficient competitor. As a long period of inactivity and ignorance of external 
and internal developments has weakened the airline, the increased activity will not 
necessarily save the airline. That depends on the access to capital as it will take 
considerable time to make the carrier fit again to reach profitability. In either case 
the period before failure or successful tum-around will be characterised by increased 
activity in the organisation, sometimes termed and well described as 'fire-fighting'. 
Increased Activity Prior to Failure 
Activity 
(Importance placed on factors) 
. Increased activity 
due to sudden change 
in internal or external 
environment. 
I Favourable results I Negative results Failure 
-~I r--- 'Fire-fighting'---1 Management 'inactivity' 
11. 7 Conclusion 
Time 
Statements distinguishing between both failed and non-failed carriers and loss-making 
and non-loss making carriers for Part I of the questionnaire, were: The airline's 
success is largely dependent on factors out of its control, everyone in our airline 
understands our long term aims and objectives, we plan and allocate sufficient 
resources to developing new markets, lack of capital will not limit our growth, we 
fulfill our customers' needs well and we are innovators in customer service. Non-
failed and non-loss making carriers had higher means for all the named statements 
except the first one. 
F or Part II of the questionnaire statements distinguishing between both failed and 
non-failed carriers and loss-making and non-loss making carriers were: Hub and 
spoke operations, yield management system, achieving critical mass, job rotation 
and computer reservation system. Other very highly significant statements 
distinguishing between failed and non-failed carriers were: Delegation and operations 
without unionised staff. No highly significant statements distinguished between loss-
makers and non-loss-makers, except Hub and spoke operations and Job rotation. 
However, statements showing significant difference were: Service quality (past), 
Merger/acquisition to gain market-share (past), Investor's attitudes towards the 
new-entrant, Alliance with the incumbents, Decentralised organisation structure 
(present) and Market-intelligent information- and communication system (future). 
Loss-making airlines show slightly less emphasis on cost reduction, while the 
statement is highly emphasised by both groups. Loss-makers show more emphasis on 
Favourable attitude of travel agents showing a need for increased emphasis on the 
distribution system, probably in order to rectify past defects. Non-loss makers show 
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increasing future emphasis on Expansion into new markets, Media advertising and 
Aircraft utilisation. 
The uniform greater emphasis on factors in Part II of the questionnaire, by 
respondents of failed carriers is traced to Increased Activity or 'fire-fighting' during 
turnaround attempts. 
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12. New-entrant Airlines' 
Failure Prediction Models 
12.1 Introduction 
In the chapter, three sources of failure prediction model construction will be 
presented: Part I and Part II of the questionnaire survey and the new-entrant airlines' 
data-base. The purpose of developing models from three sources is to test whether 
there are similarities in the variables selected into the models, as well as to test 
whether other model sources than the traditional financial source can perform as well 
or better in classifying companies into the failed and non-failed and distressed and 
non-distressed groups, as well as to test if the combination of models from more than 
one source will enhance prediction of financial distress or bankruptcy. 
A test of the null hypotheses that there is no difference in the classification accuracy 
of models derived from different subsets of variables from the questionnaire, do not 
differ in terms of classification ability, was carried out. The same hypotheses was 
tested for the data-base, but on different sub-sets from the questionnaire. 
12.1.1 Methodology Considerations 
Multicollinearity is certainly an issue in traditional regression analysis. In logistic 
regression multicollinearity can be used to enhance the discriminatory power of the 
regression function. Cochran503 showed that variables that appear unimportant on 
their own, may in combination with other variables be highly important and enhance 
classification ability of the model. In general one must assume that the same 
relationship exists between the independent variables and the dependent variable 
when the function is used to predict failure and non-failure. If multicollinearity is 
present, another assumption must be added, namely that of a stability between 
intercorrelations of the group on which the model is based and the group on which 
the function will be used to predict. If this latter assumption does not hold the results 
will be sample specific and predictability will be poorer than for the original group 
from which the function is derived. 504 
503R. Cochran and R. Green, Statistical Methods for Bankruptcy Forecasting, JOlli11al of Economics and 
Business. March 1982. pp. 349-354. 
504As reported in C. V. Zavgren, The Prediction of Corporate Failure: The State of The Art, Journal of 
ACCOWlting Literature, Vol. 2, 1983, p. 15. 
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It must be noted, however, that another function based on the variables excluded in 
the model may be as good in predicting bankruptcies due to correlation with the 
variables included. Thus, it is not appropriate to assume that anyone function 
derived from the sample data to be unique information. 505 
Another important issue in failure prediction is the potential cost of errors. Such 
costs are, of course, relative according to who is using the results of prediction 
model. F or example, from the standpoint of investors the cost of Type 1506 error 
would be more costly. Conversely from the standpoint of managers of firms the cost 
of Type 2 error would be more costly raising creditors alarm unnecessarily. 507 
Bankruptcy prediction models have sometimes been developed separately for each 
year prior to failure, often up to five years. This practice is highly questionable, 508 
since the practitioner cannot determine accurately which model to use for prediction, 
the one year, the second year or the third year model if we assume a three year data-
set. There is, however, a difference if the models are presented as base models, 509 
whereas their predictability is then tested on the other years. 510 511 Under such 
circumstances the use of a model based on the year prior to failure and an other based 
on the third year prior to failure could enhance bankruptcy and distress prediction. 
12.2 The Application of The Logistic Regression Methodology 
12.2.1 Model Construction Foundation 
The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS PC+ Ver. 6.0) was used for the data 
analysis. The SPSS logistic regression methodology uses the maximum likelihood 
estimation by the Newton-Raphson512 method. This means in practicality that the 
selected coefficients are the ones that make the observed results most likely. As the 
logistic model is non-linear an iteration algorithm is used for parameter estimation. 
Such iteration makes the coefficients larger513 each time it iterates, as a result, a 
505Op. cit. (Zavgren), p. 17. 
506Type 1 error is to predict a failed fum as non-failed; Type 2 error is to predict a non-failed fInn as failed. 
507In the case of airlines the cost of Type 2 error can in fact be detrimental for the airline, due to the travel 
agency dependency, whose bookings usually are dramatically reduced as rumours of imminent failure occur. 
508See discussion in: Keasey and McGuinnes, Failure of UK Industrial Finns 1976 - 1984, Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 17 (1), Spring 1990, p. 123.; and in: J Robertson and R.W. Mills, The Uses and 
Abuses of Corporate Prediction Models, Management Accounting, October 1991, p. 21. 
509 A base model means that the fonnula is based on that years data. This means that one can produce a base 
model from data three years prior to failure and test its classification ability on data ~ne and two year.s prior. 
This alternative raises the practitioners ability to predict failure of companies that nught not be clasSIfied as 
prone to failure according to a model based on fIrst year prior to failure. In fact ~ne can suggest .an 
algorithm where the practitioner starts out with a model based on one year prior, then \\lth a two vear pnor 
model and lastly with a three year prior model. !fthere is a discrepancy between the three base models there 
is a reason to research the company more thoroughly. 
510Such methodology was used by: John hmes, et al., Prediction of small company failure, Credit Management, 
September 1991, pp. 37-42. 
:'iIIIn fact the pmctitioner can not, based on the statistical model, infer how far from bankruptcy a given case is. 
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maximum of twenty iterations was allowed in parameter estimates in this study. 
In Logistics Regression a number of specific terms and concepts are used. The 
likelihood is the probability of the observed result given the parameter estimates. It 
is represented by -2 times the log of the likelihood (-2LL) and represents how well 
the model fits the data. Thus, a good model has a high likelihood of the observed 
results, translated into small value for _2LL.514 The model's improvement is the 
change in the -2LL as each successive variable is entered or excluded from the model. 
Thus, a large difference between the initial -2LL with only the constant included and 
the final model with one or more variables, indicates high probability of observed 
result given the parameter estimates. Thus, a model classifying the sample perfectly 
into two groups, failed and non-failed, will have -2LL ofO. 
Interpretation of the logistic coefficients is meaningful, unlike in Multiple 
Discrimination Analysis. If we write the logistic model in terms of the log of odds, or 
logit, we find: 
In( Prob (event) ) -_ B B X B X 0+ 1 1 + ... + p p Prob (no event ) (12.1 ) 
Thus, the logistic coefficient can be interpreted as change in log odds as the 
independent variable changes by one unit. Thus, a coefficient of .5 in a failure 
prediction model will with one unit change in the independent variable increase the 
log odds of failure by .5. If we rewrite the formula to represent odds only, instead of 
log odds, it takes the form: 
(12.2) 
Thus, e raised to Bi will result in a factor that determines the odds change when the 
ith independent variable increases by one unit. As a result, if the estimator Bi is 
positive the factor will be grater than 1, leading to an increase in the odds; if the Bi is 
negative it leads to a factor of less than 1, that reduces the odds. Thus, if Bi 
is 0 the factor becomes 1 and the odds are left unchanged. This leads to the third 
equation used to estimate the probability offailure in our case: 515 
1 
Estimated prob(failure) = -z 
l+e 
(12.3) 
Where e is the natural logarithm and z the log-odds. 
512For detailed discussion and full algorithm listing, please reter to the SPSS Statistical Algorithms, 2nd ed. 
51~arge coefficients are a problem as they will cause extreme swing in pre~iction results. .TIlls means that 
little change in observed value will cause large change in predicted probabIlIty. The .pra~tIca1 consequence 
is that the model will yield almost uniformly only the extreme values of ° and 1, which IS an unacceptable 
trait in the model. 
51~arija 1. Norusis, SPSSIPC+ Advanced Statistics 4.0, SPSS Inc., Chicago, 1990, p. B-45. 
mOp. cit. Norusis, p. 13-43. 
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In the model construction both forward stepwise (FSTEP) variable entry and 
ba~kwar~ stepwise (BSTEP) was used. In the former method an independent 
vanable IS entered based on the significance level of the score statistic. Thus, the 
variable with highest significance level (p. < .05) is entered and variables already in 
the model are tested for removal based on the significance of the likelihood-rati0516 
(LR) statistic (p. > .1).517 The backward stepwise methodology enters all variables at 
the first step and then proceeds to eliminate variables from the model as in FSTEP. 
The significance level for variable entry was set at .05 and . 1 for variable elimination. 
A relaxation of these lead to an increase in the inclusion of non-significant 
coefficients in the models, which was found unacceptable. 
It is important in the interpretation of the model coefficients to analyse the reasons 
behind reverse signs to what was expected. The apparent relationship of the means 
with the signs of the coefficients appears to be in the direction of the difference of the 
means. Thus, if the mean is greater for non-loss makers (NLM) than loss-makers 
(LM) the sign is positive, conversely if the mean is lower the sign is negative. 
Furthermore, interpretation of coefficient signs has to take into account that the 
representative variable may be highly emphasised or agreed to by both groups, 
regardless of its classification properties. Thus, one must not interpret any variable 
as an failure factor or success factor, one can only state that the intensity of its rating 
differs between the two groups under observation. 
An explanation for negative signs of variables that 'a priori' one would expect to be 
agreed on more readily at NLM airlines than LM airlines for Part II of the 
questionnaire survey, is the increased activity phenomena that was mentioned at the 
end of Chapter 11. This depicts that the airline will increase activity in order to 
return the airline to profitability and is characteristic of distressed airlines. Increased 
activity can be a measurement of financial distress and appear as an increase in the 
odds of financial distress (coefficient with a negative sign). 
12.3 Results of Logistic Regression on Questionnaire Part I 
J 2.3. J Model Derived from Questionnaire Part I 
Model Q 1, is based on the variables from questionnaire Part I. U sing logistic 
regression to classify the cases into two groups, loss making (LM) airlines and non-
loss making (NLM), 91.11 percent overall classification was attained. Two 
coefficients were significant and one highly significant. Some multicollinearity was 
present as can be seen from the correlation table in Appendix-L, for model Ql. This 
implies that the resulting model may be sample specific. 
51~e likelihood-ratio test estimates the model with each variable eliminated and looks at the change in the 
log-likelihood. 
5l7Variabie entry was limited to alpha level 0.05 and variable exclusion to alpha level 0.1. This led to fe\\er. 
variables be~g included in the models, than if the alpha levels were relaxed. but increased the number ot 
significant coefficients in the models. 
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The Type. 1 error was 4.17 percent, while the Type 2 error was 14.29 percent. The 
mo.del chi-square was very highly significant, while the pseudo-R squared518 was 
satIsfactory at .51. Two coefficients were significant, Everyone in our airline 
understands our long term aims and objectives and Employees are rewarded for 
taking actions that benefit our customers, while the coefficient representing Lack of 
capital will not limit our growth was highly significant. 
The coefficients in the model having negative sign show apparently wrong sign in the 
logical context, as one would normally associate these variables with non-loss-
making. The explanation is, however, that these variables have higher means for 
loss-making carriers. 




Q6 The airline's success is largely dependent on factors out of its control -1. 0158 






Our marketing is aggressive -1.1002 
Lack of capital will not limit our growth 1.7224 
Everyone in our airline understands our long term aims and objectives 0.02787 
Employees are rewarded for taking actions that benefit our customers -1.4643 
Group consensus is the usual way we make decisions -.7493 
Constant -.9600 
-2 Log Likelihood 
Goodness of frt 
30.159 
30.810 
L NL 95.83 85.71 
Overall 91.11 
Model Chi-Square 32.024··· 
Pseudo R .51 
n U4NUI 





Aggressive marketing as such begets retaliation by the incumbent and does not 
provide for longevity as People Express, America West and other temporary success 
stories prove. Thus, aggressive marketing can logically assume a negative sign in the 
model for the sample involved. 
Employees are rewarded for taking actions that benefit the customer, receives higher 
mean for loss makers. One would believe on a priori that this should be a positive 
coefficient. The reason for greater agreement among loss makers is probably due to 
their attempt to tum-around, but increased activity would logically focus on this 
aspect. 
'18The pseudo R squared is an attempt to produce a measurement device of the adequacy of the model, like that 
used in multiple linear regression. The underlying principle is the 'proportion of vanatlOn explamed by the 
model' or R 2 in multiple linear regression, simulated as pseudo-R 2 in logistic regreSSIon: 
R 2 = 1 - Residual sum of squares 
Total StUll of square 
Pseudo R2 = Initial -2 LL - model -2 LL 
Initial -2 LL 
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N ext we will examine what critical factors came up when the 'emphasis' factors of 
Part II of the questionnaire were entered into the logistic regression model. 
12.4 Results of Logistic Regression on Questionnaire Part II 
12.4.1 Models Derived from Questionnaire Part II 
F or Part II of the questionnaire the variable set was divided into six sub-groups based 
on the underlying model of analysis presented in Chapter 1. Then a separate model 
for each sub-group in the three time intervals past, present and future. 
Table 12-2 shows the resulting models for the past, while Table 12-3 and Table 12-4 
show models constructed for the present and the future. 519 Focusing on Table 12-2, 
model construction was successful for all sub-groups except financial, that yielded 
no result. Other models were significant, with highly significant model chi-square for 
the operations, management and the marketing models. The pseudo-R squared 
shows satisfactory models for operations and marketing but poorer model for 
management, although having high model chi-square significance. 
The best classifYing result was obtained in the marketing model or 87.5 percent 
overall classification. The Type 1 error was 1l.76 percent and Type 2 error 13.33 
percent. The second best performing model was that of operations with 84.85 
percent overall classification capability. That model has considerable poorer result on 
Type 1 error or 16.67 percent, while Type 2 error was the same as that of the 
marketing model. 
All coefficients were significant at the p. < 0.05 level, except Alliance with the 
incumbents, in the marketing model. Three coefficients were significant at the p. < 
0.01 level; Hub and spoke operations, in the operations model, Job rotation in the 
management model, and Service quality in the marketing model. 
The surprising result was that logistic regression on the financial variables produced 
no model given the same constraints on variable entry as that for the other models. 
As a result it appears that the qualitative financial variables applied are poorer 
predictors of financial distress than 'a priori' presumption. 
519 One model for each time period had to be constructed rather than to test a base model on the data sets of the 
other periods. The reason is that the one can not assume that the same variables are as lIDportant m the 
future as in the past, due to the inherent d)'TIamism of the qualitative variables. 
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Regression on the present part of the questionnaire resulted in only three models, all 
showing similar classification accuracy. The sub-groups of variables that did not 
produce models were the same sub-groups that produced the poorest models in the 
past. 
The pseudo R2 was non-spectacular, being 0.39 for the management (Q5b) model 
and 0.32 and 0.30 for the operations (Q4b) and marketing (Q6b) models. The 
operations model outperformed the marketing model producing the highest overall 
classification or 78.4 percent. However, this is considerable poorer performance 
compared to 84.9 percent for the operations model in the past. Model Q6b provided 
much poorer result in the 'present' variable set or 76.5 percent overall classification. 
The Type 1 and Type 2 errors differed much between the three models: For model 
Q4b the Type 1 error was 21.05 percent, while models Q5b and Q6b had 20.0 and 
29.41 percent, respectively; Type 2 error was 22.22 percent for Q4b, 29.41 percent 
for Q6b and 17.65 percent for model Q6b. 
All the coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level or better, with the exception of 
Aircraft utilisation in model Q4a. The only highly significant coefficient was Job 
rotation in model Q5a. 
The future part of the questionnaire survey produced as before a marketing (Q6c) 
and management (Q5c) model, while the operations (Q4c) variable sub-set produced 
no model. However, the information (Q3c) sub-set produced a poor one variable 
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model. Model Q5c has pseudo R2 of 0.35, while the other models Q3c and Q6c had 
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Results of Logistic Regression by Variables Sub-Group: Part 
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The surprising aspect of model Q3c is the low Type 1 error of only 9.09 percent, 
while the Type 2 error was very high, or 70.59 percent. This means that the model is 
good in classifying failed firms as failed, but extremely poor at classifying non-failed 
airlines as non-failed. The reason behind this is not clear. 
Model Q6c has 72.2 percent overall classification, while model Q5c yields 68.48 
percent. Both models have lower Type 1, compared to Type 2 errors, 28.57 and 
26.32 percent for Type 1, and 35.29 and 29.41 percent for Type 2, for models Q5c 
and Q6c, respectively. 
Each model's Beta values, test statistics and distribution of predicted probabilities 
can be found in Appendix-L. The distribution traits are especially important to 
identify extreme outliers520 that are common to all models due to carriers that are 
operationally, strategically or financially very different from the rest of the sample 
520Ex1rcme outlier is a case that has high predicted probability in the opposite direction to observed 
classification. 
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that causes different responses to the statements compared to the majority of cases in 
the same group. 
Table 12-4 Results of Logistic Regression by Functional Group for Part II, Future 
Environment Information 
ModelO2c ModelO3c 










-2 Log 48.168 
Likelihood 
Goodness of fit 37.828 
L NL 90.91 29.41 
Overall 64.10 
* Model Chi- 5.255 
Square 
Pseudo R2 0.10 
n L22 NL17 











































The overall conclusion is that the operations, marketing and management models 
yield the best521 results in terms of distribution traits. Of these three, the marketing 
model shows apparently better overall distribution traits than the rest of the models. 
12.5 Results of Logistic Regression on Airline Data-base 
J 2.5. J Introduction 
The airline data-base522 was constructed for the purpose of producing a variable set 
for discrimination between failed and non-failed new-entrant airlines in the United 
States from 1978 until 1992. The selection of new-entrants for inclusion in the data-
base was based on same principles as that of the selection of new-entrants for the 
questionnaire survey (see Chapter 11). 
521 A 'best' model in this context, is a model producing predicted probabilities much to the expected extremes. 1 
for failed and 0 for non-failed. 
)~~The data-base was constructed by the researcher directly from filings with the US DoT (used to be to the 
CAB). The data was validated thoroughly and should be as accurate as possible, discounting errors in 
filings on behalf of the airlines themselves. 
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12,5,2 The Phase-in Methodology for the Small Population Case 
The population of j,et-operating new-entrants posed a number of practical problems. 
~ne was the estabbshment, of adequate number of carriers in the two groups of the 
dlchoto~ous ob~erved ~anable due to the small population. Another was the large 
proport~on ,of failed earners ., Based on the data presented in previous chapters one 
can. ea~t1y I~er ,that many Jet operating new-entrants were quite successful for a 
p~r~od m t~elr hfe-cycle. Based on this assumption it was deemed appropriate to 
dIVIde the hfe-cycle of a failed carrier into phases of three years and handle each 
phase as a separate module for entry as failed or non-failed. The following 
paragraphs will provide detailed analogy of the method developed and applied in the 
study. 
Figure 12-1 Life-cycle Phase-in Group Inclusion523 
First phase Second phase Third phase Fourth phase 
Non-failed 1 Non-failed 2 Non-failed 3 Non-failed 4 
Non-failed 5 Non-failed 6 Non-failed 7 Failed 1 
Non-failed 8 Non-failed 9 Failed 2 
Non-failed 10 Failed 3 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+ 7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 t+13 t+14 
Note: non-failed = nf; failed = f. 
The first phase is when the carrier has operated for three complete years, which was 
the minimum operating life for inclusion in the data-base. The second phase includes 
carriers that have operated for at least seven years. 524 However, carriers failing 
anytime during year t+5 to t+ 7, will be included only as failed counting from the last 
full financial year and backwards three years. For example, a carrier failing in the 
middle of year t+6, is included as failed and years t+5 , t+4 and t+3 are included in the 
data-base. If a carrier fails, however, in year t+8, it will be included twice, first as 
non-failed by including years t+2, t+3 and t+4 and then as failed counting years t+5, 
t+6 and t+ 7 . Year t+ 1 is then counted as slack for a partial year of operations. A 
carrier operating successfully through all four phases will be included four times in 
the data-base as successful, thus, providing a contrast to carriers that fail during each 
of its successful phases. Table 12-5, shows clearly the decision rule for determining 
whether the set should be included as/ailed carrier or non-failed carrier. 
523Please note that this selection algorithm is only pertinent to the data-ba e anal si , not the qu lOnnarre 
urvey. 
n4The e phases are con tructed for convenience in building the model and do not ha e theoretl al ba i . In 
fact it can be alleged that there are actuall. four phase of failure~ initiation failure pha - v"hen the arrlm 
never get off the ground: tart-up failure phase - when the airline 1 undercapitali ed and fail \: tlun fe\ 
. ear ~ growth failure pha e - when the airline grow too fast or too low, and mature faIlure pha - when 
the airline h3 reach d large iz and tarts to ex-pand into ri kier market to ustain grO\,1h. 
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12.5.3 Selection of Ratios 
Failed 
mI0 - f3 
nf9 - f2 
nf7 - fl 
Selection of ratios and other measurement variables in the analysis was divided into 
three distinctive parts: (i) financial ratios; (ii) non-financial ratios; and (iii) ratios 
composed of one financial and one non-financial element, termed as mixed. 
The construction of mixed ratios was based partially on the assumptions put forth by 
Doganis525, namely that a cost unit should be part of a ratio supposed to measure 
efficiency. In addition, the factor of stage length and aircraft size was observed as 
important. Doganis makes the use of available tonne kilometres (ATK) rather than 
available seat kilometres (ASK) the fundamental part of many of the ratios presented 
in his article. As the ATK was not readily available to the researcher, the alternative 
available seat kilometres was used. This alternative was further reinforced on the 
basis of the tendency US airlines to base most of their income on the carriage of 
passengers rather than cargo. 
Selection of financial ratios was based primarily on previous studies of effective 
financial ratios for failure prediction primarily derived from Chen and Shimerda526 and 
Davis and Kay527 for variables related to added value. No attempt was made to 
produce a larger set of financial variables than presented in the two named studies. 
The non-financial variables have no cost or revenue element associated with the 
exception of % Non-scheduled, that is calculated on the basis non-scheduled 
revenues as a percentage of total revenues. Non-financial variables can be divided 
into two parts industry-specific and environment related. The industry-specific 
variables were based on a proposed practice on measuring performance of airlines as 
reported by DoganiS. 528 The environment variables were based on a forecasting 
model of the influences of the economic environment on air transport demand. 529 A 
priori assumption was that disposable income, interest rates and fuel costs would 
represent this influence adequately in the study. These were represented with 
changes in GDP, consumer prices, crude oil prices, spot fuel rates and interest rates. 
525Doganis, R. , Measure for Measure, Airline Business, May 1986, pp. 16-20. 
52~ung H. Chen and Thomas A. Shimerda, An Empirical Analysis of Useful Financial Ratios, Financial 
Management/Spring 1981, pp. 51-60. 
527Evan Davis and John Kay, Assessing corporate performance, Business Strategy Revicw, Summcr 1990, pp. 
1-16. 
mOp. cit. (Doganis, 1986). 
52<lSk.iTSla flugm~Uanefudar (Aviation Committee Report), The Ministry of Transport. Iceland, October 1986, 
Part V, p. 3, hv Sveinn ViClar GuClmundsson. 
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The rate of change was considered to represent the influence of the variable under 
consideration more clearly than if the actual value would be used. 
Table 12-6 Ratios and Variables Derived from The Data-Base 
Financial Variables 
Net WorthITotal Debt 
EBIT/Sa/es 
Net IncomeAVet Wath 
Current Assets/Total Assets 













Average stage length 
Aircraft Departures/T otal Personnel 
Aircraft Hours/T otal Personnel 
Weight Load-factor 
A vefage no. of seats per dep. 
Average daily rev. hours 
Distance per hour flOlNn 
Average passenger haul 
Environment 
Percent change in GOP 
Change in consumer prices 
Change in crude oil prices 
Spot fuel rate (JeWJet A 1) 
Change in spot fuel prices 
Interest rate 
Change in interest rate 




Dir. Op. Exp.lASK 
Ind. Op. Exp.lASK 
MaintenallCe/ASK 
Tot. Op. Exp.lASK 
DepreciationiA SK 
Operating RevJEmpIoyee 
Tot. Op. ExpJEmp/oyee 
ASK!11000 Wages 
ASK!11000 Op. Exp 
Pax rev JRPK (Pax yield) 
Revenue/Passenger 
Operating profitlASK 
Of the 48 ratios and variables tested only six showed significant difference between 
failed and non-failed carriers. All of these ratios are highly significant at the p < .005 
level, with the exception of the ratio of depreciation to ASK that was significant at 
the p < .05 level and long-term debt/total assets that was significant at the p < .1 
level. 
Table 12-7 Significant Differences Between Failed and Non-failed Carriers 
RatiolVariable Population 








Depreciation! ASK Failed 
Non-Failed 
Operating ell.-pense/ ASK Failed 
Non-Failed 
Long tenn debtITotal assets Failed 
Non-Faih:d 
• Ill. ** * '¥ 
Note: =p<.OOl; =p<.OL =p<.05; =p<.l. 
















All the five models presented in Table 12-8, provide high overall classification, while 
the financial model (DB 1) has slightly higher Type 1 error than the other models, 
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~it~ the exception of the non-financial model (DBS). Model DBS had highly 
slgrufican~ model Chi-Square, whi~e the other models had very highly significant 
model chi-squares. The pseudo-R ranged from .48 for model DBS to .84 for the 
mixed2 model (DB4). 
Table 12-8 Models for Variable Sets One Year Prior 
-2 Log Likelihood 

























* ADV Fixe 
-8.7176 





































































X2 ,= 24.128** 
.48 
f18 nf18 
Maintena = maintenance costs/ASK; ADV _Fixe = Added value/fixed assets; Total_ De= Total debt/Fixed assets; Long_ ter= long-
teon debt/total assets; operatin= operating profit/ASK; ASK_$101=ASKI$1000 in wages; Tot._Rev=Total revenue/Pax; 
Aircraft=aircraft departures/total personnel; Distance= distance per hour flown; Aircrafl =aircraft hours/total personnel; 
average3=average passenger haul; @_Non_Sc = percent total ASK non-sheduled; Change2 = change in spot fuel prices; Ebit_Sal 
= Earnings before intetest and taxes/Sales; Revex = RevenueslExpenses; Load Jac = load factor; Average 1 = average no of seats 
per departure. 
Two years prior to failure the overall classification was dramatically reduced for all 
models, while thefinancial2 and non-financial models gave the best results,530 75.0 
and 69.44 percent overall classification, respectively. Type 1 error was quite 
different between the two, or 22.2 and 33.3 percent. Type 2 error was conversily, 
27.8 for both models. 
530 Please bear in mind that, unlike the questiOImaire based models, the variables obtained from the empirical 
selection into the one year prior models are tested two and three years prior, rather than having new 
variables entering. 
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Table 12-9 Classification Results Two Years Prior 
-2 Log Likelihood 






























X? ,= 11.00' 
.22 
f18 nf18 

























































X? ,= 15286'1' 
.31 
f18 nfl8 
It is surprising how poorly the financial model perform in view of the emphasis 
placed on good performance of such models in prior research. Thus, it must be 
concluded that non-financial variables do provide better classification results for this 
sample further away from bankruptcy than one year, than financial variables. One 
possible explanation of this discrepancy, is 'window dressing' of financial results. 
Such actions on traffic data are not as readily practiced or possible.
531 
The pseudo-R2 is adequate for the DBS-2 model, but the model yields non-significant 
model chi-square, while the DB2-2 model had significant chi-square but low pseudo-
R2. Significant coefficients were Ebit _Sal in the financiall model, Operatin in the 
DB4-2 model and Aircraft in the DBS-2 model. 
531 u.s. airlines are required by law to file financial, personnel and traffic data with the D.o.T. In some cases. 
however, airlines become delinquent in such filing, which in itself could be an indication of fmancial 
distress. 
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Three years prior the non-financial model is still providing better results than the 
financial2 model, producing 72.2 percent overall classification compared to 66.67 
percent for the latter model. The model chi-square is not significant although the 
classification result was superior to other models presented, including the significant 
financial2 model. Significant coefficients included Aircraft hours per employee in 
model DB5 and Added Value/Fixed Assets, Total Debt/Total Assets and Long Term 
Debt/Total Assets in model DB2. The pseudo-R2 indicates that the models DB5 and 
DB2 are performing much better than the rest, although, the values are not 
particularly good, as expected. 
Table 12-10 Classification Results Three Years Prior 
-2 Log Likelihood 
























* ADV Fixe 
-2.1062 











X2 ?= 10.176· 
.20 
fl8 nflg 





























































12.6 Practical Application of The Models 
J 2.6. J Prediction Enhancement Through Model Combination 
Table 12-11 shows predicted probabilities for the airlines532 that appeared both in the 
questionnaire survey and the data-base. The main conclusion from the table is that 
the combination of models from varying sources enhances financial distress and 
failure prediction. This is obvious as there is usually conformity of predicted 
probabilities of individual raters in the questionnaire survey and the predicted 
probabilities for the associated airline derived from the data-base models. In the few 
cases where there is not conformity, like case 108, there is conformity, however, of 
the two data-base models. In the cases where there is large discrepancy between the 
financial and non-financial model, like cases 115, 122, 301 and 304, the explanation 
can be sought in the type of route strategy adopted by the respective airlines. Case 
301 and 304 had highly efficient route systems, while airlines 301 and 304 had 
services heavily geared to business travellers with all the inefficiencies that are 
associated with such strategy. As a result, these will be predicted as bankrupt if the 
non-financial model is considered in isolation. 
The predicted probabilities of financial distress depicted for QI at airline 122, implies 
management difficulties, although, other aspects of the operation seem to be in good 
condition. Such an airline should be watched carefully as the management difficulties 
could contaminate the financial and operation aspect of the airline in the near future. 
Actual research on the airline involved confirms the findings. A reverse situation 
occurs for case 108, where predicted probabilities for QI and QII imply management 
characteristics and emphasis of a non-distressed firm, although both the financial 
(DB2) and non-financial (DBS) models classify the carrier as failed. In reality this 
finding is confirmed by research, as the carrier was presenting poor financial results at 
the time and operating inefficient route system. Apparently, the management aspect 
of the airline is non-characteristic of distressed firms, meaning that the firm is either 
exceptional or about to turn-around. Such a firm should be watched carefully by 
stake-holders. 
The combination of four models can also warn the practitioner of possible conflict 
among top managers as can be seen for subject 6 of airline 108 and subject 6 of 118. 
Such cases indicate highly differing views on the airline's management reality, 
necessitating further research into the possible cause. Furthermore, the use of the 
four distinctive models will reduce the possibility of misclassification of extreme 
outliers of a single model, that are uniformly classified by the other three models. 
Furthermore such combination of models will indicate if management problems are , 
present although still not affecting financial performance or operation efficiency. 
532Plcasc note that as confidentiality was assured in the questionnaire survey, no disclosure is made as to the 
identity of the airlines involved in the questionnaire survey. 
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Table 12-11 Prediction Enhancement Through Model Combination 
Case # QI QII DB2 DB5 
Predicted Probabilities 
104 Distressed 0.99 1.00 
Suhject a 0.70 0.99 
b 0.65 1.00 
c 0.90 0.98 
d 0.59 1.00 
1 05 Distressed 0.69 0.96 
Subject a 0.88 0.92 
b 1.00 0.63 
c 0.75 0.60 
d 0.99 0.82 
e 0.99 1.00 
108 Distressed 0.94 1.00 
Subject a 0.01 0.01 
b 0.03 0.87 
c 0.00 0.01 
109 Non-distressed 0.03 0.33 
Subject a 0.00 0.06 
115 Non-distressed 0.01 1.00 
Subject a 0.01 0.06 
118 Non-distressed 0.00 0.20 
Subject a 0.02 0.00 
b 0.83 0.00 
c 0.27 0.00 
120 Non-distressed 0.19 0.01 
Subject a 0.08 0.00 
122 Non-distressed 0.01 0.99 
Subj~da 0.80 0.00 
b 0.31 0.00 
c 0.49 0.08 
301 Failed 0.63 0.08 
Subject a 1.00 0.82 
304 Failed 1.00 0.28 
Subject a 1.00 1.00 
306 Failed 0.94 1.00 
Subject a 1.00 0.93 
307 Failed 1.00 1.00 
Subject a 0.93 0.99 
313 Failed 0.98 0.57 
Subiect a 0.84 1.00 
Please note that distress and non-distress is based on fmancial data until 1993. 
12.7 Conclusion 
The null hypotheses, that all the sub-sets of variables would provide the same 
classification, can be rejected on the basis of the varying classification ability of the 
models. This result is valid for the Past, Present and Future variable sub-sets of the 
questionnaire survey Part II. The same conclusion was obtained for the sub-sets 
financial, mixed and non-financial in the data-base models. 
The best predictor variables based on model QI are the factors: Lack of capital will 
not limit our growth, Everyone in our airline understands our long term aims and 
objectives and Employees are rewarded for taking actions that benefit our 
customers. For models Q2 to Q7, taking only into consideration the past, the best 
predictors were: Yield management system, Hub and spoke operations, !1n'eslor 
attitudes towards the airline and Service quality. Turning to the present and the 
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future the best predictors are Job rotation, while Expansion into new markets and 
cost reduction perform well in the latter time period only. Other significant factors in 
the past were freight operations, decentralised organisation structure and market-
share. In the present it was flexible job descriptions, freight operations, market-
research and media advertising. Finally, in the future it was market-intelligent 
information and communication system, employees productivity and frequent flyer 
programs. The factor that appeared in all three time periods was job rotation, while 
freight operations and hub and spoke operations appear in models of two time 
periods. 
Looking at the data-base models, the best predictors are Earnings before tax and 
interest divided by sales. This variable had very high discrimination ability of the 
dichotomous variable. Other significant variables where added value divided by fixed 
assets; total debt divided by fixed assets; operating profit per available seat 
kilometer; aircraft departures per employee, distance per hour flown, aircraft hours 
per employee and load factor. 
Qualitative financial variables are poor predictors of financial distress and airline 
failure. Raters of qualitative statements show dissipating reliability from the past 
(experience) into the future (projection). This is due to reduced information and the 
uncertainty associated with the unknown. This phenomen appears in less variation in 
responses of the two groups under observation. The shift in emphasis on individual 
variables should, however, not be undermined as an indicator of future trends in 
management emphasis, given large enough sample of raters. 
The combination of three model sources: financial data-base, non-financial data-base 
and questionnaire survey; improves the information content and accuracy of failure 
and distress prediction. 
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13. Discussion of Findings 
13.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter the overall findings will be brought together in order to examine 
them within the framework of the Underlying Model of Analysis presented in Chapter 
1. Furthermore, the limitations of the failure prediction models will be discussed, 
especially in terms of how such models can be applied. Then the implications of the 
findings, will be discussed, in terms of the European case. As with most research 
many more questions appear than are answered, thus, a section on further research is 
presented. Finally, there will be a general discussion on the research itself. 
13.2 General Conclusions - Critical Factors 
13.2.1 Introduction 
In the following sections each critical factor will be presented and discussed. In 
order to facilitate the reading, these factors will be italicised. It can be useful to go 
back to the opening chapter and familiarise oneself again with the Underlying Model 
of Analysis and examine how these critical factors are distributed among the 
components of that model. However, it is important to note that this inventory of 
critical factors is not altogether unique in terms of the factors derived from the failure 
prediction models, as there could be other factors that are just as good or almost as 
good predictors of failure or non-failure, that are not selected into the models, but are 
close to be included. 
I t is important to note that critical factors can be environment influence, causal 
factors and symptomic factors. As will be explained in Sections 13.2.8 and 13.6, 
managers must respond differently to these different sources of critical factors. 
J 3.2.2 Management and Organisation Factors 
The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that any firm's success or failure is 
determined by the quality of management. Management as such is subject to various 
constraints that limit their alternatives, however, it is exactly the management of these 
constraints and the ability to overcome the resulting limitations that distinguishes the 
good performers from the poor performers in the long-term. The key to that ability is 
careful planning, analysis (research), information gathering and exceptional ability to 
utilise the employee resource to its outmost. The founders of new-entrant airlines 
have in almost all cases had extensive experience in the airlines before starting their 
272 
ow~, in that ~ense the initial risk has been less than if the founder was entering an 
entIrely new tndustry. Thus, the alternative operating formats compared to that of 
the incumbents has usually been based on prior experience within other airlines, 
rather than being thought out by an complete outsider. The most important aspect of 
this alternative methods has been better utilisation of employees through cross-
utilisation programs, given that such programs do not go to the extreme, because 
then there will be inefficiencies relating to training and quality. Furthermore, the 
division of the work-force into smaller units of responsibility that allow comparison 
of performance, enhances performance at larger airlines and permits the retention of 
some of the motivating characteristics of smaller organisations. 
To make the airline's long term aims and objectives clear to the employees is 
important for successful firms, due to the motivation it provides and concentration of 
efforts. Furthermore, to manage, select and motivate staff is important part of 
achieving a successful organisation. The staff function must approach the exceptional 
level in order to distinguish between the successful and the distressed. 
How the management arrives at its decisions is important for survival, too much 
emphasis on group consensus is not beneficial for the well-being of the firm. As 
group consensus involves too much time and risk aversion that leads to lack of 
innovation. 
Comparatively much decentralisation and job rotation is apparently not beneficial for 
the organisation, as it characterises distressed new-entrant airlines to a greater extent 
than non-distressed. Too frequent changes in employees job responsibilities are 
probably causing lack of quality due to the employee's constant process getting 
familiar with new tasks reducing his productivity. Furthermore, decentralisation 
without very clear objectives and vision cannot yield what it is supposed to achieve, 
thus, leading to chaos. These two factors, decentralisation and job rotation, proved 
to distinguish well between the two groups of carriers in the failure prediction models 
presented. The third and fourth factors that appeared in the models were flexible job 
descriptions and employee's productivity both highly related as one is the function of 
the other. 
13.2.3 Marketing and Strategy Factors 
Controlled growth is an important ingredient of non-failure for new-entrants. 
Extremely fast growth places great demand on the airline's resources that eventually 
leads to inefficiencies, as well as strategic alterations that cause serious problems for 
the airline. Market-share is important, but only on the micro-level, meaning that 
overall market-share is not important, but market-share on individual airports and 
routes is important. Large market-share at airports is especially important trait of a 
new-entrant in order to be able to fend off competition of the larger carriers. 
Comparatively Low-fares are important during entry, but they have to be backed up 
by comparatively high quality in order to maintain an advantage when the incumbent 
matches or beats the fares offered by the new-entrant. Extreme emphasis on low-
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costs and therefore cost control is a fundamental trait of a new-entrant. This control 
has to be achieved, however, without sacrificing quality. The non-failed and non-
distressed new-entrants are comparatively more customer orientated both in terms of 
fuljilling customer needs and provide innovative features in their service. Through 
this ability, non-distressed carriers achieve comparatively greater customer loyalty 
that reinforces their non-distressed status. The non-distressed carriers spend more 
resources on planning new markets, reducing the risks involved. Non-distressed 
carriers are more marketing orientated and utilise the tools of marketing to a 
comparatively larger degree than distressed carriers. Such tools being: media 
advertising, brand image and service quality. Furthermore, non-distressed carriers 
are more prone to expand into new markets than distressed carriers, but such entry is 
based on careful analysis and planning that distressed carriers emphasise to a lesser 
degree. Finally, non-distressed carriers stay independent as they emphasise alliances 
and merger and acquisition to gain market-share to much lesser degree than 
distressed carriers. This indicates that such programs affect the longevity and 
financial well-being of new-entrants negatively to an extent. 
The questionnaire based failure prediction models came up with seven marketing 
related critical factors: Alliance with the incumbents, market-share, market research, 
frequent flyer programs, service quality, media advertising and expansion into new 
markets. The first four are negatively related to success while the remaining three are 
positively related. Although the first two factors listed above are good in segregating 
the two groups of carriers it does not indicate that these aspects should be de-
emphasised by the airlines, rather it is an indication that distressed carriers emphasise 
those more regardless of the factors causal relationship to the distress present. This 
means that these factors are critical, but the questionnaire findings do not imply how 
or why. 
The data-base failure prediction models came up with four critical factors associated 
with marketing: Load-factor, average passenger haul, percent ASK non-scheduled 
and average seats per departure. The load-factor coefficient in the model has 
negative sign meaning that there is negative relationship with non-failure. This is 
because many of the failed carriers had relatively high load-factors, that must have 
been achieved by too low fares. Average passenger haul is positive, however, 
meaning that the longer the distance each passenger is carried the better for the 
airline's results. The third factor, related to the level of non-scheduled operations, is 
negatively related to non-failure. This means that the less the carrier is involved in 
charter operations the better. The relationship is only to an extent, as charter 
operations as pure by-product can not harm the profitability of the carrier, but 
scheduled operations as a by-product, probably does harm the carrier involved. The 
last factor, 'average seats per departure,' is negatively related, indicating that carriers 
operating smaller equipment fared better than those operating larger equipment. The 
influence of the fonner charter-based new-entrants is probably reflected in this 
finding, due to their very poor results. 
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13.2.4 Financial Factors 
Lack of capital is a greater limiting factor of growth for distressed carriers than non-
distressed, although both groups seem to have problems raising capital to a sufficient 
degree. Distressed carriers emphasise critical mass more than non-distressed 
carriers. This implies that the resulting market-share building is based on lack of the 
necessary product traits that are the fundamental prerequisite of successful and 
profitable market-share building. As a result, these carriers enter too costly strategies 
aimed at market-share building primarily. In order to grow faster than their balance-
sheet may allow, distressed carriers are more prone to use off-balance sheet financing 
of aircraft than non-distressed carriers. Perhaps the most important difference of the 
two groups of carriers is that non-distressed carriers emphasise cost reduction 
comparatively more than distressed carriers. This finding is striking in the light of the 
greater incentive of the distressed carriers to practice cost reduction. 
Financial variables derived from the data-base failure prediction models, were in all 
cases ratios: EBIT/Sales, Operating profit/ASK, Revenue/Expenses, Added 
value/Fixed assets, Total debt/Fixed assets, Long-term debt/Total assets, 
maintenance costs/ASK, ASK/$1000 in wages and Total revenue/Passenger. Here 
we can see that the four first ratios are related to earnings, while the next two are 
related to debt. This means that the proportional earning capability of a new-entrant 
in relation to sales, expenses, fixed assets and output is critical for the airline in terms 
of survivability. The other two ratios have conflicting signs that might indicate 
collinearity. That in itself does, however, not change their status as being critical 
ratios. The general conclusion is therefore that gearing and revenue as a proportion 
of resources applied are critical factors. The critical ratio, maintenance costs, has a 
negative sign indicating inverse relationship with non-failure. The sign could be 
wrong, or that maintenance costs are lower for distressed carriers. The latter 
relationship would therefore reinforce the critics of deregulation that have maintained 
that maintenance would suffer as a result of increased competition. Unfortunately, 
this relationship can not be proved here, but further research on this issue is 
necessary. Available seat kilometres as a ratio to $1000 in wages indicates how 
much is produced in terms of employee costs. The sign is positive indicating a 
positive relationship with non-failure. The last ratio divides total revenues with the 
total number of passengers. This relationship is negative meaning that the higher the 
average income per passenger the less the survivability of the carrier. The 
relationship seems far-fetched, but it is not so. One only needs to point to the 
premium-service new-entrants and the long-haul new-entrants to support the 
relationship, as these had high revenue per passenger, but these carriers failed. 
The ratio net worth/total debt did not appear in one of the failure prediction models, 
but the difference in this ratio between the two groups is very highly significant. The 
direction of the difference is in the order of smaller value for failed new-entrants. 
The same applies to depreciation/ASK that is significantly higher for non-failed 
carriers. The relationship is probably due to greater assets per operating unit (ASK) 
than that of failed carriers, sometimes referred to as critical mass. 
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13.2.5 Operations 
Much emphasis on aircraft utilisation is characteristic of non-distressed carriers. 
The result of this emphasis is lower cost structure as high aircraft utilisation affects 
costs in almost all aspects of the airline. Conversely the non-distressed carriers 
emphasised hub and spoke operations to a much lesser degree than distressed 
carriers. That finding reinforces the importance of aircraft utilisation as hub and 
spoke operations lead to less aircraft utilisation than direct-service does. 
The failure prediction models provided one more critical factor, freight operations in 
the addition the factors already mentioned. That factor is positively related to non-
distress, implying that freight operations are an important operating feature of non-
distressed carriers. This implies that greater utilisation of the aircraft by carrying 
freight is an important additional revenue source for new-entrant airlines, reinforcing 
non-distress. 
The data-base failure prediction models came up with number of operations related 
ratios and factors: Aircraft departures/total personnel, aircraft hours/total personnel 
and distance per hour flown. The first two are efficiency ratios of operations in 
terms of employee input. This aspect comes up again and again showing that aircraft 
utilisation is of an outmost importance in running an airline. However, the previous 
ratio has negative sign indicating that a high ratio of aircraft departures per employee 
is negatively related to non-failure. Carriers having relatively many departures per 
employee have therefore been more prone to bankruptcy compared with those having 
a lower ratio. It is possible that this inverse relationship is caused by poorer service 
quality of such carriers. Further research must be carried out to establish such 
relationship. The latter ratio, aircraft hours per employee has, however, positive sign. 
That indicates, as expected, that an aircraft in the air is more productive than an 
aircraft on the ramp. However, one can expect airlines having longer average sector 
lengths to have more flight hours per employee than short-haul carriers. 
13.2.6 Information- and Communication Factors 
In the Underlying Model of Analysis the information and communication function 
was placed at the centre, like a heart in an organism. Strangely enough, the 
distressed carriers emphasised this function more than non-distressed carriers. This 
could indicate the inadequacy of the information function at the distressed carriers, 
guiding an increased emphasis on this function. The factors that yielded difference 
between the two groups were: Computer reservation systems, Yield management 
systems and market-intelligent information- and communication system. As these 
factors imply, any disadvantage on these issues would cause the disadvantaged airline 
to emphasise the factor greatly until such disadvantage was eliminated. In that light it 
is not surprising that distressed carriers are emphasising these factors to a greater 
extent that non-distressed carriers. 
The two latter factors appeared as critical in the failure prediction models, both 
negatively related to success. As explained before this apparently wrong sign is due 
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to the greater emphasis of distressed carriers on these factors in an attempt to bring 
these factors up to a standard. 
13.2.7 Environment 
As expected investors' attitudes towards the new-entrant are emphasised to a greater 
extent by distressed carriers. This implies that the airline will be more careful about 
information released to stake-holders and the media in order not to harm its outside 
financial resources unnecessarily. The same goes for favourable attitude of travel 
agents as if the travel agents alarm is raised as to the financial health of the airline , 
there will be a substantial drop in bookings. Managers at distressed carriers are more 
prone to feel out of control in terms of shaping their airline's destiny. Such attitude 
causes less motivation, as it is highly related to alienation and will lead to poorer 
results of the affected carrier. 
There was only one critical environment factor derived from the data-base models: 
Change in spot fuel prices. The negative sign shows that as spot aviation fuel prices 
increase, the worse off the airline is. 
13.2.8 Discussion 
The critical factors presented have a fairly even distribution among the components 
of the Underlying Model of Analysis, that proves that such model can be a useful for 
analysing corporate performance. Furthermore, these factors allow a more 
concentrated research on the causal relationship of these factors to airline 
performance. 
In order to give an overview of the factors identified in the literature and in this 
research, Figure 13-1 was developed. The figure is constructed on the grounds of 
Argenti's hypothesis that corporate failure has two distinctive components, namely 
symptoms and causes of failure (see Section 9.4). The causes of failure are listed in 
the lower half of the figure, but the symptoms are shown in the upper half of the 
figure. Factors along bold lines in the diagram are directly controlled by management 
through its decision making. While factors along narrow lines in the causes section 
of the figure, are usually environment related. That is management has to make 
decisions in reaction to those factors rather than the being able to influence those 
with decision-making. Factors along the dotted lines, influence the quality of 
management's decisions. The little boxes indicate whether the group of factors next 
to it, influence costs or quality. Of course, one can infer that poor quality affects 
costs, however, in the figure an attempt was done to segregate these two in this way 
in order to emphasise the influence of critical factors on two of the most important 
aspects of running an airline. 
Figure 13-1 The Causes and Symptoms of New-entrant Airline Failures 
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It must be made clear that the factors listed are not necessarily all factors that could 
possibly belong there. The figure represents, rather, those factors that appeared along 
the research process. Most of which, appear in Chapters 9 through 12. It must also 
be pointed out that most of the factors derived from the failure prediction models in 
this research, are critical factors for failure prediction. They do, therefore, not 
necessarily reflect the direct causal relationship to failure. As a result, many of the 
factors listed as critical factors do not appear in the figure. 
As the diagram is in a wayan overview of large part of the thesis, individual items 
will not be explained further here, but the reader is referred to the chapters of the 
thesis. However, it is necessary to discuss the distinction between causal factors and 
symptoms (see previous discussion in Section 9.4.2). We can conclude from the 
model presented in Figure 1-3, that management's decision-making determines a 
company's fate, making it the primary causal factor. However, in order to apply its 
decision-making function, management can apply many 'tools' that directly affect the 
company's performance. As a result, it is logical to look upon these tools as causal 
by nature. For example the management of an airline can increase flight frequency 
(tool) in an attempt to improve an airline's performance. Such change in the causal 
factor (tool) 'flight frequency' can affect the airline in a number of ways that appear 
as 'symptoms'. The symptoms in this case could be, if we examine the negative 
effects, deteriorating load-factor and deteriorating Revex ratio, just to name two. 
From the example one can determine quite clearly the distinction between causal and 
symptomic factors. It is enough to recognise that the load-factor can not be applied 
as a tool and is therefore not causal. Frequency, on the other hand, can be changed 
directly by the management and is therefore causal factor. Having made this 
conclusion one needs to decide whether the environment is causal or symptomic. In 
fact the conclusion is that it is neither. First, the management has no control over the 
environment variables (generally speaking) and can therefore not apply environment 
factors as tools. If the environment factors can not be adjusted by the management 
there are certainly not going to be any symptoms. Therefore, one must look upon 
environment factors as external influence, which the management can either decide to 
adjust to by applying its tools or not to do so. 
13.3 General Discussion - Failure Prediction Models 
J 3.3. J Comparison of Classification Accuracy 
Table 13-1 shows a comparison of the models derived from the data-base source, 
with models resulting from other research. What is apparent, as mentioned before, is 
that the non-financial model DBS-1 has much better traits further away from 
bankruptcy than the financial model DB2-1. Both models perform better ~han the 
Altman model in the third year. The models are, however, non-spectacular In tenns 
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of classification accuracy but do give strong indications on the potential of future 
research of airline distress and failure prediction with regard to non-financial data. 
The better trait of the non-financial model is probably due to the fact, that it is much 
harder to 'window dress' airline traffic data, than financial data. Furthermore, the 
non-financial data is more clearly influenced by the quality of management, strategy 
and the environment, than financial data. Thus, it is clear that the combination of the 
financial and non-financial models is a highly recommended practice in the case of 
airline failure and distress prediction. 
The models could not be tested on a hold-out sample due to the small population, as 
a result they can not be compared to the other models in the table in that respect. 
There is, however, every reason to believe that the models will show poorer results 
under such circumstances, as the models usually do so. However, as the population 
of new-entrants increases, there is every reason to believe that hold-out tests could be 
carried out and, what is more, a new more reliable model developed with greater 
number of airlines in each group. 





































































OB2-1 Financial OB5-1 Non-fmancial 
LR LR 
Overall Type Overall Type 
1 II I 11 
5.5% 5.5 5.5 16.67% 17 17 
30.6% 33 28 25.0% 22 28 
33.3°'0 39 28 27.8% 28 28 
(1) FIgures m parentheses test agamst holdout sample. FIgures not m parentheses are tested agamst same sample from which dichotomous 
classification test was estimated. 
(2) Type I error is misclassifying a failed fIrm. Type II error is misclassifying a non-failed fIrm. 
(3) Type I and II errors were only presented for the fIrst two years. 
(4) Figures in parentheses represent test against randomly selected sample. Figures not in parentheses represent test against sample from 
which discrimination function was estimated. 
(5) Error rates based on Discriminant function for four years of data. 
533 Source: Christine V. Zavgren, The Prediction of Corporate Faihrre: The State of Art, Journal of Accounting 
Literature, Vol. 2, 1983, p. 4. 
534Blum did not utilise searching to detennine the ratios for the prediction model. He used a concept of ratio 
selection like Beaver based on the finn being 'a reservoir of fmancial resources \\ i.th the probability of 
failure being expressed in tenns of expected cash flows.' (Source: Altman 1993, p. 224.) 
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13.3.2 The Application of The Models 
As with any instrument of some complication instructions have to be issued to the 
user. The use of a failure prediction model is no different in this aspect. In fact one 
can allege that a failure prediction model can be of a great harm if improperly 
administered. In view of that the following sections should be observed carefully by 
the potential user of the models presented here. 
There are number of guidelines that must be adhered to before a failure prediction 
model is applied for prediction of financial distress or bankruptcy: 
(i) The models must be used on the same type of companies as were included 
in the original sample. To use a model specified for new-entrant airlines on a large 
airline like American would be an unacceptable use of the model, giving a potentially 
unreliable result. 
(ii) The models must only be used on airlines in the same geographical region 
as those airlines in which the original sample airlines operate. To use a model based 
on US carriers on UK carriers leads to an unreliable results. 535 
13.4 Implication of Findings for The European case 
13.4.1 Critical Factors Differing Between European and US New-entrants 
As discussed already the application of a bankruptcy model to other countries than 
that of the sample firms is not recommended. In the case of the questionnaire, 
however, European new-entrants were included and the derived model do therefore 
apply to both the European and US cases. As a result, it is of some importance to 
establish whether the critical factors established so far, differ between European and 
US new-entrant airlines. 
Examining significant differences between European and US new-entrants listed in 
Appendix-IL reveals that European new-entrants have significantly higher means for: 
interlining agreements, market-share, achieving critical mass, yield management 
systems and computer reservation systems. US new-entrant carriers have 
significantly higher means for: delegation, job rotation and manager's incentive 
programs. The statement, our service has a range of features that make it 
distinctive, has significantly higher mean for European carriers. 
These critical statements have to be viewed, therefore, in the VIew of potential 
difference in intensity between the two geographical areas. 
53>nuS is a fully acceptable statement for fmancial data due to differing accOllllting standards, but less so for 
models based on non-fmancial data and qualitative assessment like questionnaire surveys. The researcher 
found that operating strategy \\ ill have the greatest impact on e:\.1reme outliers of non-fmancial models not 
geography. 
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13.4.2 The Application of Failure Prediction Models to The European Case 
As mentioned in the opening chapter it was decided that a failure prediction model 
was not viable for European new~entrants at this stage due to differing environments 
of the European Union countries and the differing Government policies on air 
transport. The groundwork presented in this thesis will, however, make the 
development of such models more straightforward for the European case. It must be 
noted, however, that the questionnaire based models do apply to the European case 
as presented in the thesis. The only limitation to their applicability is to recognise the 
differences in the factors as presented in Section 13.4.1. 
13.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
As with all research projects, each answered question leads to number of unanswered 
ones. Unfortunately the research had limitations both in terms of time and resources 
available to investigate interesting side-tracks. In order to give a general idea of 
areas where further research could be of a special interest, the following list was 
composed. 
(i) Testing of the models on a new sample of new-entrant airlines, in order to test 
he prediction capability of the model on non-sample airlines. 
(ii) Test further the reliability of the 'Phase-in' methodology by conducting a 
comparison test of two sufficiently large samples of companies, one subject to 
Phase-in' and an other to traditional sample selection. Such study would provide 
increased reliability in using this small population technique in failure prediction. 
(iii) Separate the statements that show significant differences between the 
dichotomous groups from the rest and produce a short version of the 
questionnaire. This would probably improve the response rate and enable reliable 
testing as to their discrimination effectiveness. 
(iv) Research further the 'Increased activity' phenomena and its biasing effect on 
questionnaire surveys among distressed firms. 
(v) Establish the questionnaire methodology in failure and distress prediction by 
doing repeated surveys among same companies for three to five years or longer. 
(vi) Establish the causal relationship of the critical factors with airline 
performance. 
There are many more potential research projects that have been sparked by this 
research, but the six projects above are especially pertinent to the material presented 
in the thesis. 
13.6 Research Discussion 
J 3.6. J The Research's Contribution 
Regardless of the barriers discussed in the previous section, it is believed that the 
research is important, regardless of known and unknown limitations. First, by 
introducing an important methodology (phase-in) of failure prediction for the small 
population case. Second, by introducing various sources of models that can be 
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utilised togethe: in order to e~ance prediction quality. Third, by introducing 
thoroughly the mdustry, the enVlronment and characteristics of the population from 
which the models were derived. Fourth, by focusing the research on a segment of the 
airline industry, that practice is in many aspects uncommon compared to other 
research in this field, that is usually quite general in terms of inclusion of many 
diverse industry sectors (all manufacturing firms, all service firms, etc.). In fact 
failure prediction has been criticised by laymen on the basis of their inaccuracy when 
applied to various industry sub-segments. The answer to such problems is apparently 
to focus the research more into the various sub-segments and produce separate 
models for those. This research is an attempt at that and is important as such. 
13.6.2 Conclusion 
Much had been written about the new-entrant airlines in the United States during the 
early years of success, some were praised as marvels of business management others 
were criticised, but most felt that the new-entrants proved that deregulation was 
working. However, as the new-entrants started to disappear one after an other, those 
that praised got silent and the sceptics named a thousand and one reason for the new-
entrant's airlines failures. It is hoped that this thesis will be of some value to those 
that want to ask questions like why and how, in this respect. Those are the ones that 
will be able to understand that the basis of success is knowledge on the causes of 
previous failures. 
An important distinction between environment influence, causal factors and 
symptoms has been pointed out (see Section 13.2.8). Many of the findings in the 
thesis are related to the symptoms that result from the application of the causal 
factors. Thus, one must make it clear that managers should not attempt to forge 
changes in the symptomic factors in isolation but emphasise changes in the actual 
causal factors according to concrete analysis as to the impact that such change will 
have on the organisation. For example, if the load-factor (symptomic) has 
deteriorated it makes no sense to reduce flight frequency (causal factor) as an 
isolated attempt to raise it. Such move could in fact cause serious harm, as frequency 
is related to service quality and aircraft utilisation, to name just two factors. Thus, an 
attempt to increase the passenger load-factor, or any other symptomic factor for that 
matter, is a complex feat that involves many aspects of airline management. 
If one wanted to give an prescription for success or avoidance of failure it would 
naturally appear here. However, the general conclusion of the thesis must be that no 
such prescription exists due to the dynamism of the airlines' interaction with its 
environment. Nevertheless, it is hard not to mention six critical factors worth 
emphasising to new-entrant airlines: (i) high relative quality~ (ii) dominant market-
share on routes and airports (usually only achievable on secondary routes and 
airports); (iii) high relative aircraft utilisation; (iv) high relative employee utilisation~ 
(v) controlled growth in terms of maintaining item (ii)~ low costs in terms of 
achieving items (iii) and (iv); and (vi) resourceful innovation without going into the 
extremities. 
Appendices A - N 
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Appendix-A New-entrant Airlines Market-share at 50 Largest 
US Airports 
A-J Southwest 
Southwest's main base has been Houston's Hobby airport from the outset. The 
airline was virtually the only carrier serving that airport after Houston 
Intercontinental airport was established and attempts were executed to close down 
Hobby airport. 
Table A.l Southwest's Market-Share at Top 50 Airports 
City/airport 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
Albuquerque 8.1 11.8 24.3 30.8 32.5 30.7 29.5 27.1 32.2 37.7 40.0 43.9 
Denver 0 0 0 0.7 1.2 1.0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 
Uetroit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.0 2.9 2.4 1.5 l.l 
EI Paso 20.4 24.1 37.7 58.0 59.6 54.0 49.4 48.3 53.3 58.1 58.5 59.9 
Houston Hobby 84.3 78.2 66.3 60.2 51.2 53.9 50.1 53.7 64.9 70.2 69.4 72.0 
Houston Intercontin. 0.89 3.0 2.9 3.3 3.7 3.8 2.8 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 
Indianapolis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.1 5.7 6.1 
Kansas City 0 0 4.4 6.4 4.5 4.5 5.1 4.8 6.0 7.4 11.3 12.8 
Las Vegas 0 0 2.9 5.7 6.6 7.0 6.2 5.3 7.4 9.3 12.8 17.3 
Los Angeles 0 0 0.4 2.3 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.8 3.5 4.3 4.6 6.5 
Los Angeles 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.8 3.5 4.3 4.6 6.5 
Midway 0 0 0 0 0 11.8 21.2 21.7 23.0 25.6 23.0 25.8 
Nashville 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.4 7.4 7.2 7.7 8.1 5.7 
New Orleans 11.5 14.5 15.8 14.6 12.0 13.9 8.5 7.9 13.2 16.2 15.6 17.1 
Phoenix 0 0 7.8 14.2 13.8 13.1 13.4 14.4 19.1 22.1 21.8 24.7 
San Diego 0 0 4.9 6.5 7.9 7.8 7.3 9.1 10.7 13.8 17.3 23.6 
San Francisco 0 0 0.1 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.~ 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.5 3.1 
st. Louis 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 2.1 3.0 3.5 5.2 6.1 7.0 
Total markets 5 5 11 12 13 15 16 16 16 17 17 17 
Source: Julius Maldutis, 1991. Missing cells indicate years when the carner was not operating to the destination or not in existance. 
The decision was challenged by Southwest, giving the airline eventually a rather 
unique operating base in terms of location and limited competition. This special 
status of Hobby for Southwest is apparent in the market-share table as Southwest has 
84.3 percent share in 1980, down to 50.1 percent in 1986, but rising to 72 percent 
again in 1991. The reduced share is due to competition from Republic until 1984 and 
Muse Air that was acquired by Southwest in 1985. From 1980 until 1991 Southwest 
adds 12 airports, belonging to the group of 50 largest, to its route network. Market-
share in excess of 20 percent at the 50 largest airports was held at Albuquerque, EI 
Paso, Phoenix, San Diego, Midway and Houston's Hobby. The only large airport it 
exited was Denver, which became a major hub of United and Continental. 
A.2 People Express 
People Express had one main hub at Newark where it had 50.4 percent share of total 
enplanements in 1985. The only other large airport where it had substantial share 
was Buffalo. What is striking is how many large airports it entered in a relatively 
short period of time. From 1981 until 1985 it entered seventeen large airports. The 
market-share at these airports was usually low or 4.1 percent on the average in 1985, 
if Buffalo and Newark are excluded. 
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Table A.2 People Express' Market-Share at Top 50 Airports 
Airport City 81 82 83 84 85 86 
Baltimore 2.7 7.7 8.1 5.6 4.6 2.9 
Boston 1.1 3.1 1.1 8.1 7.6 5.7 
Huffalo 5.6 12.2 16.3 26.9 25.0 20.4 
Charlotte 0 0 0 0 1.3 1.4 
ChicagoO'H 0 0 0 0.7 1.7 1.5 
Cincinnati 0 0 0 0 3.6 3.2 
Cleveland 0 0 0 1.2 6.3 5.0 
Dayton 0 0 0 0 2.0 1.8 
Denver 0 0 0 0.1 1.1 1.7 
Detroit 0 0 0 0.9 2.2 1.7 
Ft. Lauderd. 0 0 0 0 2.7 3.5 
Houston Hobby 0 0 2.2 8.6 6.1 3.6 
Los Angeles 0 0 0 0.9 1.3 1.2 
Miami 0 0 0 0.6 2.4 1.7 
Minneapolis 0 0 0 1.1 1.2 0.9 
Nashville 0 0 0 0 3.1 2.1 
Ncwark 8.1 18.9 35.7 49.3 50.4 44.9 
Orlando 0 0 0 0.1 3.3 2.2 
RaleighlDurham 0 0 0 0 3.1 5.7 
Syracuse 4.3 13.0 18.4 23.4 16.1 11.4 
Washington Dulles 0 0.9 8.4 7.2 8.5 4.5 
Washington National 0 1.1 3.4 4.2 3.9 3.0 
Total markets 5 7 8 16 22 22 
Source: Julius Maldutis, 1991. 
A.3 America West 
America West was, as well as People Express, one of the wonders of deregulation, 
growing rapidly into a major carrier, but eventually running into financial difficulties 
and bankruptcy. Its main hub is at Phoenix Sky Harbour airport and its secondary 
hub is at Las Vegas McCannon airport. 
Table A.3 America West's Market Share at 50 Top Airports 
Airport City 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
Albuquerque 0.5 6.9 10.3 12.2 14.0 13.0 12.4 12.3 11.8 
Baltimore 0 0 0 0 1.1 1.7 1.3 1.7 2.2 
Hoston 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .9 1.7 
Chicago Midway 0 0 0 2.2 4.5 0.04 0 0 0 
Chicago O'Hare 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 
DallaslForth Worth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.7 
Denver Stapleton 0 0 0 0.1 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.5 
EI Paso 0 0.8 7.9 10.9 10.5 9.9 10.4 10.1 9.0 
Honolulu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 2.2 2.7 
Houston Intercontinental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.3 1.5 
John Wayne/Orange County 0 0 6.0 9.0 13.5 11.9 12.1 12.3 20.2 
Kansas City 1.0 1.5 0 0 0 0.7 3.4 7.0 7.0 
Las Vegas McCarran 0.3 2.8 4.8 10.6 27.4 33.7 34.7 39.7 40.2 
Los Angeles 0.2 1.3 2.7 3.2 4.2 5.2 5.1 4.8 4.3 
Minneapolis/St. Paul 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1.2 1.1 1.3 
NewYorkJFK 0 0 0 0 0.6 1.9 2.1 2.4 3.2 
Philadelphia 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 
Phoenix Sky Harbour 2.6 18.2 34.6 40.4 44.8 44.1 43.3 45.8 46.1 
Portland 0 0 0 0 3.1 3.4 2.9 3.8 5.5 
81. Louis-Lambert 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 
Salt Lake City 0 0.2 1.9 3.5 5.0 4.1 2.7 2.7 2.9 
San Diego 0.2 3.1 4.9 6.5 7.5 9.7 10.9 10.8 9.5 
San Francisco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 2.9 
Washington National 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.7 0.9 
Total markets 6 8 8 11 15 17 17 21 22 
Source: Maldutis. 1991 
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From 1983 until 1991 it entered 16 large airports, having average market-share of 4.5 
percent if the hub airports are excluded. During the period it exited Midway and 
Philadelphia airports. At these two airports Midway Airlines and USAir governed 
the majority market-share respectively. 
A.4 Air California 
Air California had a major market-share at John Wayne airport, 66 percent in 1979 
down to 30.8 percent in 1986 and 7.8 percent in the last year of operations. During 
the period it exited Las Vegas in 1982 and San Diego in 1979 but entered the latter 
airport again in 1986 along with Anchorage. The average market-share in 1986 was 
4.5 if John Wayne airport is excluded. 
Table A.4 Air California's Market-Share at 50 Top Airports 
Airport City 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 
Anchorage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.0 0.9 
John Wayne/Orange C. 66.0 63.7 60.0 55.0 42.5 34.8 30.8 30.3 7.8 
Las Vegas 2.4 3.1 3.0 2.6 0 0 0 0 0 
Los Angeles Intern. 0 0.9 2.4 1.9 2.0 3.4 4.0 4.4 1.0 
Portland 0 6.3 9.4 6.6 8.2 7.1 9.3 9.3 2.0 
San Diego 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0.5 
San Francisco 3.2 4.2 4.5 3.8 4.9 5.7 6.1 5.7 1.3 
Seattle 0 0 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.5 3.7 4.0 1.0 
Total markets 4 5 6 6 5 5 5 7 7 
Source: Julius Maldutis, 1991. 
A.5 Midway 
Midway began operations from the under-utilised financially striven Midway airport 
and gained immediately dominant market-share. It reached high 89.4 percent share in 
1982, a low of64.6 percent in 1987, moving up to 69.0 percent in 1991. 
Table A.5 Midways' Market-Share at 50 Top Airports 
Ai1port City 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
Atlanta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Boston 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.7 0.9 
Buffalo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 2.3 0.04 
Chicago Mid 69.5 84.9 89.4 85.8 75.7 69.1 68.8 64.6 64.7 64.8 69.3 69.0 
Cincinnati 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 1.2 0.01 0 0 0 0 
Cleveland 1.1 1.9 2.1 1.8 2.1 3.6 5.0 4.9 3.0 2.5 2.3 2.3 
Denver 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.5 
Detroit 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.3 1.7 
Ft. Lauderd. 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 1.3 1.3 1.8 2.2 3.2 2.2 
Indianapolis 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 1.1 1.0 1.5 0 0 0 
Kansas City 1.6 2.7 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.5 2.7 3.3 5.0 3.9 
Las Vegas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 
Memphis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.1 
Miami 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.2 0.5 
Minneapolis 0.2 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.1 1.8 2.0 1.5 0 
New Orleans 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.7 0.9 
New York LO. 0.1 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.3 
Orlando 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.8 2.0 1.6 1.1 1.3 2.6 1.6 
0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.4 12.2 3.0 Philadelphia 0 
0 0 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.6 Phoenix 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.1 Pittsburgh 0 0 
0.3 0.2 2.3 3.3 2.4 2.0 2.1 3.3 2.1 Tampa 0 0.1 0.7 
1.9 1.5 Wash. Nation 0.5 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 
Total markets 6 9 10 9 9 15 15 20 21 21 21 21 
Source: Maldutis. 1991 
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Average market -share at other large airports was 1.3 1 percent in 1991 if Midway 
airport is excluded. It exited Cincinnati and Indianapolis during the period but Delta 
and USAir governed that airports respectively. Large airports served increased by 15 
from 1980 until 1991. 
A.6 Presidential 
Presidential achieved no major market-share at any airport, but was able to gain 18.8 
percent share at its operating base at Washington-Dulles during second year of 
operations. In 1989 it had exited all the large airports except its base airport. One of 
the reasons was a marketing-agreement with United that turned it into an United 
Express feeder carrier. 
Table A.6 Presidential's Market-Share at 50 Top Airports 
Airport City 85 86 87 88 89 
Boston Logan 0.2 1.4 0.2 0 0 
Indianapolis 0.6 1.4 0 0 0 
Washington Dulles 2.8 18.8 7.2 8.7 5.7 
Total markets 3 3 2 1 1 
Source: Julius Maldutis, 1991. 
A.7 New York Air 
New York Air as well as Presidential had no major market-share at any large airport, 
until it moved its operating base from New York to Washington's Dulles airport, 
when it achieved 15.6 percent share in its last operating year. From 1980 until 1986 
the carrier entered 10 additional large airports. Its average market-share in 1986 was 
3. 1 percent if Dulles is excluded. 
Table A.7 New York Air's Market-Share at 50 Top Airports 
Airport City 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 
Baltimore Washington 0 0.3 2.8 0 0 0 
Bo~1on Logan 0 3.9 2.6 3.1 4.9 6.5 5.9 
Buffalo 0 1.4 1.3 0 0 0 0 
Cincinnati 0 0.8 1.7 0 0 0.3 0.1 
Cleveland 0 3.4 3.2 3.9 0.5 0 2.4 
Detroit 0 0.7 1.6 2.1 3.1 2.3 1.4 
Ft. Lauderdale 0 0 0 0 0 1.3 2.2 
New Orleans 0 0 0 0 0.8 3.3 2.3 
Newark 0 1.2 3.3 3.6 4.0 4.9 4.2 
NewYorkLG 0.1 6.7 5.4 6.1 6.8 6.2 4.5 
Orlando 0 0.2 1.5 0.5 0.9 2.1 1.9 
Tampa 0 0 0 0 0.1 1.3 2.0 
Washington Dulles 0 0 0 0 0 12.2 15.6 
Washington National 0.1 6.8 7.8 8.6 9.9 8.7 6.9 
Total markets 2 10 10 7 9 11 12 
Source: Julius Maldutis. 1991. 
A.8 Air Florida 
Air Florida had no substantial market-share at any large airport. Air Florida added 
two large airports New York La Guardia and Ft. Lauderdale. ,It exite~ Houston's 
Hobby airport that was governed by Southwest and New York s JFK aIrport at the 
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same time when it increased its share at New York's La Guardia. Its average 
market-share in 1983 was 2.9 percent. Air Florida emphasised international 
operations to South America and on the North Atlantic route to Europe. That 
explains their weak domestic presence. One can speculate if emphasis on 
international routes is impossible without a strong domestic system in order to 
provide enough feed. If Pan Am is taken as an example, that seems to be the case. 
Table A.8 Air Florida's Market-Share at 50 Top Airports 
Airport City 79 80 81 82 83 84 
Chicago Midway 0 0 0 0 1.1 2.3 
Ft. Lauderdale 0.6 3.4 5.6 5.5 5.4 0.9 
Houston Hobby 0 2.3 1.2 0 0 0 
Miami 1.3 6.5 9.3 9.6 7.2 1.8 
New York JFK 0.3 1.1 0.9 0.03 0 0 
New York LG 0 0 1.6 1.8 1.4 0.3 
Orlando 0.2 1.3 2.1 1.8 1.0 0.4 
Tampa 0 5.2 7.6 6.5 2.9 0.4 
Washington National 0.2 1.4 2.3 1.9 1.6 0.5 
Total markets 5 7 8 7 7 7 
Source: Julius Maldutis, 1991. 
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Appendix-B European New-entrant Airlines 
B.I British New-entrants 
B.l.l British Midland 
Although British Midland (BM) has been operating for a long period it is classified as 
a new-entrant as it began international operations by entering the London -
Amsterdam route in June, 1986. The operations were made possible due to the 
liberalisation of the UK - Netherlands bilateral. An other development enabling BM 
to operate on international routes, at all, were due to the Government's White paper 
in 1985 that gave a concession to the carrier before restrictions were imposed on 
operations from Heathrow. The carrier became, therefore, the UK's chosen 
instrument to compete with the only British carrier to operate on international routes 
from Heathrow, British Airways.l 
From 1988 SAS has been an equity holder taking on initially 24.9 percent stake and 
then increasing it to 40 percent in 1994. The carrier has enjoyed excellent traffic 
growth in the nineties, growing from 399 million RPK's to 3,365 million in 1993. 
The carrier mounted substantial losses in 1990/1991 fiscal. With SAS increased 
equity stake and other measures the carrier returned to profitability from 1992. 
British Midland has confronted BA on a number of issues and competition on routes. 
In September 1981 the carrier expressed interest in a number of routes abandoned by 
BA. Furthermore, the carrier has repeatedly undercut BA on a number of routes, for 
example. British Midland has the second largest pool of slots at Heathrow after BA. 
That fact on its own can explain the carrier's longevity next to BA, but fares out of 
Heathrow tend to carry a premium compared to other airports due to the congestion 
and its popularity as London's number one airport. 
B.l.2 ~ir [1)( 
Air UK was formed in 1980 by a merger of four small UK airlines. The airline 
centred its operations at Stansted when the airport was designated the London's third 
airport in 1988. It started to operate BAe146's for scheduled operations and Boeing 
737-200s for charter work in that year on top of its two BAC1-11s. In 1985 the 
carrier operated to four points in Scandinavia, four on mainland Europe, to Guernsey 
and Jersey and eleven points in the UK, including Belfast, from London Stansted and 
Heathrow. Strong links with KLM have been characteristic for the airline since 
formation with the Dutch carrier holding 14.9 percent equity.2 Air UK was profitable 
from 1987 until 1990 but losses accrued from 1991 until 1993. 
1 The Times, 20/6/85. p.3. . 
2 Air Transport World 'Regional international services are Air UK's specialty'. September 1985. pp. 83-86. and Air Transport 
World 'Air UK sees strong growth this year'. June 1988, pp. 184-185. 
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B.l.3 Dan Air 
Dan Air was initially set up as a charter carrier but limited scheduled services from 
1960's. However, it launched a major expansion of scheduled operations after the 
demise of Air Europe, taking over many of its routes. The carrier was not directly 
linked to a tour operator but tended to provide extra capacity to tour operators that 
had filled their own aircraft. This made the carrier vulnerable as the slump in package 
holidays occurred in the summer of 1990. At the same time schedule operations 
dropped dramatically due to the Gulf crisis. The carrier hired a 'company rescuer' 
David James in 1990 in an effort to save the company. David James is quoted in 
Airline Business in June 1991, saying that 'Everything in the financial structure was 
short-termist and instant. It was all reactive to current events. It was not an 
organised deeply-planned financial strategy.'3 Cost cutting by Air Europe along with 
the previously mentioned factors, led to the company's cash-flow difficulties. With 
close cash-flow management and 'treasury control system' installed the company 
extended its life for some months but eventually was acquired for £ 1 by BA in late 
1992. 
B.l.4 Air Europe 
Air Europe was formed in 1978 as a charter carrier. In 1985 it moved into scheduled 
operations serving Gatwick - Palma. Air Europe took the advantage of the British 
Caledonian demise in 1987 by expanding rapidly its scheduled services from Gatwick. 
In addition the company set out to establish a network of airline franchises. The first 
such company was established in Spain, Air Europa, of which ll..G had a 25 percent 
share. In 1989 the company bought 49 percent of Nurenburger Flugdienst, that 
became Air Europe of Germany. In 1988 the Group bought into Air Norway that 
became Air Europe Scandinavia operating on routes to Oslo, Stockholm and 
Copenhagen from Gatwick. Air Europe Italy was a start -up that began operations 
with two B 7 57's in 1990.4 This network of airlines gave Air Europe foothold in 
international domestic markets before any serious liberalisation occurred in Europe. 
Such strategy could have become highly advantageous for Air Europe after the 
passage of the Third Package and specifically after 1998. 
The company benefited from the low cost -structure of the charter base and from the 
interlinkages between the two. In a short period of time the airline became a major 
player in European air transport cited as an example of the viability of competition 
with the incumbents. Harry Goodman the chairman of International Leisure Group 
the parent of the airline, initiated a management buyout in 1987 in order to expand 
the carrier faster. His ambitions were financed by the Lloyds Bank and the Swiss 
investor Werner Ray that provided conditional share holding. The condition was that 
he would be bought out in the Spring of 1990. That requirement alone required the 
company to 'float' on the stock-exchange, which it could not at the time due to the 
poor market conditions. 5 As a result, this situation seriously undermined the carrier's 




Airline Business, 'Under Doctor's Orders', June 1991. p. 56. 
The A\mark Aviation Economist. 'Airline expansion on an IT base'. February/March. 1990. p.p 15 - 2l. 
Airline Business. 'Too Close To The Sun', May 1991. pp. 24-26. 
291 
also, the marketing costs of operating new scheduled services in countries where Air 
Europe was unknown. 
A scenario followed were the carrier could not adjust to cash-flow problems through 
short-term bridging with capital or loans. As Ray had to keep his interest against his 
plans it escalated financial problems of his holding company Omni Holdings. The 
holding company collapsed in March 1990 and with it thG only apparGnt source of 
capital that could have kept ILG going, but at the time $35 million was desperately 
needed. The reason for the collapse were cited as the recession and the Gulf war. 
These occurrences did in fact escalate the problems but in no means were they the 
causc. The fast groVv1:h of the airline stimulatoo by Harry Goodman as exccutivc-
chairman were the actual causes. At year end 1989 ILG had cash of only £55.8 
million, long-tci Iil debt of £215.8 Inillion and currGnt liabilities of £ 198.7 million. Of 
the short-term debt £131.5 rrtillion was aircr4L~ financing, while £33.2 million were 
loans due to the managemGnt buyout. In this situation ILG paid £27 rrtillion in 
interest that was mostly on aircraft finance. 6 
Furthermore, even though Air Europe was profitable which it claimed to be the cash 
situation was poor. In addition it was closely intcgratcd with the tour operating 
business in such a \-\lay that if either collapsed both would have to fold. 7 As a result, 
of the recession and the Gulf crisis the cash-flow situation was seriously severed 
leading to the collapse of ILG after a potential investor, as a last resource, withdrew 
in early 1991. 
B.l.5 Virgin Atlantic Airways 
Virgin Atlantic Airnrays started operation in June 1984 with one Boeing 747-100 on 
the route from Gatwick to New' York's Newark airport. In 1989 the airline was 
operating flights to New York, ~1iami, Orlando( chartered), ~1aastricht and Tokyo, 
with four Boeing 747's. The Tolqro flight commenced in l\1ay 1989. In 1992 the 
carrier had abandoned the short-haul route to l\1aastricht but added Orlando as 
scheduled destination, Los Angeles and Boston. 
The carrier has enjoyed considerable profitability if the first 26 months are excluded 
during which the carricr lost $6.4 million. 8 In 1992 the carrier lost £ 14.5 million 
allegedly due to the introduction of the 'rrtid-class' and from writing off a cost of a 
Heathrow lounge. FolloVving a 'victory' out of court settlemcnt over the 'dirty 
tricks' campaign and the sell off of Virgin Records $980 million to Thorn-El\fl the 
carricr gained higher ranking in the financial COffiI~unity. As a result of this 
developments and the necessity to add aircraft for planned expansion the carrier is 
retiring its seven ageing 747-200' s and one 747-100. Thc fleet is now composed of 
four A340's and two 747-400's. With two more 747's on order.9 The carrier 
abandoned its intra-European routes that were run under a licence to use the Virgin 
name in 1989 due to lack of loads. In 1993 Virgin took up a similar concept by 





Ibid (Airline Busim:ss 5'91), p. 25. 
\ircraft were. for example. utilised jointly by both com.-nanie.s. 
Air Transport World June 1990, pp. 19-20. 
Ibid (ATW, 6/90), p. 188. 
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operating a route between London and Athens and London's CityJet that operates 
BAe 146 between London City Airport and Dublin. 
Virgin's image is aimed at the younger middle-manager by adding an element of 'fun' 
to air travel. The early strategy involved giving free travel to performers that would 
perform on board. Although. such happenings do not occur today the carrier still 
retains the image by introducing alternative product features like manicure on board 
for 'Upper Class' passengers, selection of videos to watch from small recorders, on-
board video games, on-board gambling and so forth. Branson's oVvn image is that of 
an adventurer having established himself as a leading balloonist and speed boat 
enthusiast after attempting for the speed record across the Atlantic and a balloon 
crossing. This free promotion and the name of the airline itself has created a strong 
brand that implies relaxed, non-political, humanistic and fun type of atmosphere. 
This is something that gathers very well to many 'baby-boomers'. An other important 
part of the airline's strategy was to tum early towards the business traveller in order 
to build high-yield traffic instead of aiming only for the back-packers. 
The most important feature of the airline's strategy is the airline's ability to turn-up a 
superior product that has lead to several awards as the Best Airline of The Year along 
with several other important awards. Tl'Js more than anything else brings the Virgin 
product into the limelight and attention of the business COtTh~unity creating a strong 
loyalty. One limiting factor is the carrier's small route structure that makes it 
impossible for most to use the airline solely, like business men can do in the case of 
BA on most international routes. However, the carrier's strength lies precisely in that 
fact by being able to enter only high density long-haul routes and provide superiour 
adaptive service like only a small carrier can provide. 
B.l.6 Business Air 
Business Air is a Scottish airline that operates flights from London's City Airport to 
Frankfurt and has enjoyed considerable traffic growth. Business Air was founded in 
1987 and started scheduled operations 1988 between Aberdeen and Esbjerg in 
Denmark. It gained from a package set up by BA in order to help independent 
carriers establish domestic services as one of the requirements to take over BCal. lo 
Lufthansa took a 38 percent stake in 1994, but the two airlines had entered marketing 
pact in 1993 when Business Air started flights from London City Airport to Frankfurt 
with a BAe 146s. Moreover, the carrier feeds Lufthansa's Manchester flights. 
Swissair holds also a 38 percent stake in Business Air. 
B.2 German New-entrants 
There have been number of notable new-entrants in Germany, namely: German 
Wings, Aero Lloyd and ContiFlug. The former two were the firs~ license~ 
independents in Germany and both stopped operations soon after inauguratIOn. TheIr 
problems were claimed to be airport congestion, lesser market growth than 
anticipated and head on competition with Lufthansa. 
10 Commult:r Air Inlc:m21tional, Sc:plc:mbc:r 1992. p. 13. 
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B.2.] Aero Lloyd 
Aero Lloyd was a charter-based new-entrant that started pOint to point scheduled 
operations on the Frankfurt-Hamburg, Frankfurt-Munich and Hamburg-Munich 
markets. These markets are Lufthansa's busiest domestic routes with 1.77m, 1.83m 
and 0.77m seats offered in 1989, respectively. As the carrier faced disappointing 
results iIi the domestic market it started to look at the long-haul market and ordered 
two MD-11' s with an option for two more. Long-haul routes applied for were to 
Tokyo, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Singapore, New York, Los Angeles and Las Vegas. 
In addition to these routes, the carrier launched in 1989 service on the Frankfurt-
Paris and Munich-LondonlGatwick routes. Lufthansa's strategy against the carrier 
was to increase frequency on the domestic routes but not retaliation was encountered 
on the international routes. Initially the carrier set its fares 15 percent lower than 
Lufthansa by application, but had to follow fare increases by the flag carrier. In 
Frankfurt the carrier got a poor location leading to extended walking for its 
passengers, a fact that made it hard for many passengers to justify its use for not 
lesser fare. This situation was rectified later. The carrier did not join Lufthansa's 
CRS partner, Amadeus, as it was quoted an unacceptable high booking rate, leading 
to a negotiation with Galileo in 1990, that led to Amadeus dropping its rate in order 
to shun off Galileo' s entry into German travel agencies. 11 
B.2.2 German Wings 
German Wings started-up from scratch providing premium service at economy class 
fares. Lufthansa responded to both of the new-entrants by refusing to interline, a 
decision that was reversed by a German Court. After Lufthansa accepted interlining 
with the carriers it required endorsement by an individual airline leading to 
connection-time problems for its passengers. Still the Court found that Lufthansa 
was infringing competition regulation due to its market power. In the meantime 
German Wings had to change its whole route strategy due to lack of interlining. 
Following the ruling the carrier started to concentrate on longer-haul markets in 
order to make greater impact in the market with its premium service. This led to a 
focus on Munich - Dusseldorf, Cologne and Hamburg but it lessened the frequency 
on the Munich - Frankfurt and Frankfurt - Hamburg routes. The carrier served one 
international destination to Paris CDG from Cologne and Dusseldorf 
German Wings operated six MD-83 , s in the first year of operations targeting a fleet 
of 12 aircraft at the end of the second year. 
The Transport Ministry of Germany issued a constraint on the operations of new 
airlines by allowing initially only Category I operations, although, the aircraft ~nd 
crew were certified for CAT ill. This caused the carrier unnecessary delays dunng 
the winter-months. 
It is interesting to observe that both carriers entered the most lucrative dom~stic 
routes without success. Leading them to seek longer-haul routes as a more Vlabl.e 
route strategy. It is certain that the competition strategy by Lufthansa was antl-
II Airline Business, Independent Lessons, April 1990, pp. 50-55. 
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competitive and undermined the effort of these two German carners seriously, 
although, it is not possible to quantify that negative impact. 
B. 2. 3 ContiFlug 
ContiFlug had operated as an air taxi and charter operator since the sixties, before 
launching scheduled operations in October 1992 between Berlin Tempelhof airport 
and London City Airport with a BAe 146-200. An other identical jet was used for 
charter operations. The carrier reported that it had achieved 1 7 percent market -share 
between London and Berlin and exceeding its break-even load-factor with 62 percent 
load in April 1993. The London service was offered twice daily. In the summer of 
1993 the carrier entered the Tempelhof - Venice route claiming to have sold 5000 of 
the 7000 seats offered in advance. 12 In 1993 the carrier entered a route from 
Tempelhofto Riga but had to abandon the route due to poor loads. The carrier also 
lost a major ferry contract with Deutsche Aerospace in 1994.13 In August 1994 the 
airline folded as a rescue package could not be organised in time for the receivers 
deadline. 
B.3 French New-entrants 
B.3.] TAT 
Air France acquired a 35 percent stake in TAT in July 1989, but was required to 
divest its stake due to acquisition of UTA and Air Inter in 1990. In addition Air 
France had to give up its monopoly on 50 international routes and 8 domestic routes, 
from which TAT gained. T AT operated principally on domestic routes until the Air 
France divestiture when the carrier entered international routes to London, Milan, 
Stockholm, Munich, Frankfurt and Copenhagen. The company operates a number of 
peripheral companies in maintenance, freight and aviation training. 
British Airways acquired 49.9 percent stake in the carrier and plans to take up the 
remainder in 1997 when capotage will be allowed. In 1994 TAT's market-share in 
the French domestic market was less than 7 percent, while Air Inter dominated with 
70 percent. It is clear that TAT does not operate anymore as an independent carrier 
as it is part of BA' s strategy whose aim is to secure domestic feed to its international 
route system from major European capitals. The final brick in such strategy is the 
Commission's re-negotiation of all bilaterals with the EU considered as one entity. 
Such bilateral approach along the liberalised precedent of the US - Netherlands 
bilateral would enable any European carrier operating international routes to any 
international destination who is a party to such an agreement. 
B.3.2 AOM 
AOM was created by the merger of Air Outre Mer and Minerve. The carrier 
operates Douglas MD83' s in competition with Air Inter on the Marseilles - Paris Orly 
route and long-haul routes to Tahiti in competition with Air France and the French 
12 Travel-Trade-Gazette-Europa, April 22, 1993, p. 5. 
13 Flight Intemational. 31 August - 6 September, 1994. p. 11. 
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charter airline Corsair. In 1992 it halted its Paris - Barcelona route due to weak 
traffic. 
B.4 Other European New-entrant Airlines 
B.4.1 Ryanair 
R yanair has had an important impact on the London route from Ireland, in terms of 
lower fares, as assessed in this chapter. Its strategy is to provide low-fare, no-frills 
service. Ryanair was formed in 1985 by the sons of Dr. Tony Ryan the ex-Chairman 
ofGPA leasing, whose interests are none in Ryanair. 
To begin with (about six months) the carrier had limitations as to the size of aircraft it 
could operate, but it had to be less than 50 seats. After the limitation was eliminated 
the carrier acquired 105 seat Rombac jets (Romanian BACI-Ils). This and Aer 
Lingus step-up of frequency led to 40 percent frequency increase on the Dublin -
London route. In 1994 the carrier was operating six Boeing 737-200s and two 
BACI-Ils. 
In 1989 the Irish government issued a two airline policy, whose duration was until 
1992. In the policy it was stipulated that: (i) that the two carriers could not compete 
on new routes developed during the policies duration; (ii) only Ryanair could operate 
on routes between Ireland and Stansted; (iii) sole rights were awarded to Ryanair 
between Dublin and Munich, but Aer Lingus had consecutive rights to Paris and 
Manchester; and (iv) only Ryanair was able to develop services between Irish 
regional airports and mainland Europe. 14 
Ryanair became profitable in 1991 and 1992. Ryanair was not profitable until it 
halved its routes and increased frequency on the remainder, withdrew from the 
unprofitable Stansted service and returned its ATR 42's turboprops to the lessor. 15 
14 The Awmark Aviation Economist, 'Refuting the 'nowhere to nowhere'jibc', October 1989, pp. 16-20. 
15 Air Transport World, June 1993, p. 110. 
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Appendix-D New-entrants' Equity and Debt Structure 
Table D-I New-entrants' Equity and Debt Structure 
L.-t. debt 
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Appendix-E Analysis of the Questionnaire Means: Part I 
Table E.1 Means for Questionnaire Part I: The Dichotmous Distress Variable 
Organisation 
We have customer-oriented front line people 
Our internal social and political system support our business aim'j 
The board of directors is highly involved in the airline's affairs 
Our organisational structure is decentralised 
We would create the same organisation structure as we have now, if given the opportunity 
Management 
Our airline is flexible enough to respond immediately to major opportunities 
We usually receive many useful suggestions from our employees 
Our long term aims and objectives guide our business decisions 
The airline has a vision of the future shared by all the employees 
We surround ourselves with staff who promotes different orientations of view 
Our staff provide us with a competitive advantage 
The atmosphere among employees is very good 
Our staff is encouraged to have open discussion about the airline's problems 
We do detailed analysis before taking any major decision 
Everyone in our airline understands our long term aims and objectives 
We are good at changing our staff's beliefs and values 
We have incentives for our staff that encourages extra commitment 
Employees are rewarded for taking actions that benefit our customers 
Group consensus is the usual way wc make dccision 
The number of serious problems we are faced with increases constantly 
Finance 
We are more efficient than most of our competitiors 
Our financial control system is efficient 
We make effective cash-flow forecasts 
We are effective in monitoring important cost areas 
Lack of capital will not limit our growth 
Marketing 
Our customer loyalty is strong 
Wc fulfil our customers' needs well 
We act immediately upon customer complaints 
Our marketing performance is good 
Our marketing is aggressive 
Weare pleased with the performance of our distribution outlets 
We are innovators in customer service compared to our competitors 
We grow by selling our services to more customers 
Our service has a range of features that makes it distinctive 
Quality is our major competitive advantage 
We are effective in monitoring our customers' expectation of quality 
We are good at stimulating demand for our services 
We make changes in our service quite frequently 
We plan and allocate sufficient resources to developing new markets 
Everyone in our airline understands how they can improve quality 
Strategy 
We are constantly identifying threats and opportunities to our business 
We emphasise planning for the future 
We usually have enough resources to plan for the future 
Our long term aims and objectives are easily achievable 
We try to avoid head to head competition with our larger competitiors 
The improvement of the airline's market-share is our number one priority 
We allocate major resources for diversification into other industries 
Environment 
Long-term prospects in our primary markets are excellent 
We are rarely taken by surprise by our business environment 
The airline's success is largely dependent on factors out of its control 
Infonnation 
We are constantly upgrading and improving our information system 
Important information is communicated to employees to enable effective decision-making 
We have all the information we need on our customers, markets and opportunities 
Our information system provides us with a clear competitive advantage 
Our information .~y.~tt'm~ provide quick. accurate and relevant information 


















































































































Appendix-F Analysis of the Questionnaire Means: Part II. 
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...... §:§.i ..... i"".~?~~._.""~"" .. ~&~"" Operations without unioniscd. ... ""'fi9"'"l''''=j;23''''j'''''7j'i''''' 
6,73 : 7,82 : 8,42 Flexible job descriptions .. ,,·6:6·.y·"T'7j's ..... ·1""7j'4 ...... · 
::::::~~~:~::::::J:::::::~:?~::::::I:::::~:!~::::::: Company culture ·····6:6·.y····l·· .. =j;)9····1···sj·4 ....... · 
5,65 1 6,21 1 6,50 Business strategy . ""6'j'S' "" l'7j'S.,..."'T"i:7i ....... · 
·······-· .. ·········i··· .. ·· .. ······· ......... ~............. ......... . ................. , ......... ..."...; ................ . 
5,50 1 5,34 1 5,72 Managements' external 5,94 !: 6,90 :::. 7.52 
i 1 contacts Long-term rather than short term" "···" .... "· .. ·"l .. "" .... "· ...... • .. ~ .... " .... · ...... ".. .. .... " ......... :."""".,..,....: ................ . 
Debt reduction ··" .. ?:~.~."".i ... " .. ?:§l... .... ~ ..... ~??~" .... " Shared company vision .. ".§:.~.?"".i,,~:2~.~..j.,,~:g.~ ....... . 
....... ~?~.?".j .... J!.~.?T-F'F" .... l ...... ?!.~.!....... Company mission ...... ~??~ ..... ; ... ~1?~.i .. J!.??-..--. 
Reduction oflabour costs ..... "???~"""L .. ??~}" .. ".,,.L"",,?:~.L"". Management teams .. ".?!~.~"."i.~:~.~ ....... "'.i...?:.9.?.,..".... 
Marketing Factors ~ . Uelegation 5,34 ~ 6,53 ~ 7,69 
Service quality " .. "7:33" .. "j"' .... g~"i"i .......... f .... 8·:85'""" .. · Employees' autonomy to take .... ·S~'4·i· .. ·i:.··6:s0 ...... ·.l.: .. 7·,40-.-· 
i 1 decisions 
................... .: ........................ :..................... ·················,···············1····.··· .. ~ .. Passenger load-factors 
Expansion into new markets 







Avoidance of price wars 
Market-share 
Weight load factor 
Commission overrides 
Frequent flyer program 
Alliance with the incumbents 
6,69 ~ 7,39 ~ 7,82 Managers' incentive programs 4.63 ~ 5.12 : 6.30 
.................................................................... . ................................. : .................. . 
6,82 1 7,06 j 7,79 Employees' incentive progr31ns 4,64 j 5,06 j 6,24 
.................................................................... . .................................................... . 
6,33 j 6,91 i 6,97 Job rotation 3,89 j 4,38 j 4.75 
.................... ~ ........................ -:...................... . ................ : ......... ~.: .......... .,.."... .. 
6,52 : 7,55 : 8,27 Union relations 3.63 : 4,50 : 5,16 
.................... ~ ........................ :.................... . ...... ,; .......... ~ ............... ~ ................ . 
6,15 : 6,64 : 7,09 Staff reduction 4.27 : 6,06 : 5,67 
··· .. ···············1······················1-···········-....... . ................ , ................. , .......... .-.-.-. 
6,15 1 6,45 1 7,15 ~=:lisedorganisation 4,38 I 5,06 1 5,90 
•...•..........•... -:: ......................... :..................... . ................ ! ................ : ................ . 
5,94 : 7,00 : 7,33 Operations Factors : : 
.................... ~ ...................... ,........................ . ........••..•... , ................ ! .................... . 
5,12 : 6,67 : 7,45 Aircraft utilisation 7,68 : 8,25 : 8,88 
................... , ........... ..,.... .... ).................... .. ............... , ............... , ................. . 
5,55 : 7,06 1 7,74 Matching aircraft size with ... 6,25 ~ 7,34 : 8,06 
················ .. · .. ~·············T······,·············....... . .................................... , ................. . 
5,63 1 6,36 1 6,48 Homogeneous aircraft fleet 6,30 1 7,12 1 7,42 
............................................... ~ ........... ~.... . ........................................... ~. 
4,94 1 5,55 j 6,06 Frequency in served markets 5,61 1 7,18 1 7,81 
...... 4j"i .. · .. r .... 4)S· ...... r· .. ·:(S2·...... Acquisition of airport slots .... ·S·.6·4 .... j .... 6:06 .... j .... ·63'4 .. · .. 
...... 4:'4·8· .. ··j""··S)5..."".· .. T· .... ·S:9·i··· .. · Acquisition of new aircraft · .... 6~7·9 .... T· .. 7:"i8····1·· .. ·7j4 .... · 
.................. --.. ~ ............ ~ .... ~ ....... -..... ~.... . ................ : ............... : ................ . 
3,42 : 5,45 : 6,33 Quality of terminal space 5,85: 6,94 : 7,54 
................... , ......................... :-...................... ·················1········ ...... ·,··· .. ···· ............ · 
3,03 i 4,35 : 5,35 Interlining agreements 4,~5 : 5,~5 : 6,63 
.. · .. ·· .. ·· .... · .. ·t· .... ··· .. ··· .. · .. ····~····· .... ···· .... ··· · ...... ·· .... ····1·· .. ······ ..... 1·· .. ······· .. ···· 
Merger/acquisition to gain market- 2,71 i 3,29 i 3,90 Operation on trunk. routes 4,97 i 5,70 i 5,83 
share i 1 : 1 
.............................................. ",......................... . ................... ! ........ ...." .. , .................... . 
Diversification into other industries 1 71 ! 129 1 168 Hub and spoke operations 3,15: 4,21 : 4,63 
········: .. ·········c······· .. ·l ............ ,. ....... !............ . ................ , ............... , ................. . 
Inform. and Communication i 1 Long-haul routes 3,48 j 3,33 j 3,94 
Facton i 1 : : 
Computer reservation system 
Inter-departmental communication 






Yield management systems 
Simplification of information 
system 
............... -..... ~- ....................... ) .......... --........... ········· .. ·······1········ .... ,,·1·········· ....... . 
563 : 721 : 800 Freight operations 2,94 : 4,30 l 5.13 
•••••••• 1 ••••••••.. ~ ....... 1 ................ ~ •••••• '.............. . ................. -~ ................ , ........... ~. 
564 : 645 : 754 Feeder airline agreements 2,75 i 4,63 1 5,64 
•••••••• J •••••••••• : •••••••• .' ................ :. •••••• '••••• ~... • ................. ~.- ............ -................... . 
522 : 625 : 748 Code sharing 2,06 l3,91 1 4,97 
, :' :' : 
: : .. : 
.- .... -.--.-.--.- .. ~-----...... -....... --.-:.--.-.. -----....... -.. ------_ .. --------:----_ ... _------.--_._ .... _-------
5,19 1 6,84 1 8,19 Environment Factors : ~ 
................................. ~ .................. ~....... . .......................... ~ .............. ..- .. . 
5,09 1. 6,54 1. 7,94 Investors' attitudes towards the 5,56 l 7,18 ~ 7,72 
airlint: 
................... : ............ ~ .... ~..................... . ................ : ............. ".; ................ . 
5,03 1 5,97 ~ 7,33 Favourable attitude of travel 6,14 ~ 7,48 ~ 8,30 
. . agents ................. j ........ _.i ......... ~ . 
....... -........... ~ .. -................... ~ ............... ...-.... ~~~ ..... ~~ 
5,00 1 6,09 1 7,34 ... Competitor analysis ...... ~:.9.9 ... .,L~2.~ ..... .,L .. ?!.~.~."1'T" .. 
...... 4j'6 .... T .. 6~·9·4..--· .. ·f .. ·"8":09 ... ".,.. Reduction ofCRS bias 5,45 ~ 6,09 ~ 7,13 
................... i ............ ..--.... ;.".................. affecting the airline ................. j ............... j ................ . 
4,63 l 6,06 l 7,09 Forecasting adverse effects of 5,56 j 6,94 : 7,28 
i 1 the environment.. ................. j ....... -.-."j ................ . 
.. · ................ t· .......... · ........ r .............. · .... · InfluencinA£overnment policy 5,54: 6.90 : 7,18 
Subjects were asked to rate the importance placed on each factor at their airline on a scale from 0 to 10. 
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Appendix-G New-entrant Airlines' Life-cycle Analysis 
G.] Introduction 
The intention was to investigate the differences of failed and non-failed carriers at 
each life-cycle stage. Unfortunately it was not possible due to the small sample size. 
The different emphasis on factors according to the airlines' size is important 
nevertheless in order to understand the causes of failure and non-failure. To do the 
life-cycle analysis the size stages explained in Chapter 1 and the section on airline size 
distribution in this chapter, was used: New-entrant, Transitional and Interim Major. 
Life-cycle analysis is important in order to investigate the null hypotheses that a 
particular factors importance would not change as the airline's size increased. If the 
alternative hypotheses was true and there was a difference it would be necessary to 
investigate wether those factors that differed where also the factors that distinguish 
between failed and non-failed airlines and loss-making and non-loss-making airlines, 
thus being 'critical' factors. 
Unfortunately there was not optimal number of airlines in each group, making the 
results indicative. 
G.2 Questionnaire Part ]28 
Statistically significant differences between new-entrants and transitionals from 
interim-majors is in terms of the former two making more frequent changes in their 
service. This is consistent with the believe that smaller organisations are more 
adaptive to changes in the environment than larger organisations. This very factor 
must be viewed as one of the competitive advantages of new-entrants and 
transitionals. 
Transitionals differed from new-entrants in terms of three factors, namely 
decentralised decision making, allocation of resources into non-core business and 
emphasis on market -share. This indicates that decentralisation increases as the airline 
gets larger making more employees participate in decision making. Furthermore, 
with larger size the airline is more likely to expand into non-core businesses, 
although, the emphasis on this factor is overall very low. The third factor, market-
share, indicates that airlines will emphasise market-share more as they get larger. 
Interim-majors differed from new-entrants in terms of available market information 
and employee rewarding. Larger airlines do usually have both more staff and 
financial resources to gather market information, thus, it is not surprising that this 
factor is rated higher by respondents of large airlines than of new-entrants that are 
still installing or saving on information gathering systems and staff As organisations 
grow larger they start to get de-personalised due to increased number of personal 
interaction possibilities. In order to counteract this the airlines install control and 
reward systems that will provide the employees with some kind of recognition for 
exceptional performance. Thus, it is expected for interim-majors to have such 
28 Please note that 'Agree strongly' was rated as 5 and conversely 'Disagree strongly' was rated as I. The subjects were asked the 
following: 'Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the statements in relation to your airline (today)'. 
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systems installed, while the new-entrant has not usually the need to do so due to the 
motivational and rewarding aspects of close personal ties in a smaller organisation. 
In the smaller organisation, g~od performance, is much more likely to be detected by 
peers and managers, who Will reward the employee in a non-formal way. As the 
management layers increase this becomes harder and formal reward systems have to 
be installed. 
Table G.1 Significant Differences According to Life-cycle Stages 
New-entrant (n 12) Transitional (n - 20) Interim-major (n = 12) 
We make changes in our service We make changes in our service quite • 
... 9.~.~.!!.~~!y. .•............................... ~~~~~~~.i~th~.~~~i.~~Y.~~.~~ ............................................................................ . 
decisions . 
..............................•............................. ··w~·~ii~~~~·~·~~·~~~~;;~~~~·f~~······················ ......................................................................... . 
diversification 
..............................•............................. ··Th~·~p;.~~~~·~fth~·~ri-li;;~·;~·~~~······· ......................................................................... . 
.............................................................. .. ~~~.~~.5?~!..~~~~.~~~.~~~~: .............................................................................................. . 
• We have all the infonnation we need on 
............................................................................................................................................. ?~.~~~?~~!.~~~.~~.~p.~~~!!~: .... 
• Employees are rewarded for taking 
actions that benefit our customers. 
The mean of individual respondents was used rather than the mean of aggregated means of each individual airline. Analysis of 
Variance was used with Least Significant Difference test (LSD) test at the .05 significance level. The column containing the factor 
written out has the highest mean of the tree groups and is significantly different from the column(s) containing the. symbol. 
G.3 Questionnaire Part II, Past 
The main conclusion from Table G.2 is that respondents of new-entrant airlines, 
generally rate the importance placed on factors lower than that of respondents of the 
other two life-cycle stages listed. As a result, there is no specific factor enjoying 
more emphasis at new-entrants in comparison to the other two stages. 
Transitionals, on the other hand, do differ from both new-entrants and interim majors 
in terms of: Avoidance of price wars and logistics systems. Airlines reaching the 
transitional group are gaining more presence in the market due to larger size, thus, 
attracting more attention from larger airlines that may view it as potentially harmful in 
the near future. As a result, transitionals' marketing moves may cause reaction of the 
incumbent out of proportion to the transitionals impact on the market. Furthermore, 
the cost advantage of the new-entrants' stage may have dissipated at the transitionals 
stage making substantial fare reductions less sustainable. In view of this it is perhaps 
not surprising that transitionals are more likely to avoid price wars. Larger airline 
size creates increased need for logistics systems in order to link together different 
parts of the organisation. A new-entrant is usually pretty much fixed to one city or 
few cities, while transitionals may have one main base and few large sub-bases and 
larger number of cities requiring own personnel. Once such system has been 
constructed during the transitional stage it will grow incrementally with the airline, 
without, requiring similar emphasis as during the transitional stage. 
Respondents of interim majors differed from the two other stages in terms of: 
Company culture, frequency in served markets, delegation, flexible job descriptions, 
frequent flyer programs, service quality and expansion into new markets. At the 
interim-major stage the airline has penetrated the market in a geographical sub-
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section thouroughly, causing a need for growth opportunities in other sub-sections 
that require greater analysis and risk-taking due to increased likelihood of other 
carriers' retaliation. Furthermore, as the airline gets larger it starts to move away 
from the niche concept into being a more 'ordinary' carrier, emphasising similar 
product features like seat-width, frequent flyer programs and food quality. At the 
interim-major stage the organisation has become very large with tens of thousands of 
employees causing the management to emphasise company culture, delegation and 
job flexibility in order to maintain high employee productivity. 
Table G.2 Differences According to Life-cycle Stages, Part II Past 
Ncw-entrant (n -7) Transitional (n - 19) Interim-major (n - 12) 
Mana ement Factors 
• Union relations Union relations 
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::~)~~~!~~~::~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~~~i~~~?~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
............................ ! .............................. ~~~p~y..~~!:~.~ .............................................. ~?~p.~y..~.~~~ .......................................... . 
.......................................................... ................................................................................ ~.rp£~?y.~.~~J.~!.~?'.I:~ ....................................... . 
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~'-?r~:fu~~1~~¥.~~:::::::::::::::::::::::: 
............................•........................... ···B~~~~·;,tr~t~·····················································B~~~~·~~i~································ .............. . 
Infonnation factors 
............................ : ........................... ··tf!f~tiZIi1i~·~~~~ti~~:·~~f······················M~kcl:hrteiiii~··:r~;m~ii~~~·~d·········· 
............................................................. ~~~.l:I;~~.~~~?':l:.~y.~~ ........................................... ~?~~~~~~~.~¥.~~ .............................. . 
............................ ! ............................. ~~~?~.~~~ .......................................................................................................................... . 
• Forecasting adverse effects of the economy on 
............................................................ ~~ .. ~~~~~ ................................................................................................................................... . 
............................ ~ ........................... ···~~~g·~y.~·········ii··········································skpiill~~ii~~····~f····~~;;:.:;~;:i~~:····~d··· 
conununication sy.stem 
............................•................................................................................. ·····························yi~id·~~··~~;:·~·········· ........................ . 
Financial Factors 
Marketing Factors . 
• : Acnuisition of aiport slots ... 1... .................................................................. . ····························iii···························~···F~~~~;;~bi~·~ttih~de·~f~~~ ... ~~s.~~············::::: ... L .................................................................. . 
............................•......................... ·r·Q~~iitY·~fi~~ ..... ~p~~~··~dgr~~d·f~~iiities i Quality of terminal space and ground 
...................................................... ····j···············:·····;·················ark·········································j···i~·~l~~~·~t~·~~;·~~~~ ..................... . 
• : E Ion mto new m ets • . .. ; ..... ~ ............................................................ . 
Analvsis of Variance was used willi Least Significant Difference test (LSD) at the .05 significance level. TIle c~h.~nm:~~e 
facto~ written out has the highest mean of the tree groups and is significantly different from the column(s) contaInmg s~m. 
This factors, if emphasised, can retain some of the posItIve. aspects of smaller 
organisations like flexibility and 'family' athmosphere (belongmg) a~d break the 
bureucratic tendencies of larger organisations. These management actIons can also 
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be cost saving as delegation and job-flexibility reduces the personnel requirements by 
increasing productivity, carrying some of the cost advantages of earlier life-cycle 
stages to later stages. 
The growth emphasis makes the airline want to grow in the least risky way by 
stimulating traffic on present routes, before expanding into new markets. Cost 
reduction only enters the picture as the airline has reached a size where cost 
inefficiencies and a scope for cost reduction occurs. Airlines at the new-entrants' 
stage are usually underpriviledged at larger airports, often subject to lower quality 
facilities at airports. As the airlines enter the transitional and interim-major stage the 
importance of offering comparable quality in all aspect of service gains increased 
importance due to less competitive advantage. 29 This also applies due to the 
transitionals wanting to step-up frequency at major airports requiring extensive 
lobbying on their behalf at the airport, aviation authorities and at political institutions. 
This causes increased presence in the market leading to forceful reactions of other 
airlines present in the market. 
Interim-majors differ from transitionals in terms of importance placed on frequency in 
served markets and delegation. This is for the same reasons as stated before. 
G.4 Questionnaire Part II, Present 
As we move to the present we find that new-entrants differ from interim-majors in 
terms of emphasis on computer reservation systems. The reason may lie in the fact 
that smaller airlines are unfavoured in terms of biases (see Chapter x) and costs that 
are usually higher than that of larger airlines. Furthermore, some new-entrants are 
only listed and not full participants in the commercial CRS' s. As the new-entrant 
grows, which is usually fast, the importance of participation increases. 
Table G.3 Differences According to Life-cycle Stages, Part II Present 
New-entrant (0 - 6) Transitional (0 - 16) Interim-major (0 11) 
Management 
.................................. : ....................... ····· .. ··t-·~~fi;~1~~~·~p~~·;;;.~ii~~~i'····· .. ··I .. ~Ifi;~:{~~i .. ~p~~·~d·i~~d· .. · .. · 
~ facilities ~ facilities 
Marketing 
• Favourable attitude of~~~~~.~~!!~ ................................................................................... . 
:::::::::::::::::::.:::::....:.: ....... :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::::::::::~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::i~~~== 
Infomlation 
Lo . . • 
.................................. : .......................................... w.~~.~.Y..~~ .............................................................................................................. . 
.. S~~p.~~.~~E~~~~i~ .. ~Y.~~~ .. · ...... · .. ··········F~~~~.g·~~~·~ff~~·~f"ih~· .. ···· .... · ........ F~~~g·~~~·.~ff~·~fth~············· 
economy 00 the airline economy 00 the arrlme 
Finance 
:::::::::::::::::::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=:=::===::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Analvsis of Variance was used with Least Significant Difference test (LSD) test at the .. 05 significance le\el. The colwnn 
cOnbining the factor written out has the highest mean of the tree groups and is significantly different from the column(s) contammg 
the • symbol. 
29 For more detailed el\-planations see the chapter 00 oew-entrants' strategy. 
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Transitionals differ from interim majors only in terms of logistics systems for the 
same reason as stated before. 
Transitionals and interim-majors differ from new-entrants in terms of emphasis on 
forecasting adverse effects of the economy on the airline, quality of terminal space 
and ground facilities, union relations and cost reduction. As the airline's size 
increases it becomes increasingly hard to fend off unions. Unions are, however, a 
fact of life for most if not all European airlines. Thus, making union relations 
increasingly important as the airline's size increases. Thus, it is logical that emphasis 
on this factor increases as the airline gets larger in order to keep the peace but 
maintain as low cost base as possible. 
G.5 Questionnaire Part II, Future 
The respondents were asked to project the importance placed on the factors into the 
future. Emphasis on the reduction of CRS bias at new-entrants and transitionals was 
significantly different from interim-majors. The emphasis still on CRS' s while the 
importance placed on passenger load factors was significantly different from interim-
majors. This may indicate that the new-entrants in the sample were not satisfied with 
load-factors, wanting to improve those. While new airlines are gaining recognition 
and entering new markets load factors are often low (see Table X.x. in Chapter X). 
Respondents of transitionals do not differ from interim-majors for any factor. They 
do, however, differ from new-entrants in tenns of commission overrides, cost 
reduction and union relations. The reasons for the importance on cost reduction and 
union relations has been explained before. The new factor that enters the picture 
here, commission overrides, can be explained in tenns of increased emphasis on T A's 
distribution and the neccessity to match override offers by the competitors. 
Table G.5 Differences According to Life-cycle Stages, Part II Future. 
New-entrant (n = 13) Transitional (n = 17) Interim-major (n - 12) 
... ~~~~~!~~.~f.~~~.~!~.~~~.~~.~!~~ ........ ~~~~?~.?f.~~.~ .. ?~~.~~.~.~.~.~~~ ................................. ~ ........................... . 
... ~~~p.~~ .. ~~~~~~~~.~~.~ ...................................................................................................................................... ~ ........................... . 
::::P:~~.loa~~~~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::~~~~:~)~=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::f.&;.~i~t~~~::::::::::::::::: 
c .. . des ;;;;;~;;;~~;;;~~;;;~~:~;;;~?;:::::::i:::;h~;:~~~~~~~~~~;;;;;;~;~;:;;~:;;;;;;;;;~';~;j~:;~l~~~;;;;;:;;:~;:;;::;::;::;:::::::::::~:i~~!~;:;:; 
Analysis of Variance was used with Least Significant Difference test (LSD) test at the .05 significance level. The co~unm 
containing the factor written out has the highest mean of the tree groups and is significantly different from the column(s) contatnlDg 
the • symbol. 
Interim-majors differ from both transitionals and new-entrants by placing more 
importance on frequency in served markets and homogenous aircraft fleet. ~ew­
entrants have frequently grown very fast adding aircraft that may have been aVaIlable 
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when needed but not compatible with existing fleet as growth decreases more effort 
may be placed on harmonising the fleet. 
Interim-majors differ from transitionals only, in terms of delegation and employees' 
incentive program. As the organisation gets larger bureucratic tendencies increase, 
that is concentrated power and decreased responsiveness intuitivity. In order to 
counter this, organisations place increased importance on delegation and employee 
incentive programs. 
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Appendix-H The Difference Between European and U.S. 
Airline Management Practice 
H.i Introduction 
The following section maps the difference between European and United States 
carriers for questionnaire I and questionnaire II. Specialists are included in the 
analysis for the latter questionnaire. 
The importance of doing this analysis is to establish if European and United States 
carriers actually differ in terms of the items that distinguish between the carriers by 
performance. 
H.2 Questionnaire Part I 
According to the findings European respondents agree strongly on the average that 
the board of directors is highly involved in the airline's affairs. Their United States 
counterparts average slightly above the mid-point, which indicates less involvement 
of the board of directors in the airlines' affairs in the United States. The explanation 
of this difference must be sought in the way that the Board of Directors is composed 
between the two geographical areas. In Germany, for example, the board of 
directors has a supervisory board assembled of representatives of shareholders, 
employees and other stakeholders. This supervisory board then appoints the 
management board to deal with the detailed management of the company. Under the 
Insolvency Act the responsibility of British directors has been increased. For 
example, they may be personally held liable for company debts if they trade after the 
company is insolvent. This two examples imply that by tradition the board of 
directors is highly participatory in Germany and also in Great Britain due to changes 
in the insolvency act. In the United States on the other hand, there is a much more 
controversy over the role of the Board of Directors. This less effective role of the 
board is clearly reflected in the results. The trend has nevertheless been towards 
more board involvement in the United States. A statistical composition of boards of 
directors published by Heidrick and Struggles, Inc, shows that the trend is towards 
increased role in the governance of the corporations, more involvement of outsiders, 
more reliance on working committees chaired by outsiders and increased 
compensation that reflects more demands on directors. The criticism of the board of 
directors in many companies in the United States is that they are assembled with 
insiders primarily, attorney from the company's outside law firm, the president from 
the company's bank and few of the chief executive's personal friends. 
The US respondents have stronger feelings, than their European counterparts, on 
their airlines providing incentives to employees that encourage extra commitment, 
although the average is not particularly high. The reason for the difference can be 
sought in the fact that the US carriers have participated in fierce competition for a 
decade, thus utilizing more efficiently the managment tools available than their 
heavily unionised less competitive European counterparts. 
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Respondents of US carriers agree that long-term prospects in their airlines' primary 
markets are excellent, more readily than those from Europe which may indicate that 
the foothold of the large incumbents is actually dissipating giving the smaller carriers 
openings in their markets. The protectionism and strong government involvement 
and lack of experience in full competitive environment may on the other hand cause 
European carriers to feel more pessismistic about their long term prospects in their 
primary markets. 
US respondents agree more readily that important communication is communicated 
to employees to enable effective decision making, which indicates that they view this 
part of their management role higher than their European counterparts. Effective 
communication is important both as a motivating factor as well as providing for more 
effective decision making. The difference is probably due to the high demands of 
highly competitive environment in the United States. 
Distribution is one of the fundamental aspects of any airlines' marketing operation. 
Apparently US carriers are more satisfied with the performance of their distribution 
outlets than European respondents. One must have in mind, though, that two new 
reservations systems have been installed since 1988, Amadeus and Galileo. Number 
of toothing problems have occurred in addition to the disadvantages of being non-
owner like most new-entrants are. In view of that it is not surprising that European 
respondents are less satisfied. 
Table H.l Significant Differences Between Respondents of European and United 
States Carriers: Questionnaire Part I 
Statement Population i Mean 1 Sig. 
~~~53~. ~~~e~bo~~~d~o~f~~'~~~o~~~is~~~'~~y~~~v~olv~~~~~~~e~~~' ~~. ~e'~s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2~2)~1··~:j~i~··--t-·w""" 
....................................................................................................................................... ..~.1;lE~~f.~2·················~··~:·~§·~·?:······+··w···· ... Q43. We have ~centives for our staff~at encourages extra ~nited States(22) 1 3.6364 1 
···Q~4·.·····c:i~~:~~~·~·~~·p~·~~~·~~·;~~~ii~t········· .................. ··5~i~~{~(22)·······t··~~~·~i-······t············ 
. ~.l;IE~p.~~Q~>' ................. ~ .. ~:~7.~.~ ....... 1.. •......... ···Q52".·····i~~~~ti.;r~~~ti~~··i·~·~~~~;;~·i~·~pi~y~~~·t;;·~hi;················· '~nited States(22) ~ 4.2273 ~ 
effective decision makinp .. ~.':I:~~f.~2 ................ .L.~:~.~.~~ ...... i. .•......... ···Q2i·····w~·~~·pi~~~~i"~th·th~·p~~~~·~f"~~~·di~b~ti~~·~~ti~~.................. ~nited States(21) 1 3.8571 1 
···Q2i····Th~·~p~;~~~~i·~fth~·~~i~~;;·~~kct·~~~··i~·~~~·;;~b~~····················· ··5:~s~{~~21)······t·}~~j·~······t············ 
···Q32".·····;~:fi~;~~j~~·~~~~~~~·f~;·di~;;ri~~ti~~·~t~·~th~···· ....................... ··5;:~~{~22)·······t··i~~~~~······t············ 
···Q4o· .. ····o:~~~~·~~~i~i·~d·P~iiii~~i·~y~·~;;P;,rt·~~b~~~ ...................... ··5:~~22)·······t··~~~!-j-~······t············ 
aims .. ~.':':':~~f.f.2 ................. ~ .. ~:.~.~.~.~ ...... ~ ..•......... 
···Q~6· .. ···~·~·~;~i~·~·h~·;;~g~··~ii~~t~~~·th~t·~~~·ii·di~~~ti~~························ ~nited States(22) ~ 3.7727 ~ 
Euro 23 : 4.4348 
European carriers feel more strongly on the neccessity to improv~ market-s~are, 
which indicates that they assume that market -share somewhat Importan.t 10 a 
competitive environment. Their US counterparts disagree so~ewhat With the 
statement, which indicates that other priorities are considered more Important. 
Respondents from both European and United States ~isa~~d that emphasis had 
been placed on diversification into other industries, whic~ mdlcates that the sample 
airlines tend to stick to their core business. European carners show nevertheless less 
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disagreement. This may be due to the fact that the smaller European airlines have in 
many instances limited ability to maximize their returns from their core business so 
frin?e busine~ses bec~~e necessary in order to maintain the profitability of the ~ore 
busmess. This trend IS lIkely to change as competition increases in Europe. 
Respondents of US carriers agree on the average that the internal social and political 
sy.stem supports the airline's business aims, which indicates slightly more conformity 
WIth the company welfare rather than personal politics. The European respondents 
average in the center, which indicates that their social and political system may not 
support their company's business aims as strongly as in the United States although 
the system is not working against their company's. 
European airlines have by tradition competed on service rather than price, as a result 
it is logical to see European respondents agree with their service having range of 
features that make it distinctive, more readily than US respondents. Both agree with 
the statement typically. 
H.3 Questionnaire Part II 
The importance of delegation is rated higher in the United States and the likely 
explanation is the necessity to empower the employees in order to maintain the 
highest possible efficiency level in order to stay competitive. This competition driven 
management philosophy has not found its way fully to European airlines as the 
findings show here. 
Incentive programs are important to motivate employees and to maximize their worth 
to the organisation. It is apparent from the findings that United States carriers place 
more importance on incentive programs, both for managers and employees. 
According to the findings United States carriers have placed much less importance on 
staff reduction than European carriers. This may be due to the inherent problems 
with European carriers' heavy unionisation that leads to inefficiencies compared to 
US carriers. This finding supports the believe that European carriers have been 
preparing for increased competition by trimming their cost structure through staff 
reduction. The importance placed on company culture is apparently greater at United 
States carriers. 
Interlining agreements are deemed more important by European respondants than 
their US counterparts. This indicates that European new-entrant carriers are more 
dependent on interline traffic than US carriers, perhaps due to the limited scope of 
route possibilities. This limited scope is due to smaller geographical scope of intra-
European air transport in comparison to that of the US and the heavy inclination of 
European flag carriers to trans-continental routes, unlike the US counterparts. These 
factors make interlining more important in order to pick up some of the trans-
continental traffic on medium to shorter-haul intra-European routes. 
One of the distinctive differences between highly deregulated and less dergulated 
market is the influence of the government on the company. European deregulation is 
just begining and many policy decisions were unsolved as this survey was perfo~ed. 
Thus, it is not surprising that European respondents still rate this statement higher 
than their United States counterparts. 
309 
Table H.2 Significant Differences Between Respondents of European and United 
States Carriers: Questionnaire Part II 
I Past Present Future 
Statement Population Mean Sig. Sig 
Delegation United States(24) 6.5833 United States(25) 7.0400 
I 
Sig 
.............................................................. . ~~!:~~~) ............. ~}.~g.9. ..... .... Eur?'p'~28) 5.5000 
Employees' incentive program United States(25) 6.4000 on ·U~ted·S~~(25) .... :.;:2000 .... m· .. "li~~~i'S~~(2"5"j' .... 7:84(jO .... ·~·' .... 
.............................................................. . ~~~.'?~~~L .......... ~:!?~.~.~ .......... Euro~29) 4.1034 EuronPI30) 5.3667 
Managers' incentive program United States(25) 6.4400 " ·Ucited·~25) .... 6:8800 .. ··v.r· .. · ·lj~~~26·j .. · .. 7:42":3"i"" .. ·• ........ 
.............................................................. . ~~.'?~~~L ......... }:2.~}.?..... . .... ~~~.(~?L....... 4.1724 EuronP(30) 5.5000 
Staff reduction United States(23) 2.6087 If .......................... "lT~t~~t~i·~2"5·j·····3:3200 .... 'y .... · 
............................................................... ~~!:'?p.~(~?L .......... ~:2.~.~~..... ...... Europe(29) 5.8966 Company culture United States(25) 7.7200 ' ·unii~d"SWes(25) .... 8:4800 .... y ............................................................... . 
.............................................................. . ~~!:?~i~~) 5.9231 Eur~29\ 6.5517 
hrterlining agreements United Sta~2·5·)···4·.·i·200·····'······ ·U;ilied·S~~~(25)····4:2800···· .. "···· ·U~tit~d·S:w~26·j .. ···4:80·ii·· .... · .. ·· 
.. infl~~~~g·g~~~~t·p~i·i~·~~······ ·~=~~~~(2·4)···~~~~~~·····,······ .~~!!:?P.~~?) .............. ~:~~.~.~ ............. ~~!~~~~g.! ............... ~;~.~.? ........... . 
.. ~~~~?-~.: ........... :................................. .~~~.?P.~~~) ............. ~:.~}~? ..... , ...................................................... w~ .....................................................• y .... . 
AcqUiSItion ofatrport slots Uruted States(25) 5.0400 United States(25) 4.2000 United States(26) 4.2692 ' 
............................................................... ~~!:'?~(~~) ............. ~:2.~.~.? ............ . ~~!.?p.~.(~?) .............. ?:~~~!? ........... ~~~~p~pg) ............... ~;~~.~.? 
Alliance with the incumbents United States(24) 2.4167 ........... .. 
Euro~(24) 3.9167 
....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Price leadership in served markets United States(24) 7.7500 
.............................................................. .~~'?~~.~) ............. §:~.~.~.? ............................................................ y ......................................................... y .••••. 
Employee relations United States(25) 8.4000 United States(26) 8.8846 
............. : ... ; .............. :............................. . ........................................................ ~~!:?~.(~?) .............. ~:?~.~.~ .... y, .... .. ~~~~~(~.9.! ............... ~:7~gg·····.w· .. ·· 
COmmtSSlon overndes United States(25) 4.3200 United States(26) 4.1538 
.............................................................. . ........................................................ ~~!:?~~?) .............. ~:2~~~ .... ~ .•...... ~~~~~~.9.) ............... §:~~}} ............ . 
Shared company vision United States(25) 7.6800 
.............................................................. . ........................................................ ~~!:?e~.(~?) .............. ?:~§~.! .... y •••••••••.•••••••••••.•••••••••••••••.•••.•••••.••••••..• y .•... 
Reduction ofCRS bias affecting the United States(24) 5.0833 United States(24) 5.3333 
.. ~~~~~.................................................. . ....................................................... . ~~!:?p.~.(~~) .............. ?:2~~~ ....•..... .. ~~~~(~.?) ............... ~:§.~.?? ...•....... 
Achieving critical mass United States(25) 4.0000 United States(26) 4.4615 
.............................................................. . ........................................................ ~~~~~~t ............ ?:?§~~ .... y ....... ~~.'?~~.?! ............... ~;~.~.~.~ ............. . 
Market share United States(25) 4.4800 United States(26) 4.8077 
.............................................................. . ........................................................ ~~?~~?) .............. ~:~~§2 .... y ..... •• ~~~.'?~~g1 .............. ~:7§.~.? ....•....... 
Merger/acquisition to gain market United States(25) 1.8800 I Jnited States(26) 2.4615 
.. ~~~.~.................................................... . ........................................................ ~~!:?~~?) .............. ~:~~.~.~ .......... .. ~~~.?~Q.~! ............... ~;.~g.?~ ............. . 
Job rotation United States(25) 5.4000 
.............................................................. . ........................................................ ~~!:~~~) .............. ~:?~~.? .................................................................... .. 
Increase margins United States(25) 8.2400 
.............................................................. . ........................................................ !::~!.?M~?) .............. ?:.I.?~.~ ..................................................................... . 
Employees' autonomy to take United States(25) 6.8400 
.. ~~!~!~~.............................................. . ........................................................ ~~!:?~~~) .............. ?:~~~2 ..................................................................... . 
Diversification into other industries United States(25) .5200 
........................................................................................................................ ~~?~~?) .............. ~.:~¥.~ ..................................................................... . 
Yield management system United States(26) 6.9231 
.... ................ ....................................... . ................................................................................................................ ~u~.'?p~~}~) ............... ~:.~.~.~.! ........... . 
Computer reservation systems United States(26) 7.0385 
··F~~d~;:·~·~i~~~·~g;.~~;~~;~··················· ............................................................................................................... ·~~~f~~1~(2·5·)·····!~~~ri············ 
··op~ti~~·~~·~~·~~~~~·················· ............................................................................................................... ·t~~~L~24·j .... ·~~j·i}ri············ 
Europe(29) 6.1379 
As higher proportion of European airports is congested it is of greater importance for 
European carriers to place higher importance on the acquisition of airport slots. 
Alliance with the incumbents has been viewed as important by many European 
airlines as a preparation for increased competition of the liberalisation process. 
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Although both European and US respondents rate the importance low it is seemingly 
lower in the US. The reason may be that the carriers included in the sample were 
independents, thus, this may not reflect the general importance placed on alliances 
with incumbents. 
Looking at the present column, one can see that employee relations, shared company 
vision, job rotation, increased margins, employees autonomy, are emphasised more 
by US carriers, while commission overrides, reduction of CRS bias, achievement of 
critical mass, market-share, merger/acquisition to gain market-share and 
diversification are emphasised more by European new-entrant carriers. These 
differences are especially apparent for for merger/acquisition to gain market-share, 
where the European average is 3.5 but the US average only 1.9. The factors having 
the highest mean are: employee relations, increase margins, shared company vision 
and achieving critical mass. 
Factors emphasised significantly more by European carriers in the future are: yield 
management system, computer reservation system, feeder airline agreements and 
operations on trunk routes. 
The overall conclusion from this account is that European new-entrant airlines are 
trying to shed their inefficiencies to improve profitability. Their existance is, 
however, still very much colored by the politically strong flag carriers, making 
alliances and mergers frequent in Europe. Nevertheless, the underlying tone implies 
that changes are occurring in new-entrants' strategy as emphasis on trunk routes, 
yield management and distribution show in the future column. 
Appendix-I Questionnaire Research Variables 
Table 1.1 Part A: Questionnaire Research Variables 
Questionnaire item Type Factor group Researcb Rationalisation Indication If 
variable "a2reement" or "much emphasis" 
Competitor analysis F Environment Competitors Must be a constant Rrocess to be able to take informed strategic decisions 'we need to align our strategy with our competitor's strategy' 
Government or EC lobbying to improve the airline's F Environment Strategy NE airlines are at a disadvantage 'we need to gain equal rights' 
competitive status 
Weare more efficient than most of our competitors. A Environment Competitors Important strategic advantage "we are in a good position strategically" 
ReductIOn offuel costs(fuel efficient aircraft, etc.) F Finance Control Neccessary to reduce costs 'we want to lower our costs' 
Reduction of CRS usage costs F Finance Control Necessary to reduce costs 'we want to lower our costs' 
Strict fmancial control F Finance Control Very important if low cost structure is to be achieved 'we want to increase our margin or maintain price leadership' 
Low cost-structure F Finance Control Important if sufficient margins are to be realized 'we want to increase our margin or maintain price leadership' 
Low debt F Finance Control Important to reduce adverse effects of cyclical markets on returns (Low 'we want to stay strong when e>.."ternal environment gets 
leverage) tough' 
We make effective cash-flow forecasts. A Finance Control Essential to avoid cash crisis "we reduce the chances of cash crisis" 
We have done internal analysis that has revealed the major A Finance Control It is important to identifY where adjustments can be made in costs. "we know where to save" 
cost areas and other key issues we need to monitor. 
Turnover growth F Finance Grov.1h Growth allows the company to acquire more employees and assets (Critical 'we want become big' 
mass) 
Lack of capital Wlll not limit our growth. A Finance Grov.1h Capital is the fueling of growth. "we will be able to grow as expected" 
We do allocate major resources on diversification. A Finance Grov.1h Diversification is risky. "we are in cyclical and/or troubled business" 
Leasing of aircraft F Finance GrO\\1h Allows the airline to show healthier balance sheet. (False health) 'we want show better health than we really have' 
Investor" s positive attitudes to the airline F Finance GrO\\1h Increases the availability of capitaL (F inancing of growthllosses) 'we need to have access to external capital' 
HIghmargms F Finance Control Increases profitability. 'we want to increase our profitability' 
Emphasis on long-term rather than short-term profits. F Finance Strat~ Increases the long-term health of the company 'we are future orientated' 
Cntlcal mass (minimum investment necessary before profits F Finance GrO\\1h Perhaps necessary to become profitable. 'we need to become profitable' 
WIll be made 2 
AcquiSItIon of new aircraft F Finance Costs Increases costs in the short-run 'we must be competitive in the long-run' 
EffectIve fmancial information system F Information Decisions Important so management will knows where the company stands as decisions ' we want to know what effect our decisions have on the 
system and are made company's fmancial status' 
communication 
(Jood mterdepartrnental communication F Information Change Internal efficiency reduces costs (Reduces resistance to change) "we want to reduce our costs" 
system and 
communication 
YIeld management system F Information Control Revenue maximization (Makes pricing decisions more effcient) "we want to maximize our market receIpts" 
system and 
communication 




Table 1.1 Part B: Questionnaire Research Variables 
Questionnaire item Type Factor group Research Rationalisation Indication if 
variable "ajp"eement" or "much emphasis" 
We have identified what critical infonnation we need to A Information Decision Reduces waste of decisions based on little or wrong information. "Better use of potential" 
stimulate demand for our services. system and 
communication 
Critical information is communicated to staff to enable them A Information Decision Reduces waste (Internal efficiency) "priorities knovom" 
to make effective decisions. system and 
communication 
We are rarely taken by sUIpnse by our business A Information Environment Monitoring of environment ., constant evaluation of direction" 
environment system and 
communication 
Our Information systems proVIde quick., accurate and relevant A Information Quality Efficient MIS is important if informed decisions are to be made "contidence in MIS" 
cntJcaJ information system and 
communication 
We have all the information we need on our customers, A Information Markets Market intelligence system for informed marketing decision making ,. constant evaluation of direction" 
markets and opportunities. system and 
communication 
Our information system provides us Wlth a clear competitive A Information Competitors Superior intelligence gathering "we know more than the competitors" 
advantage. system and 
communication 
We are constantly upgrading and improving our intormation A Information Quality Allocation of resources to MIS ,. we understand the meaning of information" 
system system and 
communication 
Management information system F Information Quality Good MIS is the heart of the decision making apparatus, Wlthout it efficient "we need to improve our MIS system" 
system and decisions can not be made 
communication 
What IS your age':' Q Management Experience The higher the manager's age the better is the company performance of small assumed level of experience 
businesses 
Our people resource adds real value to our business. A ManJigement Motivation Good staff increases efficiencY "we are satisfied with our staff" 
Involved board of directors F Management Control Involved board increases management performance "the airline has better chance of survi"tng" 
The airline's executives surround themselves with people A Management Suppon Well informed executives incur less risk "the executives are not isolated" 
who promote distinctly different orientations and points of 
VIew 
Group consensus is the usual way we make decisions. A Management Decisions Reduces risk and motivates conformity to decisions "we are a team" 
Our staff is encouraged to have open diSCUSSIOn about the A Management Suppon If the staffhas a saying it increases conformity to change ,. our people are important" 
airline's problems. 
We do detailed analysis before taking any major decision. A Management Decisions Entrepreunerial companies may make premature decisions "we are a professional company" 




Table 1. I Part C: Questionnaire Research Variables 
Questionnaire item Type Factor group Research Rationalisation Indication If 
variable "qreement" or "much emphasis" 
People are reviarded for taking actions that benefit our A Management Customer Empowerment of employees increases efficiency "we trust our people" 
customers. delight 
Strong centralised leadership F Management Delegation Centralisation can be beneficient for small business but liability for large. "we don't trust our staff" 
Employees autonomy to take decisions F Management Delegation Management's autonomy saves time and monev "we are inefficient but want to improve" 
Management's education level F Management Education The larger the organisation the better to have educated staff "we want our staff to understand where we are going and get 
us there" 
How many years of formal education have you completed? Q Management Education Education level influences how you manage 
If your formal education is more than 12 years, what Q Management Education 
was( were) your fiel~) of specialisation? 
We have customer-oriented front-line people. A Management Customer Customer oriented staff increases customer satisfaction "we are satisfied with our service quality" 
delight 
Management's e".-perience F Management Experience The gre.ater the management's experience the less likely it is to make ~we need more experienced management" 
fundamental mistakes 
For how long have you been employed with the airline? Q Management Experience Airline experience is advantageuos 
In '.vhat management related positions have you been Q Management Experience Management experience IS advantageous 
em~loyed? 
A new entrant airline's success is largely dependent on A Management Environment The external environment is only part of the business problems "We are reactive and powerless" 
factors out of its control. 
M~ement's ex1.emal contacts (Government, etc.) F Management Environment Necessary to avoid being cllllgllt unaware "we know our external environment" 
We are constantly identifying threats and opportunities to our A Management Environment The business knows its constraints "we know where we can go" 
business 
Our social and political system support our business aims. A Management Politics The informal structure has to work with the airline "we have favourable political climate" 
We are good at changing our people's beliefs and values. A Management Change The ability to implement c~e increases the airline's flexibilit)' ,·the people work with us" 
Everyone in our business understands our mission and frods A Management Mission It increases motivation ,·the statement has had an impact" 
It motivating 
We use our mission statement to guide our business A Management Mission Management has to adapt the mission for it to be effective "we believe in the mission" 
decisions. 
Our mission statement describes accurately our true identity A Management Mission The mission has to be realistic to be adopted "we like if' 
and what we are about. 
Management's adherence to a set mission F Management Mission The mission is important because it states where the comapny is heading "there is a discrepancy between ollr mission ,illd our 
management's actions" 
Our people provide us with a competitive advantage. A Management Customer Well motivated staff increases customer satisfaction "we are good at motivating our staff" 
delight 
We have incentives for our staff that encourages extra A Management Customer Well motivated staff increases customer satisfaction ,. if our staff do well they will benefit" 
comrmtment delight 
Do m;ill ;gers ovm shares in the company? What is your Q Management Motivation 
approxilnate share holding, if any? 
The number of serious problems we are faced With increases A Management Organisation Increased pressure may stem from inadequate org. structure. "we are having a lot of problems TWilling the company" 
constantly 
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Table 1.1 Part D: Questionnaire Research Variables 
---
Qut'Stionnaire item Type Factor group Research Rationalisation Indication if 
variable "aareement" or "much emphasis" 
Everyone in our business understands how they can improve A Management 
our service quality. 
Quality Quality increases number of customers and retention "we are quality concerned" 
The aIThne's direction is shared and understood by all the A Management Motivation If the company knows where it is heading it knows how to get there. "we mow where we are going" 
_ erIlployees. 
We are future focused company. A Management Vision The future should have impact on the present. "we mow what to anticipate" 
We usually have enough resources to plan for the future. A Management Growth It is important to prepare for the future "we aknowledge the importance of the future by allocating 
resources on it" 
Travel agent's favourable attitudes towards the airline F Marketi!Jg Distribution Neccessary to gain as much as possible from the distribution ~tem 'we understand the TA effect on our profitability' 
AcquisitJon of~ua!.ity terminal space and ground facilities F Marketing Environment Necessary to provide competitive service 'we must provide as good service as our competitors' 
AcquisitIon of airport slots F Marketing Environment Necessary to I'rovide convenient fligllts 'we need to increase our competitiveness' 
Access to distribution.systems F Marketing Distribution Access to distribution systems is fundamental to be able to sell the service "we are not satified with our access to distribution channels" 
We make changes in our service quite frequently. A Marketing Flexibility The service has to adapt to customer's needs and wants. "we know what our customers want, and respond to those 
wants" 
Our business is flexible enough to respond immediately to A Marketing Flexibility If the airline is non-beaurocratic it can grab opportunities successfully "we are decentralised and well staffed" 
I major vl'I"-'H~ties. 
Long-term prospects in our primarv markets are excellent. A Marketi!tg Growth It is an advantage to be in a groViing market "we can stick to our main market" 
We have analysed what the difference is between our A Marketing Customer It is important to fulfil all the needs of the customers, as the wants define the "we mow what our customer's wants and needs are" 
customers' needs and wants. commitment competitive advantage 
We are satisfied with our marketing performance. A Marketing Performance Good marketing performance is the fundamental to competitive advantage "we are doing well" 
Our marketing is aggressive. A Marketing Performance Agressive marketing can mean incumbent retaliation "we take risks" 
Our customer loyalty is strong. A Marketing Customer Customer loyalty is important due to the high cost of gaining customers "we mow our customers worth, and we satisfY their needs" 
deligl1t 
We fulfil our customer's needs well. A Marketing Customer It is important to act upon important data on customer needs "we satisfY our customer's needs weir" 
delight 
We act immediately upon customer complaints. A Marketing Customer Customer complaints is a important indicator of performance "we use customer complaints to manage more efficiently" 
delight 
Quality is our major competitive advantage. A Marketing Quality Quality can be as important strategy as price leadership "we put our quality in the forefront" 
We monitor our customer's expectation of quality through A Marketing Quality Quality is important to measure for necessary adjustments "We monitor our own performance" 
regular in-flight surv~s 
HIgh service quality F Marketing Quality Quality is the basis for customer satisfaction. "we need to ster.uJ.J. our quality" 
We lTV to avoid gOing into head to head competition with A Marketing Strategy Direct agressive competition can attract more attention than deserved. "we try to minimize rivalry" 
our largest competitor 
We 'tfOW by sellmg our services to more customers. A Marketing Growth Internal growth is the safest way to grow. "we are careful in our gro""th strategy" 
()ur service has a range of features that makes it distinctive. A Marketing Service The airlme must develop its unique selling I'.roposition. "we are different" 
We plan for and allocate sufficient resources to developing A Marketing Growth The airline must prepare its growth alternatives carefully "we are pro-active towards growth opportunities" 
new markets 
AllIance with the mcumbents F Marketing Strategy Alliance with the incumbents is necessary to reduce rivalry "we want to avoid bloody competitJon" 
Merger to gam mar_ket share F Marketmg Growth Market share is important to gain economies of scale "we have to gain market share or we wI! I jaIl" 
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Table I.] Part E: Questionnaire Research Variables 
---
QuHtionnaire Item Type Factor group Research Rationalisation Indication If 
variable "agreement" or "much emphasis" 
Diverstfication into other industries F Marketing Growth Diverisficatioo is necessary to reduce cyclical effects 00 revenue or decline ~we are in cash flow danger or reaching maturity and need to 
avoid it at all costs ~ 
Freaueotflyerprograrns F Marketing Loyalty Incentives for customers are important so th~ will stay with us ~we must offer no less than everyp<:><iy else" 
Operation on trunk routes F Marketing Strategy The highest portion of the total market travels on the trunk routes 'we want to play with the big boys' 
Busmess passengers F Marketing Strategy Business passengers pay the highest fares 'we want to enhance our service level to reach more Bp· s 
Lar~ overall market share F Marketing Strategy Large market share has directi influence 00 ROI 'we want to increase our profitability' 
El!lQhasis on price competition F Marketing Strategy The lowest price has direct relationship with the number of pa'( attracted 'we want to attract as many pax as possible' 
HI...ShJ'assenger load factors F Marketing Control Increases revenue if fares are reasonable 'we must gain market share' 
High frequency in served markets F Marketing Strategy Increases market share 'we must gain market share' 
Hub and spoke operations F Marketmg Strategy Creates economies of scale 'we have to increase our economies' 
Long haul routes F Marketing Strategy Reduce unit costs 'we must keep our unit costs down' 
Interlining agreements F Marketing Strategy Enlarges potential market 'we must have access to the larger market' 
Codesharmg F Marketing Strategy Fools the passenger 'we must fool the passenger to increase our short-term gam 
HIgh alfcTaft utilisation F Operations Control Reduces costs 'we need to keep costs at its lowest 
MatchIng of 'llfcraft sIZe with route requirement F _ Operations Control Increases efficiency 'we must increase our efficiency' 
Feeder ownership/agreements F Operations Strategy Increases efficiencies 'we must increase our efficiency' 
OrgarusatlOnal culture (shared attlt'-ldes, beliefs, norms). F Organisation Culture The culture has to support the organization 
Decentralised organisatlOnal structure. F Organisation Delegation Delegation reinforces success as the air!. grows 
Diversified administrative team's background. F Organisation Experience Different point of views reduce the likelyhood of very flawed decisions "balanced decisIOns" 
Good employee reiatlOns. F Organisation Motivation Well informed and participating workforce makes the airline efficient and "our workforce is important to our success" 
flexible 
Incentive program for employees. F Organisation Motivation Highly motivated workforce provides this necessary extra thing "our workforce is important to our success" 
The executives build partnerships with all their key people. A Organisation Suppon An executive needs support to be effective '·well informed executive" 
High labour productivity F Organisation Output High employee output increases efficiency r we want to get the most out of our employee resource'-
Our organisational structure is decentralised. A Orgat1isation Structure Decentralised organisational structure is more effective as size incr. ~we cherish flexibility of the organisation" 
Staning from scratch and given a clean sheet of paper we A Organisation Structure Are there any problems v.-ith the current structure? ,. satisfactory structure ,-
would create exactly the same structure as we have right 
now 
Good union relations F Organisation Unions Good union relations can reduce the likelyhood of clashes "We want to avoid labour disputes" 
Operations WithOut unionised staff (where possible ) F Organisation Unions Unionized workforce is costlier than non-unionised "we want full control over our workforce and its costs" 
Shared company VISion F Organisation Vision If the workforce knows where the company is heading and likes it, they will "we want to motivate our workforce" 




Classification of Airlines into Loss and Non-
loss Makers 
Table 1.1 Classification of Airlines into Loss and Non-loss Makers 
Airline 1989 1990 1991 1992 Status Notes 
: 101 na OR OR na No-loss : I·················· ............................................................................................................................................................................................. < 
: 104 Profit Profit Loss na Loss : 
[:)Q:~:::::::::: ::~~~~::::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::::::::::::::::::~~:::: ::::::::::::::::::::::~~~~:~::::::::l 
: 106 Profit Profit Profit ProfitlLoss No-loss i 
: 115 Profit Profit Profit Profit No-loss i 
Appendix-K Results of Factor Analysis 
Table K.l Factor Solution I, Oblimin Rotation, No Group Fusiona 
Fmancial 
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Factor 1 Motivation systems Planning systems Logistics systems :\iarket-intel1igent information Control systems Simplification of 
and communication infonnation and 
communication 
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Interlining agreements Acquisition of airport slots Hub and spoke operations :\iatching aircraft size with 
................................................................................................................................................................................................... ~~~~.~.~~9.~.~~~.~~ ......................................................................................................................... . 
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the airline on aviation of the ~L"onomy on the toward., th.: airlin.: 
airline 
a (jn .up fusion m.:ans that the group segregation used on the questionnaire fonn is broken up in order to group together all fa...'tors that could possibly interact with ~ach other. 
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Table K.2 Factor Solution II, Oblimin Rotation, Group Fusiona Allowed 
Operations and 
Marketin 
Factor 1 I Brand image Service quality Media advertising Quality oftenninal space and 
!'JTOund facilities 
··································1··················· ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1'<..: ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••.•..••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••...•••....•..•...........••......•...••...•....•...... 
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........................... ·······1·············································· ................................................................................................ ~~~~ ................................................ ~~.~~~.~ .......................................................................................................................... . 
Factor 6 (-) Code sharing (-) Yield management system (-) Reduction ofCRS bias (-) Frequent flyer programs (-) Business (-) Feeder airline 
····F~~·7··················r··Di;rtrib~ti~~·~~~~k···········································fu~i~g·~ii~;~~t~··························~~~g~~~~~~·~ih···············H~b·~d·~p~k~·~p~ii·.;~············~~~~7~~··················~~.~~~ ........................... . 
........................... ·· ... ·.1 ............................................................................................................................................. E~~~.~~9.~!!.~~~ .................................................................................... ?y.~.J!i.~~~ ..................................................................... . 
Factor 8 (-) Passenger load-factor (-) Weight load-factor (-) Market-share (-) Price leadership in served 
markets 
··································1··················· ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Factor 9 Merger/acquisition to gain market-share Diversification into other Alliance with the incumbents 
.................................................................................................................. !!!~~~ ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
... ~~?I:}2 ................... ~~.?.i.~.?~.~f.p~?.~.~~ ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ . 
FinanCIal 
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f.~~?~.~ ..................... ~~.~.~.I.~~~:~.l.t:~~!.r.~.~~S .. ?r~.~~~ ............... .!.'!:':!!~~~.lP.:?~ ................................... f.~~!.£?~ ........................................... :~£~.~~.~.~g.~~~~.~~~ ....................................... : ............................................................ . 
Factor 3 Reduction of labour costs Staff reduction 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
... ~~~~.~ ..................... ~~lt~.~.~!!~~~.~.~.~~~~::~~.p.~~~~~ ............. A?ql:'.~~~.~?~.?f.~f.~~~.~~~ .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. . 
.......... ¥.<!.~~8~!!?~~~ .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
~~?!-.?~.} ...................... ~~.I~.Y.~~~ .. ~.':l~?I.1.?'E.y..~?.~~.~~.~~~\~~ ............... !?~I.~.~~~j.?I?: ......................................... ... ~~!}}P.~.~.~.~~ ............................. ~~~~.~~~~r..y.!!':~?~ ................ ~.?I!}~.¥ .. ~~.I~.~~ ........................................................ . 
Factor 2 Logistics systems Forecasting adverse effects of the Motivation systems Control systems Simplification of Interdepartmental 
economy on the airline infonnation and eonununication 
communication 
.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. ~~~ ......................................................................... . 
.. (~).~1~~S~:.~~~~!~~.P.~&.".~ ....................... j:>..~!}}p.l.?y.~~!'::.!!!~~~y.~.P.~~w.~ ........ ~r.I~.?'.l .. ~~!~~i?~~ ............................................................................................................................................................................ . Factor 3 .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. 
Factor 4 
. .. ~~~~S~~~~:!':.~.~.~.~.??~ ......................... ~~ ... ?.Y.~.~.~~~~~.?.~ ............................... (~~~?~.:::!!!!!~.~) ......................................................................................................................................................................... . 
Factor 5 Decentralised ore:anisation structure Job rotation Manae:ement teams 
a Group fusion m':..ins that the group segregation used on the questionnaire fonn is broken up in order to group together all factors that could possibly interact with each other. 
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Appendix-L Failure Prediction Models 
L.l Questionnaire Part I - Model Q 1 
Predicted 








































VJald df Sig R 
2,2292 1 ,1354 -,0607 
1,3293 1 ,2489 ,oeoo 
6,2469 1 ,0124 ,2613 
4,7492 1 ,0293 ,2103 
5,0236 1 ,0250 -,2205 
2,4739 1 ,1158 -,0573 
2,4033 1 ,1211 -,0505 
,0229 1 ,8796 
Q6 The airliLe's success is largely depeLden: OL facto=s out of its control 
Ql) We fulfil our customers' needs well 
Q23 Lack of capital ~ill not limit our growth 
Q25 Everyo:le in O'.lr airline understands our long term aims and objectives 
Q4S Employees are re1o-arded for :aking actions that J:ene:it our cuetomers 
Q17 OUr marketing is aggreseive 































L N L N N NN N 
U N L N N NN N 
LL L L L L N L LL L LL L L L L NN N N L NNN NNNN 
LL L L L L N L LL L LL L L L L NN N N L NNN NNNN 
I I I 
I I 
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
LLLLLL::'LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL:'>JNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN:'>JNKNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNl'lNKNNNNNNNNNNN 
Predic~ed Probability is of Membership for No-loss 
Symbols: L - Loss 
N - No-loss 
Esch ~/ffibol Represe~t6 ,5 Cases. 
Correlation Matrix: 
Constant Q6 Q13 Q25 Q26 Q45 Q17 Q5 
Constant 1,00000 
Q6 -,62093 l,OOCOO 
Ci=- 3 -,80304 ,18442 1,00000 
Q23 -,13421 -,40338 ,43311 1,00000 
Q26 ,02787 -,35C75 ,10454 ,48472 1,00000 
Q43 ,00936 ,42628 -,31989 -,68008 -,60782 1,00000 
Q17 ,02366 ,33383 -,44345 -,69926 -,46700 ,45855 1,OCOOO 
C)5 -,35744 ,46771 ,00081 -,14867 -,15506 -,02770 ,14563 1,00000 
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L.2 Questionnaire Part II - Past - Model QIIPA 
Predicted 
Loss No-loss Percent Corn 
L N 
Observed 
~oss L 19 1 9:>,00% 
No-loss N 2 16 88,89% 
OVerc.ll 92,11% 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R Exp(B) 
Q75A -,7265 ,3252 4.,9906 1 ,0255 -,2385 ,4836 
Q70A -1,6669 ,9377 3.,1599 1 ,0755 -,1485 ,1888 
Q109A 1,4891 ,7622 3,8165 1 ,0507 ,1859 4,4331 
Q80A 1,2904 ,8457 2,3285 1 ,1270 ,0790 3,6343 
Constant -E,4536 5,3157 L 4739 1 ,2247 
Q75A Past - Hub and spoke operations 
Q70A Past - CompLter reserva~io~ system 
Q109A Past - Service quality 
Q80A Past - Homoqeneous aircraft fleet 
Constant Q75A Q70A Q109A Q 
Constant 1,COOOO ,52493 ,60987 -,86870 -,78: 
Q75A ,:2493 1,00000 ,33437 -,73455 -,34 
Q70h. ,E0987 ,33437 1,OOCOO -,75604 -,92 
Ql09A -,56870 -,73455 -,75E04 1,00000 ,75 
Q80A -,78261 -,34869 -,92C86 ,75539 1,00 
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LL L N 
LL L ~ L N L N L ~ L N NNNl'J NN 
L J 
I r 
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLM~~~NN~~~~~~~NNNNN 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for No-loss 
~ymbols: L - Loss 
N - No-loss 
Each S~~bol Represents 1 Case. 
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L.3 Questionnaire Part II - Present - Model QIIPR 
Predicted 







No-loss N 2 18 90,00% 
Overall 87,50% 
Variable B S.E. Wald dE Sig 
Q90B -1,0557 ,4194 6,3366 1 ,0118 
Q103B -,9030 ,3809 5,6197 1 ,0178 
Q114B ,8302 ,3654 5,1616 1 ,0231 
Q71B 1,2767 ,5919 4,6529 1 ,0310 
Constant -6,5933 3,7024 3,1713 1 ,0749 
Q90B Present - Job rotation 
Q103B Present - Alliance with the incu~Jents 
Q114B Present - Media advertising 






Cons~ant Q90B Q103B Q114B Q' 
Constant 1,00000 ,39982 ,39634 -,53C74 -,79 
Q90B ,39982 1,00000 ,74951 -,50292 -,74 
Q103B ,39634 ,74951 1,00000 -,59521 -,69 
Ql14B -,53074 -,50292 -,59521 1,00COO ,34 



























LL L L 











N N NN 
N N NN 
L~ L L L L L N L L N N N N L N N N NN 
L~ L L L L L N L L N N N N L N N N NN 
I __ .... 1 1 1-' _J . I .. 1 r ----. -,-- I I 1 
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 .. 9 1 
LLLLL~LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL~LLLLLLLLLLLLNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN:mJNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN 
Predicted Probability is of Merrbership for No-loss 
Symbols: L - Loss 
N - Ko-loss 
Each Symbol Represents ,5 Cases. 
324 





















Loss No-loss Percent Corn 
L N 
L 17 5 77,27% 
N 5 15 75,00% 
Overall 76,19% 
B S.E. wald df Sig R 
-,3712 ,2002 3,4377 1 ,0637 -,1573 
1,0411 ,4040 6,6411 1 ,0100 ,2826 
-,9561 ,3769 6,4332 1 ,0112 -,2762 
-,1459 2,9464 ,0026 1 ,9597 
Future - Hub a~d spoke operations 
Future - Job rotation 
Future - Allia~ce with the incumbents 
Future - Cost reduction 
Future - Favourable attitude of travel agents 
Future - Expansio~ into new markets 
Future - Market-i~telligent infor~ation- and communication system 
Constant Q90C Q122C Q6 
1,00OOe -,12180 -,51696 -,319 
-,1218C 1,00000 -,33533 ,21C 
-,51696 -,33533 1,00000 -,601 


























LL L LL N 









L LLL LL L N N LNLN N L L N L N L N N 





N L N::JNN 
N L N::JNN 
LLL L LL N L LLL LL L N N LNLN N L L N L N L N N N L N ::J N N 
LLL L LL N L LLL LL L N N LNLN N L L N L N L N N N L N ::J N N 
1 1 1 1 1 _I ___ ~___ 1 __ 1 I I ---T-------. 
o ,_ ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNM~NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for No-loss 
Syrrbols: L - Loss 
N - No-loss 
Each Symbol Represents ,25 Cases. 
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NNN N F F F 
NNNNN NN NN N N FFN F F F FFF 
NNNNN NN NN N N FFN F F F FFF 
I I L I I_L____ ----'-__ 
I 
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
NNN~IKN\jNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN~Nt\NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNt\NNNNNFFFFFFFFFF?FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted P:ocab~lity is of Membership for Failed 
Symbol 3: N - Non-failed 
F - FaLed 
Each Symbol Represents ,5 Cases. 
327 





































































:::I NN N NN FNN FFNF FF N NFF 





F N FF K :::IF N 
F N FF K :::IF N 
:::I NN N NN FNN FFNF FF N NFF F N FF K :::IF N F F 
:::I NN N NN FNN FFNF FF N NFF F N FF K :::IF N F F 
1 _I .J.~ ___ __-----.l I .--- -----
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for Failed 
Symbols: N - Non-failed 
F - Failed 
Each Symbol Represents ,25 Cases. 
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77 , 78% 
44,44% 







































N N K FF N?N NNNNFN FN F N K F F 
N N K FF N?N NNNNFN FN F N K F F 
L I L__ I 
.-------- ,---- -- ,. - .--- I 
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
rr'ltlNNK~TNNNNNNNNNNtTNNNNNNNNNNNNN)lNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNtTNNFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
pu,jict.ed Probabi~ity is of 14embership for Failed 
Symbols: N - Ncn-failed 
F - Failed 
E':lCh Symbol Re~resents ,5 Cases. 
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Non-failed Failed Percent Carr 
N F 
17 1 94,44% 
1 17 94,44% 
Overall 94,44% 
oS.E. Wald df Sig R Ex] 
8,7851 2,4953 1 ,1142 -,0996 
4,3634 3,9915 1 ,0457 -,1998 
10,5016 4,1734 1 ,0411 ,2087 2,08: 
12,5819 3,1451 1 ,0762 -,1515 
9,5306 ::",2353 1 ,2664 
REVEX ADV_FIXE TOTAL_DE LONG_' 
-,9543~ -,04028 -,16346 ,03: 
1,00:)00 ,06752 ,05039 -,01 
,06752 1,00000 -,88179 ,88· 
,05839 -,88179 1,00080 -,93 
-,01:)28 ,88453 -,93840 1,00 
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NNNNNN NNN N F N FF F F NF F F? 
J _ I L 1_ _ __ ----.L ____ .l...-____ ..L...-__ 
I ---l~~- I 
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 
NNNNNNNNNNKNN:::INNNNNNNNNNKNIDINNNNNNNNNNKNN::JNNNNNNNNFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted Pro::::>ability is of Membership for Failed 
Symbols: N - :::Ion-failed 
F - Fa:"led 
Each Symbol Represents 1 Case. 
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Non-failed Failed Percent Corr 
N F 
13 5 72,22% 
6 12 66,67% 
---
Overall 69,44% 
a.E. Wald df Sig R Ex] 
6,3718 ,2292 1 ,6321 ,0000 
,5136 ,0212 1 ,8843 ,0000 
3,3692 2,0766 1 ,1496 ,0392 128" 
3,2467 =-,4250 1 ,2326 ,0000 
7,7718 ,0290 1 ,8648 
REVEX ADV_FlXE TOTAL_DE LONG_' 
-,98743 ,29020 -,61432 ,34' 
1,00800 -,27902 ,53128 -,32 
-,27902 1,00000 -,53426 ,51 
,53128 -,53426 1,00080 -,83 
-,32329 ,51478 -,83617 1,00 
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NFFN N N N 









F NFNFN F N F N F F FFFF 
F NFNFN F N F N F F FFFF 
NN N NNN F NFFN N 1\1 N F NFNFN F N F N F F FFFF 
NN N NNN F NFFN N N N F NFNFN F N F N F F FFFF 
_L I I _~ ____ 1 __ ---..JI'----___ --...a ____ ---L ___ _ 1 1----' -.. r--- -1 
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN:.JNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN1:;rNNNNNNNNNNNN:.JF?FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF?FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for Failed 
Symbols: N - Non-failed 
F - Failed 
Each Symbol Represents ,25 Cases. 
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Non-failed Failed Percent Carr 
N F 
13 5 72,22% 
7 11 61,11% 
Overall 66,67% 
S.E. Wald df Sig R EX] 
4,5218 ,3007 1 ,5835 ,0000 12,' 
l,J522 4,0071 1 ,0453 -,2005 
5,2592 4,9023 1 ,0268 ,2412 1140· 
5,9560 3,9379 1 ,0472 -,1971 
5,3161 ,7184 1 ,3967 
REVEX ADV_FlXE TOTAL_DE LONG_' 
-,97588 ,32490 -,467J9 ,30 
l,OOJOO -,30409 ,38438 -,27 
-,30409 1,00000 -,89134 ,91 
,38438 -,89184 1,000JO -,94 
-,27519 ,91851 -,94330 1,00 
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N F N F 
N F N F 
N F N F 
N F N F 

























N NN N N N N F N N N FF F FN F ~ IN F F F F F 
N NN N N N N F N N N FF NN F FN F NN F F F F F 
N NN N N N N F N N N FF NN F FN F NN F F F F F 
I 1 1 1 1 1 I 1- ---1-~--~r ---.- ---.-
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for Failed 
Symbols: N - Non-fai~ec. 
F - Failed 
Each Sy~bol Represents ,25 Cases. 
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df Sig R 
1 ,0218 -,2557 

























NNK F N N N F FF F F 












o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
~~~~~~~~FFF?FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF?FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for Failed 
Sy~ols: ~ - Non-failed 
F - Failed 
Ec.ch Symbol Represents 1 Case. 
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L.12 Mixedl - Year2 
Predicted 











CPERATIN -3,2E-06 5,258E-06 
MAINTENA -31,5307 47,52'=5 
Constant ,7216 ,9019 
Constant OPERATIN 
Constant 1,00000 -,80532 
CPERATIN -,80632 1,00:)00 




14 77 , 78% 
Overall 61, 11% 
Wald df Sig R 
,3658 1 ,5453 ,0000 
,4402 1 ,5070 ,0000 














E FN F 
N FN F 
C F FN FF 
Y F FN FF 
N F FFNFFF 
N F FFNFFF 
N F FNNN NNN FNNNNNF NN 
N F FNNN NNN FNNNNNF NN 
Predict L ___ L L I J J r-------~.--------.---------.--------,---------.--------.r-------~--------~ 
ob: 
oup: 
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,:) ,6 ,7 ,S ,9 1 
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNKNNNNNNNNNNN~NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF?FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for Failed 
Symbols: N - Non-failed 
F - Failed 
Each Symbol Represents ,5 Cases. 
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L. ] 3 Mixed] - Year 3 
Predicted 














CPERATIN -l,8E-06 4,945E-06 
Constant ,4535 ,3608 
Constant HAINTENA 
Constant 1,00000 -,47576 
MAINTE1\1A -,47576 1,00800 




Overall 61, 11% 
Wald df Sig R 
,2613 1 ,6092 ,0000 
,1275 1 ,7211 ,0000 















































NFFN N N FNNNNN N 
NFFN N N FNl'-lNNN N 
LJ I I L 1 r- T ~--- T ---- .----- ~r -- ~ -I --- -- - 1-- -
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
~~~~~~~~~~~NN~~~~FFF?FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF?FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted Probab~lity is of Membership for Failed 
Symbols: ~ - Non-failed 
F - FaLed 
Each Symbol 'Represents ,5 Cases. 
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L.14 Mixed2 - Year 1 
Predicted 











CPERATIN -2053,89 1597,J689 
ASK_$101 5,40E-05 4,J69E-05 
'lOT._REV -,0406 , J286 
Constant -4,1067 5,J671 
Constant OPERATIN 
Constant 1,00000 ,84257 
CPERATIN ,84257 l,OOJOO 
ASK_$101 -,91303 -,95745 




Overall 94 .. 44% 
Wald df Sig R 
'-,6539 1 ,1984 ,0000 
'-,5254 1 ,2168 ,0000 
2,0153 1 ,1557 -,0175 
,6568 1 ,4177 










































N N N N F F FN F F 
_ L_ I _1 _ L _ _ __ J 
~- I I 
o ,_ /2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
NNNNNNm~NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNm~NNNNNNNNm~NNNNNNNNN1{NNFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for Failed 
Sy~bols: N - Non-failed 
F - Failed 
Each Symbol Represents 1 Case. 
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L.15 Mixed2 - Year2 
Predicted 
Non-failed Failed Percent Corr 
N 
Cbserved 
Non-failed N 9 
Failed F 7 
CPERATIN -7,5E-067,883E-06 
ASK_$101 4,74E-05 5,044E-05 
'IOTAL_RE ,0056 ,8076 
Constant -,3986 1,2155 
Constant OPERATIN 
Constant 1,00000 -,21312 
CPERATIN -,21812 l,OOJOO 
ASK_$101 -,75971 -,26707 





,9114 1 ,3397 ,0000 
,8812 1 ,3479 ,0000 
,5455 1 ,4602 ,0000 



































NN FN F NFN N 
NN FN F NFN N 









F F N N 
F F N N 
F F N N 
F F N N 
N N NNFN 
N N NNFN 















NN FN F NFN N N N NNFN FFFFN N N F 
L __ ~ __ ~L _____ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ t I I 1 _ _ _ _ 1 
,- - - -I--~---T I I 
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 
NNNNNNNNNNl\"NN)lNNNNNNNNNNKNN)lNNNNNNNNNNl\~NNNNNNNNFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted F'ro:::>ability is of Membership for Failed 
Symbols: N - )Ion-failed 
F - Fa:"led 
Each symbol Represents ,25 Cases. 
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L.16Mixed2 - Year3 
Predicted 











CPERATIN -4,lE-06 5,762E-06 
ASK_$101 6,55E-05 4,803E-05 
'IOTAL_RE ,0062 ,J056 
Constant -1,2543 1, 26~5 
Constant OPERATIN 
Constant 1,00000 -,372H 
CPERATIN -,37214 1,00JOO 
ASK_$101 -,77314 -,07585 





Wald df Sig R 
,5023 1 ,4785 ,0000 
=-,8618 1 ,1724 ,0000 
::",2202 1 ,2693 ,0000 












Observed Grouys and Predicted Probabilities 
4 
F 














N F FNNN FNF 














N N?NF N F F F F F 
N N?NF N F F F F F 
N F FNNN FNF FFNN NFF N N?NF N F F F F F 
N F FNNN FNF FFNN NFF N N?NF N F F F F F 
Predicted 
Prob: 0 
L ____ L I I I I 
-. ----.-- I I -----. 
,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
Group: NNNNNNNNNNNKNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNKNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF?FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF?FFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for Failed 
Syrrbols: N - Non-failed 
F - Failed 
Each Symbol Represents ,25 Cases. 
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Constant AVERAGE 1 
'::r;-lstant 1,00000 -,34847 
AVERAGE 1 -,34847 1,00000 
AI ~(=FAFr -,91640 ,40292 
DI3TANCE -, :30862 ,02598 
ABCRAF1 ,62771 -,06819 
A'/EPp.SEJ ,65627 -,63464 
:"CAD_FA" -,65880 ,18543 
Q_NON_S2 -,45115 /66205 
CHANGE_2 -,52619 ,65456 
?redicted 
Non-faile~ Failed Percent Carr 
N F 
I 
E· 3 I 83,33% 
3 15 83,33% 
, 
Overal=- 83,33% 
S.E. Wald df Sig R Ex] 
,0202 3,3574 1 ,0495 -,1929 
,1424 6,3216 1 ,0119 -,2943 , I 
,0142 2,5319 1 ,1047 -,1125 
,1137 4,25:,9 1 ,0391 ,2126 1, : 
,0008 5,9890 1 ,0144 ,2827 1, I 
10,.1093 3,9515 1 ,0468 -,1977 
6,8189 3,5309 1 ,0567 -,1808 
4,9910 3,3679 1 ,0665 -,1656 
12,6308 6, Jl66 1 ,0142 
AIRCRAFT DISTANCE AIRCRAFl AVERAGE 3 LOA:J_FAC @_NON_SC C 
-,91540 -,80862 ,62771 ,65627 -,55880 -,45115 
,40292 ,02598 -,06819 -,63464 ,18543 ,66205 
1,00800 ,81823 -,80392 -,72486 ,':;1021 ,59679 
,81323 1,00000 -,72887 -,49547 ,20896 ,24233 
-,80392 -,72887 1,00008 ,6010 -,40630 -,43960 
-,72486 -,49547 ,64718 1,00000 -,48403 -,80833 
,51821 ,20896 -,40638 -,48403 1,80000 , 31159 
,59579 ,24233 -,43968 -,80833 ,31159 1,00000 






























F F F F 
N N N N N N N N N N F N F F F F NF N F F FF FFFF 
NN N N N N N N N N N F N F F F F NF N F F FF FFFF 
NN N N N N N N N N N F N F F F F NF N F F FF FFFF 
NN N N N N N N N N N F N F F F F NF N F F FF FFFF 
II I I I 1-- -- - --T----- I I I -~---.- ~---- --- T- ----- ---. 
o ,I ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 1 
NNm~NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNm~NNNNNNFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for Failed 
Symbo~s: N - Non-failed 
F - Failed 
Each Symbol ~epresents ,25 Cases. 
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L.19 Non-financial- Year2 
Predicted 
Non-failed Failed Percent Carr 
N F 
Observed 
Non-failed N 14 4 
Failed F 5 13 
Variable B S.E. Wald df 
AVERAGE 1 ,0043 ,0156 ,0767 1 
AIRCRAFT -,145E ,0599 5,9101 1 
DISTANCE -,008E ,0088 ,9597 1 
AIRCRAF1 ,1419 ,0771 3,3888 1 
AVERAGE3 ,0003 ,0007 ,1811 1 
LOAD_FAC -8,1492 7,3545 1,2278 1 
@_NON_SC -1,4555 4,8353 ,0906 1 
CHANGE_2 4,5861 3,7139 1,5248 1 
Constant 9,8932 6,8351 2,0950 1 
Constant AVERAGE 1 AIRCRAFT DISTANCE 
CO::1stant 1,00000 -,06544 -,69171 -,77318 
AVERAGE1 -,06544 1,00000 -,oo:no -,17270 
AI~CF.AFT -,69171 -,00370 1,00000 ,63776 
DI3TJI.NCE -,77318 -,17270 ,63776 1,00000 
AI~CHAF1 ,16637 ,14977 -,70610 -,21567 
AVERAGE 3 ,27391 -,62980 -,19489 -,07389 
LOAD_FA: -,45970 -,03705 ,32111 -,06496 
@_NON_S: ,12942 ,06564 -,12345 -,05850 




Sig R Ex] 
,7818 ,0000 1, , 
,0151 -,2799 , . 
,3273 ,0000 
,0656 ,1668 1, 
,6704 ,0000 1, , 
,2678 ,0000 
,7634 ,0000 , . 
,2169 ,0000 98, 
,1478 
AIRCRAF1 ,lI.VERAGE3 LOAD_FAC 
,16637 ,27391 -,45970 
,14977 -,62980 -,03705 
-,70610 -,19489 ,32111 
-,21567 -,07389 -,06496 
1,00000 ,17418 -,38684 
,17418 l,OOJO(' -,30020 
-,38684 -,30820 1,00000 
,17079 -,4490:. -,18814 





























N N N NN N 





F N F KNN N? NN F 






N FN F FFF F F F 
FN?F N N FN F FFF F F F 
N N N NN N F N F KNN N? NN F FN?F N N FN F FFF F F F 
N N N NN N F N F KNN N? NN F FN?F N N FN F FFF F F F 
Predicted I I I I I I I I 
Prob: 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ( 6 , 7 ( 8 , 9 1 
Group: NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNKNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNKNNNNNNNFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF?FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF?FFF 
Predicted Probability is of Membership for Failed 
Symbols: N - Non-failec. 
F - Failed 


























Constant AVERAGE 1 
Constant 1,00000 -,20977 
AVERAGE 1 -,20977 1,0000C 
AIRCRAFT -,73225 ,21133 
DISTANCE -,64177 ,0049C 
AIRCRAF1 ,10256 ,04463 
AVERAGE3 ,39574 -,624ge 
LOAD_FAC -,60126 -,0021S 
@_NON_SC ,32161 -,21669 





























Wald df Sig R Ex] 
1,1258 1 ,2887 ,0000 , . 
3,9203 1 ,0477 -,1962 
,0006 1 ,9798 ,0000 1, I 
3,8680 1 ,0492 ,1935 1, 
1,8221 1 ,1771 ,0000 1, I 
2,1755 1 ,1402 -,0593 
,0823 1 ,7742 ,0000 3, : 
1,0089 1 ,3152 ,0000 15, : 
1,1700 1 ,2794 
DISTANCE AIRCRAF1 AVERAGE 3 LOAD_FAC 
-,64177 ,10256 ,39574 -,60126 
,00490 ,04463 -,62498 -,00215 
,48587 -,59458 -,33096 ,47465 
1,00000 ,17301 -,17939 -,15042 
,17301 1,00000 ,16539 -,51581 
-,17939 ,16539 1,00000 -,27933 
-,15042 -,51581 -,27933 1,00000 
-,07845 ,10237 -,11264 -,32168 




























N F F F 
N F F F 
N F F F 
N F F F 
N NN N F N FN N N N N F NN N NF 
N NN N F N FN N N N N F NN N NF 
FNN F F F N F 
FNN F F F N F 
F F F 





N NN N F N FN N N N N F NN N NF FNN F F F N F F F F F F 
N NN N F N FN N N N N F NN N NF FNN F F F N F F F F F F 
I I I I I I I . --1--- I --- ---.- -----I 
o ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 
NNNNNNNNNNKNN::-JNNNNNNNNNNKNN::-JNNNNNNNNNNKNN::-JNNNNNNNNFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
Predicted Pro::Jability is of Membership for Failed 
Symbols: N - ::-Jon-failed 
F - Fa:"led 
Each Symbol Represents ,25 Cases. 
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Appendix-M Organisational Life-cycle Theories 
Table M-I Overview of Organisational Life-cycle Theories 
Summary Model 
1. Entrepreneurial 1. struggle for autonomy stage 
Stage - Legitimise the fimction to the external 
- Marshalling of resources environment 
- Multiple and diverse ideas - Obtain autonomy from parent or 
- Entrepreneurial activities competing bureau 
- Litt1e planning and co-ordination - Stabilise resources 
Kimberly: Internal social control. structure 
and environmental relations(J 979) 
First Stage 
- Marshalling of resources 
- Creation of an ideology 
Adizes: Major organisational activities(1979) Scott: Strategy and structure(1971) 
Courtship Stage Stage 1 
- Founders are dreaming up 'what we might do' - One man rule 
- Entrepreneuria1 activities - Paternalistic reward system 
- Subjective evaluation criteria 
- No fornlal structure 
• - Formation of a 'niche' - Achieve survival threshold : : : . 
L __ :_'.~.~.~~,:,~' .. ~J?!>.!!,!! ............................................................ _ ........... l .......................................................... _ ......................... L ................................................ _ ................................................ t .................................................................... .1 I 2. CollectJve Stage 2. Rapid growth stage I Second stage I Infant Organisation Stage Stage 2 l 
I -Informal communication and -Innovators and climbers have control I -Obtaining support for the extema1 envirorunent : - Emphasis on production - Functional specialisation l 
: structure - Emphasis on innovation and expansion : - Choice of a 'prime mover' i-Tune pressures keenly felt - Institutionalised procedures : 
I -Sense of collectivity - Occurrence of an 'age lump' in i-staffing of the organisation i-No tradition - S}'l>"1ernatic reward system l 
I -Long hours spent membership I -Frequent, discrete decisions are made I -Few meetings - Impersonal evaluation I 
: - Sense of mission : : - Little planning - Fonnalised structure : 
i-Innovation continues i i l 
i .. :.~.~~~! ...................... < ............ _ .................................. _ ........... i .................................... -............................................... : .................................................................................................. ~ ..................................................................... 1 
: 3. Formalization & 3. Deceleration Stage : Third stage Go-go Organisation Stage Stage 3 : 
Control Stage -Increased size and complexity causes co- I -Formation of identity - Rapid expansion - Diversified product markets l 
- Formalization or rules ordination problems 1 Sense of collectivity offamily - Personalised leadership - Search for new products and growth l 
. Stable structure - Innovation is de-emphasised : - High member commitment and involvement in the - Some planning opportunities: 
- Emphasis on efficiency and - Smoothness and predictability are 1 organisation - Fast, frequent, intuitive decision making - Semi-autonomous divisionalized structure 1 
maintenance emphasised l -Pursuit of oIpItisationai mission 1 
- Conservatism - 'Conservers' have control : - Postponing individual need fulfilment temporarily : 
- Institutionalised procedures • - F onna1ised and elaborate role systems 1 i 
................................................ t .. :.~~~~~.~~~~tY. .............................. : .............................................................. ····· .... ······· .. ····1····· .. ······ .. ····· .. · .. ········ .. · ............................................................... ) .................................................................... .1 
4. Elaboration f: Fourth Stage : Adolescent Organisation Stage : 
structure stage 1 - Formalised structure l - Planning and co-ordination are important i 
- Elaboration of structure 1 - Policies and rules set up l -Administrative activities incre&lie at the expense of entrepreneurial 1 
• Decentralisation: • Internal organisational competition : activities and production : 
- Domain expansion 1 -Stabilised external relations i-Stability and conservatism l 
. Adaptal10n 1 -Conservative trend l -Fonnalised rules and policies l 
.:.~ .................................. !. ............................................................. :.~.~~~.~y~~~!.!l~~<?!!~ ................................. L ................................................................................................. 1 
: : : Prime Organisation Stage : 
~ 1 l -Emphasis on efficiency l 
: 1 1 - Increasing loss oftouch with the envirorunent 1 
~ l -Thick orpanisation bOWldaries 1 
: : : - Aspirations remain stable, no desire to grow or change : 
\.... . ....................................... ; ........................................................... j .................................................................................... ! ..~~~tys:ie.1'!~~ .. ~!:·~~1!·~~ ............................................ ·· .. ·1 
: j l -Paternalistic, c.omfortable organisational climate 1 
. ! -Low emphasis on production i 
l - Forma1ised relationships 1 
i-Little innovation : 
Suun:e As in: Cameron.. Kim S., Whetten, David A, Models of the Organisational Life Cycle: Applications to Higher Education, Review of Higher Education.. Vol. 6, 1983, pp. 53-54. 
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College of Aeronautics 
Department of Air Transport 
Cranfield, Bedfordshlre MK43 OAL 
England 
NEW-ENTRANT AIRLINES' 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
FACTORS 
o Cranfield 
This questionnaire is a part of a larger study to identify the success and failure factors of new-entrant 
airlines. Please note that the definition of a new-entrant airline for the purpose of this project is: -a 
domestic or international airline established after deregulatiorVliberalisation of a domestic market or 
bilateral route; or a regional carrier that expanded its scope of operations considerable after the 
regulatory change. • 
Some of the questions may be In an area which is out of your direct responsibility, please do not omit 
these questions unless you have no Idea at all about their subject. 
Please be assured that all Information will be treated In confidence and the resuHs will be presented 
in the aggregated form. 
1. Please indicate <..J> if you agree or disagree with the statements In relation to yoyr 
airline today. 
Neither 
Agr .. Agr .. 8gr .. nor Dlugr .. Dlugree 











Our financial control system is efficient. I I I I I 
The airline has a vision of the future shared by all 
the employees. , I I I I 
We surround ourselves with staff who promotes 
different orientations and points of view. I I I I I 
Group consensus is the usual way we make 
decisions. I I I I I 
The airline's success is largely dependent on 
factors out of hs control. I I I I I 
The number of serious problems we are faced I I I I I with increases constantly. 
Our staff is encouraged to have open discussion 
about the airline's problems. I I I I I 
We do detailed analysis before taking any major 
decision. I I I I I 
We make changes In our service quite frequently. I I I I J 
We usually have enough resources to plan for the I 
future. I I I f 
Our customer loyaHy is strong. I I I I 
OCranfield 
Neither 
Agree Agree agree nor DIsagree Disagree 
slr~!l sllShlll d'!!Sree sllghlll Slrong'l 
We fulfil our customers' needs well. I I I I I I 
We act immediately upon customer complaints. I I I I I I 
Our marketing performance is good. I I I I I I 
Our long term aims and objectives are easily I I I I I I achievable. 
Our marketing Is aggressive. I I I I I I 
We usually receive many useful suggestions from I I I I I I our employees. 
We are more efficient than most of our I I I I I I competitors. 
We try to avoid head to head competition with our I 
larger competitors. I I I I I 
Our long term alms and objectives guide our I I I I I I business decisions. 
Our airline is flexible enough to respond I I I I I I immediately to major opportunities. 
We are pleased with the performance of our I I I I I I distribution outlets. 
We are innovators In customer service compared I I I I I I to our competitors. 
Lack of capital will not limit our growth. I I I I I I 
Everyone in our airline understands our long term I I I I I I aims and objectives. 
We are constantly Identifying threats and I I I I I I opportunities to our business. 
The Improvement of the airline's market-share is 
I I I I I I our number one priority. 





Ag .... Agr .. egr .. nor Dlsagr .. Disagree 





I We emphasise planning for the future. I I I 
I I I We grow by selling our services to more I I I customers. 
We allocate major resources for diversification 
into other industries. ( I I I I f 
We plan for and allocate sufficient resources to 
developing new markets. I I I I I I 
Long-term prospects in our primary markets are 
excellent. I I I I I I 
We have customer-oriented front-line people. I I I I I , 
Our service has a range of features that makes it 
distinctive. I I I I I I 
Quality is our major compet~ive advantage. I I I I I I 
Everyone in our airline understands how they can 
improve quality. I I I I I I 
We are effective in monitoring our customers' I I I I I I expectation of quality. 
Our internal social and political system Sl4lJ)Ort 
our business aims. I I I I I I 
We are good at changing our staff's beliefs and 
values. I I I I I I 
Our staff provide us with a competitive 
advantage. I I I I I J 
We have Incentives for our staff that encourages 
extra commitment. I I I I I I 
We have all the information we need on our I I I I I J customers, markets and opportunities. 
Employees are rewarded for taking-actions that 
benefit our customers. I I I I I I 
Our Information system provides us with a clear 
competitive advantage. I I ] 
4 
o Cranfield 
We are constantly upgrading and improving our 
Information system. 
We would create the same organisation structure 
as we have now, if given the opportunity. 
We make effective cash-flow forecasts. 
We are good at stimulating demand for our 
services. 
We are effective in monitoring important cost 
areas. 
Important information is communicated to 
employees to enable effective decision-making. 
The board of directors is highly involved in the 
airline's affairs. 
The atmosphere among employees is very good. 
Our information systems provide quick, accurate 















2. Indicate the Importance placed on the following factors at your airline in the past, at the present 
and as expected in the future. Use up to 10 points for each factor, per cell. The most important factors 
receive ten (10), factors of least importance may receive one (1) and factors of no importance a zero (0). 
Example 
.:-' " ' ..... ~ " ," ", .. : 'Put ,', Pl't8iNlt futul1I 
' ' s.". ficliH!I " (PJlorfl) ('92;'93, (1995 and 
1992) '94) onWard) 
Em>!oyees· motivation 8 10 10 
Willtnaness 10 acceolllexble lob tasks 0 .. 8 
Please remember that you are rating the Importance placed 
on each factor at ~ airline! ' 






" , " ' Past Present Future " 
En,lro",unt t'(I~o" (Prior to f92. ('95 and 
1992} '93 '94} onward) 
Favourable attitude of travel aaents 
Reduction of CRS bias affectina the airline 
Comoetitor analysis 
Influencina aovernment DOlley on aviation 
Forecasting adverse effects of the economy on the airline 
Investors' attitudes towards the airline (Investment bankers, stockholders, etc.) 
5 
o Cranfield 
Please remember that you are rallng the Importance placed 
on each factor at XQI4 alrHne! 
. Past 
Information· and oommunleaUon e,etam '.otora (Prior to 
11m} 
Control systems (monitoring the work of the or~atlon) 
looistics systems (linking of clfferenlJll!!! of the organisation) 
Motivation systems (targets and objectives for staff Involvement and motivation) 
Planning systems (lntegallon of Informallon 10 ~~e business action plans) 
Yield management ~ystem 
Interdepartmental communication 
Market-intelligent information- and communication syStem 
Simplification of Information- and communication sYstems 
Computer reservation system 
Operation taotor. 
Aircraft utilisation 
ACQuisition of new aircraft 
Acquisition of airport slots 
FreQuency in served markets 
Hub and spoke operations 
long haul routes 
Quality of terminal space and ground facilities 
Matching of aircraft size with route requirement 
Interlining agreements 
Homogeneous aircraft fleet 
Operation on trunk routes 
Code sharino 
Freight operations 
Feeder airline agreements 
.... nlg.m.nl and or,*nl"lIon factore 
Delegation 
Company culture (shared attitudes, beliefs, norms) 
Union relations 
Employee relations 
Flexible iob descriptions 
Job rotation 
Decentralised oraanisation structure 
Shared company vision (the future 'we' want) 
Management tearns (lnter..,.- u,_,tall8ams~ 
Operations w"hout un ionised staff~whefe possible) 
ManaQement's external contacts (Government, etc.) 
Staff reduction 
Employees' autonomy to take decisions 
Company mission (Long-term alms and ObJective., 
Employees' Incentive program 
Business strategy 
Employees' productivity 




'93 '94) onward) 
OCranfield 
Please remember that you are rating the importance placed 
on each factor at ~ airline! 
Put 
"'.rketlng f.ctor. (Prior to 
1992) 
Alliance with the incumbents 
Merger/aCQuisition to gain market share 
Diversification into other industries 




Passenger load factors 
Price leadership In served markets 
Expansion into new markets 
Market research 
Media advertising 
Weight load factor 





-- - ... - . - . .. - .. 





Long-term rather than short-term profits 
Achieving critical mass (investment 08CesSatY before profits will be made) 
Turnover growth 
Reduction of labour costs 
Off balance-sheet financing of aircraft 
Fuel costs (fuel efficient aircraft, etc.) 
................. ... .... ," ',_. :.,',. ",,' '-"'.' 
plea .. write down any ractor. w"leb you , •• , .t~ omn,.d 
."0'. ~nd ... te 'he ..... app,oprla'e In th •• P.tB.PtoY1~.d. 
Present Future 
('92, ('95 and 
'93 '94) DIlward) 




Does the company have a formal mission statement? 0 Yes 0 No 
Do managers generally own shares in the airline? 0 Yes 0 No 
If you own shares, please (...J) according 
to your approximate share-holding? 8<1% 8 1 '2% 83 • 4% 85 •10 % 8 11 '15% 16·20% 21·30% 31-40% 41.50% > 50% 
7 
f~ Cranfield 
6. How many years of formal education have you completed? 
(For example. higl schoof g~ equals 12 years) D years of formal education. 
7. If your formal education Is more than 12 years, what Is your field of specialisation? 
(For example: BA degH WI SocIal ~s; MBA dig .. wl1h concentration Wlllnanct.) 
8. What is your age? ..... 1___ I years. 
9. What management positions have you held? 
~ (-I) In Ihe approprl.te column below. If the airline (Jew 
from one Ilzt classlncaUon to another while you held the same 
position. !hen pleast mark In the column lhatlrdcates the alrline's 
IlltJt!lt belort you made your career move. 
tfUmber am.n t.gt NdoNII .... or 
. ::.b~~~~~:~: Placi pre'tnt po.llIon flut and O'r--I ,~ ,tglon .. ('100m·' C·$lbn 
Indlclte If dlUettnt po.lllone .r. InIM (c '10 m (SI0· too m bnop. rtv., operat~ Induabj: 
within th ••• m. company. ~tIon op.r.v.) cp. rl\'., rev.) ::'.: >:":::. ":" 
If you have any comments on this surveyor on new·entrant airlines' success or failure, please feel free to 
use the spaces below or separate paper. 
g ,~ue[ fiR~~ to/ tf.Clllt901~"104114ille~/l(!f:J'fo", tf.~ 








College of Aeronautics 
Department of Air Transport 
Cranfield, Bedfordshlre MK43 OAL 
England 
NEW-ENTRANT AIRLINES' 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
FACTORS 
o Cranfield 
This questionnaire is a part of a larger study to Identify the success and failure factors of new-entrant 
airlines. Please note that the definition of a new-entrant airline for the purpose of this project is: -a 
domestic or international airline established after deregulationllibaralisatlon of a domestic market or 
bilateral route; or a regional carrier that expanded its scope of operations considerable after the 
regulatory change.· Such carriers Include: People Express, America West, Southwest and Virgin 
Atlantic, etc. 
Please be assured that all Information will be treated In confidence and the results will be presented 
in the aggregated form. 
1. Indicate the Importance of each of the following factors for new-entrant airlines In the past, at 
the present and as expected In the future. Use UP to 10 points for each factor, per cell. The ID2§1 
important factors receive ten (10), factors of least Importance may receive one (1) and factors of n2 
importance a zero (0). 
Example 
PaC ,.....". f"''''' 
autt 'aclon (PrIot 10 fll2, '83. (1Q9fj and 
'11Mn) '1M) .onw.rd) 
Errc>IOYees· moIMIIlon 8 10 10 
s 10 IICC8P 1lextJ6e ~ tuQ 0 4 8 
P •• , p, ... nt Future:' 
Env,ronm.nt raclon (Prior to ~~) (~5.nd ' 1992) . onwarc:ft. ' 
Favourable attitude of travel aoents 
Reduction of CRS bias affectino the airline 
Competitor analysis 
Influencino government policy on aviation 
Forecastino adverse effects of the economy on the airline 
Investors' attitudes towards the airline (Inv.stment bank.,1 ltockholderl. elo.) 
.:',.,' 
Inform.lton. and comlrlunloaUon .,.,.", faolor. ';': ': ,,: 
Control systems (monitoring the work of the or~lation) 
Logistics systems (Hoking of dtferent parts of the organllallon) 
Motivation systems (targats and obIe<:tives for stan involVement and mollvation) 
Planning systems (int8aation of Information 10 pr8p8le blnine .. ICIion pIaN) 
Yield manaQement svstem 
Interdepartmental communication 
Market-intelligent Information- and communication system 
Simplification of Information- and communication systems 
Computer reservation system 
2 
o Cranfield 
Pnl Present Future 
Opera lion facto,. (Prior to ('92, ('95 and 
1992) '93 '94) onward) 
Aircraft utilisation 
A~uisition of new aircraft 
Acquisition of airport slots 
F~uency In served markets 
Hub and spoke operations 
long haul routes 
Quality of terminal space and ground facilities 
Matching of aircraft size with route requirement 
Interlining agreements 
Homogeneous aircraft fleet 
Operation on trunk routes 
Code sharing 
Freight operations 
Feeder airline agreements 
. ... - . . ' . .... 
. ,. 
Manaa.ment end ouanl .. Uon 'acto,. 
Delegation 
Company culture (shared attitudes, beliefs, norms) 
Union relations 
Employee relations 
Flexible lob descriptions 
Job rotation 
Decentralised organisation structure 
Shared company vision (the future 'we' want) 
Management teams (inter .......... UII ... taJ tsams) 
Operations without union/sed staff (where possible) 
Management's external contacts (Government, etc.) 
Staff reduction 
Employees' autonomy to take decisions 
Company mission (Long-term alms and objectives) 
Employees' Incentive program 
Business strategy 
Employees' productivity 
Managers' Incentive program 
" i-
Marketing 'ector. 
Alliance with the Incumbents 
Merger/acquisition to gain market share 
Diversification Into other industries 




Passenger load factors 
Price leadership in served markets 
Marketing fllCtoT8 continue on next pIIIIIA-
3 
CCranfield 
Past Pr ... nt Future 
Marketing ,actots (Prior 10 
'" 
(,92. ('95 and 
19921 '93 '94.1 onwat~ 
Expansion into new markets 
Market research 
Media advertisina 
WeiQht load factor 










long-term rather than short-term profits 
Achievina critical mass (investment beloreJlr~ts wi be made) 
Turnover growth 
Reduction of labour costs 
Off balance-sheet financing of aircraH 
Fuel costs (Iue! efficient _craft, ele.) 
Pi .... wrll. down any 'ulor. which lOU hel .re omUled 
and tate thelll .. appropriate In the spac .. proylded. 
2. What is your age? .... 1 ___ I years. 
3. If you have any comments on this surveyor on new-entrant airlines' success or failure, please 
feel free to use the spaces below or separate paper: 
.':1 ,,'oueL fif., 10· IfUlII! :J0'" mo41,6 (IICU." f,,-t; lfa~ 
f(me :Jou. f.a~e.,·"relli. comrfctill:J' lfai4 . .,,,w.:!, 




College of Aeronautics 
Department of Air Transport 
Cranfield, Bedfordshlre MK43 OAL 
England 
NEW-ENTRANT AIRLINES' 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
FACTORS 
o Cranfield 
This questionnaire is a part of a larger study to identify the success and failure factors of new-entrant 
airlines. Please note that the definftion of a new-entrant airline for the purpose of this project is: -a 
domestic or international airline established after deregulatlorVIiberalisation of a domestic market or 
bilateral route; or a regional carrier that expanded Its scope of operations considerable after the 
regulatory change. -
Some of the questions may be in an area which was out of your direct responsibility, please do not omit 
these questions unless you have no Idea at all about their subject. Furthermore, do not rate the 
questions with the months immediately before failure In mind. Focus rather on the airline's life-cycle as a 
whole. 
Please be assured that allinfonnation will be treated In confidence and the results will be presented 
in the aggregated form. 
1. Please indicate (..J) if you agree or disagree wnh the statements 10 relation 10 IhQ 
~. 
Our organisational structure was decentralised. 
Our financial control system was effICient. 




Agr.. IIgr .. nor Dlugr.. Dlugr .. 
,0I1g06' , -....... , "1g01ly, """"SIll 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
We surrounded ourselves with staff who I I I I I I 
promoted different orientations and points of view. L __ ...l ___ L ___ L. __ -L __ --J 
Group consensus was the usual way we rnade 
decisions. 
The airline's success was largely dependent on 
factors out of its control. 
The number of serious problems we were faced 
with Increased constantly. 
Our staff was encouraged to have open 
discussion about the airline's problems. 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
~~I~~n~etailed analysis before taking any major L' __ -LI __ --Ill-__ .LI __ --LI __ --lJ 
We made changes in our service qufte frequently. 
We usually had enough resources to plan for the 
future. 
Our customer loyalty was strong. 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 




Agree Agree agree nor Disagree Disagree 
I 
strong'l slighUl dl8!!9ree sllghHl strong'l 
We fulfilled our customers' needs well. I I I I I 
We acted immediately upon customer complaints. I I I I I I 
'" Our marketing performance was good. I I I I I I 
Our long term aims and objectives were easily I I I I I I achievable. 
Our marketing was aggressive. I I I I I I 
We usually received many useful suggestions I I I I I I from our employees. 
We were more efficient than most of our I I I I I I competitors. 
We tried to avoid head to head competition with I I I I I I our larger competitors. 
Our long term aims and objectives guided our I I I I I I business decisions. 
Our airline was flexible enough to respond I I I I I I immediately to major opportunities. 
We were pleased with the performance of our I I I I I I distribution outlets. 
We were innovators In customer service I I I I I I compared to our competitors. 
Lack of capital did not limit our growth. I I I I I I 
Everyone in our airline understood our long term I I I I I I aims and objectives. 
We were constantly identifying threats and I I I I I I opportunities to our business. 
The Improvement of the airline's market-share 
was our number one priority. I I I I I I 




Agr .. Agr .. IIgfMnor Dlug, .. Ding, .. 










I I I I I We grew by selling our services to more I customers. 
I I I I We allocated major resources for diversification I I into other industries. 
I I I I We planned for and allocated sufficient resources I I to developing new markets. 
Long-term prospects in our primary markets were I I I I I I excellent. 
We had customer-oriented front-line people. I I I I I I 
I I I I Our service had a range of features that made It I I distinctive. 
Quality was our major competitive advantage. I I I I I I 
Everyone in our airfine understood how they could I 
improve quality. I I I I I 
We were effective in monitoring our customers' I I I I I I expectation of quality. 
I I I I Our internal social and political system supported I I our business aims. 
We were good at changing our staff's beliefs and I I I I I I values. 
Our staff provided us with a competitive 
advantage. I I I I I I 
We had Incentives for our staff that encouraged 
extra commitment. I I I I I I 
I I I I We had all the information we needed on our I I customers, markets and opportunities. 
Employees were rewarded for taking actions that 
benefited our customers. I I I I I I 
Our information system provided us with a clear I I I I competitive advantage. 
OCranfield 
We were constantly upgrading and improving our 
information system. 
We would create the same organisation structure 
as we had, if given the opportunity. 
We made effective cash-flow forecasts. 
We were good at stimulating demand for our 
services. 
We were effective in monitoring important cost 
areas. 
Important information was communicated to 
employees to enable effective decision-making. 
The board of directors was highly involved In the 
airline's affairs. 
The atmosphere among employees was very 
good. 
Neither 
Agree Agree agree nor Disagree Disagree I ........ ' 10n.'III I "'--- I oI'I!'·l I ""ona'Y I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
Our information systems provided quick, accurate I I I I I I 
and relevant information. L-. __ --'-. __ --I. ___ ...L. __ -1. __ ----1. 
2. Indicate the Importance placed on the following factors at your airline in the past and if the 
airline failed in 1992 or 1993 please fill in the column marked present. In the column marked future 
please give your expert view on what importance a new start-up airline should place on the factors. Use 
UP to 10 points for each factor, per cell. The most important factors receive ten (10), factors of ~ 
Importance may receive one (1) and factors of no importance a zero (0). 
Example 
'."" '. 
Sta" factor. (PtiotlO 
1992~ 




Favourable aHitude of travel 8Qents 
Reduction of CRS bias affectinQ the airline 
Comoetitor analysis 
Influencing QOvernment policy on aviation 
Forecasting adverse effects of the economv on the airline 
Investors' aHitudes towards the airline (Investment bankers, stockholders, etc.) 
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Intormallon- and cOnlmunlullon .r •••• fulon 
Control systems (monitoring the wortc 01 the 01 ...... 
logistics systems. (linking of cI1Jereni p!WU of fie 01 I, 
Motivation systems (targets and objectlv .. loI.tatr ~ and motvallon, 
Planning systemsl~legallon 01 nlonnallon b prepetl bua ...... acton pIaN) 
Yield management system 
Interdepartmental communication 
Market-intelligent information-- and communication system 
Simplification of information- and c:ommunJcatlon systems 
Computer reservation system 
Op.rallon 'acton 
Aircraft utilisation 
Acquisition of new aircraft 
~uisition of airport slots 
Frequency In served markets 
Hub and spoke operations 
long haul routes 
Quality of terminal space and grOtmd facUities 
Matchi'1Q of aircraft size with route reQUirement 
Interlining agreements 
HQ!1}Qgeneous aircraft fleet 
Operation on trunk routes 
Code sharing 
Freight operations 
Feeder airline agreements 
"Inlg.m.nl and organl •• llon f,o'ore 
Delegation 
Company culture (shared a1t11udes. beliefs ncnnJ) 
Union relations 
Employee relations 
Flexible job descriptions 
Job rotation 
Decentralised organisation structure 
Shared company vision ( .... lJU. 'H' wllnt} 
Management teams (n , __ taaml) 
O"erations without unionised staff (whet. poeltlla, 
Management's external contacts (Government. alc., 
Staff reduction 
Employees' autonomy to take decisions 
Company mission (long-tarm .Im. and obleetlvu, 
Emj)loyees' Incentive program 
Business strategy 
Emplo'yees' productivity 













Alliance with the Incumbents 
MerQer/acqulsition to gain market share 
Diversification into other industries 
FreQuent flverI>rQgrams 
Business passengers , 
Market share 
Service quality 
Passenger load factors 
Price leadership in served markets 
Expansion into new markets 
Market research 
Media advertising 
Weight load factor 










LonQ-term rather than short-term profits 
Achieving critical mass (investment necessary before profits will be made) 
Turnover growth 
Reduction of labour costs 
Off balance-sheet financing of aircraft 
Fuel costs (fuel efficient aircraft, etc.) 
", . , ' :. -;,' . 
pl .... w,lt. down any hictor. Which you t •• t Ir. ,orriU.ed" ,:-, 










3. How many board members did the airline have? D ~ How many were outside directors? D 
4. Did the company have a formal mission statement? DYes D No 
5. a. Did managers generally own shares in the airline? DYes D No 
b. If you owned shares, please (""> according 8 <1% 81 '2% E!3'4% E!5'10% 8'1-15% to your approximate share-holding? 16 - 20% 21·:JOO,{, 31-40% 41·50% >50% 
7 
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6. How many years of formal education have you completed? 
(F0I8xampie. higl school gac1Ja1e equals 12 years) D years of formal education. 
7. If your formal education is more than 12 years, what is your field of specialisation? 
(F0I8XampIe: BA degee i'I SocIal Sclencq; MBA deg .. with concenlraUon In nnanc •. ) 
8. What is your age1 .... 1 _-III years. 
9. What management positions have you held until and Including the posHlon at the failed airline? 
,..". 
PIIDe poeltlon at the r.".d c."I., ofy.n rlr_, 
.nd 'ndlut. If dlU.,ent ,"1M 
p081110", Ir. within the 'Ime poeItIon 
com piny. 
Please feel free to omit the following sectlonl 
"..... (.J) In the lpPIopriat. column below. "the airline gew 
from one .Iz. clasalftcalion to another whll. you held the same 
position, then pleat. mark In the column !hat Indcates the airline's 
alz.lual belor. you made your career move. 
Small lMge N.aonai II., ··:::.o·~:::::::·: regton.l regional ($1<lqm·1 (> "b1'1 
« ',0m ($10' 100m bI'I W. fev.) operat~ ~ ... ~ 
cp. rev.) cp. rev.) JaY.) 
. ~;;;:::\ ::::~:::~2:~~::i:;:: .:. 
I am very interested to hear you view on the reasons for the airline's failure, (Pleu, us. the apac. below 01 
separate paper dependng on the .pace you need). 
g ~ue~ l'.ii~ la-IRa,.t3o'''m~I'd i'IU/lf'3-fo/llllif/ 






College of Aeronautics 
Department of Air Transport 
Cranfield, Bedfordshlre MK43 OAL 
England 
NEW-ENTRANT AIRLINES' 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
FACTORS 
o Cranfield 
This questionnaire is a part of a larger study to identify the success and failure factors of new-entrant 
airlines. Please note that the definition of a new-entrant airline for the purpose of this project is: -a 
domestic or international airline established after deregulationlliberalisation of a domestic market or 
bilateral route; or a regional carrier that expanded its scope of operations considerable after the 
regulatory change.· 
Some of the questions may be In an area which is out of your direct responsibility, please do not omit 
these questions unless you have no jdea at all about their subject. 
Please be assured that all Information will be treated In confidence and the results will be presented 
in the aggregated form. 
1. Please indicate ("I) if you agree or disagree with the statements In relation to your 
airline today. 
Neither 
Agr .. Agr .. agr .. nor Disagr .. Dlsagr .. 
str0!!SIX sllahUx dl!!Sr .. sllghUX 
I 
stronglll 
I Our organisational structure is decentralised. I I I 
Our financial control system is efficient. I I I I 
The airline has a vision of the future shared by all I I I I the employees. 
We surround ourselves with staff who promotes I I I I different orientations and points of view. 
Group consensus Is the usual way we make I I I I decisions. 
The airline's success is largely dependent on I I I I factors out of its control. 
The number of serious problems we are faced I I I I with increases constantly. 
Our staff is encouraged to have open discussion I I I I about the airline's problems. 
We do detailed analysis before taking any major I I I I decision. 
We make changes in our service quite frequently. I I I I 
We usually have enough resources to plan for the I 
future. I I I 












aInHIgIf I We fulfil our customers' needs well. I I 
We act Immediately upon customer complaints. I I I I I I 
Our marketing performance is good. I I I I I I 
Our long term aims and objectives are easily I I I I I I achievable. 
Our marketing is aggressive. I I I I I I 
We usually receive many useful suggestions from I I I I I I our employees. 
We are more efficient than most of our I I I I I I competitors. 
We try to avoid head to head competition with our I 
larger competitors. I I I I I 
Our long term aims and objectives guide our I I I I I I business decisions. 
Our airline is flexible enough to respond I I I I I I immediately to major opportunities. 
We are pleased with the performance of our I I I I I I distribution outlets. 
We are innovators in customer service compared I I I I I I to our competitors. 
Lack of capital will nollimit our growth. I I I I I I 
Everyone in our airline understands our long term I I I I I I aims and objectives. 
We are constantly identifying threats and I I I I I I opportunities to our business. 
The improvement of the airline's market-share is 
I I I I I I our number one priority. 





Agr .. Agr .. agr .. nor Disagr .. Disagree 











We grow by selling our services to more I I I I I I customers. 
We allocate major resources for diversification I I I I I I into other industries. 
We plan for and allocate sufficient resources to I I I I I I developing new markets. 
long-term prospects In our primary markets are I I I I I I excellent. 
We have customer~riented front-line people. I I I I I I 
Our service has a range of features that makes It I I I I I I distinctive. 
Quality is our major competitive advantage. I I I I I I 
Everyone in our air1ine understands how they can I I I I I I Improve quality. 
We are effective in monitoring our customers' I I I I I I expectation of quality. 
Our internal social and political system support I I I I I I our business aims. 
We are good at changing our staff's beliefs and I I I I I I values. 
Our staff provide us with a competitive I I I I I I advantage. 
We have incentives for our staff that encourages I I I I I I extra commitment. 
We have all the information we need on our I I I I I I customers, markets and opportunities. 
Employees are rewarded for taking actions that I I I I I I benefit our customers. 
Our Information system provides us with a clear I I I I I competitive advantage. 
o Cranfield 
Neither 
Agree Agree agree nor Disagree Disagree 
I 
stronglI slighUI dl!!Sree slighUI strong II 
We are constantly upgrading and improving our I I I I I information system. 
We would create the same organisation structure I I I I I I as we have now, if given the opportunity. 
We make effective cash-flow forecasts. I I I I I I 
We are good at stimulating demand for our I I I I I I services. 
We are effective in monitoring important cost I I I I I I areas. 
Important information is communicated to I I I I I I employees to enable effective decision-making. 
The board of directors Is highly involved in the I I I I I I airline's affairs. 
The atmosphere among employees is very good. I I I I I I 
Our information systems provide quick, accurate I I I I I I and relevant information. 
2. Indicate the Importance placed on the following factors at your airline in the past, at the present 
and as expected In the future, Use up to 10 points for each factor, per cell. The most important factors 
receive ten (10), factors of least importance may receive one (1) and factors of no importance a zero (0). 
Example 
" .... .... .:.'.:" ..... ;.:.:: : ...... ," ' .. :', ',' 
E ITI>loyees' motivation 
.~ 









Please remember that you are rating the importance placed 
on each factor at ~ airline! 
... " 
.... 
. " .. . .. ..... : ... .... present 
En"IJC~nm.n~ 'nlQf. 
. . 
. : . .. . (,92 • 
'93 '94) 
Favourable attitude of travel aaents 
Reduction of CRS bias affect ina the airline 
Competitor analvsis 
Influencing aovemment policvon aviation 
Forecasting adverse effects of the economy on the airline 






Please remember that you are rating the Importance placed 
on each factor at ~ alrline! 
Pretent 
Ittfotmailon- and communication *vah,,,. ,utor. ('92, 
"93 "94) 
Control systems (monitoring the work of the organisation) 
Logistics systems (linking of different parts of the organisation) 
Motivation systems (targets and objectives for staff Involvement and motivation) 
Planning systems (integration of information to prepare business action plans) 
Yield management system 
Interdepartmental communication 
Market-intelligent information- and communication system 
Simplification of information- and communication systems 
Computer reservation system 
operation raclo,a 
Aircraft utilisation 
Acquisition of new aircraft 
Acquisition of airport slots 
F~uency in served markets 
Hub and spoke operations 
Long haul routes 
Quality of terminal space and_ground facilHies 
Matching of aircraft size with route requirement 
Interlining agreements 
Homogeneous aircraft fleet 
Operation on trunk routes 
Code sharing 
Freight operations 
Feeder airline agreements 
lintg."..nt end organ ••• Uon hoto;. 
Delegation 
Company culture (shared attitudes, beliefs, norms) 
Union relations 
Employee relations 
Flexible job descriptions 
Job rotation 
Decentralised organisation structure 
Shared company vision (the future 'we' want) 
Management teams (Inter ntal teams) 
Operations without unionised staff (where possible) 
Management's external contacts (Government, etc.) 
Staff reduction 
Employees' autonomy to take decisions 
Company mission(Long-term alms and objectives) 
Employees' incentive program 
Business strategy 
Employees' productivity 








Please remember that you are rating the importance placed 
on each factor at ~ airline! 
Marhtlng t.ctora 
Alliance with the incumbents 
Merger/acquisition to oain market share 
Diversification into other industries 




Passenoer load factors 
Price leadership In served markets 
Expansion into new markets 
Market research 
Media advertising 
Weioht load factor 





.. .- .. '.' ". 
... .. ',', ... 





long-term rather than short-term profits 
Achieving critical mass (investment necessary before profits will be made) 
Turnover growth 
Reduction of labour costs 
Off balance-sheet financing of aircraft 
Fuel costs (fuel efficient aircraft, etc.) 
.... .. ... .... . : . . .. .. -, ',' . . . . . ... . . 
Pl .... write down any '~ctor. whl~" y~u ' .. f .n om,,,.,.d 
."0,,6 and fat- them ••• pprop,_ .. '. '" .tie .p.~I!l. pfoV,ded. 
. i . ••••• . 
Present Future 
("92, ('95 and 
'93 '94\ onward} 
How many board members does the airline have? D -+ How many are outside directors? 
Does the company have a formal mission statement? 0 Yes 0 No 
D 
5.a. Do managers generally own shares in the airline? 0 Yes 0 No 
b. If you own shares, please (...J)according a <1% a 1-2% 83 - 4% B 5-10% 811.15% 
to your approximate share-holding? 16 - 20% 21-30% 31-40% 41·50% > SOOk 
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6. How many years of formal education have you completed? 
(For example, high school graduate equals 12 years.) 0 years of formal education, 
7. If your formal education is more than 12 years, what Is your field of specialisation? 
(For example: BA degree In Social Sciences; MBA degree with concenlrallon In finance.) 
8. What is your age? L..---,I years. 
9. What management posHions have you held? 
PleMe (.J) In the appropriate column below. If the airline grew 
from one Ilze classification to another while you held the same 
position. then please mark In the column lhallndicates the airline's 
Ilze Just before you made your career move . 
Numb« 8nuIII iMp National· .... or 
P'lce pre .. "t po.liIon "ul ud of' .... regional regional ($toom-1 (>"bn Other· Indicate If dlff.rent po.lllon •• ,. Inlhe « ',0m (StO-100m bn op. rev.) openstlng industry 
within the •• rne company. I»OtIltion cp. rev.) op. rev., tev.) 
If you have any comments on this surveyor on new-entrant airlines' success or failure, please feel free to 
use the spaces below or separate paper: 
g \v.au.& fi~ ~ 1.R.a111&90'l/"I~Mllee".d:J'fOIl/ tfw.-
({III"/ 90'" f.av~~p~ll ~com/ltlill:1' (J{(.,.;.uvv2,,:p 
6.5.93 
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«City», «State» «Postcode» 
«Country» 
Dear «Name»: 
We feel that your participation in assessing the importance of key success and failure factors of new-entrant 
airlines is of a crucial importance for the advancement of current knowledge on airlines' success and 
failure. 
The results of the project will have an important meaning for you as an airline manager. Therefore, could 
you give the questionnaire sent to you in May your urgent attention? If your have not received the 
questionnaire, then please return the enclosed response form so we can rush a copy to you. 
Please be assured that ~ participation is strictly confidential and the results will only be reported in the 
aggregated form. The name of individual airlines will not be mentioned in conjunction with the data 
derived from the questionnaire survey. 
We want to emphasise that you will be sent a personal copy of the results upon participation. 
Sincerely, 
Sveinn Vidar Gudmundsson 
Encl. 





,City", ,State" ,Postcode" 
,Country" 
Dear ~Name»: 
SVelnn Vldar Gudmundsson 
College of Aeronautics 
department of Air Transport 
Cranfield Institute of Technology 
Cranfield, Beds MK43 OAL 
United Kingdom 
Many new airlines have been launched in the last ten years. Many of these airlines have 
had success but then failed, few have survived and prospered. Many questions come up 
as a result: Is success and failure primarily caused by external factors or are there internal 
factors that have much influence? Can critical success and failure factors be established 
and measured, thus improving managers ability to monitor their airlines wellbeing? 
In my research, which is part of a Ph.D. study, f will search for answers for the above 
mentioned questions and many more concerned with new entrant airlines in liberated or 
deregulated market. Over sixty new entrant airlines in Europe and North-America will be 
studied. 
I would very much value your heip by filling in the enclosed questionnaire based on your 
views and experience. It should not take you much more than 30 minutes. 
If you would like to receive a private copy of the results of this questionnaire, I would be 
happy to send it to you. Furthermore, if you would like to discuss the results or new entrant 
airllne#s success and failure, I would be very pleased to arrange a meeting with you. 
I would like to emphasise that your name and your answers will be held strictly confidential 
and the results will only be reported as averages for a number of grouped airlines. 
Yours faithfully, 
Sveinn Vidar Gudmundsson, 8S(AviaHon). MBA. MSc 
Teleph.: +44 (0)234 -750111 (Message dep. Transport) 
Fox: +44 (0)234 752207 
Encl. Survey questionnaire, 
o Cranfield 
College of Aeronautics - ~"A<T~ 
I have not received the questionnaire. (Please send it to me!)..................... ... ........ 0 
Name: 
Title: 
Company: 
Address: 
28.7.93 
Comments: 
